THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,. VS. BENIGNO LINGAD Y VITO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On October 30, 1954, Benigno Lingad y Vito was charged before the Municipal
Court of Manila with the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence where, after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine
of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

On appeal to the court of first instance, the accused filed a motion to
quash, which the court granted and dismissed the case, holding that the crime of
slight physical injuries when committed thru reckless inprudence is not
punishable “by law. The Government appealed to this Court. The pertinent portion
of the information reads:

“That on or about the 28th day of October, 1954, in the city of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being then the driver and person in charge of
Pick-up with plate No. T-518 (Cavite-’54), did then and there drive, manage and
operate the same along Arroceros Street, in said city, in a careless, reckless,
negligent and imprudent manner, by then and there making the same run at a speed
greater than was reasonable and proper and by not taking the necessary
precautions to avoid accident to persons or damage to property, considering the
condition of traffic in said place at the time, causing by such carelessness,
recklessness, imprudence and lack of precaution the said Pick-up with plate No.
T-518 (Cavite-’54), so driven, managed and operated by him to strike and bump
against car No. PI-2578 (Manila) which was then at a stopped position and driven
by Det. Mariano Joaquin, and as a result of the violent impact Mayor Arsenio
Lacson, a passenger of the said car with plate No. PI-2573 sustained physical
injuries, which have required and will require medical attendance for a period
of more than 1 but less than 10 days and have prevented and will prevent the
said Mayor Arsenio Lacson from engaging in his customary labor for the same
period of time.” (p. 4, record)

In sustaining the motion to quash, the
trial court relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macario
Ande y Marino, 51 Off. Gaz., p. 5222, wherein it held that “The law does not
declare as a crime and does not provide any penalty for the execution of an
act – more serious as it is – committed thru reckless imprudence which, if
intentional (only) amounts to a light felony.” And this decision is predicated
on a portion of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “A
fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.”

We have no quarrel with the above citation. The same is in accordance with
law. But the question is: Do the acts alleged in the information not fit into
the framework of said decision, or do they not come under the above quoted
portion of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code?

The answer is obviously in the affirmative if we carefully examine the
averments of the information. While the information gives the designation of the
crime as “slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence”, the body
thereof does not specify the kind of negligence or imprudence that qualifies the
crime charged, for it merely alleges that it was committed “in a careless,
reckless, negligent and imprudent manner * * * causing by such carelessness,
recklessness, Imprudence and lack of precaution”, the collision which resulted
in the injury. Under such vague allegation of the imprudence act, one may infer
that the act may have been committed either through reckless or simple
negligence, depending upon the nature of the evidence that may be presented by
the prosecution. And even if what was intended was to qualify the crime with
reckless imprudence, still it cannot be said that the same is not punishable by
law for it may still be shown during the trial that the accused committed the
act only through simple negligence upon the theory that what is more or graver
includes the less or lighter, in the same manner as a serious physical injury
includes a slight injury, or robbery includes the crime of theft. The question,
therefore, in the last analysis may boil down to a matter of evidence. In other
words, the elements of the two kinds of negligence are practically the same, the
only difference lies in the degree, and this can be substantiated by proper
evidence.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court erred in sustaining
the motion to quash .and in dismissing the case.

Wherefore, we hereby set aside the order appealed from and direct that the
case be remanded to the trial court for hearing on the merits. No costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Concepcion and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

 

---

CONCURRING

 

J. B. L. REYES, J.,

I concur in the result because in my opinion, the allegations of the
information charge reckless imprudence.

 

 

---

DISSENTING

FELIX, J.,

As stated in the majority Decision:

“On October 30, 1954, Benigno Lingad y Vito was charged before the Municipal
Court of Manila with the crime of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence where, after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine
of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

On appeal to the court of first instance, the accused filed a motion to
quash, which the court granted and dismissed the ease, holding that the crime of
slight physical injuries when committed through reckless imprudence is not
punishable by law. The Government appealed to this Court”.

The question for determination by the Court, as posed in the majority
Decision, is: “Do the acts alleged in the information not fit into the framework
of said decision, or do they not come under the above-quoted portion of Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code” which provides that “a fine not exceeding 200
pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple inprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted light felony”? The majority of this Court, after examining the
corresponding part of the information, held that “while the information gives
the designation of the crime as ‘slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence’, the body thereof does not specify the kind of negligence or
imprudence that qualifies the crime charged, for it merely alleges that it ivas
committed ‘in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner * * *
causing, by such carelessness, recklessness, negligence, imprudence and lack of
precaution’ the collision which resulted in the injury”. So that from “such
va,gue allegation of the imprudent act, one may infer that the act may have been
committed with reckless or simple negligence, depending upon the nature of the
evidence that may be presented by the prosecution”. And premised upon this
conclusion, the majority of this Court set aside the order appealed from and
directed that the case be remanded to the trial court for hearing on the
merit.

I dissent, from (l) Both the assertion that the body of the information does
not specify the kind of negligence or imprudence that qualifies the crime
charged, as well as the implied acceptance of the views expressed in the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macario Ande y Marino, 51 Off.
Gaz., 5222; and (2) From the order of remand of the case to the trial court for
hearing” on the merits, because by this proceeding, the defendant will be placed
in double jeopardy.

I. The information is copied in full in the majority Decision, and for
convenience I also copy it hereunder. It reads as follows:

“That on or about the 28th day of October, 1954, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being then the driver and person incharge of
Pick-up with Plate No. T-518 (Cavite-’54), did then and there drive, manage and
operate the same along Arroceros Street, in said city, in a careless, reckless,
negligence and imprudent manner, by then and there making the same run at a
speed greater than mas reasonable and proper and by not taking the necessary
precautions to avoid accident to persons or damage to property, considering the
condition of traffic in said place at the time, causing by such carelessness,
recklessness, imprudence and lack of precaution the said Pick-up with plate No.
T-518 (Cavite-’54), so driven, managed and operated by him to strike and bump
against car No. PI-2578 (Manila) which was then at a stepped position and driven
by Det. Mariano Joaquin, and as a result of the violent impact Mayor Arsenio
Lacson, a passenger of the said car with plate No. PI-2573 sustained physical
injuries, which havs required and will require medical attendance for a period
of more than 1 but less than 10 days and have prevented and will prevent the
said Mayor Arsenio Lacson from engaging in his customary labor for the same
period of time”.

With said Information in sight I dare to maintain that the assertion of the
majority that it does not specify the designation of the kind of negligence or
imprudence that qualifies the crime charged, is not correct because it. is
precisely the portion of the information which is specifically indicated and
quoted in the decision to prove their point that “would show the contrary view
if the “complete” text of that portion would be given instead of substituting
the omission by “* * *.” As may be seen from the first portion underscored of
the above quoted information, the Fiscal specined the kind of reckless or
negligence of the defendant by describing what such negligence consisted of,
which is the same way, manner or pattern that all fiscals throughout the
Philippines have to state and define reckless imprudence, and this being the
case the majority of this Court should have rejected the principle involved in
the case of People vs. Macario Ande, supra, which was the ratio decidendi for
the exoneration of the defendant in said case, as otherwise they would have to
uphold the order of the lower court dismissing the information in the case at
bar.

I wish, however, to qualify my opinion in this case. Although I am of the
belief that the information charges the defendant Benigno Lingad y Vito with the
crime of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence and although
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code does not really provide any penalty for
light offenses through reckless imprudence, yet the application of the
aforementioned principle in the case of People vs. Ande, supra, would lead Us to
the inescapable absurdity of liberating a defendant guilty of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, a person whom We would be ready to convict
and punish if his criminal liability were of less importance or perversity, that
is, if the criminal act were committed through simple negligence. It is my
humble though considered opinion that in such a situation, the defendant in the
case at bar, if found guilty of the crime charged in the information, should be
sentenced to the penalty fixed by law for slight physical injuries through
simple imprudence, an offense less serious but included in the crime ?charged.
By doing this We would simply adjust, or better still, construe and apply the
law to conform to certain peculiar situations that Life sometimes submits to Our
?consideration. I, therefore, believe that the lower court has really committed
an error in dismissing the information.

II. However, the order of the Court to that effect is unappealable because
the exoneration of a defendant by the Court of First Instance after his trial
and conviction in the inferior Court, places the defendant in double
jeopardy.

Sec. 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court prescribes:

SEC. 9. FORMER CONVICTION OE ACQUITTAL OR FORMER JEOPARDY.- When a defendant
shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction, or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or ior any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charge in the former
complaint or information.

L-11748, (May 28, 1958) which is so far as the principle of jeopardy is
concerned, is on all fours similar to the case at bar, I had occasion to say the
following:

“Confronting the provisions of the aforequoted Section 9 of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court with the acts established and enumerated in the majority
decision, it cannot be denied that the defendant was prosecuted and convicted of
the offense charged in a Court of competent jurisdiction and that his conviction
therein after he had pleaded not guilty to the charge and after evidence was
submitted in the case, constitutes, in the language of the Rules of Court, a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense even though lie may have been later
acquitted thereof on appeal to the proper Court of First Instance. It is true
that the defendant appealed from the decision to the lower Court; that, for
procedural purposes, the decision convicting the defendant of such offense was
vacated; and that the elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance for
trial de novo was upon the instance and on appeal of the very defendant, but all
this succession of events cannot by any means obliterate nor wipe out facts that
have already existed and brought to life, a metaphysical impossibility that even
our Creator cannot accomplish, so that once the defendant is acquitted or the
case dismissed in the upper Court under the circumstances of the case at bar, he
is exonerated forever and the prosecution of his ease cannot be subject to
further proceedings.

In the case of People vs. Doyle, 54 Phil. 862, this Court held that:

‘This dismissal of a criminal case of estafa which was appealed from a
Justice of the Peace to the Court of First Instance, the former being vested
with jurisdiction to try and decide, is equivalent to an acquittal of the
defendant in said case, and the filing of a new information in which the case
dismissed is included, exposes said defendant to a second conviction of one and
the same offense, and therefore constitutes double jeopardy’.

In the case of People vs. Fajardo, 49 Phil., 206, the same principle was
upheld:

“The Justice of the Peace having as he had jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint for esiafa filed in the case, the trial court committed an error of
taw in holding that it had no jurisdiction to try the case on appeal; but its
judgment, however, in dismissing the case and releasing the accused is
unappealable for the reason that he was already placed in jeopardy, and
therefore the motion for dismissal must be granted’.

That We cannot disregard what has been done in the Municipal Court of Legaspi
is a matter already repeatedly decided by this Court. We see for example that in
the case of People vs. Hermino, 64 Phil. 403:

‘Appellant confessed his crime after the prosecution had presented its
evidence, at least in the Municipal Court where the case originated. It cannot
be stated that the appeal taken by him to the Court of First Instance again
restored the case to its original stage for the very reason that the law
requires a trial de novo, that is, that there had been no presentation of
evidence before he confessed or admitted his crime, because a trial de novo
gives the impression and necessarily implies the existence of a previous trial.
The confession, in order to constitute a mitigating circustance, must not only
be spontaneous but also be made prior to the presentation of the evidence for
the prosecution (Art. 13, Sec. 7, Revised Penal Code)’.

The same doctrine was enunciated in the case of People vs. Bawasanta, 64
Phil., 409, wherein it was said:

“Trial de novo means a new trial in the same manner, with the same effect,
and upon the same issues as the case was tried in the lower court, in accordance
with the rules of practice in the appellate court (Sandlin vs. State, 1910-3
Okla. Cr. 578; State vs. Port, 1909-164 Ala. 578; Crisostomo vs. Director of
Prisons, 41 Phil., 368), and it does not mean that all the proceedings in the
lower court had thereby been wiped out so as to prelude the ascertainment of
whether the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty in the lower court for the
purpose of determining the existence of this mitigating
circumstance’.

See also the cases of People vs. Sy Chay (alias Sy Kuan), 44 Phil., 900 and
People vs. De la Pena, 66 Phil., 451.

Now, if the trial de novo does not wipe out the proceeding in the inferior
court and the law allows this Court, for the purpose of determining the
circumstances attending the case in the court of origin, to go over the record
thereof, even in cases of trials de moro after appeal to the Court of First
Instance, under what principles of justice or even reason and logic are We to
disregard in the ease at bar the undeniable fact that the defendant has already
been convicted in the inferior court? This question is unanswerable and, as
stated before, constitutes a bull’s-eye hit on the majority decision. Said in
Latin, that is ‘quod erat demonstrandum’ “.

At the deliberations of this case, the writer of the majority Decision
contended that I cannot raise and this Court cannot pass upon the question of
jeopardy because the defense has not put it on issue and shall be considered as
waived. In answer to this allegation 1 can -say, in the first place, that the
defendant relied in the lower court on his claim that there was no penalty
provided by law for the offense he was charged, and although that contention
might be erroneous, yet the lower court found it sufficient to dismiss the case,
so the defendant saw no need of raising the question of jeopardy anymore, even
if he knew of that defense. In the second place, it is not to be forgotten that
defendant is the appellee herein and his only duty in this instance is to refute
the questions raised by the prosecution which did not touch upon this matter.
Anyway, I cannot by any means agree with the theory that the defense of jeopardy
can be waived and shall not be considered by this Court in this case. Section 8,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that:

“An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in
Section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of the rule”,

and the latter subsection refers to cases in which the defendant moves to
quash the complaint or information on the ground that he “has been previously
convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged”. And
although Section 10 of the same Rule 113 also states that “if the defendant does
not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall
be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash
except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense or the court
has no jurisdiction over the same”, yet this very same section also allows, the
defendant, under certain circumstances, to raise the defense of jeopardy even
after pleading. But even if the Rules of Court on said alleged waiver are to be
strictly construed, yet I would say that they cannot prevail over the express
provisions of our Constitution. As it is known, the Bill of Rights prescribes in
its Section 1-(20) that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense” and this mandate, undoubtedly directed to the Court of
Justice, is not limited by any act or omission of the defendant, nor depends
upon whether or not he invokes such defense.

Wherefore, I firmly and unhesitatingly maintain that the remanding of this
case to the lower court for trial on the merits is equivalent or tantamount to
placing the defendant in double jeopardy. So the present appeal of the
government must be necessarily dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., concurs. Order set aside.