G.R. No. L-455. October 30, 1947
JOAQUIN MA. JOSON, PETITIONER, VS. ILDEFONSO SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
BENGZON, J.:
February 14, 1946, granting the respondent Ildefonso Santos a temporary
certificate of public convenience to install, and operate until the end of the
year 1948, in the municipality of Orion, Province of Bataan, an ice plant
capable of producing five tons daily, the product to be sold in Orion and the
other municipalities of Bataan.
It is admitted that long before the Pacific War, petitioner Joaquin Ma. Joson
was operating ice plants in the municipalities of Orani, Samal, Balanga and
Orion, Province of Bataan, pursuant to certificates of public convenience
regularly issued. As a result of the war his establishments were destroyed,
except that of Orani, which was nevertheless considerably damaged.
Herein respondent, who is a Filipino, submitted on August 6, 1945, the
application that started these proceedings. He alleged that he had complete
machineries and equipment for the proposed ice plant and was in a position to
immediately commence the installation thereof. Herein petitioner Joaquin Ma.
Joson objected in writing, upon the ground that he had a certificate for the
territory, and that public convenience did not demand the construction of
another ice maker, which would additionally prejudice his prior rights entitled
to protection.
Favorably acting on the application, the Public Service Commission made the
following estimate of the evidence pro and con:
“Applicant’s evidence aims to prove that actually there is a great demand for
ice not only in Orion but in the entire Province of Bataan; that this demand
comes from the general public and especially from fishermen who need big
quantities of ice daily to preserve their catch; that the present supply of ice
which comes from Orani is insufficient for this demand; that even before the War
the production of the 2-ton plant in Orion was inadequate for the needs of the
people of that town; that the ice plant in Orion is not operating at present
having been destroyed during the War; that fishing is one of the major
industries of Bataan but due to the inadequate supply of ice a big portion of
the daily fish catch is spoiled due to lack of this needed commodity; that
applicant has the necessary capital to invest in the installation and operation
of the proposed ice plant, and that public interests and convenience will be
properly and adequately served by the approval of this application.“Oppositor’s evidence, on the other hand, purports to show that there is no
necessity for an ice plant in Orion inasmuch as even prior to the War the
produce of his 2-ton plant in Orion was in excess of the actual ice demands of
that municipality and at the present time the little demand that exists is
supplied by him from his plant in Orani; that the ravages of and the destruction
caused by the War have greatly impaired the principal industries of Bataan,
particularly the fishing industry, so that the demand for ice to be used to
conserve fish is very small; that there is little demand for ice from the
general public and as to the fish most of it is immediately brought to Manila
and other towns so that fishermen really have no use for ice; that he has
already ordered from the United States, through the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific
Co., ice plant machineries and equipment part of which will be installed in
Orion, and has made an initial investment of more than P40,000; that the little
demand for ice in Orion does not warrant the operation of two ice plants in that
place, and would only result in bringing about a ruinous and destructive
competition between his plant and that of the applicant.”
Overruling the opposition, the Commission made these pertinent remarks:
“Oppositor also argues that he has already ordered from the United States
machineries and equipment part of which will be used for his plant in Orion, and
has invested more than P40,000, and that the operation of two ice plants in
Orion would result in ruinous competition. It appears that oppositor has
deposited P41,000 on an indent order for ice plant machineries placed with the
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. in Manila. The witness of the oppositor who
testified on this point said that the order was transmitted to the Fairbanks
Morse & Co. and York Corporation in the United States. Said companies,
according to the witness, accepted the order but would not commit themselves as
to when shipment of the machineries would be made to Manila. There is no
certainty, therefore, as to when oppositor would be able to operate his plant,
and it would not be proper for us to deprive the public of this much needed
service while oppositor waits for his machineries. Nor can we sustain
oppositor’s contention that the operation of two plants in Orion would result in
ruinous competition. The evidence regarding the demand for ice in Orion and the
rest of Bataan shows that even if the oppositor should install his plant there
would be enough business for his plant and that of the applicant, and no ruinous
competition would ensue.“With reference to the contention of the oppositor that his rights and
investments as a prior operator should be protected by this Commission thru a
denial of this application, we have repeatedly ruled in other cases of
applications for certificates of public convenience to operate ice plant
services (Case No. 177, Off. Gaz., Vol. 41, No. 7, Page 670; Cases 307, 417, et
al., Case 136 and Case 401) that that protection can be effected by issuing only
temporary certificates in territories where the former operators are not
operating at present due to the destruction of their plants. In the present case
applicant made of record his willingness to accept a certificate subject to a
period of validity which the Commission may fix and to operate the proposed
service under said certificate. * * *”
Attributing error to the Commission, the instant petition for review has
argued several propositions which may be reduced to three, namely: (1) the order
is not reasonably supported by the evidence of record; (2) there is no emergency
requiring a temporary permit; (3) the petitioner was denied the protection he is
entitled under the law; and (4) the grant violates the Commission’s policy not
to authorize more than one plant in any given municipality.
In this class of cases it is a fundamental rule that this Court will not
modify or set aside the Commission’s order unless it clearly appears that there
was no evidence before it to support reasonably such order, or that the same was
without the jurisdiction of the Commission, or contrary to law.[1]
There being no question as to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the
legal principles involved, our inquiry in this litigation is necessarily limited
to the issue whether its award is reasonably justified by the evidence submitted
to it, and which is presently before this Court for examination and
revision.
We observe that, besides the applicant and his wife, three fishermen of Orion
and one fish trader of the same locality testified in support of the
application. Their assertions are aptly summarized in the appealed order, and
undoubtedly furnish rational basis for the grant of a temporary permit to
manufacture and sell ice.
It is true that the portions in the testimony of applicant and his spouse
quoted by petitioner in his brief are hearsay; but the other parts referring to
the same point (inadequate supply of ice in Bataan) are of their own knowledge.
Anyway the need for ice and the scarcity thereof was sufficiently established
with the statements under oath of Gregorio Dijungco and Pedro Quicho, whose
veracity has not been successfully impeached. On the other hand, it appears that
whereas the applicant had, at the time of the hearing, the necessary machineries
and equipment ready for erection in Orion, the oppositor merely proved that he
had placed orders for new equipment, but the dates of the receipt and of the
installation thereof were uncertain. Both reason and equity approve the issuance
of the temporary license. In these days of reconstruction and rehabilitation
there is a crying need to reestablish public services destroyed by the war. As
always, the people’s convenience and welfare should be of paramount importance.
It is not in keeping with this view for pre-war operators to adopt a
dog-in-the-manger policy, opposing the rendition by others of those services
which they can not actually and immediately perform. At any rate, protection is
not denied them if, as in this instance, the permit is temporary in nature,
because at the expiration of the period—when normalcy shall have been probably
restored—their prior rights will be recognized and preserved, if herein
applicant should ask for a permanent certificate or should wish to continue
operating his plant. It is needless to add that these temporary permits are
accepted at their face value, the permittees realizing that no extension or
continuation is thereby promised or held forth.
The order is sustained, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo,
Perfecto, Hilado, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
[1] Section 35, Com. Act 146; San Miguel
Brewery vs. Lapid, 53 Phil., 542; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. and Acro
Taxicab Co. vs. Danon, 58 Phil., 75.