G.R. No. 12567. May 30, 1958

TAN GIN SAN, PETITIONER, VS. ROSALIA A. TAN CARPIZO ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE OF TAN CUAN, DECEASED, HON. LEOVIGILDO B. MIJARES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZA…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 30, 1958 BENGZON, J.:


BENGZON, J.:


Three litigations are now pending before the court of first instance of
Zamboanga City concerning two buildings of strong materials in the same city
owned by Tan Cuan, deceased.

The first, Civil Case No. 608, is a suit wherein the administratrix of his
intestate, his widow Rosalia A. Tan Carpizo, seeks the annulment of a chattel
mortgage on the building reportedly executed by Tan Cuan during his lifetime in
favor of Tan Gin San. She denies execution thereof by Tan Cuan, and alleges that
in case it was duly executed it is illegal as to one-half, since the property
belongs to their conjugal partnership, and she did not sign the mortgage
deed.

In the second, Civil Case No. 610, Tan Gin San tries to obtain legal
possession of the two buildings, which the administratrix refused to surrender,
even after extra-judicial proceedings to foreclose the chattel mortgage had been
duly carried out through the intervention of the Sheriff.

As the two buildings were leased to several tenants. the latter were
subjected to conflicting claims regarding the rents of the occupied premises.
Consequently, sixteen of tttem, Santiago Bernardo, et al. instituted the third
Civil Case No. 648 for interpleader. Therein they made deposits of the monthly
rentals when and as they become due. Therein also were issued the orders of the
respondent judge dated February 16, 1957, April 29, 1957, May 7, 1957, etc.
which gave rise to the institution of this petition for certiorari. Said orders
authorized the administratrix to withdraw and receive from the Clerk of Court
the amounts deposited as rents by the tenants of the aforesaid buildings.

Citing Rivera vs. Ocampo[1] wherein we
held it impermissible, in interpleader cases, to deliver’ to one party the money
deposited in court even upon the filing of a bond, and alleging excess of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion, plus irreparable damages, petitioner asked
for preliminary injunction, which was in due course granted after submission of
a suitable bond.

The tenants, who were made respondents expressed, in their answer, their
objection to the disputed orders. However, inasmuch as they may not be required
again to pay the rentals they have already deposited, they have really no
interest in the matter, their stand may be disregarded and the controversy may be
limited to petitioner against Rosalia Tan.

The respondent judge is a mere nominal party. The respondent administratrix
is actually the one called upon to defend. And she explains, in her answer, that
the orders were necessary consequence of the court’s directive in Civil Case No.
610 on December 29, 1956, requiring the sheriff to return the possession of the
two buildings to her; that possession was thus restored to her; that her
possession necessarily entailed the right to collect rents from the tenants;
that it was too late for petitioner to complaint, since he did not appeal nor
question in a higher court the order restoring possession, which has thereby
become final; that anyway the rights of petitioner are amply secured by the,
bond of P140,000 the administratrix had filed in Civil Case No. 610.

Disputing this last proposition, petitioner denies the legal feasibility of
extending the surety’s liability-without its consent-under the bond in Civil
Case No. 610 to the damages resulting from an order in another Civil Case No.
648. To settle this point it becomes necessary to describe the background and
the terms of the bond filed in Civil Case No. 610, which as stated aimed to
wrest possession of the buildings from the administratrix.

It seems clear from the pleadings and annexes thereto, that in said Civil
Case No. 610, plaintiff Tan Gin San (secured, by an order of replevin the
surrender to him of the two buildings which had been extra-judicially
foreclosed; that subsequently, acting on a petition of Rosalia Tan which
asserted nullity of said foreclosure in view of the ruling of this Court in
Manarang vs. Ofilada[1] the judge impliedly
annulling the foreclosure, declared the administratrix entitled to the return of
the buildings “upon the posting of a bond of P140,000 to answer for the alleged
unpaid loan and for any damage which plaintiff” (Tan Gin San) may suffer by
virtue thereof. (November 16, 1956.) The bond was submitted, and the sheriff
redelivered possession to the administratrix in January 1957.

Now, in ordering delivery of the rentals deposited in court in Civil Case No.
648 the Court expressly said it was giving effect to the orders in Civil Case
No. 610 declaring the administratrix’s right to possession of buildings and
returning them to her. Therefore, it would not be erroneous to hold that if the
deposited rentals should be lost, the damages, if any, suffered thereby is a
mere consequence of the return of possession and is chargeable against the bond
of P140,000.

The petitioner’s credit, secured by the mortgage is P40,000 with interest at
6 per cent beginning February 28, 1958. At the time this petition was filed,
such credit did not exceed P46,000. He has therefore no serious ground for
concern because the bond is amply sufficient.

Turning to the issues of jurisdiction or discretion, the court undoubtedly
had jurisdiction; the moneys were in court in a litigation properly within its
competence. And no authority is cited to the contrary.

Was there abuse of discretion? We think not. The rentals accrued in and after
December 1956. Yet in November 1956, the court had declared and upheld the
possessory right over the buildings of the administratrix, thereby overruling
the claims of Tan Gin San as mortgage creditor-temporarily of course.

The right to possession of the buildings includes the right to the use or the
fruits thereof. Rentals, which are civil fruits (Waite vs. Williams, 5 Phil.,
571) belong to the possessor in good faith (Art. 544 New Civil Code).
Furthermore, and this is conclusive, Tan Gin San considers Tan Cuan the owner of
the buildings. Therefore, Tan Cuan (or his estate represented by Rosalia Tan) is
entitled to the rents, in the absence of better rights of Tan Gin San – which the
latter has not shown.

And this brings us to Rivera vs. Ocampo, supra, on
which rests the petitioner’s contentions. There we held it was abuse of
discretion, in interpleader cases, to allow one of the contestants to get the
money deposited, even upon the filing of a bond. But that case is
distinguishable from this in that the order permitting withdrawal was avowedly
for the purpose of helping one of the claimants; whereas here it was permitted
as a consequence of the court’s previous order-final it seems-awarding to
Rosalia Tan possession of the rented premises. A further distinction is that
whereas in the Rivera case the right to the money was disputed among several
interested parties, in this case the right of the owner and the possessor to
rents is reasonably clear.

Everything considered, we perceive no grave abuse of discretion calling for
the issuance of certiorari. Accordingly, the petition is denied, and the
injunction heretofore issued is dissolved. Costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia,
and Felix, JJ., concur.

 


[1]52 Off. Gaz., 3364; 93 Phil., 588.

[1]52 Off. Gaz., 3954, 99 Phil., 108