THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FLORO YBOA ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

HILADO, J.:


Floro Yboa and Antonio Yboa appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Samar finding them guilty of the crime of assault upon an
agent of a person in authority and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of from (5) months and (11) days of arresto mayor to (1) year,
(8) months and (20) days of prision correccional

to pay a fine in the
sum of four hundred pesos (P400.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, said subsidiary imprisonment in no case to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty, and to pay the costs.

The appellants are brothers, Floro being a dentist, and Antonio a driver.

During the first months following the liberation of Samar, the United States
Army established in Catbalogan, the capital, its unit known as the Philippine
Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU) No. 28, with Captain lyden as supply, relief, and
welfare officer. That unit of the United States Army rendered help and
assistance to the civil government in a number of matters, principally supplies
for civilian relief, health and sanitation, civilian hospitals and medical care,
peace and order, reopening of schools, and appointment of temporary officials.
However, the said unit did not thereby become in any sense, a branch or agency
of the Commonwealth Government nor of that of the province or of the city or
town in which it operated—it continued, for obvious reasons, to be a unit of the
United States Army. Its officers and employees were not answerable to the
Commonwealth Government nor to that of the province, city, or municipality in
whose civil affairs it rendered its help and assistance. They naturally
continued under the exclusive control and discipline of the Army of which they
were but a unit. In contemplation of law, it was the United States Army which
was, through its said unit, rendering said help and assistance to the civil
government, and, if we were to hold that the officers and personnel, including
the civilian employees,of said PCAU No. 28, became functionaries of the civil
government while they were rendering the latter said aid and assistance, we
would have to hold that the United States Army itself became a part or agency of
the civil government on the same account, which is, of course, absurd.

Captain Myden’s right-hand man at the PCAU office in Catbalogan during the
period referred to in this case was the offended party herein, Jose Claudio, who
was employed as cashier in the supply office by virtue of an appointment duly
extended to him on January 27, 1945. In that capacity he was authorized by his
superiors to enforce PCAU rules and regulations.

In early April, 1945 employees of the PCAU in charge of checking up the
distribution of relief detected an anomaly involving the Yboa brothers, Floro
and Vicente, who were found to be purchasing rations at two different PCAU
stores under one and the same ration card, in violation of PCAU rules and
regulations. Before April 28, 1945 when the occurrence giving rise to this case
took place, appellant Antonio Yboa was informed by his wife that Jose” Claudio
had been circulating all over the town the talk that Dr. Floro Yboa had
committed serious irregularities in the purchase of his PCAU rations. At this,
the appellants took offense.

At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of April 28, 1945 while Jose Claudio was
discharging his duties at the supply office of the PCAU in Catbalogan, which was
barely 30 yards from the Provincial Capitol, he was told by a fellow employee,
named Alejandro Villarin, that Dr. Floro Yboa wanted to see him outside.
Villarin transmitted the message to Claudio, but as the latter was busy at the
time, he asked Villarin to request Dr. Iboa to wait for a while or to come
inside if he so desired. Shortly thereafter, the defendant Antonio Iboa asked
Villarin to come out of the PCAU office and there Dr. Yboa reiterated to
Villarin his request that Claudio be asked in his name to see him outside.
Thereafter, Claudio went out of his office to see Dr. Yboa, who, upon seeing the
former, started questioning him saying, “Peping, what is this I heard?” At this
moment, the defendant Antonio Yboa appeared from behind his brother and without
warning struck Claudio with his fist, as a result of which the latter was
stunned and fell to the ground. According to the medical certificate of the
Director of the Sasiar Civilian Hospital, who examined and rendered medical
assistance to the offended party, the latter suffered a contusion in the
interclavicular region which required two days medical attendance.

Before committing the assault the appellant Antonio Iboa had been walking to
and fro between the Capitol Building and the supply office of the PCAU for
around twenty five minutes, all this time with his knuckles wrapped with a
handkerchief “like a boxer before he inserts his hands in the gloves”, in the
words of the witness Estavillo. This appellant himself admitted in his testimony
that, upon being informed by his wife a few days before the incident, that
Claudio had been circulating the talk about his brother Floro, he decided to
assault Claudio.

The principal question around which hinges the determination of this case is
whether Jose Claudio, the offended party, was, under the facts above narrated,
an agent of a person in authority. We find no difficulty in holding that he was
not, without prejudice to the imposition of the corresponding penalty for the
criminal offense committed by the accused, Antonio Yboa, as hereinafter
considered.

It has been settled by former decisions of this Court that a “person in
authority” referred to by the former Penal Code (whose pertinent provisions have
been incorporated in the present Revised Penal Code) is a “functionary of the
Civil Government” and that “an officer of the United States is not a person
vested with jurisdiction and is not a public officer, who takes part in the
performance of duties in the public service of the Philippine Islands” (U. S.
vs. Smith, 39 Phil. 533, 537, and cases therein cited). In the same
case and on the same page of the cited volume, this Court said:

“We think that the terms ‘person in authority’ and ‘public officer found in
the Spanish Penal Code must be given a restricted meaning so as to include only
persons who perform some of the functions of the Government of the Philippine
Islands.”

In the case of Carrington vs. U. S, (1908), 208 U. S. 1, the United
States Supreme Court said that “As a soldier he (Carrington) was not an officer
of the Philippines, but of the United States.”

Captain Myden of the PCAU No. 28 in Catbalogan, Samar, did not cease to be an
officer of the United States Army, and therefore of the United States
government, because his duties, as head of said unit, comprised the rendering
of.assistance and help to the liberated areas within the sphere of his
activities in civil affairs. He was still rendering that assistance as an
officer and a part of the United States Army. Indeed, his unit was a unit of
that Army. As already stated above, for the discharge of those duties, Captain
Myden was not answerable to either the Commonwealth Government, the provincial
government of Samar or the city government of Catbalogan.

If, then, Captain Myden was not a “person in authority”, within the meaning
of Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, his right-hand man, Jose Claudio,
could not be an “agent of a person in authority”, within the meaning of the same
article. This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the offense committed
could not be that penalized by the said article.

The evidence falls far short of establishing any guilty participation on the
part of appellant Floro Yboa in the offense committed by his brother, Antonio,
for which reason the former should be acquitted with one-half of the costs
de officio.

As to appellant Antonio Yboa, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that he inflicted upon Jose Claudio physical injuries which required
medical attendance for two days and which therefore should be classified as
slight physical injuries punishable by arresto menor under Article 266,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. We further find from the facts above
stated that the commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery (People vs. Capitania, 49 Phil. 475; People
vs. Pengzon, 44 Phil. 224) and evident premeditation (United States
vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457).

Wherefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, we acquit appellant Floro
Yboa, with one-half of the costs de officio and convict appellant Antonio Yboa
of the crime of slight physical Injuries, sentencing him to suffer 30 days of
arresto menor, with the corresponding accessory penalty, and to pay one-half of
the costs. So ordered.

Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, and Padilla, JJ., concur.