SEVERINA BONOAN DE YABUT, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE vs. JUAN VENTURA AND EUSTAQUIA COLOMA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

TUASON, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this court of July
31, 1946, dismissing the appeal and ordering the entry of final judgment n the
case. The ground of the motion is, in the words of attorney for
defendants-appellants, that he “had always been of the honest belief that his
second petition asking for a last extension up tio August 10, 1946, within which
to file defendants-appellants’ brief was favorably considered and granted by
this Honorable Supreme Court.”

It appears that by resolution of July 16 of this Court, defendants-appellants
were granted a first extension of 15 days from July 9, to file brief. By
resolution of July 31 they were granted “a second extension of 10 days only,
from July 24th,” and another motion dated July 24 and receieved in the Clerk’s
Office on July 29, asking for a last “extension not to beyond August 10, 1946.”
Copy of the last resolution was received by defendants-appellants attorney on
August 9, on which he deposited his brief in the post office of Laoag, Ilocos
Norte.

There was no justification for defendants-appellants’ attorney to take for
granted that he would be given, or had been given, the entire period of
extension he had aked for. Neither the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court
nor the practice of this court could have inspired reassurance of a favorable
action on his motion to its full extent. Far from favoring automatic
indiscriminate granting of extensions of time to file brief, the rule and the
policy of this court on the matter bare a marked tendency to make such
concessions sparingly. Section 16 of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court provides that
“extension of time for the filing of brief will not be allowed, except for good
and sufficient cause.” And the policy of many years’ standing of this court is
to grant no more than 15 days for the first extension and 10 days for second
extension.

Quite apart from this rule and this polocy, the resolution of this court on
defendants-appellants’ first motion for extension pointed out clearly how much
time might be expected on their second motion. Having been granted only 15 out
of 30 days that they had prayed for in the first motion, there was no ground to
work on the assumption they would be allowed a longer period on the second
motion. The most that they could have reasonably hope to get under the
circumstances was 15 days. But even if 15 days had been grated the
defendants-appellants, computed from July 24, atill their brief was filed one
day late.

We take this opportunity to suggest the advisability of attorneys endeavoring
to file their motions for extension of time sufficiently in advance of the time
sought in order to avoid surprise and delusion after the mistake gets beyond
repair or recall. It is trite to say that periods for the filing of papers
needed in the decision of causes are fixed as a matter of public policy, which
recognizes the necessity of putting an end to litigations within the shortest
possible time compatible only with the right of litigants to have an opportunity
to be heard and the best interest of justice. The aformentioned rule and the
regulative measure which supplements it will not be deviated from except on a
godd showing.

The motion for reconsideration is denied.

Moran, C. J., Feria, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ.,
concur.