URSU LUANGCO, ARISTON RAMOS, RESTITUTO REDOÑA, SIMPLICION IBAÑEZ, AND BENITO BAGOHEN, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, vs. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF TACLOBAN, LEYTE, RESPONDENT AND AP…

FERIA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the petitioner Igmidio Lagera from the decision
rendered on May 30, 1945, by the Court ofFirst Instance of Leyte presided by
Judge F. Borromeo Veloso, and by all the other petitioners from the decision
rendered on February 23, 1945, by the same court presided by Judge Sotero B.
Cabahug, in which decisions the petitioner’s applications for writ of habeas
corpus were denied.

From the decisions appealed from it appears that the petitioners in these two
cases (G.R. No. L-142 and G.R. No. L-143), were members of the Philippine
Constabulary of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and they were
convicted, sometime during the year 1944, of the crime of robbery and of robbery
homicide defined and penalized by Act No. 65 enacted by the Assembly of the
so-called Republic of the Philippines, by the Court of Special Criminal
Jurisdiction created in Leyte by Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of
the said Republic.

The definition of the crime of robbery found in the Revised Penal Code of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, was adopted in said Act No. 65 and penalized
with a penalty heavier than that imposed by the Revised Penal Code for the crime
of robbery, if committed by officers and persons, such as the herein
petitioners, charged or connected with the supervision and control of the
production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries.

The petitioners, in support of their appeal, allege that “the lower court
erred in not holding that Act 65 and Ordinance No. 7 of the Republic of the
Philippines were null and void ab initio, because (1) the procedure
prescribed therein did not afford a fair trial and violated fundamental human
rights; and (2) Ordinance No. 7 deprived the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
to review, reverse, affirm or modify on appeal final judgment of inferior courts
in violation of the Constitution;” and “The lower court erred likewise in not
holding that the punitive sentences imposed by the Court of Special Criminal
Jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Act 65 and Ordinance No. 7 ceased to
have legal force and effect upon the reestablishiment or restoration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.”

It is not necessary for us to discuss the first ground or assignment of
error, for it is included in the second.

In the case of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, (75 Phils., 285),
the decision, concurred in by Messrs. Justices Jaranille, Pablo, Bengzon, and in
its result by Chief Justice Moran, in which the same questions of fact and law
we raised am decided, held that the punitive sentence rendered by the Courts of
Special Criminal Jurisdiction ceased to have force and effect upon the
restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and in their respective five
separate concurring opinions, Messrs. Justices Ozaeta, De Joya, Perfecto, Hilado
and Briones held that said punitive sentence was null and void ab
initio. Although, the dispositive part of the decision of the majority does
not constitute a precedent for only five Justices concurred therein, it is plain
that all the Justices, except Mr. Justice Paras, were unanimous in that said
sentence ceased to be effective or valid at least after the restoration of the
Commonwealth government. Because if it were null and void ab initio
during the Japanese occupation, it must have been necessarily void also after
said restoration.

Applying the decision in said case to the present, it is evident that the
punitive sentences imposed upon the petitioners by the Court of Special Criminal
jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 of the President of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, for violation of Act No. 65 promulgated by the
Assembly of said Republic, ceased to have any force and effect after the
restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and therefore the
confinement of the petitioners by virtue of said punitive sentences has become
illegal at lesst after said restoration.

It may not be amiss to say, in connection with Mr. Justice Paras’ dissenting
opinion, that there is no legal way for this Court to order the reconstitution
of the record of the criminal cases against the appellants, for there is no
appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Court of Special Criminal
Jurisdiction of leyte pending before us. The appeal under consideration is from
this order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying the appellant’s
petition for habeas corpus. Besides, it would be of no avail to order
such reconstitution, inasmuch as, we would have, after oil, to dismiss the case
against the eppellants for the reasons stated, in this decision.

Although it is not necessary to decide in this case, end there is doubt in
the minds of some members of this court as to whether the appellants may after
their release be prosecuted for robbery under the Revised Penal Code, the writer
of this decision is of the opinion that the appellants’ conviction for violation
of Act No. 65 and their release on the ground of nullity of the punitive
sentence imposed upon them, will not be a bar to their being prosecuted now for
robbery under the Revised Penel Code. Because the crime of robbery penalised by
this Code is not the same robbery punished by said Act No. 65. The former is an
offense punished by a municipal law continued in force by the invader, and the
latter is a crime of political complexion created and penalized by an Act,
prosecuted, under a different procedure, and before a Court of Special Original
Jurisdiction (promulgated and organized by the occupant), all of which became
null and of no effect upon the restoration of the legitimate or Commonwealth
Government. Besides, as the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction that
convicted the defendants had no jurisdiction to try offenses penalized by the
Revised Penal Code, the defendants could not set up the defense of double
jeopardy if prosecuted now for robbery undersaid Code, for they had not been in
danger of being convicted thereof by said court, although the robbery under the
Penal Code vias necessarily included in the robbery penalised by said Act No.
65.

We therefore reverse the decision appealed from and order the release of the
petitioners, with costs. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Bengzon, Briones,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

PERFECTO, J.:

On the strength of the theories advanced in our opinions in Co Kim Cham
vs. Valdes, Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 371), and in Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons, (75 Phil., 285), we concur in the reversal of
the appealed decision and in the immediate release of petitioners, without
costs.

Whether or not, after their release, petitioners-appellants may again
be prosecuted for the acts upon which they were tried and convicted under the
judicial proceedings declared null and void, is a question not properly raised
by the parties in these cases, and
should not be passed upon unless and until
an appeal is squarely submitted for our decision.

CONCURRING

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the reversal of the decisions appealed from and the consequent
release of petitioners. My grounds are those stated in support of my following
opinions heretofore delivered: (1) my dissenting opinion, both from the main
decision and from the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 371); (2) my
concurring opinion in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, (75 Phil., 285);
(3) my concurring opinion in People vs. Jose, (75 Phil., 612); (4) my
dissent in Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, (75 Phil., 494); (5) my
concurring opinion in De Castro vs. Court of Appeals; (75 Phil., 824);
and (6) the doctrine in Jones vs. United States (137 U. S. 202; 34 Law
ed., 691, 696, and in the cases therein cited), that:

“Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto,of a territory is not a
judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the
legislative and executive department of any government conclusively binds the
judges as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects, of that government.
This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under
a great variety of circumstances. (Gelston vs. Hoyt, 16 U. S., 3 Wheat,
246, 324 [4:381, 401] United States vs. Palmer, Id., 6l0 [471]; the
Divina Pastora, 17 U. S., 4 Wheat, 52 [4:512]; Foster vs. Neilson, 27
U. S. 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309 [7:415, 433, 434]; Keene vs. M’Donough, 33
U. S. 8 Pet., 308 [8:955]; Garcia vs. Lee, 37 U. S. 12 Pet., 511, 520
[9:1176]; Williams vs. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U. S. 13 Pet., 415
[10:226]; United States vs. Yorba, 68 U. S. 1 Wall., 412; 423 [17:635;
637]; United States vs. Lynde, 78 U. S. 11 Wall., 632, 638 [20:230,
232]. It is equally well settled in England. The Pelican, Edw. Admin Appx. D;
Taylor vs. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria vs.Day, 3
DeG. F. & J., 217, 221, 233; Republic of Peru vs. Peruvian Guano
Co., L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 489, 497; Republic of Peru vs. Dreyfus, L. R. 38 Ch,
Div.348, 356, 359)” (137 U. S. 213, 34 Law ed. 696.)

Finally, this concurring opinion is also based on the considerations stated
in my dissenting opinion in Ibañez vs. Hernandez (p. 775, post).

PABLO, M., Concurrente y disidente:

Los recurrentes fueron acusados y condenados por el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Leyto en la causa Criminal No. 1, por infraccion del articulo 6 de
la Ley No. 65 de la Republica establecida por el ejerecito japones; en las
causas criminales Nos. 2 y 3 por infraccion del articulo 294, parrafo l. del
Codigo Penal Revisado (robo con homicidio), y en la causa criminal No. 4 por
infraccion del articulo 294, parrafo 4 del Codigo Penal Revisado, (robo con
violencia e intimidacion innecesarias). Contra el recurrente Ursu Luangco, se
dictaron dos sentencias de pena capital y los expedientes fueron elevados ante
este Tribunal en grado de consulta. Todos los demas acusados han presentado
escritos de apelacion y el Juzgado no les dio curso, en cumplimiento con las
disposiciones de la Ordenanza No. 7. Porque se les impidio apelar, todos los
recurrentes, excepto Ursu Luangco, presentaron recurso de mandamus ante
este Tribunal, pidiendo que se ordene al Juzgado inferior que de curso a su
apelacion. Todos los expedientes han sido destruidos por la guerra.

En Abril 21, 1945, despues de restablecido el Commonwealth, Igmidio Lagera
presento su solicitud de habeas corpus (causa civil No. 15) ante el
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Leyte y fue denegada por el Hon. Juez Borromeo
Veloso en 2 de mayo de 1945; los otros recurrentes presentaron peticion de
habeas corpus (causa civil No. 7 del mismo Juzgado) en enero
20, 1945 y fue denegada por el Hon. Juez Cabahug en febrero 23, 1945. Todos los
recurrentes apelaron.

Las dos condenas de muerte impuestas contra Luangco no estan firmes aun
porque estan pendientes en este Tribunal en grado de consulta.

Los otros recurrentea tampoco estan sufriendo condena final porque
interpusieron recurso de mandamus pidiendo que este Tribunal ordene al
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Leyte que de curso a su apelacion. Es verdad que
bajo la Ordenanza No. 7 no podian apelar; pero mientras no haya resolucion
definitiva sobre su recurso de mandamus, las sentencias dictadas contra
ellos no podian aun ser ejecutadas. Los recurrentes, pues, en las dos presentes
causas de habeas corpus no son mas que simples presos preventivos en
las causas criminales Nos. 1, 2, 3 y 4 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Leyte, pendientes de resolucion en este Tribunal. No tienen derecho al recurso
solicitado.

Poner en libertad a los recurrentes es dejar impunes los delitos cometidos
por ellos. Es fomentar, en vez de reprimir, la comision de delitos tan graves
como los cometidos por estos recurrentes.

Porque fueron procesados bajo la Ordenanza No. 7 que es una medida
legislativa de caracter politico (Peralta contra Director de Prisiones,
(75 Phil., 285) todo el proceso es nulo y de ningun valor. Sin embargo, las
querellas presentadas en las causas Nos. 2, 3 y 4 son validas porque versan
sobre infraccion de los parrafos 1 y 4 del articulo 294 del Codigo Penal
Revisado, que es ley municipal.
Dicho articulo no ha sido enmendado por la
Ley No. 65.

Concurro con la mayoria en cuanto revoca las decisiones dictadas
en estos dos expedientes de habeas corpus; pero disiento en cuanto
ordena la libertad de los recurrentes. La vindicta publica exige que sean
procesados de acuerdo con las leyes vigentes. Creo que este Tribunal debe
ordenar al Ministerio Fiscal que proceda contra ellos en las causas criminales
Nos. 2, 3 y 4 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Leyte, bajo las querellas ya
presentadas.

DISSENTING

PARAS, J.:

A graphic exposition of the facts and status of the criminal cases in which
the petitioners were prosecuted and convicted and which occasioned their
confinement-now complained of-is contained in the decision of Judge Sotero B.
Cabahug partly reading as follows:

“Los recurrentes eran miembros de la Constabularia Filipina de la titulada
Republica de Filipinas el mayo 25, 1944, y estaban destacados en aquel dia en el
municipio de Barugo, de esta provincia. Dichos recurrentes, juntamente con otros
soldados, armados de fusiles, sin ninguna orden de registro y sin consentimiento
de los dueños de la embarcacion de vela llamada ‘Lucia II’, entonces fondeada en
las playas del citado municipio, registrar on dicha embarcacion y confiscaron
tres sacos de palay y cuatro de arroz, avaluados en su totalidad en P176, y los
llevaron a su campamento. Poco despues, en aquel mismo dia, volvieron a la
embarcacion citada y arrestaron a Benigno Estacion y Luis Avila y se apoderaron
de dinero en metalico y otros efectos que en total ascendieron a mas de P3,000.
Despues de maltratar barbaramente a Benigno Estacion y Luis Avila, mataron a
estos dos desgraciados, enterrandoles durante la noche en las playas del
referido municipio de Barugo.

“Por estos actos barbaros e inhumanos ejecutados por los aquI recurrentes,
ellos y sus compañeros fueron procesados en los expedientes Nos. 1, 2, 3, y 4 en
el Juzgado EspeCial de esta provincia, por los delitos de violacion del articulo
2, parrafo (i) de la Ley No. 65; por robo con homicidio por la muerte de Benigno
Estacion; por robo con homicidio por la muerte de Luis Avila; y por robo en
cuadrilla. Despues de la vista correspondiente en que los recurrentes se
defendieron y fueron representados por abogados competentes, los recurrentes
Ursu Luangco y Ariston Ramos fueron condenados, en el expediente No. 1, a una
prision de ocho (8) años y un (1) dia como minimum a diez (10) años como
maximum, y Simplicio Ibañez y Benito Bagohen a sufrir una prision de cuatro (4)
años y dos (2) meses a cinco (5) años; en el expediente No. 2, Ursu Luangco ha
sido condenado a la pena capital, Restituto Redoña y Ariston Ramos a cadena
perpetua, y Simplicio Ibañez y Benito Bagohen a una prision de diez (10) años y
un (1) dia a doce (12) años, ademas de haber sido condenados todos a indemnizar
a los herederos del occiso Benigno Estacion en la suma de P2,000 y a pagarles la
de P500 que era el valor del anillo de diamante robado; en el expediente No. 3,
Ursu Luangco, otra vez fue condenado a la pena capital, Restituto Redoña y
Ariston Ramos a la de cadena perpetua, Simplicio Ibañez a una prision de diez
(10) años y un (1) dia a doce (12) años, y Benito Bagohen a una prision de seis
(6) años y un (1) dia a ocho (8) años, aparte de haber sido condenados todos a
indemnizar a los herederos de Luis Avila en la suma de P2,000 y a pagarles la
cantidad robada de P180; y en el expediente No. 4, Ursu Luangco fue condenado a
cadena perpetua, Restituto Redoña y Ariston Ramos a una prision de diez (10)
años a quince (15) años, y Simplicio Ibañez y Benito Bagohen a sufrir una
prision de cuatro (4) meses.

“Estas cuatro causas se vieron conjuntamente y esta sentencia se dicto en las
mismas el 18 de julio de 1944 por el Honorable Vicente de la Cruz, quien era el
que presidia el Juzgado Especial establecido en esta provincia.

“En virtud de la sentencia arriba mencionada, los aqui recurrentes fueron
recluidos en la carcel provincial y alli estan hasta ahora extinguiendo sus
respectivas condenas, a excepcion de Ursu Luangco,
cuya condena en los
expedientes Nos. 2 y 3, se ha remitido a la Honorable Corte Suprema en grado de
consulta y para su revision. Sin embargo, los otros recurrentes, cuya apelacion
no ha sido admitida por el Juzgado Especial, acudieron a dicha Honorable Corte
Suprema en un recurso de mandamus para compeler al citado Juzgado que
admita la referida apelacion, el cual recurso sigue pendiente hasta ahora ante
dicha Superioridad.

“Del anterior relato de hechos, se desprende claramente que aun cuando se
declarase nula e ilegal la sentencia dictada por el Juzgado Especial en el
expediente No. 1 por violacion de la Ley No. 65, en relacion con la Ordenanza
No. 7, los aqui recurrentes no tienen, ciertamente, derecho alguno al remedio
que solicitan en la presente causa; por lo mismo que todavia quedarian las tres
condenas a ellos impuestas en los expedientes Nos. 2, 3 y 4 por dos delitos de
robo con homicidio y uno de robo en cuadrilla, los cuales delitos estan
castigados por nuestro propio Codigo Penal Revisado aprobado por la Legislatura
Filipina en 8 de diciembre de 1930, tan es asi que el Honorable Juez De la Cruz,
al dictar su decision condenatoria en los citados expedientes Nos. 2, 3 y 4,
cita el articulo 294, parrafos 1 y 4 del mencionado Codigo. El Juzgado cree que
el silencio que guardan las recurrentes sobre las sentencias condenatorias
contra ellos dictadas en los ultimos tres expedientes es muy significativo; ello
no indica otra cosa mas que su tacito reconocimiento de la legalidad y validez
de dichas sentencias, cuyas penas, naturalmente, tienen que ser extinguidas en
su totalidad, a menos que las mencionadas sentencias sean revocadas por un
Tribunal competente o los recurrentes fuesen objeto de la clemencia
ejecutiva.”

As the criminal cases against the petitioners have not thus reached a final
stage and, at the time of the loss or destruction of the records, were pending
in this court on appeal or otherwise, it is proper and becomes necessary, in my
judgment, to order their reconstitution or, if this be impossible, the holding
of a new trial. If, as held by fire members of this court, the convictions were
valid prior to the liberation of the Philippines from enemy occupation, the
petitioners cannot further be criminally charged with the same acts for which
they had already, for a time at least,
been validly prosecuted and sentenced,
without placing them twice in jeopardy. If, as contended by five other members,
the proceedings had in the court below were void ab initio, in view
only of the inquisitorial and unconstitutional procedure provided for in
Ordinance No. 7, there yet remains a valid indictment which may and should be
proceeded with conformably to existing rules.

In Peralta vs. The Director of Prisons, (75 Phil., 285), cited by
the majority, wherein the writ of habeas corpus was granted, no
doctrine that can be said to be binding was enunciated because the members of
this Court, though all concurring in the result, had expressed individual
divergent views with respect to the fundamental basis for the allowance of the
writ. Indeed, some held that Act No. 65 of the so-called Philippine Republic and
Ordinance No. 7 of the President of said Republic, under which Peralta was
indicted and convicted, as well as the creation of and the summary
procedure
prescribed for, the courts of special and exclusive criminal jurisdiction, were
perfectly valid, but that the punitive judgment imposed upon Peralta, while
effective during the enemy occupation, ceased to be valid after the restoration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by reason of its political complexion.
Others predicated their votes on criticisms against the inquisitorial features
of Ordinance No. 7, and on the consequent view that the proceedings that
resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of Peralta are null and void, ab
initio. Upon the other hand, I was of the opinion that Peralta could be set
free by simply extending to him the benefit of, and applying the existing laws,
without invoking any rule of international law.

The herein petitioners were charged with and convicted of robbery and robbery
with homicide, offenses which, though covered by Act No. 65 and Ordinance No. 7
above referred to, are common law crimes penalized in the Revised Penal Code
(also in force during the enemy occupation); and the penalty actually imposed
upon them is in accordance with said Code. The result is that the present case
is distinguishable from the peralta ease where the penalty prescribed in Act No.
65, which was heavier than that fixed in the Revised Penal Code, was imposed.
Certainly, the punitive sentences against the herein petitioners did not
penalize as a crime an act not criminal by the municipal law, and could not
therefore have any political complexion. Indeed, the mjority admit that the
“definition of the crime of robbery found in the Revised Penal Code of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, was adopted in said Act No. 65.”

Although the courts of first instance of the provinces were authorized by
Ordinance No. 7 to sit as courts of special and exclusive jurisdiction, there is
now no evidence before us, in view of the destruction of the records, that the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, which tried and convicted the herein
petitioners, followed the summary procedure adopted by said Ordinance. In all
probability, the Rules of Court, then and now in force, might have been
observed. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of any case in which a defendant
had ever been actually subjected to the inquisitorial procedure condemned by
some of the members of this Court. Hence, we cannot on said account set aside
the herein punitive sentences.

I vote to affirm the appealed decision and to order the reconstitute on of
the records of the criminal cases in question or, in its default, a new trial. I
am really averse to the idea of setting at large the authors of such criminal
acts as pictured and particularized in the appealed decisions, because I am
skeptical about the possibility or their being legally held accountable therefor
subsequently.