CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANUEL E. SADDE, JUANITA SAN PEDRO, FELISA BUNA, GREGORIA GARCIA, ENCARNACION ARFILER, CRISTINA ARCEGA, BENITA CARPIO AND ERLI…

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondent
Honorable Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of First Instance of Quezon City, from
hearing Civil Case No. Q-2482 thereof, entitled “La Campana Food Products Inc.
vs. Consolidated Labor Association of the Philippines, et al.,” to set aside a
writ of preliminary injunction therein issued by said respondent, and to enjoin
the latter, during the pendency of this case, from further proceeding with, and
taking cognizance of said case No. Q-2482, and from enforcing the aforementioned
writ of preliminary injunction. Upon the filing of the requisite bond, we issued
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.

Petitioner Consolidated Labor Association of the Philippines—hereafter
referred to as the Association—is a duly registered labor organization, of which
a number of employees—the majority, according to the petition—of respondent La
Campana Food Products, Inc. and of the order respondents herein—namely, By Go
and Ricardo, Juanita, Maria, Jose and Pacita, all surnamed Tantongco-operating
under the business of firm name La Campana Starch Packing, are members. The
other petitioner, namely, Manuel B. Sadde, Juanita San Pedro, Felisa Buna,
Gregorio Garcia, Encarnacion Arfiler, Cristina Arcega, Benita Carpio and Erlinda
Segovia are officers of said Association, and some of them are employees of said
respondents, who are hereafter referred to as employers. It appears that, in
line with its claim that it is entitled to deal with the employers as the
exclusive collective bargaining agency of its employees, the Association had,
prior to July 13, 1957, instituted, in the Court of Industrial Relations,
certification election case No. 17-MC. On said date, the employers dismissed the
following employees thereof, who are officers and active members of said
Association:

	Felisa Buna	Patrocinia Almonte
	Presentacion de Guzman	Rosario Tiangan
	Silvia Demillo	Remedios Agacer
	Pilar Gencito	Gliceria Solano
	Luningning Demillo	Lilia Buna
	Ofelia Chua	Romualda Demiasa

Soon thereafter, or on July 5, 1957, the members of the Association who were
working for the employers made, upon the latter, certain demands, and then went
on strike and began picketing the factory of said employers. On July 9, 1957,
the Association commence, in the Court of of Industrial Relations, case No.
1072-V thereof, against said employers. In the petition therein filed, it was
alleged, among other things,

“3. That about one hundred members of the petitioner are employed by the
respondents;

“4. That on July 5, 1957, because of unfair labor practices and violations of
the Eight Hour Labor Law, Commonwealth Act No. 444, and the Minimum Wage Law
Republic Act No. 602, the members of the petitioner union went on a strike
against the respondent companies’ establishment;

“5. That the principal
demands in this dispute are the following:

(a) Reinstatement of employees dismissed for union activities;

(b) Strict observation of the hours of work under the Eight Hour Labor
Law;

(c) Payment of back overtime wages of employees involved in the dispute from
1952 up to the present time;

(d) Strict observance of the Minimum Wage Law, in that minimum wages must be
paid for every eight hours work without any further condition such as the
imposition of certain ‘quotas’ or allotment of work.

“6. That the strike exist up to the present and will continue to disturb the
industrial peace unless this Honorable Court assumes jurisdiction over this
dispute.”

It was prayed, therefore, that “the proper remedy be granted” to said
Association. The next day, July 10, 1957, at 3:46 p.m., an acting prosecutor of
the Court of Industrial Relations filed therein a formal complaint charging the
employers with unfair labor practice. It was alleged in said complaint, which
had been docketed as case No. 1371 ULP of said court:

“4. That the respondents knew of the existence of the complainant Union on
February 18, 1957, when the complainant sent a petition to the respondent, for a
harmonious relationship between the employees and employer;

“5. That when the respondents received the petition, they became unreasonably
strict and hostile to the union and told the complainant members that ‘the union
is no good, don’t form the union’, and refused to answer the same, inspite of
repeated demands and a conference in the Conciliation Office of the Department
of Labor;

“6. That on July 3, 1957, respondents thru their representative, a certain
‘Tani’, dismissed the following officers and active members of the complainant
Union from their respective work;

	Felisa Buna	Patrocinia Almonte
	Presentacion de Guzman	Rosario Tiangan
	Silvia Demillo	Remedios Agacer
	Pilar Gencito	Gliceria Solano
	Luningning Demillo	Lilia Buna
	Ofelia Chua	Romualda Demiasa

“7. That since their dismissal up to the present time, they have not found
any substantial or equivalent employment for themselves.”

The prayer in
said complaint is of the following tenor:

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the respondents be ordered or
declared:

1. Guilty of the unlawful acts charged;
2. To cease and desist from the unfair labor practice complained of;
3. To bargain with the complainant in good faith;
4. To reinstate the dismissed employees above-mentioned to their former
   positions with all the rights and privileges they enjoyed before, with back
   wages from the time they were dismissed to the time of their actual
   reinstatement; and

5. For such other relief as the Honorable Court may deem just, proper, and
   equitable under the foregoing premises, and for any other affirmative action
   that may effectuate the policies of the Industrial Peace Act.”

Several hours earlier-seemingly late, in the morning of July 10, 1957-the
employers had, in turn, instituted, against petitioners herein, Civil Case No.
Q-2482, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, presided
over by respondent, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge. In their complaint therein,
the employers alleged, substantially, that on July 5, 1957, petitioners herein,
had presented a 20-point demand, including the recognition of the Association as
the sole collective bargaining agency in the factories of said employers; that,
on said date, members, of the Association went on strike and picketed said
factories; that those picketing “carried out many unlawful acts of conspiracy,
connivance and confabulation, force, coercion, threat and intimidation and other
false promises, misrepresentations and illegal machinations, as well as
slanderous, libelous and contemptuous language,” more specifically described in
paragraph 7 of said complaint; that, as a consequence, the employers had
suffered, and would continue to suffer, damages at the rate of P2,700 a day,
apart from moral damages amounting to not less than P15,000 and attorney’s fees
in the sum of P5,000; that the employers “have no adequate remedy at law”; and
that “the public officers charged with the duties to protect plaintiffs’ person,
property and business are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.”
The employers prayed, accordingly, that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining the defendants therein from further committing the unlawful
acts above mentioned and that, after due trial, said defendants be sentenced to
pay damages and the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent.

Upon the filing of said complaint, respondent Judge ordered that the petition
therein for a writ of preliminary injunction be set for hearing at 2:30 that
afternoon. When the case was called at about that time, plaintiffs and their
counsel appeared. Although the defendants therein had not been served, as yet,
either with summons, or with copy of the order setting for hearing the incident
in question, Manuel E. Sadde—one of the defendants therein and one of the
petitioners herein, as well as president of the Association—and some of its
officers and members, appeared to ask for a postponement of the hearing, in
order that they could notify their counsel. This petition was denied by
respondent Judge, who proceeded to receive the testimony of plaintiff Ricardo
Tantongco, one of the plaintiffs in that case and a respondent herein.
Thereupon, respondent Judge issued an order, dated July 10, 1957, the
dispositive part of which is as follows:

“It appearing that the complaint and petition for writ of injunction is
sufficient in form and substance, supported by the testimony of Ricardo
Tantongco, and having complied with the requirements of section 9(d) of Republic
Act No. 875, and it appearing further that this Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of this case, the defendants, agents and/or representatives are
hereby enjoined from committing the unlawful acts complained of, namely,
preventing the company officials, personnel, customers, agents and vehicles from
entering into and/or going out from the factory premises, placing obstructions
on the door and gates leading to the factory’s compound; they are further
enjoined from committing any act which may tend to provoke violence and
disturbance; and further, the defendants are enjoined or ordered to keep a
distance of five (5) meters from the entrance (main) and other doors leading to
the company compound.

This order shall become effective upon the posting
of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of P5.000 to answer for any loss or
damage caused by the issuance of this writ of injunction.

“Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict
compliance herein is enjoined.”

Forthwith, the case at bar was instituted in this Court. Petitioners herein
maintain that, in issuing said writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge
had acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, with grave abuse of
discretion, and in clear violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
875.

In their answer, respondents herein allege, among other things, that the
strike called by petitioner union is illegal, for lack of previous notice
thereof, that in picketing respondents’ factories, petitioners herein had
performed the illegal acts described in the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-2482
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; and that the writ of preliminary
injunction complained of had been issued in accordance with law.

It is not contested that there was a labor dispute between respondents
herein, as employers, on the one hand, and its employees, who are members of the
Association, on the other hand, and that the strike and the picketing that led
to the institution of said Civil Case No. Q-2482, were incidents of said labor
dispute. Neither is it disputed that several officers and active members of said
Association, who were working for said employers, were dismissed by the latter
on July 3, 1957; that on July 9, 1957, said Association instituted Case No.
1072-V of the Court of Industrial Relations against the employers, upon the
ground that the latter were guilty of unfair labor practices, and of violations
of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444), and the Minimum Wage Law (R. A. No.
602) ; and that on July 10, 1957, a formal complaint for unfair labor practice
was filed by a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations against the
employers. It is clear therefore, that, before the commencement of said Civil
Case No. Q-2482 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Court of Industrial
Relations had already acquired jurisdiction over certain charges preferred by
petitioners herein against the employers, including a charge for unfair labor
practice, which a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations found to be
meritorious.

Pursuant to section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 875, the Court of Industrial
Relations

“shall have jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices and is
empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This
power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement,
code, law or otherwise”. (Italics ours.)

Construing this provision, in relation to section 9 of the same Act,
regulating the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, we have repeatedly
held that courts of first instance may not enjoin the picketing staged in
connection with such disputes, and that the jurisdiction to entertain a petition
to enjoin said picketing and to issue the corresponding writ of injunction is
vested exclusively in the Court of Industrial Relations, if charges of unfair
labor practice, in relation to said labor disputes, are pending before the
latter court prior to the filing of said petition.

Thus, in National Garments
and Textiles Workers’ Union PAFLU (Premier Shirts and Pants Factory Chapter) vs.
Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al., L-9104 (September 10, 1956) we said:

“* * * But; as the record discloses, this labor dispute is already involved
in the two unfair labor cases that were then pending between the same parties
before the Court of Industrial Relations which were instituted much ahead in
time than the instant case. The Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, had
already acquired jurisdiction over this labor dispute when the instant case was
instituted, which jurisdiction, concerning as it does an unfair labor practice,
is exclusive of that court (Section 5[a], Republic Act 875).”

The language used in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul, et al. vs. Hon.
Gustavo Victoriano, L-9290 (January 14, 1958) was:

“It appearing that in addition to the labor dispute involved herein there
were other labor cases pending between the same parties before the Court of
Industrial Relations which had been instituted prior to the filing of the
present case, among them Case No. 548-ULP which involved an unfair labor
practice, was declared that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to try the
instant case for the same is already involved in those case which had been
submitted to the industrial court for adjudication. This step is necessary in
order to avoid multiplicity of actions. If the purpose of the action is to
obtain some injunctive relief against certain acts of violence of the laborers,
the same can be obtained from the industrial court which is given ample power to
act thereon by the Magna Carta. Verily, the court a quo acted without
jurisdiction in the case.” (Italics ours.)

We even declared, that when “the acts against which the injunction in
question was obtained constitute unfair labor practices,” the application for
injunction would be “exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations
and beyond the jurisdiction of the * * * Court of First Instance,” even if no
complaint for unfair labor practice had been filed, as yet, with the Court of
Industrial Relations (Reyes, et al. vs. Tan, et al., 99 Phil., 880; 52 Off.
Gaz., [14], 6187).

None of the parties herein has advanced any reason to justify a departure
from this view, which, we feel, is demanded by the letter and spirit of Republic
Act No. 875, specially sections 5 and 9 thereof. Neither have we overlooked the
argument to the effect that a party migiit, with a view to depriving a Court of
First Instance of its legitimate jurisdiction, file, with the Court of
Industrial Relations, groundless charges of unfair labor practice against the
other party. Suffice it to say that, when such charges are preferred, the same
shall be investigated by the Court of Industrial Relations or by a member or
agent thereof, who will refuse to file the corresponding complaint and will
dismiss the charges, if the same are found to be untenable. As Mr. Justice
Montemayor has lucidly put it:

“From the above quoted legal provision, it is, to us, clear that the Court
(CIR) must first investigate the charges filed and that said investigation may
be conducted either by the Court itself or a member thereof or any agent, like
the acting prosecutor or a commissioner. Such investigation, is mandatory,
because the law uses the word ‘must’. Now, whether or not a regular complaint is
to be filed by him depends upon the result of said investigation. It is when a
regular complaint based on the said investigation is filed that the CIR
intervenes by requiring respondent to answer the complaint and then both parties
are heard to receive the evidence to be adduced by them. The investigation is
really necessary not only for the protection of the respondent but also for the
benefit of the CIR itself so that the respondent may not be required to defend
itself against frivolous and unfounded charges, and the valuable time of the CIR
dissipated and unnecessarily spent in hearing charges without any basis.”
(National Union of Printing Workers vs. The Asia Printing and/or Lu Ming, et
al., 52 Off. Gaz. [13], 5858; 99 Phil., 589.)

In the case at bar, a prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations found
that the charges against the employers were true and filed a formal complaint
against said employers. What is more, the record before us indicates that said
finding was not groundless, arbitrary or capricious, for on August 15, 1957,
respondents agreed to the return of all members of petitioner union and not to
“abet the formation of a company union.”

Wherefore, the order complained of is hereby annulled and set aside, and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court made permanent, with costs
against respondents herein, excluding respondent Judge. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes J.B.L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.

 

 

---

DISSENTING

 

MONTEMAYOR, J.,

For the reasons stated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of
Philippine Association of Free Labor Union, et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et
al., 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz., [13] 5836, I dissent, and reiterate my views
therein expressed that the ordinary courts of the Philippines, including the
Courts of First Instance, are authorized to issue writs of injunction to
restrain the commission of violence, intimidation, coercion, malicious mischief,
etc. even in cases involving labor disputes and unfair labor practices, as long
as the conditions imposed by Section 9 of the Industrial Peace Act, are complied
with in the issuance of the writ.