THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL RICARTE ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Accused of the crime of homicide committed on April 10, 1945, in Iloilo, for
allegedly participating in the killing of Emilio Dahuya, appellant Manuel
Ricarte was sentenced by the lower court to suffer from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000,
without subsidiary imprisonment, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay one-half of the costs.

As to how the deceased was killed, the prosecution called only one witness to
testify, Concepcion Binalon.

At about 9 a. m. on April 10, 1945, because it was warm, Concepcion was at
the window of her house and she saw the two accused and the deceased coming down
from a house. Evangelio asked Dahuya why he went up the house in undershirt when
there were girls and Americans enjoying singing. Dahuya answered that it did not
matter because it was warm. “You are shameless,” said Evangelio and immediately
hit Dahuya with a guitar. Dahuya wrested the guitar from the former and hit him
with it. Ricarte took a piece of bamboo and hit Dahuya at the left jaw; Dahuya
fell. Evangelio mounted on Dahuya and gave him fist blows at the mouth and in
the face. Ricarte ran away saying, “Continue fighting as I am going to call
Porfirio,” the latter being a brother of Evangelio. Concepcion shouted for help
but nobody came. She ran away and went to tell Amparo, Dahuya’s wife, that her
husband died. The incident took place in the District of Lapuz, jurisdiction of
La Paz, City of Iloilo.

The above was testified to by Concepcion Binalon in her direct testimony. At
cross-examination, she testified that Dahuya was her step-son. The witness is
the owner of the house where she was at the time of the incident. But she was
not living there because it was still unfinished. She was temporarily living in
the house of one Anunciacion about three “brazas” away. When the incident took
place, her husband was present. She was about three “brazas” away from the
accused and the deceased when the incident took place, which happened for” less
than an hour. All the time she remained standing at the place facing the three
persons. It was only when Dahuya fell down and Evangelio mounted on him and
rained blows on his face when she cried for help. After that, “me retire a
casa.” She could not tell whether Evangelio was still in the same place with
Dahuya when she returned to her house, because people gathered at the place,
including American MPs. She does not know if any investigation was conducted at
the place of the incident that night. The incident was also witnessed by a
woman, Adelina Santillan. When Dahuya was being hit by Evangelio, “he was
already dead.”

Several reasons compel us not to accept Concepcion Binalon’s testimony to
convict appellant:

1. Her name does not appear in the list of witnesses appearing at the bottom of
   the information, and nowhere in the record can we find any explanation why her
   name was omitted if she was to be used as a witness.

2. In her direct testimony she declared having witnessed the incident from the
   window of her unfinished house, while at her cross-examination she testified
   that she witnessed the incident standing in an unmentioned place but other than
   her house, from which she had to retire to said house, after unsuccessfully
   crying for help, a contradiction not having been explained in any way.

3. While her husband was present when the incident took place, no explanation
   has been given why said husband was not presented as witness, although he must
   be the father of the deceased, as can be deduced from the fact that the latter
   is the step-son of the witness, and, therefore, should have taken interest in
   the case.

4. No explanation has been given why the witness, notwithstanding her relations
   with the deceased, went away from the place when people, including American MPs,
   came around, instead of giving her version of the incident to the authorities
   present. She even failed to know whether any investigation was conducted in the
   place at the very night of the incident.

5. Adelina Santillan is mentioned by the witness as one who also witnessed the
   incident, but, for no reason at all, said woman was not called to testify.
6. The information carries a list of witnesses for the prosecution, including
   Antonina Magluyan, Maria de la Cruz, and Adela Dahuya, but no one of the three
   was called to testify.

7. Another witness for the prosecution, also mentioned in the information, is
   Loreto A. Herrera. She was not called to testify for the prosecution. But the
   defense called her to testify, and her testimony corroborates the defense.

8. The alibi of appellant Manuel Ricarte is supported, not only by his
   own testimony but also by testimonies of Loreto A. Herrera, Valentin Concepcion
   and his co-accused Igmedio Evangelio. The latter testified that it was he alone
   who fought with the deceased and it was he who hit the deceased with a piece of
   bamboo. There is no reason why he should assume exclusive responsibility for the
   killing, while he was still on trial and not knowing whether he was to be
   acquitted or not, unless he was telling the truth.

Our conclusion is
that there is no evidence of record to support appellant’s conviction beyond all
reasonable doubt.

When the evidence of the prosecution consists in the uncorroborated testimony
of a lone witness, who has incurred in an unexplained contradiction on an
important detail and had shown an attitude apparently inconsistent with the
truth of his testimony, it should not be enough basis to convict the accused.
The fact that the prosecution, without explanation, failed to call several
witnesses, three mentioned in the information and the two others mentioned by
its lone witness, the presumption is that their testimonies will not be
favorable to the prosecution’s cause.

The lower court’s decision is reversed and appellant Manuel Ricarte is
acquitted.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones,
and Padilla, JJ., concur.

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TUASON, J.:

I regret I am unable to give my assent to the decision of the Court. Upon
consideration of the conflicting evidence, there is no occasion to reverse the
finding of the trial judge. The Court has departed, without cause, from the
time-honored, rational and realistic norm of this Court of respecting the
decision, on the question of credibility, of the judge who was in the best
position to gauge that credibility.

Independent of the lower court’s finding, I am satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant is guilty. The prosecution’s eye-witness had no motive
to perjure herself, and the evidence discloses nothing to impeach her ability to
recognize the appellant. She and he had known each other intimately and had
resided in the same barrio. Under the circumstances, she could tell him from
others even without seeing his facial features.

I am firmly convinced that the accused was present at the affray. I might
doubt the evidence against him on the score of what he actually did in that
affray if he had admitted his presence and denied participation in the fight.
But his defense is crude and should not merit serious attention. In putting up
alibi, he established by inference his direct intervention in the
crime—assuming, as I believe the evidence shows, that he was with his
coaccused.

The majority overlook the fact that appellant was arrested on the
morning of the next day, if not sooner, and was held under detention from that
time on. The importance of this circumstance is that it tends to preclude the
idea of the accusation against him being trumped-up.