NICANOR TAVORA, PETITIONER, VS. BONIFACIO N. GAVINA AND PEDRO O. ARCIAGA, RESPONDENTS.

There is no question about the fact alleged in the petition, that the
petitioner was appointed justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, and
took possession of his office on or about April 16, 1916, that he has not
resigned nor has he been removed therefrom, and that he has ceased to act as
such justice of the peace on December 1941, but reassumed his office after
liberation, that is, on April 27, 1945.

According to section 9 Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines,
the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.

The fact that the petitioner has performed the duties of justice of the peace
of the municipality of San Fernando, La Union, during the Japanese occupation of
the Philippines, by virtue of appointment made by the Chairman of the Executive
Commission, did not constitute an abandonment of his office held under the
Commonwealth, because the government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation was not a foreign government, but a government established
by the military occupant as an agency thereof to preserve order during the
occupation. This Court, in its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113),
held among others the following:

“(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth
continued in the Philippines by the belligerent occupant became also courts of
Japan, and their judgments and proceedings being acts of foreign courts can not
now be considered valid and continued by the courts of the Commonwealth
Government after the restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our
decision the fundamental reasons why said courts, while functioning during the
Japanese regime, could not be considered as courts of Japan, it is sufficient
now to invite attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How.,
498; 14 Law. ed., 240, which we did not deem necessary to quote in our decision,
in which it was held that ‘the courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico
during the war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more than
the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the
conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and
property while it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the
military power, and their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding
officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United
States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no
prize.’ (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; 14 Law. ed.,
240.)”

The appointment by President Osmeña of the respondent Bonifacio N. Gavina as
ad-interim justice of the peace of San Fernando on February 18, 1946, did not
oust the petitioner from his office, not only because such appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, but because the petitioner had
the constitutional right to continue in office until he has reached the age of
seventy years, and the President of the Commonwealth had no power to remove the
petitioner from office without just cause and previous investigation.

The appointment of the other respondent Pedro O. Arciaga as justice of the
peace of the same municipality made by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines and approved by the Commission on Appointments on July 27, 1946, did
not remove the petitioner from his office as justice of the peace of San
Fernando, La Union, since the petitioner had the constitutional right to
continue as such justice of the peace until he has reached 70 years; and upon
the cessation of the American sovereignty over these Islands and the
proclamation of the Philippine Independence, the petitioner did not cease to be
justice of the peace of said municipality of San Fernando, La Union. In this
connection the writer of this opinion in his concurring opinion in the case of
Brodett vs. De la Rosa (77 Phil., 752), held the following:

“The petitioners impugn the validity of the judgment of the respondent judge
on the ground that, as said respondent was not re-appointed by the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, he must have ceased to be judge upon the
proclamation of the Independence of the Philippines. Presumably the petitioners’
contention is based on the legal maxim of statutory construction—expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, and the provision of our Constitution relating
to the officers of the Commonwealth who should continue in office after the
proclamation of our Independence, which says:

” ‘The officials elected and serving under this Constitution shall be
constitutional officers of the free and independent Government of the
Philippines and qualified to function in all respects as if elected directly
under such Government, and shall serve their full terms of office as prescribed
in this Constitution.’

“The Philippine Independence Act promulgated by the Congress of the United
States on March 24, 1944, provides in its section 2 (b) (2) as
follows:

” ‘(b) The constitution [of the Philippines] shall also contain the
following provisions, effective as of the date of the proclamation of the
President recognizing the independence of the Philippine Islands, as hereinafter
provided:

” ‘(2) That the officials elected and serving under the constitution adopted
pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall be constitutional officers of the
free and independent Government of the Philippine Islands and qualified to
function in all respects as if elected directly under such Government, and shall
served their full terms of office as prescribed in the Constitution.’

“The last quoted provision which is incorporated in paragraph or section 1
(2), Article XVII, of the Constitution, constitutes a limitation on the power of
the framers of our Constitution to provide for the continuance or cessation of
the officers therein mentioned. As they were not at liberty to insert or not
said provision, its inclusion in our Constitution can not be considered as the
expression of their intention that the officers therein mentioned shall continue
as officer of the free and independent government of the Philippines.
Consequently, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which is
based upon the rules of logic and the natural working of the human mind and
serve as a guide in determining the probable intention of the makers of laws and
constitutions expressly mentioning some and not others, can not be applied or
invoked in support of the contention that, from the inclusion of said provision
it may be inferred that it was the intention of the delegates of the
Constitutional Convention which drafted our Constitution that appointive
officers and employees and other elective officials should cease or not continue
in office upon the proclamation of our Independence.

“On the other hand, as the framers of our Constitution were free to provide
in the Constitution for the cessation or continuation in office of all
appointive officers and employees and all other elective officers under the
Commonwealth, if it were their intention that they should not continue or cease,
they could and should have so expressly provided; but they did not do so. On the
contrary, the Constitution prescribes that “The members of the Supreme Court and
all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office,’ (section 9, Article VIII); that ‘The Auditor General shall
hold office for a term of ten years and may not be reappointed’ (section 1,
Article XI); that ‘No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law’ (section 4, Article XII).

“There is no doubt that the Constitution of the Philippines is a Constitution
for the Commonwealth and the Republic. Article XVIII thereof provides that ‘The
government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of
the United States and the proclamation of the Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of
the Philippines.’ The only provisions of the Constitution not applicable to the
Commonwealth are those of Article XVII which became effective upon the
declaration of the Independence of the Philippines; and the provisions of the
Constitution not applicable to the Republic of the Philippines are those of
Article XVI, or the transitory provisions from the former colonial or
territorial to the Commonwealth Government.

“The Constitution, referring to the transition from the former Philippine
Government to the Commonwealth, provides in its section 4, Article XVI, that
‘All officers and employees of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers
whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate
their respective offices upon the appointment and qualification of their
succesors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date
of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.’ Undoubtedly, the
framers of our Constitution deemed it necessary to so provide in order to avoid
any doubt about their authority to continue in office; because the said officers
and employees were appointed by authority of the People of the United States
represented by the Congress and the President of the United States, or the Jones
Law; while the officers and employees of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
were to be appointed by authority of the People of the Philippines in whom the
sovereignty resides and from whom all government authority emanates, according
to section 1, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines.

“But there is no similar provision in the Constitution covering the
transition from the Commonwealth to the Republic. Evidently, it was not deemed
necessary to provide expressly in the Constitution for the continuation of all
the officers and employees of the Commonwealth Government, because they had to
continue, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, for they are
officers and employees appointed by authority of the People of the Philippines,
since the Commonwealth as well as the Republic are government established by the
same Filipino people in the exercise of their sovereignty, limited under the
Commonwealth and complete or absolute after the proclamation of our
independence.

“That the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act
and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not
only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving
the Independence Law quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which
contains the declaration that ‘Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them’ (section 1, Article II), but also by
the Executive Department of the United States. The late President Roosevelt in
one of his messages to Congress said, among others, ‘As I stated on August 12,
1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations—in fact all the attributes
of complete and respected nationhood.’ (Congressional Record Vol. 29, part 6,
page 8173). And it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is ‘a
purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well
as all other officers, citizens and subjects.’

“A contrary construction, that is, that all appointive officers and employees
of the Government of the Commonwealth, from the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to an office messenger, had ceased ipso facto or automatically upon
the proclamation of the Independence of the Philippines, would lead to enormous
public inconvenience, a complete paralization of all the functions of the
government, since it would necessarily require a considerable period of time to
appoint the new officers and employees in their place. And if they were to hold
over or continue in office until their successors are appointed, as there is no
limitation provided in the Constitution as to the time within which the
appointing powers may or must appoint their successors, a sort of Damocles’
sword would be left hanging and ready to fall over the heads of said officers
and employees for an indefinite period of time, to the detriment of the pr6per
discharge of their functions and the independence that is to be expected from
judges in the performance of their duties, essential for a good and clean
government.

“In view of all the foregoing, it is evident that the respondent judge had
the constitutional right to continue acting as judge after the proclamation of
the Philippine Independence, and that, therefore, the judgment rendered by him
in the present case is that of a judge de jure and
valid.”

The fact that during the pendency of the present case before this Court, the
petitioner reached the age of seventy years, can not affect the question
involved in the present case, that is, whether or not the petitioner was the
rightful justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, at the time the
respondent Arciaga was appointed on July, 1946, justice of the peace in lieu of
the petitioner, and afterwards until he has reached the age of seventy
years.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude and hold that the petitioner had the
right to continue in office until he has reached the age of seventy years, with
all the privileges and emoluments appurtenant to the office; and that the
ad-interim appointment of respondent Gavina disapproved, and of the respondent
Arciaga approved, by the Commission on Appointments, had no effect whatever on
the status of the petitioner as justice of the peace of San Fernando until he
has reached the age of seventy years.

Moran, C.J., Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I concur in the result.

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HILADO, J.:

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that petitioner had the right to
continue in office until he reached the age of seventy years, with all the
privileges and emoluments thereto, appertaining, and that the ad interim
appointments of respondent Gavina which was disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments, and that of respondent Arciaga which was approved thereby, did not
operate to deprive petitioner of his right and title to said office until he
reached the age of 70 years on January 8, 1947. My reasons follow:

Although I am of opinion that the constitutional right of members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts to hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office, is waivable by the incumbent, and should be construed
without prejudice to the legal effects of abandonment in proper cases, I do not
see from the record that petitioner has waived said constitutional right nor
that he has abandoned his office as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La
Union, to which he was appointed and in which he duly qualified, and which he
took possession of on April 16, 1916. Petitioner’s appointment as justice of the
peace of San Fernando, La Union, by the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission, and which he alleges to have accepted “fearful that he might be
branded or suspected as being anti-Japanese with injurious consequences to
himself and his family,” under which he avers that he “acted, not willingly, as
such Justice of the Peace until July, 1944, but remaining all the time loyal of
the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and now to
the Republic of the Philippines” (Complaint, paragraph II [c], there
being no allegation on the part of respondents that petitioner acted wilfully
and disloyally toward his lawful government and to that of the United States),
did not in my opinion work an abandonment of his Commonwealth appointment, for
the double reason that if under the theory of the majority of this Court the
Philippine Executive Commission was a de facto government, then it was a
different government from the Commonwealth Government, which latter, under such
theory, must be considered as suspended in the areas where such de facto
government operated, with the consequence that when petitioner acted as justice
of the peace of said de facto government his functions under the de
jure government were in a state of suspension, which in turn give rise to
the result that he did not need to abandon his Commonwealth appointment in order
to be able to accept the occupation appointment; and that if the Philippine
Executive Commission was not even a de facto government but a mere puppet
organization, under my theory, then petitioner’s appointment thereby was and is
null and void so far as the Republic is concerned; and, lastly, so far as the
record reveals, his acceptance of the occupation appointment was under enemy
pressure, and for that reason was null and void any way.

Besides, it appears that petitioner after the reestablishment of the
Commonwealth government, more specifically on April 27, 1945, was recalled to
the office of the justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, and thereafter
acted and continued to act as such justice of the peace until December 10, 1945,
when he fell ill and obtained from the judge of the Court of First Instance of
the province a grant of sick leave, upon which occasion respondent Gavina, who
was. justice of the peace of San Gabriel and San Juan, La Union, was designated
to act in petitioner’s place “until he (petitioner) shall return to duty,” (Exh.
1). These facts clearly show that to the mind of the Commonwealth Government
petitioner had not been guilty of disloyalty or within breach of his oath of
office during the occupation.

PABLO, and PERFECTO, JJ.:

We concur in
this opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

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December 11, 1947

FERIA, J.:

This Court did not exercise its discretion to require the appearance of the
Solicitor General in this case under section 23, Rule 3, because the action does
not involve the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation; and did not notify him of the filing of this action, because it is
not the duty of the Solicitor General to represent the respondent Arciaga under
section 1661 (b) of the Administrative Code, since this is a quo
warranto proceeding instituted against the said respondent, not in his
official capacity as justice of the peace, but in his private capacity as an
alleged intruder or person alleged to be unlawfully holding the public office of
justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, to which the latter is entitled
under the Constitution.

However, we shall pass upon the merits of the motion for reconsideration and
new trial filed by the office of the Solicitor General (signed by the First
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon),
in order to put in bolder relief the unassailability of our opinion on the right
of the appointive officers of the Commonwealth to continue as officers of the
Republic. For clearness’ sake, we shall first state the basis of our opinion and
then the arguments of the Solicitor General.

We hold, in our decision in this case, that the petitioner could not be
removed from his office as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union,
because section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution provides that “the members
of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become
incapacitated to discharge their office.” The transition from the Commonwealth
to the Republic did not affect those officers appointed or holding office during
the Commonwealth, since there can be no doubt that the Constitution of the
Philippines is for the Commonwealth as well as for the Republic. The
Constitution is for both, because Article XVIII thereof provides that “The
government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of
the United States and the proclamation of the Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of
the Philippines.”

We stated in our decision that, it cannot be contended that the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to provide that appointive officers of the
Commonwealth should cease or not continue as officers of the Republic, may be
inferred from the inclusion of the provision of section 2 (b) of the
Philippine Independence Act of Tydings-McDuffie Law in our Constitution (as
section 1 [2], Article XVII) to the effect that “The officials elected and
serving under this constitution shall be constitutional officers of the free and
independent Government of the Philippines and qualified to function in all
respects as if elected directly under such government, and shall serve their
full term of office as prescribed in the Constitution. Because, the Congress of
the United States having required the inclusion of the above quoted provision in
our Constitution, the framers thereof were not free or at liberty to insert or
not said provision therein; and therefore, the legal maxim “expressio unius est
exclusio alterius” is not applicable, for this maxim is based upon the rules of
logic and the natural working of the human mind, and serves as a guide in
determining the probable intention of the makers of laws and constitutions in
mentioning some and not others of the same class.

The only arguments of the Solicitor General in support of his motion for
reconsideration and new trial which deserve some consideration, boils down to a
syllogism the premises of which we are quoting verbatim from his
memorandum, to wit:

Major premise: “Applying the maxim (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius)
there can be no question as to the intention of the United States Congress, in
providing that elective officials should continue as officials of the
independent Republic, to exclude those not belonging to that category of
officers [that is, that the latter should not continue in office upon
proclamation of our Independence], On the other hand, the framers of our
Constitution, by inserting without alteration or amendment the constitutional
provision in question must be deemed to have also adopted the intention of the
Congress of the United States as expressed in the Tydings-McDuffie Act.”

Minor premise: “The framers of the Constitution were most certainly free to
provide that other officers of the Commonwealth, besides those mentioned in said
provision of the Philippine Independence Act, should continue in office under
the Republic. Not having done so, the clear inference is that the framers of the
Constitution likewise adopted the intention of the United States Congress.”

Conclusion: Therefore, it was also the intention of the framers of the
Constitution that the appointive and other elective officers of the Commonwealth
should not continue as officers under the Republic.

The major and minor premises of the syllogism are not correct, and therefore
the conclusion is untenable.

The major premise is incorrect, since it assumes that it was the intention of
Congress, in requiring the insertion of the above-quoted provision, that the
appointive and other elective officers of the Commonwealth should not continue
in office as officers of the independent Government of the Philippines. For it
is evidently clear that the intention of the Congress of the United States, in
requiring that our Constitution should contain said transitory provision, was to
establish only that limitation on the Constitution and leave the framers thereof
free or at liberty to provide whether or not the appointive and other elective
officers of the Commonwealth should continue as officers of the independent
Government of the Philippines. The Solicitor General admits that “the framers of
the Constitution were free to provide that other officers of the Commonwealth
should continue in office under the Republic,” and consequently that they should
also not continue. Had it been the intention of the United States Congress that
all the other officers of the Commonwealth should not continue as officers of
the Republic, it should have enacted a provision to that effect among those
required by the Tydings-McDuffie Act to be included in our Constitution.

The minor premise is also incorrect, for it was not possible for the framers
of our Constitution to have adopted by mere implication the assumed intention of
the United States Congress that the appointive and other elective officers of
the Commonwealth should not continue as officers of the Republic. In the first
place, because there was no such an intention of the United States Congress as
already shown. And, besides because even assuming arguendo that the
United States Congress, in requiring the insertion in our Constitution of the
provision under consideration, had the intention that the appointive and other
elective officers of the Commonwealth should not continue as officers of the
Republic, it can not be inferred that the framers of our Constitution, in
including said provision and not providing otherwise, have adopted such
intention of the Congress. For the simple reason that the provision of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law under consideration was not adopted but imposed upon the
framers of our Constitution, and the latter were not free to include it or not.
To adopt a constitutional or statutory provision with its necessary
implications into another, presupposes freedom to do or not to do so. The legal
maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” is predicated upon one’s own
voluntary act and not upon that of others. Therefore, motion is
denied.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

---

PERFECTO, J.:

The Solicitor General, in a pleading dated November 14, 1947, moved for the
reconsideration of our decision in this case promulgated on October 30, 1947.
The main question raised in the motion refers to the interpretation of
subsection 2 of section 1 of Article XVII of the Constitution which reads as
follows:

“The officials elected and serving under this Constitution shall be
constitutional officers of the free and independent Government of the
Philippines and qualified to function in all respects as if elected directly
under such Government, and shall serve their full terms of office as prescribed
in this Constitution.”

The movant contends that, applying to the provision the Latin maxim “expresio
unius est exclusio alterius,” we should reverse the doctrine set in our decision
to the effect that the appointive officers of the Commonwealth continue, without
the need of a new appointment under the Republic, as de jure officers of
the Republic and may not be removed from office by the appointment of other
persons in their places except in the manner and for the causes provided by the
Constitution or by a statutory provision.

The question herein discussed has been raised for the first time in the
petition dated July 29, 1946, filed in the original case of prohibition of
Brodett vs. De la Rosa.

Petitioners in said case impunged the validity of an order issued on July 16,
1946, by Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa, of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
upon the fact that said judge has been appointed as such before the proclamation
of independence on July 4, 1946, and that not having been appointed under the
Republic, he ceased to have authority to issue the order in question by virtue
of the constitutional provision now under our consideration.

Petitioners argued that in accordance with subsection 2 of section 1 of
Article XVII of the Constitution, upon the cessation of the Commonwealth
Government on July 4, 1946, all its officers, with the exception of the elective
ones, ceased to have any authority. They maintain that to retain said authority
Judge De la Rosa must have been appointed anew by the President under the
Republic before issuing the order in question.

Petitioner’s contention was unanimously rejected by this Court in its
decision promulgated on December 18, 1946. To elaborate upon the Court’s theory,
Mr. Justice Feria wrote a concurring opinion, the statements in which have been
adopted in the majority decision in the instant case.

After a careful re-examination of the question, we cannot find our way for
reversing our pronouncement as to the inapplicability of the maxim. There is no
single valid ground in the arguments adduced by the Solicitor General to support
the reversal.

The constitutional provision in question must be read and construed, not as
an isolated and independent precept, but as an integral part of the whole
document in which it is embodied, and in the light of the history of its
enactment and insertion in the fundamental law.

As truthfully stated by the writer of the majority decision in this case, the
provision has been inserted in compliance with one of the specific mandates of
the Tydings-McDuffie Act. As one of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, we are in a position to certify that this statement is based on
fact.

It must be noted that there are three separate articles in the Constitution
reproducing provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act—Article XVI, Transitory
Provisions, Article XVII, Special Provisions Effective Upon the
Proclamation of the Independence of the Philippines, and the unnumbered
article entitled Ordinance Appended to the Constitution. At the time we
drafted the Constitution we had in mind two paramount purposes, to produce the
best possible constitution and to insure its approval by the President of the
United States. Whenever we felt that there was a conflict between the two, we
sacrificed the first for the sake of the second, having in mind that whatever
defects the document might have could later be cured by amendment when the
metropolis shall have withdrawn completely its sovereignty over our country.

The draft, as transferred to the Committee on Style, already embodied several
provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Still concerned with the idea of
insuring the approval of the President of the United States of America, the
Committee on Style, composed of the most representative members of the
Convention, including some of the foremost leaders of the two dominant political
parties of the country, both committed to the platform of securing our national
independence, added to the text many other provisions taken from the
Tydings-McDuffie Act, so as to drive in the mind of President Roosevelt the
conviction that none of the conditions imposed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act may
remain unfulfilled. We wanted to be sure that the Constitution should come into
effect and that upon the termination of the ten-year transitory period our
national independence shall be proclaimed. The complete success of the political
aims of the Constitutional Convention is born out by the events of more than one
decade of our national history.

Reading the provision in question, not as an isolated unit, but as an
integral part, so it is, of the fundamental law, there is absolutely no ground
in support of the theory advanced by the Solicitor General, The provisions of
Articles XVI and XVII and of the Ordinance are of special and transitory
character and, therefore, should be strictly construed. Nothing ought to be read
in them which is not clearly intended by their clear wording.

There is nothing in the provision in question to the effect that non-elective
officers and employees of the Commonwealth shall cease in their office upon the
proclamation of independence, or that in the Republic they shall be divested of
the rights, prerogatives and protection guaranteed and afforded to them by
constitutional or statutory provisions during the Commonwealth.

Being declaratory and affirmative, the provision in question cannot
comprehend any matter not covered by the clear meaning of its words.

Section IV of Article XV of the Constitution provides:

“No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law.”

There is absolutely no incompatibility between this precept and the special
provision in question. There is no conflict between the provision that elective
officials of the Commonwealth shall complete their full terms of office after
the proclamation of independence and the precept that the tenure of office of
civil service officers and employees shall not be interrupted subject only to
removal or suspension for cause as provided by law.

Under section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office.” This guaranty in favor of all the members
of the judiciary is not and cannot be affected by the provision we are
discussing. The two provisions may go hand in hand without any conflict.

The philosophy of the Constitution is premised on the idea of continuity and
stability as a general principle guiding the transition from pre-Commonwealth to
Republic Government so as to avoid a vacuum or hiatus disrupting the orderly
processes of society and leading to anarchy.

From a substantial point of view, the change and transfer from the
pre-Commonwealth Government to the Commonwealth Government has been more
significant and important than the change from the Commonwealth to the
Republic.

As a matter of fact, the last transition has been mostly a matter of form.
Under Article XVIII of the Constitution, “upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as
the Republic of the Philippines.” A mere matter of name.

The change from pre-Commonwealth to Commonwealth Government has been attended
by a revolution, peaceful and orderly but no less real. The American Governor
General, appointed by the President of a foreign country, has been replaced by a
Chief Executive elected by the free will of the Filipino people. It seems
unnecessary to elaborate on further details as to the revolutionary change from
American government to a Filipino government, from a foreign government to a
national government.

Even the fundamental concept of national sovereignty started only to become a
reality since the establishment of the Commonwealth. Such national sovereignty
of the Filipino people has since then become recognized by the United States of
America when, by authority of the Congress of the United States, President
Roosevelt approved our Constitution where it is declared: “The Philippines is a
Republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. (Section 1, Article II.)

In more than one statement issued during the last war, President Roosevelt
has officially recognized our government as a government of a sovereign country.
That recognition of our national sovereignty has been ratified by all the
members of the United Nations, not only when the Philippines took part in the
organization of the United Nations, but when all the other members have accepted
the ratification of the Charter made by our Senate on August 30, 1945, almost a
year before the proclamation of independence.

The general rule of continuity and stability, lying behind the philosophy
followed by the drafters of the Constitution, is supported by the fact that, in
order that the President of our people may place in government, especially in
key positions, men of his confidence, in substitution of those appointed by the
American Governor General, it has been necessary to insert the exception
provided in section 4 of Article XVI, which reads as follows:

“All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but
all officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President
shall vacate their respective, offices upon the appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from
the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.”

It will be noted that this section enunciates first the general rules of
continuity and stability and then proceeds to provide for an exception, which is
perfectly understandable if we take into consideration the revolutionary change
resulting from the replacement of a foreign appointive Chief Executive by an
elective Filipino President.

The transition from the Commonwealth Government to the Government of the
Republic being merely formal, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention did
not perceive any reason why the appointive officers should be disturbed in their
positions. By the same token by which we did not feel it necessary to disturb in
their positions the minor officers and employees upon the advent of the
Commonwealth, because their functions are strictly administrative and are
regulated by Civil Service rules, in accordance with Article XII of the
Constitution and pertiment statutory provisions, and there was no reasons to
believe that the continuation in office of Commonwealth minor officers and
employees may offer any obstacle to any administrative policy which the Filipino
President may adopt or any legislative policy which the National Assembly may
enact, in section 4 of Article XVI we circumscribed, the exception to officers
whose appointments are vested upon the President on the ground that many of them
were exercising policy-determining functions to control and supervise which the
President should have a free hand for the success of his administration.

Upon the advent of the Republic, policy-determining officers derived their
appointment from the elective President of the Philippines and not from any
other Chief Executive. Under our system of representative democracy, as
established by the fundamental law, their authority emanated from the sovereign
people, the latter being represented by the elective officials who will continue
holding their offices after independence. There was absolutely no reason why we
should have authorized a new revamping of the government, prone to provoke
unnecessary political complications, uncertainty and uneasiness in public
service, set aside merits in the service, and give rise to understandable
machinations, each and all of which are not conducive to the bolstering of
public interest but, on the contrary, are highly detrimental to the general
well-being of the people.

Movant’s theory, besides lacking any basis in the clear text of the
Constitution, is highly dangerous. In effect, it will give the President
unlimited discretion to change part of or the whole membership of the Supreme
Court, the great majority of the judges of inferior courts, and all other
officers whose appointment is vested in him by the Constitution, and high
executive officers unlimited discretion to replace with outsiders, excluding
political favorites, thousands upon thousands of officers and employees in the
civil service, the overwhelming majority of whom have been rendering long years
of honest, faithful, efficient, and meritorious service to the government and to
the people. Shall any one be surprised if under such situation the backbone of
our judicial system and the solid body of our civil service shall be broken into
pieces to be used as pawns in political maneuvers? After smashing the principle
of stability which guarantees the independence of the judiciary and an honest
and efficient civil service, the resulting situation of insecurity will not fail
to lead to evil consequences, highly detrimental to public peace.

No one can ignore the possibility that the situation may be used to further
entrench in government the political party in power, no matter what the people
may feel about it, and wipe out all opposition to insure the existence of a
one-party system, a step beyond which lies a truculent dictatorship. Judicial
independence and civil service stability are indispensable in the democratic
system of government established by the Constitution. Their necessary
alternatives are fascism and tyranny. To accept these alternatives will be an
unpardonable betrayal of our conscience and of our people.

The other grounds
alleged in the motion for reconsideration being also unmeritorious, so much so
that we deem it unnecessary to waste any time on them, we hold and so vote that
the motion should be, as it is now, denied.

---

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the foregoing resolution, without prejudice to my concurring
opinion when this case was decided originally. I only wish to add that when
Article XVIII of the Constitution was included therein, providing that “upon the
final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines,” the framers must
have intended the Republic of the Philippines, which was there provided to
automatically come into existence upon the happening of the event therein
mentioned, to be a republican government complete with the same three great
departments, their respective bureaus, divisions and subordinate offices, and
their respective personnel, that made up the Government of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, which was thus to be transformed into the Republic. By its very
nature a “republic, as that contemplated by the Tydings-McDuffie Act and the
Constitution of the Philippines adopted pursuant thereto, is a tripartite form
of government composed of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial
departments. Most assuredly, the framers did not intend that upon the withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of the independence
of the Philippines there should emerge a republic without a judicial department
and without all other governmental offices occupied by appointive officials, as
well as elective ones not constitutional in nature; and just as certainly can it
be assumed that said framers did not intend to leave with the newly born
republic upon its emergence only the names of the offices and positions
constituting the judiciary, as well as such other appointive and elective
offices as were not constitutional in nature, without their incumbents who were
occupying them under the Commonwealth Government at the very moment of its
transformation into the Republic.

If it be considered, as I think it should, that the framers of the
Constitution in Article XVIII thereof intended that all the great departments of
the Commonwealth government, with all their bureaus, divisions and subordinate
offices, and all their personnel, should continue intact and go with the
government when it was automatically transformed into that of the Republic of
the Philippines upon the happening of the historic event therein spoken of, it
will follow without saying that those of said officials whose offices were
constitutional would continue in their respective offices by virtue of the same
constitution, among whose provisions section 9 of Article VIII would still
continue to govern. Concretely referring to the judiciary, as we have to in the
present incident, it is elementary that a court can not exist without a judge
(21 C.J.S., p. 214, section 139).

Therefore, the judicial officers referred
to in said section 9 were under the Republic, just as they had under the
Commonwealth, to “hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of
seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office.”