DOMINADOR S. PONGOS, PETITIONER, VS. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (RIZAL CITY BRANCH) AND THE SHERIFF OF RIZAL, RE…

This is a special civil action of certiorari filed this Court
by the petitioner against the respondent Judge Bienvenido A. Tan to set aside an
order of the respondent judge for the delivery by the petitioner of the
machineries, equiptments, and appurtenances of the Pasay Ice Plant and Cold
Storage to the other respondent.

According to the facts alleged in the petition, the petitioner
instituted an action against the respondent Hidalgo Enterprises Inc., civil case
No. 472 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to cancel or rescind the
contract between them by which the petitioner turned over and delivered to the
respondent the full management, operation, possession and control of the Pasay
Ice Plant and Storage, and conveyed to said respondent, by way of chattel
mortgage, all the machineries, equipment, accessories and the certificate of
public convenience of the said plant, as security for the payment of the
advances of money made by the respondent to pay the outstanding debts and
obligation due from the petitioner to other person on account of said Ice Plant
and Cold Storage.

The defendant Hidalgo Enterprises Inc., during the pendency of
the suit, secured first a writ of mandatory injunction directing the plaintiff,
now petitioner, to surrender the possession of the said Pasay Ice Plant and Cold
Storage to the;said defendant and afterwards, upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by the plaintiff, the respondent judge reconsidered its order and
appointed a receiver, who qualified as such and took possession of said
properties on March 30, 1948, and died in February, 1949.

On or about June 25, 1945, before another receiver had been
appointed, the defendant Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. amended its answer and set up
a counterclaim for the recovery of money due from the plaintiff-petitioner to
the defendant-respondent and the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage above
mentioned, and as a necessary step for the foreclosure asked the court to order
the plaintiff who was in possession of the machineries, equipment, and
appurtenances of the Pasay Ice Plant and Cold Storage, to deliver them to the
defendant, which was granted by the court, and hence the filing of the present
action of certiorari.

The petitioner contends that the respondent judge exceeded in
the exercise of his jurisdiction in ordering the delivery of the personal
property mortgaged to the respondent, on two grounds: First, because said
properties were in custodia legis and the respondent juige had no
authority to order their delivery to the defendant; and second, because the
respoondent Hidalgo Enterprises being a defendant in the civil action No. 472,
cannot ask for the delivery of personal property, since such order may be
secured only by the plaintiff according to Rule 62 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner’s contentions are untenable. As to the first ground,
“The appointment of a receiver vests in the court no absolute control over the
property and no general authority to displace vested contract liens, and while a
receiver will be appointed only on the application of one who appears to have an
interest in the subject-matter, yet when the appointment is made the receiver is
a mere officer of the court, and the appointment creates no lien in favor of any
of the parties applying for it and gives no advantage or preference to such
parties over other claimants to the property; it does not determine the rights
of the parties,” * * * (Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, Vol. 34, p. 180).

And as to the second ground, it is obvious that the defendant
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. with respect to the plaintiff’s complaint, is the
plaintiff in the counterclaim filed by him against the plaintiff. “A
counterclaim is termed a mutual petition, because both parties sue each other
mutually in the same action, each of them assuming the double role of plaintiff
and defendant, before the trial judge, and the two suits are brought under a
single proceeding where both actions are tried at the same time and finally
determined in one and the same judgment” (De la Peña vs. Hidalgo, 20 Phil.,
323). If a counterclaim was considered a counter suit filed by the defendant
against the plaintiff, the counterclaim of the defendant respondent Hidalgo
Enterprises Inc. may a fortiori be considered a complaint against the
plaintiff-petitioner, for it is rather in the nature of a cross complaint than
of a counterclaim under the old Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the
respondent Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. as counterclaimant or plaintiff in the
counterclaim may obtain from the respondent judge an order for delivery to it of
the personal properties he seeksto recover in its counterclaim from the
plaintiff.

Wherefore the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
and Montemayor, JJ., concur.