MACARIO QUINTERO AND RAMON GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. FELIX MARTINEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, AND PIO D. LIWANAG, RESPON…

This is a special action of mandamus to compel the respondent
judge to issue in the civil case No. 7359, instituted by the petitioner against
the respondent Pio D. Liwanag and the Sheriff of the City of Manila a
preliminary prohibitory injunction restraining the respondent sheriff from
executing the final judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila in the civil case
No. 4217 on the ground that the said judgment was obtained through fraud,
falsification and collusion.

There can not be any question that it is a discretionary, and
not a ministerial duty of the respondent judge, to issue or not a preliminary
injunction in a case pending before its court, for section 3, Rule 60, provides
that a preliminary injunction may be granted when it appears prime facie
“that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of; that the commission or continuance of the acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; and that
the defendant is doing, threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights
respecting the subject of the action.”

It is obvious that mandamus lies against a tribunal or judge
who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from his office, that is to perform a ministerial
duty specially enjoined by law. It is not the function of mandamus to compel
a judge exercising a judicial function such as the issuance of preliminary
injunction, to grant or deny it, however clearly erroneous its action in
granting or denying the injunction may be; and therefore the respondent judge
can not be compelled to issue the injunction sought by the petitioned just
because he acted contrary to law or with grave abuse of discretion in denying
the injunction. The ruling of this Court in the case of Bañares vs. Flordeliza
and Gavito, 51 Phil., 786, was a very special one laid down under the special
circumstance of particular case not applicable to the case at bar.

Besides the respondent judge acted in the present case in
conformity with law. The first and principal cause of action in civil case No.
7359 is to annul the final judgment of the municipal court in the case No. 4217
on the ground of fraud. And in the third cause of action, the plaintiffs seek to
restrain the sheriff of the City of Manila from carrying out the order of
execution of said judgment, on the ground that the judgment is null and void;
that the commission or continuance of the execution complained of during the
litigation would work injustice to the plaintiffs, and that the defendant
sheriff is ejecting or threatens to eject the plaintiffs in violation of their
rights. It is evident that the third cause of action does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and therefore the plaintiffs are not
entitled prima facie to the relief demanded therein, which consists in
restraining the defendant sheriff from executing the judgment; and that the
sheriff in executing the final judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila by
order of the said court is only complying with his official duty, and does not
violate the plaintiffs’ right. Therefore none of the requisites required by
section 3, Rule 60, for granting a preliminary injunction exists.

Unless and until the court sets aside as null and void the
final judgment of the Municipal Court of Manila in the civil case No. 4217 on
the ground of fraud, the execution thereof can not be enjoined in an action of
in junction against the sheriff of Manila, because the presumption is that the
judgment was legally rendered. If the first cause of action seeking to annul
said final judgment is decided in favor of the petitioners and the judgment is
set aside, which will carry with it the nullity of the writ of execution, the
sheriff could no longer enforce it without necessity of being enjoined not to do
so. The third cause of action can have no independent existence, for it is a
mere sequence of the first. To issue a preliminary injunction as ancillary to
the third cause of action alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint in civil case No.
7359, would be to allow judgment debtors to delay the execution of it final
judgment against them by filing a complaint like the one filed by the
petitioners in the said case, irrespective of the final outcome of the
action.

In view of the foregoing, the petition mandamus is dismissed,
and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court in the present case is
consequently set aside, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Mogran, C.J., Ozaeta, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I dissent for the same reason stated in the Lopez vs.
Gutierrez.