G.R. No. L-788. October 30, 1947
CEBU TRANSIT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
PARAS, J.:
City of Cebu and its suburbs under a certificate of public convenience issued in
its favor by the Public Service Commission in 1931. Due to the destruction and
loss of the records of the Commission consequent upon the last war, the
petitioner, under date of December 21, 1945, filed an application (Case No.
4502), for the reconstitution of its certificate of public convenience. After
hearing, the Commission rendered a decision dated May 13, 1946, directing the
issuance to the petitioner of a reconstituted certificate containing, however,
the new condition that the same “shall be valid and subsisting only for a period
of fifteen (15) years.” The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in
which it was contended that the condition “was imposed without any evidence
before this Honorable Commission to reasonably support such limitation.” The
motion was denied after a hearing at which counsel for the petitioner did not
present any evidence. Hence this appeal.
It is not pretended that the Commission has no power to impose the condition
in question upon certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939, the date of the
approval of Commonwealth Act No. 454, which amended section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146 in a sense authorizing the Commission to prescribe “as a condition
for the issuance of the certificate * * * that the certificate shall be valid
only for a definite period of time.” But even if the petitioner does make such
pretense, we need only refer to the decision in Pangasinan Transportation Co.
vs. Public Service Commission (70 Phil., 221), upholding the power of the
Commission on the ground, among others, that “statutes enacted for the
regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its
police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after their passage, but likewise to those already established and in
operation.”
Petitioner’s principal criticism is addressed to the alleged total absence of
evidence reasonably supporting the appealed decision in so far as it limits the
duration of its reconstituted certificate to fifteen years. In answer, it may be
pointed out that the petitioner itself presented in evidence the decisions of
the Commission dated February 4, 1931, December 19, 1933, and January 31, 1939,
regarding the issuance of petitioner’s original certificate, its authorization
to increase its equipment and to reduce its rates, and the design and color of
its taxicabs. The Commission can thus be deemed to have considered the facts
appearing in said decisions, in connection with the results of its own
observations and investigations which ripened into the issuance by the
Commission of its memorandum of July 26, 1939, approved by the Secretary of
Justice on August 23, 1939, fixing the duration periods for various public
services, fifteen years being thought proper for taxicab services. As held in
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Araullo (60 Phil., 833). “The Public
Service Commission in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative
functions has the power to take into consideration the result of its own
observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for consideration
and decision, in connection with other evidence presented at the hearing of a
case.”
The case before us is not one in which the petitioner did not have an
opportunity to be heard or to present evidence, because when its motion for
reconsideration was heard,—and that was the suitable stage wherein it could show
the impropriety of the period of fifteen years by corresponding evidence—its
counsel merely manifested that “we submit our case on the basis of our motion
for reconsideration.” We take it that the petitioner never claimed that it can
hold its certificate in perpetuity or beyond fifty years, the maximum period
prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 146 and in the Constitution. Consequently,
the petitioner could only have contended that its certificate should be made
valid for a period longer than fifteen, but not exceeding fifty years, and it
could have presented the necessary evidence at the hearing of its motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, considering that the period fixed by the Commission
started only from 1946, the duration of petitioner’s certificate, including the
period subsequent to its issuance in 1931 up to 1945, covers a total of nearly
thirty years.
The appealed decision is therefore affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs
against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING
FERIA, J.:
I concur in the result.
The petition of the appellant in the present case is for reconstitution of
the certificate of public convenience to operate a taxicab service, and for
renewal or replacement of its equipment consisting of eleven taxicabs which were
lost during the war. One of the conditions imposed upon the petitioner by the
decision which granted the original certificate dated February 4, 1941, Exhibit
A, is that the appellant can not replace its equipment without the authority of
the Commissioner; and the second and fourth paragraphs of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, read as
follows:
” ‘The Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the
certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired
by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon
payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation;
and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period
of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the
immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express
action on the part of the Commission.” ‘The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of
certificates actually in force and to those which may hereafter be issued, to
permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to
authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.’ ” (Italics
ours.)
Under the above quoted provisions, the Commissioner may impose as a condition
for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience that the certificate be
valid for a definite period of time. Periods of validity of each type of
certificate of public convenience are fixed by the Public Service Commission in
accordance with a memorandum of July 26, 1939, prepared by the Commission and
its experts, and approved by the Secretary of Justice on August 23, 1939, which
fixes the periods of validity as follows:
“TPU Service 25 years Taxicab service 15 years Autocalesa service 10 years PU service 15 years Garage service 15 years TH service 15 years TG service 15 years Wharfs or docks 25 years Shipyards 25 years Marine repair shops 25 years Warehouses 25 years Canal and irrigation systems 50 years Ice plants and Ice refrigeration plants 15 years Public services operated by Municipal or Provincial
Governments50 years Marine railway, subways, electric, telephone, sewerage, wireless,
gas, water
Life of certificates, same as that fixed in the
franchise.”Railroad Street railway service Tramways
Though the petitioner was originally granted a certificate of public
convenience in 1931, the above quoted provisions of law and schedule of periods
of validity were applicable and applied to the appellant when it applied for
reconstitution of its original certificate and renewal or replacement of its
equipment. This Court in the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs.
Public Service Commission (70 Phil., 221), held among others, that “statutes
enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the
state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities
coming into existence after their passage, but likewise to those already
established and in operation.”
Appellant contends that according to law, there must be a hearing before the
Commissioner may determine and decide whether, according to the evidence, the
public interest will be promoted by limiting the period of validity imposed upon
a certificate of public convenience to less than fifty years. And the appellant
was not given a hearing. This contention is untenable. The limitations or
periods of validity of certificates of public convenience set forth in the
memorandum above quoted are based on experience and training of engineers,
accountants and technical men in the service of Public Commission, and not being
arbitrary, the decision of the Commission which applies therein provided to the
present case, should not be disregarded by this Court (Manila Electric Co.
vs. Reyes, G. R. No. 41988).
The decision of this Court in the case
entitled “the Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Public Service
Commission,” G. R. No. 47065 is not applicable to the present case, because the
question as to power of the Commission to impose the limitation to 25 years of
the life of the certificate or public convenience in that case, arose and was
decided before the memorandum which fixes the periods of validity of
certificates of public convenience, was approved by the Secretary of Justice and
adopted and applied by the Commission. Before said adoption and application, as
there was no limitation on the discretion of the power of the Commission as to
the period of validity, provided it does not exceed the maximum period of 50
years, it was necessary to have a hearing in order that the Commission might
determine the period of validity which would promote public interest. After the
application of said memorandum as a standard to be followed by the Commission,
such hearing is no longer necessary, because it is to be presumed that the
periods of limitation set forth therein promote the public interest in a proper
and suitable manner. The contention of the appellant would be tenable had the
Commission imposed a period of limitation less than or in excess of 15 years
without a hearing, for especial circumstances should be shown in a hearing” to
justify the nonapplication of the already fixed period of validity of 15 years
applicable to all taxicab service. After all, before the expiration of the
period of validity of its certificate, the appellant may apply for an amendment
or extension thereof, and show that public interest would be promoted by
amending or extending the period of validity of its certificate.