PROCOPIO BELTRAN, PETITIONER, VS. POMPEYO DIAZ, JOSE P. VELUZ, AND ANTONIO QUIRINO, ASSOCIATE JUDGES OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT, FIFTH DIVISION, AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AS HEAD OF…

SANCHEZ, J.:

Certiorari to annul an order issued by the Fifth Division of the People’s
Court cancelling the bail filed by petitioner for his provisional liberty and
ordering the arrest of the latter

Petitioner, a political detainee, was, on September 15, 1945, released on a
bail of P20,000 granted by the Solicitor General, pursuant to the authority
vested in the latter by the provisions of Executive Order No. 65 (41 Off. Gaz.,
p. 416).

On February 5, 1946, the Office of Special Prosecutors filed in the People’s
Court an indictment on twelve counts charging petitioner with the high crime of
treason. Simultaneously, the office of Special Prosecutors filed in the same
court a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s bail, planted upon the
ground that the evidence of guilt then in their possession was strong.

The foregoing petition was heard on March 2 and 11, 1946, before the
Honorable Jose P. Veluz, one of the Judges of the Fifth Division of the People’s
Court. In the course of the hearing, the Special Prosecutor recited what he
terms “a few of the summary of the evidence in the hands of the prosecution in
support of the counts of treason alleged in the information against the
accused,” taken from the affidavits of witnesses. No further evidence was
introduced by the prosecution. Counsel for petitioner objected to the competency
and sufficiency of the recital made by the Special Prosecutor. He invoked the
right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. Counsel moved for a
ruling on his objection, without prejudice to petitioner’s right to present
evidence on his behalf.
Judge Veluz overruled the objection upon the ground
that the Special Prosecutor declined to reveal his evidence and had expressed
his desire to present the the witnesses for the prosecution only at the trial of
the case. Petitioner then presented two witnesses, namely, Dalmacio Maniquis and
Major Fernando Perello of the Philippine Army. The subatance of their testimony
is ttiat the accused had knowledge of the guerrilla activities of these two
witnesses and helped the latter. Said witnesses, however, had no knowledge of
the charges
against the petitioner.

Predicated upon the ground that the evidence which sustains the acts charged
in the information against the accused is strong “according to the recital made
on the record by the Special Prosecutor”, and that said evidence was not
rebutted or strengthened by the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
defense, the respondent Judges, in an order dated March 14, 1946, ordered the
cancellation of the bail and the arrest of petitioner.

A motion for reconsideration having been denied by the respondent Judges in
an order dated April 13, 1946, petitioner brought the case before this court on
certiorari. It is urged, first, that the respondent Judge Honorable
Jose P. Veluz, sitting alone, was without authority to hear the petition for the
cancellation of the bail; and secondly, that the respondent Judges of
the People’s Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
cancellation of the bail without a showing, on the part of the prosecution, of
competent and strong evidence of guilt.

1. The question as to the number of Judges required to be present in order to
   authorize the legal transaction of business by the People’s Court is to be
   determined from the law of its creation. The general rule is that the death,
   disqualification, resignation, or absence of a Judge “will not deprive the
   surviving or remaining Judges of authority to hold court and transact the
   business of the court * * * provided, however, the number of the court is not
   reduced below that legally required for the transaction of its business” (14 Am.
   Jur. 282-283). By Section 6 of the People’s Court Act, the said court may sit in
   five divisions of three judges each. Section 9 of the same Act provides that two
   judges shall constitute a quorum “for the sessions in division”, and
   added that: “In the absence of a quorum, the * * * division shall stand
   ipso facto adjourned until such time as the requisite number shall be
   present, and a memorandum to this effect shall be inserted by the clerk in the
   minutes of the court.” In the absence of a quorum owing to the legal
   disqualification of a Judge, Section 7 of the law directs that the president
   shall designate a District Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-Large of First
   Instance, Cadastral Judge, Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations,
   Securities and Exchange Commissioner, or Public Service Commissioner “to sit and
   vote” in lieu of the disqualified Judge, in connection with the case which
   brought about the disqualification. Section 12 enjoins the People’s Court to try
   and decide or otherwise dispose of its cases in the manner provided for in the
   Act and in existing laws not inconsistent therewith.

   A circumspect and considerate examination of the foregoing provisions of the
   People’s Court Act discloses that Congress made it abundantly clear that in the
   absence of a quorum, a division of the People’s Court must suspend its
   sessions, and it shall stand ipso facto, adjourned until such time as
   the requisite number shall be present. The statutory requirement of a
   quorum for the sessions in division is mandatory. The phraseology of
   the law is clear. There is no room for doubt. Short of the presence of two
   Judges, a division of the People’s Court has no authority to sit for the
   transaction of business; it has no power to hear a petition for the cancellation
   of bail. Consequently, the respondent Judge Honorable Jose P. Veluz, sitting
   alone, was without authority to hear the application for the cancellation of
   petitioner’s bail.

   The mere fact that the order directing the cancellation of the bail was
   subsequently signed by the three respondent judges constituting the Fifth
   Division of the People’s Court, is of no moment. The mandatory requirement of a
   quorum in the People’s Court Act cannot be detoured by the simple
   expedient of permitting one of the judges of a division to hold sessions and
   thereafter submit the case for the consideration of the members of that
   division. A man’s liberty is so precious as to be treated so lightly. In this
   particular case, petitioner received less than a fair hearing. For, under the
   law, he was entitled to a resolution handed down at the hearing by at least two
   of the Judges of the Fifth Division, sitting in court, upon a question of
   substance, namely, his objection to the competency and sufficiency of the
   recital of the evidence made by the special Prosecutor.

   Upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the proceedings
   had before the respondent Judge Honorable Jose P. Veluz on the matter of the
   petition for the cancellation of the bail herein, are null and void.

2. Constitutional law has established the basic rule that all persons shall
   before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with
   capital “offenses when evidence of guilt is strong (section 1 [16], Article III
   of the constitution; Ocampo vs. Hon. Jose Bernabe, p.55,
   ante). It is now well-settled that at the hearing of an application for
   the cancellation of ball in a capital offense, the burden of proof is on the
   prosecution (Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 Phil., 82; Ocampo vs.
   Bernabe, supra). And, in Ocampo vs. Bernabe, supra,
   this court said;

“* * * The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong
is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion.
This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos
vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal. * * *”

In the present case, the charge against petitioner is a capital, offense,
namely, treason. Therefore, for the petition to cancel his bail to prosper, the
prosecution must present strong evidence of guilt. No evidence, however, was
adduced by the Special Prosecutor at the hearing of the application to cancel
the bail. It is true that the Special Prosecutor made a recital in the form of a
summary of a portion of the evidence in the hands of the prosecution in support
of the counts of treason against respondent, taken from the affidavits of
witnesses. But this recital was objected to by the defense. And, as was
correctly stated in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,
supra, the rule is that “mere affidavits or recital of their
contents are not sufficient since they are hearsay evidence, unless the
petitioner fails to object”. Really, if the rule were otherwise, a Special
Prosecutor would be virtually clothed with the power of an arbiter on the
question of determining whether or not a person accused of treason is entitled
to bail. This would amount to an abdication of the court’s prerogatives. Such is
not the law.

It appearing that no evidence was presented in support of the motion for the
cancellation of the bail, the respondent Judges of the Fifth Division of the
People’s Court committed an abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation of
petitioner’s bail and the arrest of the
latter.

But the People’s Court order in question had heretofore produced its effects.
It was executed. The bail in effect was cancelled, and petitioner was arrested
and now is in the custody of the law. We are faced by a fait accompli.
From the moment petitioner was arrested upon cancellation of his bail, his
surety ceased to be his mancupator-his jailer, was deprived of control over and
custody of petitioner, and was thus effectively prevented from discharging its
legal obligations (section 2, Rule 110, Rules of Court) under the undertaking.
Consequently, the surety was discharged and the bail bond ceased to be in force.
Said bail bond is beyond recall. Reversal of the executed order of cancellation
and arrest will not revive it. Our duty in the premises is plain. It is to
restore petitioner to his status quo ante as far as is possible,
petitioner, accordingly, is entitled to be released upon the filing and approval
by the People’s Court, of a new ball bond in the same amount as the original
bond, that is, P20,000.

Wherefore, the order of the respondent judges dated March 14, 1946, directing
the cancellation of bail and the arrest of petitioner, and the order of the said
Judges dated April 13, 1946, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration are
hereby set aside; and the People’s Court is hereby ordered to admit petitioner
to a new bail in the sum of P20,000, without prejudice to the right of the
Office of Special Prosecutors thereafter to petition the People’s Court for the
cancellation of said bail, which petition shall be heard and decided in
accordance with the opinion herein. Without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Hilado, JJ., and De la Rosa, Santos, Angeles, Ramos,
and Benitez, Acting JJ., concur.

FERIA, J.:

I hereby certify that Acting Associate Justice Nicasio Yatco voted in
accordance with this decision, but could not sign the same because of his being
assigned in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

We concur in the majority opinion in so far as it reiterates the principles
and doctrines which we have enunciated in our dissenting or concurring opinions
in Duran vs. Abad Santos, (42 Off. Gaz., 263, 1945), in Herras Teehankee
vs Rovira, (75 Phil., 634), in Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, (76 Phil., 756), and in Ocampo vs. Bernabe, (p.55,
ante).

We also fully agree with the pronouncement that the proceedings had before
one of the respondent judges without the presence of at least another one, are
null and void, being in violation of the People’s Court let which provides that
two judges shall constitute a quorum for the sessions in division of
the People’s Court and that, in the absence of a quorum, the division
shall stand ipso facto adjourned until such time as the requisite
number shall be present.

But, as in De la Rama vs. Misa, (42 Off. Gaz., 1544), in Ocampo
vs. Bernabe, supra, and lastly in De la Rama vs. People’s
Court (p. 461, ante), we are compelled to dissent from the dispositive
part of the majority opinion in the present case as being inconsistent with the
legal principles and doctrines enunciated as, premises in the body of the
majority opinion.

We are of opinion that petitioner Procopio Beltran is entitled to immediate
release, without the necessity of posting any new bond, as his bond in the
amount of P20,000, posted on September 15, 1945, must be considered surviving
and continued by the decision setting aside the order of respondent judges dated
March 14, 1946, ordering the cancellation of the bail and the arrest of the
petitioner, and the one dated April 13, 1946, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The orders of March 14 and April 13, 1946, being null and void as having been
issued in violation of law and with grave abuse of discretion, must be, for all
legal purposes, considered as if they had not been issued at all and, therefore,
they have not the effect of cancelling the bail of petitioner. It is, besides,
highly unjust to compel petitioner to support the heavy expenses entailed in
posting a new bond in the amount of P20,000.

If logic and consistency have any meaning, the annulment of the two orders
complained of must restore petitioner to the legal status which was illegally
disturbed by the two illegal orders. Petitioner must be set free and given
freedom on the bail bond posted on September 15, 1945.

To require petitioner to file a new bond in the amount of P20,000, which must
be submitted to the approval of the People’s Court, and to reserve to the Office
of Special Prosecutors the right or privilege “to petition the People’s Court
for the cancellation of said bail,” seems to us not only contrary to all
elements of consistency, but tends to make of judicial procedure not as a means
of settling rights and ending litigations, but as a sort of cloth of Penelope or
a jigsaw puzzle which Is made and broken, remade and again broken, until the
player gets tired or exhausted.

We vote to order the immediate release of petitioner on his bail bond posted
on September 15, 1945, without the necessity of filing another one.