FROILAN LOPEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SILVESTRE DE JESUS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The plaintiff is the owner of an apartment known and identified as No. 2237
Rizal Avenue, Manila. This apartment has been occupied by the defendant since
September, 1940, tmder a verbal contract of lease calling for a monthly rental
of P35.00 payable in advance, which was raised by the plaintiff to P44.00 in
June, 1945. On April 2, 1945, and. again on July 2, 1945, the plaintiff gave
notice to the defendant for,-him to vacate the premises. Defendant’s failure to
do so led to the filing, on July 9, 1945, by the plaintiff of an action for
ejectment in the Municipal Court of Manila which, after trial, handed down a
decision in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, but the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in vttieh the parties submitted a stipulation of
facts, rendered a judgment for restitution and the payment of the monthly rental
of 144.00 beginning June 1, 1945.

Appealing again, the defendant — through his counsel — argues that the action
for ejectment was prematurely instituted and that, at least on equitable
considerations, he should be allowed to stay.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 provides that “A lease for the
occupation as dwelling of a building or part thereof which is not a room or
rooms of an hotel, which does not specify any term, shall be considered of six
months duration counted from the date of occupation by virtue of said lease at
the option of the lessee.” It is now the theory of the appellant that since the
period of his lease was not specified, he has the right to remain as lessee for
at least six months from June 1, 1945, when the rental was increased to P44.00 —
an act which resulted in a novation of the original lease.

Counsel for the appellant is mistaken. As the lease did not have a fixed
term, it should be considered as one from month to month (the rental being
payable monthly) and to have ceased, without the necessity of special notice,
upon the expiration of every month. (Article 1581, Civil Code.) Even if, as
contended by the appellant, a novation took place when the appellee increased
the rent in June, 1945, the lease was still monthly and terminated after said
month. Appellee’s election to end the lease was unmistakably made known to the
appellant when, on July 2, 1945, the latter was asked to vacate. Consequently,
after June, 1945, there was no longer any lease that could be affected by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.689, which, was enacted only on October 15,
1945, even assuming that said law is applicable to a legal relation that came
into being prior to its enactment.

From the equitable viewpoint, appellant’s case cannot also prosper. He might
have been an old tenant now facing the difficulty of finding another house, but
this circumstance cannot nullify the legal rights of the appellee and his family
who have been admittedly “compelled to live upon the charity of some friend who
generously offered them temporary shelter in his house which is overcrowded, to
say the least.”

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Padilla, JJ., concur.