ALEJO MABANAG ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE LOPEZ VITO ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated “Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto.” The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the above-mentioned
resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.

The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of
the case it is unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will mention only
the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose
it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the
plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in
the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the
Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the
elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension
had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take
part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress.

At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this
Court. The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the
collusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some
merit in the petitioners’ contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which
is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an enactment or
resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection, however,
is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between
the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they boil down to the same
thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the
regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal, coordinate, and independent
departments of the Government. If a political question conclusively binds the
judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill rule” born of that
respect.

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C. J. S., 431.) This
doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle
also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The
difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions,
on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government.

But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman
vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court reported and annotated in 122 A. L. R., 695. That case, by a majority
decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion
that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment
to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable.
The Court further held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the
Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an amendment has been adopted
within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature,
is not subject to review by the court.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement
each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted
that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution “consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification.” There is no logic in attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is
a highly political function performed by the “Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The
exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is leas reason for judicial inquiry
into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the
Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:

“There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the
stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force
from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger
in submitting in an established form, to a free people, the proposition whether
they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for the exercise of
their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and
embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free
government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of
the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument.” (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L. R. A., N. S.,
150.)

Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts,
Frankfurter and Douglas, in Miller vs. Coleman, supra, finds no
basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:

“The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of
constitutional amendments. Final determination by Congress that ratification by
three-fourths of the States has taken place ‘is conclusive upon the courts.’ In
the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the
Constitution. However, whether submission, intervening procedure or
Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the
Constitution, call for decisions by a ‘political department’ of questions of a
type which this Court has frequently designated ‘political.’ And decision of a
‘political question’ by the ‘political department’ to which the Constitution has
committed it ‘conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of * * * government’ Proclamation under authority of
Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn
assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution
commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part
of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of
interpretation. To the extent that the Court’s opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive
constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of
amendments, we are unable to agree.

“The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption. However, it
is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation
of a ‘reasonable time’ within which Congress may accept ratification; as to
whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or
voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once taken
upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with
an ultimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must
inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely
to the political branch of government.

“The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some
respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final
authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at
in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a
properly submitted amendment must die unless ratified within a ‘reasonable
time.’ Nor docs the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to make
such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5
of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court’s opinion declares that
Congress has the exclusive power to decide the ‘political questions’ of whether
a State, whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may
subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a
case as this, an amendment is dead because an ‘unreasonable’ time has elapsed.
No such division between the political and judicial branches of the government
is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to
Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article
exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is ‘political’ in its
entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point.”

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other
three justices subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though his thesis was
the petitioner’s lack of standing in court—a point which not having been raised
by the parties herein we will not decide—his reasoning inevitably extends to a
consideration of the nature of the legislative proceeding the legality of which
the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter
as political, saying:

“The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U. S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a
voter’s right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and
the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U. S., 536,
540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000
damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to
vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the
plaintiff had no cause of action because the subject matter of the suit was
political, Mr. Justice Holmes thus spoke for the Court: ‘Of course the petition
concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private
damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be
recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred
years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1
Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been
recognized by this Court.’ ‘Private damage’ is the clue to the famous ruling in
Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as well as that of cases
in this Court of which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is
permeated with the conception that a voter’s franchise is a personal right,
assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount ‘is peculiarly
appropriate for the determination of a jury,’ see Wiley vs.
Sinkler, 179 U. S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which
there is no remedy outside the law courts. ‘Although this matter relates to the
parliament,’ said Lord Holt, ‘yet it is an injury precedaneous to the
parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2
Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 475. The parliament cannot judge of this
injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a
recompense.’ (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas.,
521.)

“The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed
it leave intra-parliamentary controversies to parliaments and outside the
scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies—who
are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of
votes for different phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how
they were counted—surely are matters that not merely concern political action
but are of the very essence of political action, if ‘political’ has any
connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U. S., 649,
670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495; Leser vs.
Garnett, 258 U. S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense
are they matters of ‘private damage.’ They pertain to legislators not as
individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative process.
To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment
on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private
rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred years, it
is equally significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White
has not been sought to tie put to purposes like the present In seeking redress
here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court.
The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be
dismissed.”

We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound
principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought
on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the
fundamental Jaw. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening
understanding of the spirit of the United States institutions after which ours
are patterned.

But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be
presently shown, they are the opinions which should operate to adjudicate the
questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at
the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an
analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on
that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to our aid and
lightens our labor in this phase of the controversy.

Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in
the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate, including
twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the
Secretary of the Senate to erase an indorsement on the resolution to the effect
that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the words “as not
passed.” They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of
Representatives from signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of
Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.

The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor
Amendment was proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the
legislature of Kansas adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the
resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in
January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying
the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of whom voted for
and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the
Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor of the resolution.

The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition
set forth the prior rejection of the proposed amendment and alleged that in the
period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by
both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only
in five states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure of
ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its
vitality.

The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but.
dismissed the petition on the merits. When the case reached the Supreme Court of
the United States the questions were framed substantially in the following
manner:

First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners
had standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reversed; second,
whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he
did, it being the contention of the petitioners that “in the light of the powers
and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the
state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the
Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the ‘legislature’ so that under Article 5
of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding vote on
the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally
divided”; and third, the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and
of the lapse of time after its submission.

The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question,
regarding the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided,
stating: “Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a
question upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the court
expresses no opinion upon that point.” On the third question, the Court reached
the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification
by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its
control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the
decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of
the questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted
within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.

The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was
affirmed but on the grounds stated in the United States Supreme Court’s
decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts,
Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to
bring the petition and that all the questions raised are political and
nonjusticiable. Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions
were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and
that the petition should have been granted and the decision of the Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the
issues as political and nonjusticiable, passed by the question of the authority
of the Lieutenant Governor to cast a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court
was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.

The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds,
on the one. hand, and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed,
on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached,
these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices
Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that part of the decision
which declares certain questions political and nonjusticiable.

As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, the foregoing four
opinions “show interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the Justices
on the issues discussed.” It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455,
amusingly entitled “Sawing a Justice in Half,” which, in the light of the
divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries “whether the proper
procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment
below and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.” It says that
these divergencies and line-ups of the justices “leave power to dictate the
result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four
justices who concurred in Mr. Justice Black’s opinion.” Referring to the failure
of the Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to
vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered the “equally
divided” court would seem under any circumstances to be an equal division of an
odd number of justices, and asks “What really did happen? Did a justice refuse
to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his
mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the
conference and have him walk away whole?” But speaking in a more serious vein,
the commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds
of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the
issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment
below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.

From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be
considered as laying down the rule of the case.

The respondent’s other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, “In point
of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and
con the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their
original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in
Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their
decisions.” (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important
to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on
the side of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law.
ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36
Law. ed., 294.)

If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our
law making body, we choose’ to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of
Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may
be proved as follows: * * * (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or
of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts
of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.”

But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.

This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and
commentaries written with evident vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule
have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to
pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. With such
vast mass of cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to
an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments under the
criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.

The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which
opposed it are, in our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these reasons are
summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:

“SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness.—It has been declared that the
rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a
coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be an
inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate
power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the
administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because courts
could not rely on the published session laws, hut would be required to look
beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills
and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature.
Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained
from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had never become a law. In
this respect, it has been declared that there is quite enough uncertainty as to
what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the
legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court
whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the
parties.”

From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696,
697, we extract these passages:

“I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my
estimation, few things would be more mischievous than the introduction of the
opposite rule. * * * The rule contended for is that the Court should look at the
journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested
and filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the
statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal value
whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and
the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the
act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to the
statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have
been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be
more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would
unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us some evidence of
the little reliability of these legislative journals. * * * Can any one deny
that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these
journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all written law
will be shaken to its very foundations? * * * We are to remember the danger,
under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional
corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say that
the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all
persons having access to these journals. * * *” ([1866], Beasley, C. J., in
Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N. J. L., 29, 34.)

“But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the
Courts, then loss than a quorum of each House may by the aid of corrupt
presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of
the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be
possible. Public authority and political power must of necessity be confided to
officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps
cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is
not fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others;
nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have
not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with
faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of
their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to
it; nor can it keep a legislative journal.” (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans
vs. Browne, 30 Ind., 514, 524.)

Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence—considered a classic, and described
by one who himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as “a permanent
contribution to American law” and having “put the matured nineteenth- century
law in form to be used in a new era of growth”—unequivocally identifies himself
with those who believe in the soundness of the rule. The distinguished
professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i. e.,
the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional
restrictions on legislative action, says:

“(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent
application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the
constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like,
and if therefore an act must be declared no law which in fact was not read three
times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine according to
the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals may not
represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals,
if it can be shown beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein
represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted
upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted
upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper
votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding an act based on
improper votes falsified in the enrolment. This supposed duty, in short, is to
see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short
with the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an
examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members present is not
allowable. If to support this it be said that such an inquiry would be too
uncertain and impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed
constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at
the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any
cost; and if it is merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical
convenience, then the argument changes into the second one above, namely, how
far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical
convenience; and from this point of view there can be but one answer.

“(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is
treated thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain point suggests that
it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is exposed only
by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It
rests on the fallacious notion that every constitutional provision is ‘per se’
capable of being enforced through the Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the
Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large
field of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for
enforcement, and may remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial
remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a
clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature
to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted
by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot
safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had
by imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or
to call out the militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of
facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such
belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into
his belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a
law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions exist;
can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the
Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the
Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a
soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be
done?

“These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial
function of applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases to operate. That
situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives
and judgment of a particular independent department of government,—Legislature,
Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other
department if the one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution may
provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be treated
as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution
attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to and motivating the action
of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that department
to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this
purpose of the same nature as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution
may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought
over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole
Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition
read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in
the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of
the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature
to its duty:

* * * *
* * *

“The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the
Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by
asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular government” (4 Wigmore on Evidence,
699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance
in this jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34
Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to
find out whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the
petitioners are in error.

It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods of
proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes
or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by
their order; and (2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because,
in all probability, those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not
appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed
before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this
Court would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the
law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it “passed over
the question” of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and
the mode of its passage.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the
due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs
of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It
did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely,
look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and
the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have
been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to
the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
“shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”

In view of the foregoing considerations, we deem it unnecessary to decide the
question of whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote Mere members of Congress within
the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.

The petition is dismissed without costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, and
Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

---

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA,
J.:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can’t
vote for them, because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon us.

1. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the
   question whether an amendment to the existing constitution has been duly
   proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly belongs to the
   judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California,
   Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
   Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
   Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin.
   (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16 C. J. S., 437.) (See also 11 Am. Jur.,
   639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a different view. (16 C. J.
   S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)

   ” ‘The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a
   constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements
   of an existing constitution is a judicial question.’ (McConaughy vs.
   Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N. W., 408.)” (12 C. J., 880.)

   ” ‘An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost
   uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal,
   submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been judicially
   determined whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of
   votes. (Knight vs. Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78
   Ark., 432; 96 S. W., 396; Green vs. State Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P.,
   259; 95 Am. S. R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N. E., 359; 51 L.
   R. A., 722; Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank
   vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N. W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.
   J. L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L. R. A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh.
   St., 677; 23 N. E., 491; 6 L. R. A., 422.)’ ” (12 C. J., 880.)

   As our constitutional system (“limitation” of powers) is more analogous to
   state systems than to the Federal theory of “grant” of powers, it is proper to
   assume that the members of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of
   lawyers, and even the members of the American Congress that approved the
   Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation, contemplated the adoption of such
   constitutional practice in this portion of the world. Hence, my conclusion that
   in Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of
   this controversy.

2. The petitioners’ grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the
   Constitution (Article XV), the proposed amendment was not approved “by a vote of
   three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
   Representatives.” They complain that certain Senators and some members of the
   House of Representatives were not allowed to participate and were not considered
   in determining the required three-fourths vote.

   The respondents, besides denying our power to revise the counting, assert
   that the persons mentioned, for all practical purposes did not belong to the
   Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and
   approved.

   Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 “to submit to the Filipino
   people, for approval or disapproval, the amendment to the Constitution of the
   Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of
   the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc.”

   Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of
   legislation. Its first section provides that “the amendment to the Constitution
   of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the
   Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September
   eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six, shall be submitted to the people, for
   approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be held on March
   eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of
   this Act.”

   By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the
   Executive, declares in the most solemn manner that the resolution proposing the
   amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether
   those petitioners who are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act No.
   73 are not precluded from questioning its validity or veracity, unless they
   assert and prove that in Congress they opposed its enactment. In default of a
   contrary showing, is it not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress
   they endorsed—or at least are bound by—the declarations of Republic Act No. 73?
   And if a private party is estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy
   of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C. J. S., 198 and 11 Am.
   Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be estopped from impugning a statute
   lie helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the
   remaining petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim.
   (Cf. 16 C. J. S., 169.)

3. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision,
   because the instant litigation may be solved by the application of other
   well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which one
   department of the Government entertains for the actions of the others.

   On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to
   the applicability and binding effect of section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended
   by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of
   Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine expounded by the
   authoritative Wigmore on a question admittedly within the domain of the law on
   evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution upon the judicial
   authorities.

4. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents
   could plausibly fall back on the time-honored rule that the courts may not go
   behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United States
   vs. Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)

   According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate
   sixteen (16) senators approved the resolution against five (5), with no
   absences; whereas in the House sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted “yes”,
   eighteen (18) voted “no”, one abstained from voting and one was absent.
   Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of twenty-one of the
   Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total membership
   of eighty-eight (88) of the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1),
   it is crystal clear that the measure was upheld by the number of votes
   prescribed by the Constitution.

   True, there are in the said exhibit
   statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect that the votes did
   not constitute the majority required by the Constitution. However, in the face
   of the incontestable arithmetical computation above shown, those protests must
   be attributed to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having then
   asserted that “there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken
   into account.” For although we might have judicial notice of the number of
   proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no better qualified than the
   Legislative to determine the number of its actual membership at any given
   moment, what with demises or demissions, remotions or
   suspensions.

---

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds
supporting the same in so far as they are not inconsistent with the applicable
reasons supporting my concurring: opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil.,
192). But I dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante)
wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the Senate and House of
Representatives had been counted “the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress.”

The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera
vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions therein raised
were political in nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and,
second, that the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It
is to me evident that the questions involved in the present proceeding are no
less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is deemed
unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the grounds of my said concurring
opinion.

The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority
opinion in the instant proceeding is that the suspension of the said members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives being a political question, the
judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere with the determination
thereof by the proper political department of the government, has perforce to
abide by said determination if it were to go any further in the; consideration
of the case. In other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court
will have to start from the premise that said members have been suspended by the
respective Houses of Congress and that we, being powerless to interfere with the
matter of said suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the determination of
said political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U. S.], 130; 23 Law. ed.,
649), “in cases involving the action of the political departments of the
government, the judiciary is bound by such action.” (Williams vs.
Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel
vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob
of Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves. Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7
How., 1; R. I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)

If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said
members have been thus suspended, there will be to my mind, absolutely no
justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the determination of
whether or not the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case was
entirely different from that of members who, not having been suspended nor
otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon the resolution. In the case
of the latter, they had, like all other members similarly situated, three
alternatives, namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or
to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their votes had to be
counted among those supporting the resolution. If they voted against, of course,
their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from
voting, there would be sound justification for counting them as not in favor of
the resolution, because by their very abstention they impliedly but necessarily
would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if
they did, they would have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those
suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity or legality
we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In
their case there would be no way of determining which way their votes would have
gone or whether or not they would have abstained from voting. In this
connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not
been suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended members
may belong to the political party which, as a party, was opposed to the
resolution, still they would have voted independently and following their
individual convictions. In this connection, it might not be amiss to mention
that there were quite a number of minority members of the legislature who voted
for the resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said suspended
members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the
resolution, nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have abstained from
voting. Why then should they be counted with the members who voted against the
resolution or those who, having the right to vote, abstained from doing so? Why
should we count them as though we knew that they would have voted against
the resolution, or even that they would have abstained from voting? Soundly
construed, I submit that the Constitution does not, and could not, include
suspended members in the determination of the required three-fourths vote.

I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the
Constitution that “The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (italics supplied) separately * * *”, advisedly
used the vital and all-important word “voting” therein. I take it, that they
meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all
members not suspended or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way
or the other. But I am here even making a concession in favor of the opponents
when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain from voting, may be
counted among those not in favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring myself
to conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to count suspended
or disqualified members as opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it,
without it being possible to know which way they would have voted or that they
would have abstained from voting—that they would never have voted in favor of
the measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or
disqualified members among those in favor of the measure, I am sure those who
opine differently would answer, because we do not know that they would have
voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not
count them among those against the measure, I would answer that we do not know
that they would have voted against it or that they would have abstained from
voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion—the only one possible—that
such suspended or disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due to
that very impossibility of knowing which way they would have voted or whether
they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a sound and rational
construction of the constitutional precept.

PARAS, J.:

I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr.
Justice Hilado.

---

PERFECTO, J.:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.

The last bastion of democracy is in danger.

Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least
resistance, and the banner of the Constitution is silently and meekly hauled
down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard bearers of a
new brand of Fascism. In the words of Cicero, “recedere de statu suae
dignitatis.”

Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by
those, throwing overboard all ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in
desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even in ignominy,
could not stand the impact of initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome
military hordes.

The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subject to determinate and
indeterminate ideological pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a
blind alloy obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces, or
the arcane predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless
ship floating in the middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound
to be wrecked at the advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we begin to
hear and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding
stars in our actions and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times
the clouds dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only to rely on
our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough
followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm and cloudless
nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and
disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day shall come that
we will be judged on how we are judging. Posterity shall always have the final
say. When the time solvent has dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered
the final verdict as to whether we have faced our task fearlessly or whether our
hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude of our duties and have chosen the most
comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether we have
kept burning the fire of justice as the vestals did keep burning the tripod fire
in the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by
the cold mist of historical oblivion; others will have their names as bywords
repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and still others
will bo remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guerdon
accorded to all those who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of
justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.

This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this
tribunal has the sturdy courage to keep its responsibility in proper high level.
It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive
verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens
and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot decision of Chief Justice
Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil war, or whether in the
heart of each future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory
will be remembered with gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching
judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and
held the rock bottom foundations which made of the American Constitution the
veritable supreme law of the land and established the role of the tribunals as
the ultimate keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and
it will be impartial and unbiased, exacting and pitiless, with unappealable
finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line: “lasciati
ogni speranza.”

Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea
of stubborn refusal to see reality or should be impaired by the polaroid visors
of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the resolution in
question, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted, the members
of the. Senate were 24 and the members of the House of Representatives were 96,
and that the 16 members of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by
undisputable mathematical computation, do not constitute three-fourths of the 24
members thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives who voted
for the resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute
three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The official certifications
made by the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress to the effect that
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the
members of the House of Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue,
cannot change the facts. Nothing in existence can. The certification, being a
clear falsification of public document punished by article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot
give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that is in conflict with
the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and
besides some of them are members of the Senate, others are members of the House
of Representatives, and still others are presidents of political parties, duly
registered, with considerable following in all parts of the Philippines.

The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections and the remaining three are respectively the Treasurer
of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the Bureau of
Printing.

Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8
elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23, 1946, and that the House of Representatives
is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2 who resigned to
assume other positions in the Government.

On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of
the Philippines a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the
Members of each House voting separately, To propose, as they do hereby propose,
the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as
an Ordinance thereto:

” ‘ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

” ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and
section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the
effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July,
nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
Numbered seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the
third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation,
development, and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any
person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business
enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the
United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed
upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Philippines.’

“This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the
people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.”

Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68
Representatives voted in favor and 18 against.

Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be
held on March 11, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the people the proposed
amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said
purpose.

Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional
because Congress may not, by said act, submit to the people for approval or
disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution
Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article XV of
the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
three-fourths of the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18
Senators, 2 more than those who actually voted for the resolution in question,
and three-fourths of the 98 members of the House of Representatives should at
least be 72 Representatives, or 4 more than those who actually voted for the
resolution.

Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding
from them petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege
that the House of Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only 90.
They admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider the resolution
Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16 votes were cast in the Senate and in
the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate and 18 in the House of
Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No.
73 and that necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being
taken, but deny that said act is unconstitutional, and by way of defense, allege
that the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately and,
consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for
approval or disapproval, fixing a date for a general election, and appropriating
public funds for said purpose, is valid and constitutional.

At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following
stipulation:

“The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following
facts:

“1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the
majority vote of the Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the
election of April 23, 1946;

“2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect
took part in the election of the President of that body; but that before the
senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a resolution was
presented, and subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath and
the seating of Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending
the hearing and decision of the protest lodged against their election;

“3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their
alleged oath of office before notaries public, and not on the floor, and filed
said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the said
date;

“4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other
oaths of office accomplished by them outside of the floor before a notary public
and the Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31, 1946,
respectively; and that their corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were
paid on August 31, 1946;

“5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W.
Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno’s alleged oath of office dated May 25, 1946,
with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15, 1946, and on said date his salary
was paid corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;

“6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen
days;

“7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and
oaths up to the present time, the said Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not
been allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate and to vote
therein, nor do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;

“8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of
canvassers certified as having been elected in the election held on April 23,
1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos and Jesus B.
Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M.
Yuson and Luis Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F.
Gustilo for Negros Occidental;

“9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives
took part in the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives held on
May 25, 1946;

“10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn
in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a
resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson
for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro
Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F.
Gustilo for Negros Occidental ‘pending the hearing and decision on the protests
lodged against their election,’ copy of the resolution being attached to and
made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;

“11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative
Escareal and approved by the House, referred for study to a committee of seven,
which up to the present has not reported, as shown by the Congressional Record
for the House of Representatives;

“12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not
sworn in on the floor and have not been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the
present time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of the House
of Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to
in paragraph 11 hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their
names do not appear in the roll of the members of the House except as shown by
the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the roll
inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the
Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;

“13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged
oaths of office on the date set opposite their names, as follows:

“Jose Cando		May 25, 1946
“Vicente Gustilo		May 25, 1946
“Constancio Padilla		May 22, 1946
“Alejo Santos		May 23, 1946
“Luis M. Taruc		May 25, 1946
“Amado M. Yuson		May 25, 1946
“Jesus B. Lava		May 25, 1946
“Alejandro Simpauco		May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of
the first four who took their oaths before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of
the House;

“14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the
Secretary of the House of Representatives;

“15. That the persons mentioned an paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the
term beginning April 23, 1946, up to the present, with the exception of Messrs.
Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since August 16;

“16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and were allowed to sit on September
30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;

“17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of
the House, Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned
before the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was discussed
and passed on September 18, 1946;

“18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution was made by the Secretary calling the roll of each house and the
votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of the
House of Representatives hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part
hereof; and

“19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House ct
Representatives and the alleged oaths of office are made a part of this
Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right to question
their materiality and admissibility.

“Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.
“For the petitioners:		“For the respondents:
	“JOSE E. ROMERO		“ROMAN OZAETA
	“ANTONIO BARREDO		“Secretary of Justice
			“JOSE B. L. REYES
		“First Asst. Solicitor General“

PETITIONERS’ PERSONALITY

Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in
this case is the first question we have to consider.

No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the
Court’s deliberation, we should not evade deciding it and giving what in law and
justice should be the answer.

To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to
institute the present recourse of prohibition. If petitioners should lack that
personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by
respondents themselves.

Respondents’ failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that
petitioners have the necessary legal personality to file the petition, and we do
not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.

Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators;
the second, of representatives; and the third, of presidents of four political
parties.

All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of
Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are members of either
of the two houses of Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution
Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three excepted senators
were the ones who were excluded in the consideration of said resolution and act
and were not counted for purposes of determining the three- fourths
constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.

In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken
all the necessary steps for the holding of the general election on March 11,
1947, and that the carrying out of said acts “constitute an attempt to enforce
the resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution,” is
without or in excess of respondents’ jurisdiction and powers, “violative of the
rights of the petitioners who are members of the Congress, and will cause the
illegal expenditure and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable
injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the
petitioners and those represented by them in their capacities mentioned
above.”

There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators
or members of the House of Representatives have direct interest in the legal
issues involved in this case as members of the Congress which adopted the
resolution, in open violation of the Constitution, and passed the act intended
to make effective such unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress,
they are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the
Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless
they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives
of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the
fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled
upon.

The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners,
represent large groups of our population, perhaps nearly one-half of the latter,
and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will
personally be affected by the question whether the Constitution should be
lightly taken and can easily be violated without any relief and whether it can
be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the Constitution
itself.

As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly
each and every one of the citizens and inhabitants of this country. Whether our
Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap
of paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter of
far-reaching importance to the security, property, personal freedom, life,
honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will necessarily
affect the way of life of the whole people and of its most unimportant unit.
Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this land of ours shall have to
make plans for the future depending on how the question is finally decided. No
one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.

Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute
the present action; and much more, those who are members of Congress have the
legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them by
the electorate.

24 SENATORS

The first question raised by respondents’ answer refers to the actual number
of the members of the Senate. According to petitioners there are 24 of them
while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according to them, “they are
not duly qualified and sworn in members of the Senate.”

This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the
stipulation of facts submitted by both parties.

No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logodaedaly may change the
meanings and effects of the words placed by respondents themselves in said seven
paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude anyone into believing that Senators
Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having been
proclaimed as elected senators, their having taken part in the election of the
President of the Senate, their having taken their oaths of office, and their
receiving salaries as senators.

Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the
undeveloped brains of the pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred
millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting to the human mind of the
twentieth century.

Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as
members of the Senate, without taking into consideration whatever legal effects
the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question upon which we have already
elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended
or not suspended, they are senators anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a
fact so clear and simple as the presence of the sun at day time. Therefore,
counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the present
Senate.

96 REPRESENTATIVES

The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners’
allegations to the effect that the present House of Representatives is composed
of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at present “only 90
members have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as
such.”

Again respondents’ allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of
the stipulation of facts.

The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives
Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in
paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the House of
Representatives.

The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight
persons are actual members of the House of Representatives. We may even add that
the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even greater than in the
case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no resolution of suspension
has ever been adopted by the House of Representatives against said eight
members, who are being deprived of the exercise of some of their official
functions and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the
Speaker.

That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries
where the insolence of totalitarian rulers have replaced all constitutional
guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a constitutional
question: whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving representatives
duly elected by the people of their constitutional functions, privileges, and
prerogatives. To allow the existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit
its exercise unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.

The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a wanton onslaught
against the sovereignty itself of the people, an onslaught which may cause the
people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No system of
representative government may subsist if those elected by the people may so
easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of their constitutional
functions.

From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the
last national election, 98 representatives were elected and at the time the
resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual
members of the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) had
resigned.

Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the
resolution was adopted; three-fourths of them should at least be 18 and not the
16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96
representatives, three-fourths of them should certainly be more than the 68 who
voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is that, since not
three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting separately have voted
in favor of the resolution as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there
can be no question that the resolution has not been validly adopted.

We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in
agreement with the majority opinion, have skipped the questions as to the actual
membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact
that they are among the first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of
both parties. If they had taken them into consideration, it would seem clear
that their sense of fairness will bring them to the same conclusion we now
arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of
Representatives.

Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it appears evident that the remedy sought for in the petition
should be granted.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Without judging respondents’ own estimate as to the strength of their own
position concerning the questions of the actual membership of the Senate and
House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the written
arguments they have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the
certification of authenticity made by the presiding officers and secretaries of
both Houses of Congress as their last redoubt.

The resolution in question begins as follows: “Resolved by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a
vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each House voting
separately, * * *.”

Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement,
appears to be certified over the signatures of the President of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses, respondents
want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept
unconditionally as a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have
shown, appears to be a brazen official falsehood.

Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.

An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice,
throwing overboard all scruples, in the administration of justice, could accept
as true what we know is not and then perform our official functions upon that
voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurd to be entertained even for a
moment. Anyone who keeps the minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel
aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which necessarily will result
from the suggestion.

But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this
Court to inquire behind the false certification made by the presiding officers
and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.

Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, “the
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution.”

To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part
of this opinion, as Appendices A, B, and C,^[1] the memoranda presented by both petitioners
and respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and ably discussed
the question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners’ contentions to
be standing on stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their
arguments.

In what follows “we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority
opinion.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The majority enunciates the proposition that “political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary,” except “by express constitutional or
statutory provision” to the contrary. Then argues that “a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the ‘enrolled bill rule’ out of respect
to the political departments.”

The doctrine is predicated “on the principle of the separation of
powers.”

This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the
case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat
what we have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated
on the question.

Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary is “too
well-established to need citation of authorities,” they recognize the difficulty
“in determining what matters fall under the meaning of political questions.”

This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not
accept it even as a good doctrine. It is a general proposition made without a
full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies
behind it.

The confession that the “difficulty lies in determining what matters fall
within the meaning of political question” shows conclusively that the so-called
doctrine has recklessly been advanced.

This allegedly “well-established” doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of
the confessed difficulty in determining what matters fall within the designation
of political question. The majority itself admits that the term “is not
susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always
in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the
government.”

Doctrine is that “which is taught; what is held, put forth as true, and
supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the
body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of
faith.” It is a synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule,
and axiom. In its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative truth or
working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their
acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple and
self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the elemental or nuclear terms is
the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.

A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting
point for developing new propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of
many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It
is the basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone,
it should at least be one of the main columns of an architectonic construction.
If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose
existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.

We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is
based on the unsettled meaning of political question.

The general proposition that “political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary” is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements made
as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to
refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.

It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of
powers, the handful of sand with which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as
if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to
drive away a danger or an evil.

We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and
the process to make it effective, as provided in Article XV of the Constitution,
are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that
a litigation as to whether said article has been complied with or violated is
beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion
we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely
exposed as erroneous and false.

Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all
questions relating to it, therefore, be taken away from the courts? Then, what
about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power
to decide “all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?”

COLEMAN versus MILLER

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller
(122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the mainstay of the majority position.

No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the
exposition and analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court.

The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that “the efficacy of
ratification by the State legislature of a proposed amendment to the federal
Constitution” and that “the decision by Congress, in its control of the
Secretary of State of the questions of whether an amendment has been adopted
within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature,”
are political questions and not justiciable.

At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no
similarity or analogy with the constitutional questions herein discussed. The
question as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the
Child Labor amendment proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and
upon the decision of said Congress, “in its control of the Secretary of State,”
whether the amendment has been adopted “within a reasonable time from the date
of submission to the State legislature,” either one of them does not raise a
controversy of violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones
raised in the present case.

No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated
because in January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a
copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying the amendment was
adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20 division, the Lieutenant Governor
casting the deciding vote. Neither was there such mention of constitutional
violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time
after submission of the amendment to the State legislature.

No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated
because the Lieutenant Governor had cast his vote or because by the lapse of
time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost
its vitality.

It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon
the efficacy of ratification by a State legislature of a proposed amendment, it
was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide the
question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of its constitutional power,
to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the promulgation of the
adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.

Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in
controversy in the present case.

We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in
Coleman vs. Miller, according to the American Law Reports, show
“interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices,” and are the
subject of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled “Sawing a
Justice in Half,” asking how it happened that the nine-member United States
Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question of the right of the
Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of
justices was “equally divided.”

How such a “confusing” and “amusing” four-opinion decision in Coleman
vs. Miller could be an authority is beyond our comprehension.

GREEN versus WELLER

One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Green vs. Weller (32 Miss., 650), quoting
one paragraph thereof.

Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its
reversed effect.

The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature
of the submission to the people of a proposal to amend the Constitution which
should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it
dangerous to the stability of the government, but in making this pronouncement,
it assumes that the submission is made “in a established form,” adding that the
means provided for the exercise by the people of their sovereign right of
changing the fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to
trample upon the exercise of their right, and that the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of
the state to change their Constitution “in the mode prescribed by the
instrument.”

So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that
the majority position is wrong because the Mississippi Supreme Court, in making
the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the people is made
“in a established form” and “in the mode prescribed” by the Constitution,
namely, in accordance with the provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements
would be the opposite if, as in the present case, the submission of the proposal
of amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the
Constitution, aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and
tyrannical trampling of the constitutional prerogatives of duly elected
representatives of the people.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice
Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, in the “confusing” and
“amusing” decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the
majority, but this other authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping
hand to a helpless, desperate position.

The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: “The Constitution
granted Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional
amendments.”

Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent
power is granted by our fundamental law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our
Congress may propose amendments or call a convention to make the proposal, but
that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be found any word, any grammatical
sign, not even the faintest hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to
the people. Congress shall have “exclusive power to control the submission.”
That submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and come into
effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring action of the
President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to violate the fundamental
law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law
is enacted, its execution devolves upon the Executive Department. As a matter of
fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people the
proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of
the Philippines may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war,
rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.

After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major
premise not obtainable in the Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the
majority in any way.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the “confusing” and
“amusing” case of Coleman vs. Miller is the next authority invoked by the
majority, but the opinion does not offer much help. The Justice maintains that
the proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies “are matters that concern
not merely political actions but are also of the very essence of political
action,” and then advances the following argument: “To open the law-courts to
such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes
engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies.”

The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude,
one of simple distaste for the idea, but fails to give any sensible reason for
the attitude. In a totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in
answer to the promptings of a sense of justice, but as expressions of moods,
caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s attitude could
be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to elevate him first to the
category of a fuehrer.

In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be
founded on reason, but never on passing unreasoned moods, judicial or
otherwise.

We regret that we cannot agree with the majority’s sharing Mr. Justice
Frankfurter’s views, which in their judgment are in accord “with sound
principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought
on the workings of constitutional and popular government.” Our regret is not for
ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned
and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of a foreign country,
praising it even with the much-abused label as “liberal,” notwithstanding the
fact that it represents the whimsical rule of personal attitudes and not the
rule of well-matured reason.

THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached
hereto as Appendices A, B, and C. Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge
the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is
stated in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full approval of
the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts.

The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How
can we accept the absolute verity of the presiding officers’ certification that
the resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a matter of
undisputable fact the certification is false? How can we accept a theory which
elevates a falsehood to the category of truth?

The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because
the English have committed the nonsense of accepting the theory, is that reason
for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our
tribunals not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by
simians trained in the art of imitation but by human beings, and human beings
must act according to reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such
mistakes may happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be
inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.

Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the
majority states that in the United States the jurisdictions are divided almost
equally pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners’
memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that
there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to
pro and con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to whether
the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not make reason nor justice.

The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our
law-making body, invoking to said effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.

Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon
the authority of laws which have been repealed or abolished, still the evidence
pointed out by the majority does not support their contention. Section 313
alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct
Philippine Commission or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the
Philippines, with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said
commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive proof “of the provisions of such
acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court.
Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show conclusively that this Supreme Court, in
making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take judicial notice of
the official acts of Congress and section 41 provides what evidence can be used
to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a provision be found
that would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both Houses of Congress even if we know by conclusive evidence
that the certification is false.

The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of
our lawmaking body, upon the very evidence used in support thereof, after a
little analysis, has to banish as a midsummer night’s dream.

50 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, SECTION 150

In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority
of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked as reasons for the theory.

We will analyze the reasons adduced:

1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This
   must be the strongest one, when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to
   require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a
   social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown between different
   departments of the government? Has our sense of evaluation of spiritual values
   become so perverted that we can make such a blunder in our choice? Since when
   have the social or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent of
   overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?

2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make “an inquisition into
   the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power.” This
   second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a
   Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the members of the
   majority are a kind of emperors of Japan, to be worshipped but never to be
   discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be relegated to
   where it belongs: the archeological museum.

3. “The rule is also one of convenience.” This reason again shows a perverted
   evaluation of human values. Is justice to be sacrificed for the sake of
   convenience?

4. “Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled
   bills authenticated as executed by the Constitution, for years, it might be
   ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never become a
   law.” This last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we
   leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the extent to which legal
   stupidity may reach.

Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the
majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will also analyze the arguments relied
upon.

1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill “would unsettle the entire statute law
   of the State.” This argument, as it appears quoted in the majority decision, is
   premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a
   mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following: “We are to remember the
   danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the
   intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much
   to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at
   the mercy of all persons having access to these journals. * * *”

   The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American
   experience, which seems not to be too flattering to our former metropolis.

   Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes
   convinces us that Wigmore’s assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is
   true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we have seen few
   instances in which there had been disagreement between what has actually been
   passed, as shown by the journal, and the authenticated enrolled bill. But the
   instances were so few to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by
   Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the
   evil in the Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the
   following revolutionary provision in the Constitution: “No bill shall be passed
   by either House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their final
   form furnished each member at least three calendar days prior to its passage,
   except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
   enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
   allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately
   thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the journal.” (Section 21 [2],
   Article VI of the Constitution.)

   This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by
   Wigmore’s fears.

2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the
   courts, then less than a quorum of each House may by the aid of presiding
   officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the
   Constitution, Wigmore answers: “This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But
   it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should
   claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times
   with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced.”

   The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been
   blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary
   presiding officers and members of the legislature should be allowed to have
   their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and balances established by
   the Constitution presupposes the possibility of error and corruption in any
   department of government and the system is established to put a check on
   them.

   When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the
   legislature is placed at the bar of justice, the judiciary must not shrink from
   its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper
   remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity
   commit “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high
   crimes” without being liable to be removed from office on impeachment, and we
   hope, if there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate
   will do their duty in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution, and not
   follow the uncourageous example which is given under the intellectual tutelage
   of Wigmore.

The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as
a guarantee against the adoption of amendments to the fundamental law by mere
majorities.

The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if
any change is to be introduced in it, it must be in answer to a pressing public
need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been
adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all the other numerical rules, with
the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must be complied with mathematical
precision, with the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or
expressible in arithmetical figures.

Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately, it means an exact number,
not susceptible of any more or less. All the members means that no single member
should be excluded in the counting. It means not excluding three Senators and
eight Representatives as respondents want us to do in order not to cause any
inconvenience to the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of
Congress who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been
complied with in the adoption of the resolution in question, when such a
certification is as false as any falsehood can be.

The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary
majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell of constitutionalism in our
country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened
in the adoption of the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with
the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a whimsical
government of men.

The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the
Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may
expel a member with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members (section 10
[3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each be composed of nine
members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislative members
(section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the President, the
concurrence of two- thirds of all the members of each House is necessary
(section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of
three-fourths of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2],
Article VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House, have the sole power to declare war (section 25, Article
VI); that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two- thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court (section 10,
Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment by a vote of two- thirds of all its members (section 2, Article IX);
and that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).

So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution
affect matters not of momentary but of momentous importance. Each and every one
of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not only because our
loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also because by inserting them
the Constitutional Convention had abided by the wise teachings of
experience.

By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the
unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in question to have their way is to
set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of
lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora’s box of evils and
disasters.

The power to declare war can only be exercised by Congress with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. From now on, by the
simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of
both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority had voted in fact,
said majority may plunge our people into a maelstrom of war.

The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of
two-thirds of all the members of the House of Representatives. From now on, a
mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high officials,
including the President, on the carpet.

To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence
of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate. From now on, that
three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not counting three
actual Senators, as has been done in the resolution in question, and thereby
oust the President of the Philippines if he happens not to be in the good graces
of a senatorial majority.

Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to
submit which to the people high-handed means have been resorted to, there can be
no question that it is of vital importance to the people and it will affect
future generations to unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had
thought it wise that before such a momentous proposal could be submitted to the
people the three-fourth rule should be adhered to by Congress.

QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE

Months ago we stated: “It is high time to sound the clarion call that will
summon all the forces of liberalism to wage a crusade for human freedom. They
should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the
vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in the Constitution and
the high purposes of the Chapter of the United Nations.” This, we said in our
dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the
judgment that the future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in
that same opinion we ventured that the historian may, under the heading of
“Epoch of Great Reaction,” write as follows:

“At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most
reactionary and retrogressive. When the victims of a constitutional violation,
perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the government, came to it
for redress, it adopted a hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary
vitality to grapple with the situation and finding refuge in a comfortable
retreat, completely disappointing those who have pinned their faith and hope in
it as the first pillar of the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human
fundamental rights. The issue of human freedom was disposed of by them most
discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on bail on
appeal, in flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the
fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.”

Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same
historian may record that the highest tribunal of the new Republic of the
Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional system,
by refusing to do its duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the
fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and apallment of millions
of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes on constitutionalism for
the survival of humanity.

The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the
deliberations of the several organs of the United Nations is predicated in the
adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of
our planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the pattern of that
single legal standard. But the whole system is liable to crash if it is not
founded on the rockbed of the elemental principle that the majesty of the law
must always be held supreme.

To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the
existing social organs, moral attitudes and habits of thinking should undergo
reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to
be replaced with more progressive ones and in consonance with truth and reason.
Among these ideas are the wrong ones which are used as premises for the majority
opinion in this case.

The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but
innovation and reform should continuously be undertaken if death by stagnation
is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas created. New
formulas must be devised and invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and
useful traditions must be preserved, but those hampering the progressive
evolution of culture should be stored in the museum of memory. The past and the
present are just stopping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the
future.

Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science has
progressed by leaps and bounds. Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam
Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma
particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter to become an
under-microscopic planetarian system of neutrons, protons, and electrons.

Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin.
Plants are grown in plain water, without any soil, but only with anions and
cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood
sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum,
almost absolute, is being achieved to serve ends that contribute to human
welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are harnessed to serve useful human
purposes. The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic acid to
produce vinegar for the asking. The penicillum notatum and the
bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and tyrothricin, two
wonder drugs that are saving many lives from formerly lethal infections. DDT
decimates harmful insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that
used to claim more than one million victims a year in the world. The creation of
synthetics has enriched the material treasures offered to man by nature. Means
of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific
dreams are fast becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is
no reason why the administration of justice should not progress onward,
synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better
future.

The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any
qualm violated Article XV of the Constitution and the majority of this Court,
instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the
comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems
to be ogling for more violations of the fundamental law. The final results no
one is in a position to foresee.

Our vote is for the granting of the
petition.

---

^[1] Omitted.

---

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA,
M.:

Por segunda vez en menos de un año nos llaman a decidir y arbitrar sobre una
violacion de la Constitucion—el codigo fundamental de nuestro pais. A mediados
del año pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta misma Corte Suprema
por tres Senadores^[1] que se quejaban de
haber sido privados injusta y arbitrariamente de su derecho a sentarse en el
Senado dc Filipinas y a participar y votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave
infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion que ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos
mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de otra violacion de
la Constitucion, pero esta vez no vienen solos: les acompañan otros cinco
miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros de la Camara de Representantes y tres
jefes de agrupaciones o partidos politicos—Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y
Philippine Youth Party. Jose O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de
miembro del Senado y Presidente del Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los
recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8 Senadores, 17 Representantes y 3
particulares.^[2] Tienen un comun
denominador, a saber: que son todos ciudadanos de Filipinas, y, ademas,
contribuyentes y electores.

Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el
Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor General y el Director del Buro de
Imprenta.^[3]

El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion
dirigido a los recurridos para que estos, sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y
otras personas que aetuen bajo su superintendencia o en su nombre “se abstengan
y desistan de dar los pasos tendentes hacia la celebracion de un plebiscito o
eleccion general el 11 de Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre
reforma de los articulos 13.° y 14.° de la Constitucion), las balotas y otros
papeles necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito, y de desembolsar o de
autorizar el expendio de fondos publicos para dicho proposito.”

Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesario publicar integro a
continuacion el texto de la Resolucion conjunta que contiene la propuesta
reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia u objeto de la
consulta popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la misma que en
el lexico corriente de la prensa y del publico se conoce por resolucion sobre
paridad o igualdad de derechos constitucionales a favor de los americanos, es
decir, que concede a estos iguales derechos que a los filipinos en la propiedad
y cultivo de terrenos publicos, en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales
como bosques, minas, pesca y fuerza hidraulica, y en la propiedad y operacion de
utilidades publicas. He aqui su texto:

“RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the
Members of each House voting separately, To propose, as they do hereby
propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an Ordinance thereto;

“ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

“Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section
eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity
of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with
the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and
forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred
and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and
sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and
the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to
citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of
the Philippines.

“This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the
people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

“Adopted,

	(Sgd.) “JOSE AVELINO
		“President of the Senate
	(Sgd.) “EUGENIO PEREZ
		“Speaker of the House of
			Representatives

“We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses
in joint session assembled in the Hall of the House of Representatives on
September 18, 1946.

	(Sgd.) “ANTONIO ZACARIAS
		“Secretary of the Senate
	(Sgd.) “NARCISO PIMENTEL
		“Secretary of the House
			of Representatives“

Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional propuesta
el Congreso de Filipinas ha aprobado la Ley No. 73 de la Republica que dispone y
ordena la celebracion de un plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de este año, provee a
la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el presupuesto necesario para sufragar los
gastos del mismo. Si una mayoria de los electores votare afirmativamente, la
reforma quedara ratificada y estara en vigor por un periodo de 28 años; en caso
contrario, quedara rechazada.

Los recurrentes alegan y sostienen que la resolucion conjunta de que se trata
es ilegal y nula por no haberse aprobado con los votos de las tres
cuartas-partes (¾) del Congreso, conforme a lo provisto en el Articulo XV de la
Constitucion, a saber:

“SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution
or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.”

Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta el
Senado se componia actualmente de 24 miembros, es decir, el numero exacto fijado
en la Constitution, y la Camara de Representantes de 96 miembros, es decir, dos
menos que el numero señalado en la Constitucion, pues dos dimitieron despues de
las elecciones, uno para aceptar un cargo en el ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y
otro para aceptar un nombramiento en el servicio diplomatico. Sin embargo, segun
la demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo se permitio votar a 21
miembros, excluyendose de las deliberaciones y votacion final de la Resolucion a
tres miembros, a saber: los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero. De los referidos 21
miembros, votaron a favor de la Resolucion 16 y en contra 5; asi que—arguyen los
recurrentes—la Resolucion no quedo aprobada, por parte del Senado, con el numero
constitucional de tres cuartas-partes (¾) de los miembros, el cual debia ser
18.

En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio votar
a 88 miembros, excluyendose de las deliberaciones y votacion final de la
resolucion a 8 miembros, a saber: Representantes Alejo Santos y Jesus B. Lava,
de Bulacan; Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P. Padilla, de Nueva Ecija; Reps.
Amado M. Yuson y Luis Taruc, de Pampanga; Rep. Alejandro Simpauco, de Tarlac; y
Rep. Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros Occidental. De los referidos 88 miembros
votaron a favor de la Resolucion solo 68; asi que—arguyen los recurrentes—la
Resolucion tampoco quedo aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero
constitucional de tres cuartas-partes (¾) partes de sus miembros, el cual debia
ser 72, por lo menos, y no 68, aun dando por descontados los dos miembros que
despues de las elecciones aceptaron cargos en otros ramos del gobierno.

Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica de que se trata,
consiguientemente los recurrentes tachan tambien de inconstitucional e invalida
la referida Ley de la Republica No. 73 que convoca una eleccion general o
plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter al pueblo para su
ratificacion o repudio la enmienda constitucional propuesta, y que consigna la
suma de P1,000,000 para los gastos en que se hubiere de incurrir con motivo de
la celebracion de dicho plebiscito, entre habilitacion de precintos electorales,
pago de dietas de los inspectores y costo de la impresion, publicacion, fijacion
y distribucion gratuita de copias de la propuesta enmienda en ingles, español y
otros dialectos del pais.

Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegaciones esenciales de la
demanda y negar otras, plantean las siguientes defensas especiales:

Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled
Act or Resolution) de ambas Camaras del Congreso, adverada o autenticada con las
firmas de los Presidentes de dichas Camaras, es prueba concluyente de que la
misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud del respeto que se debe a un
ramo igual y coordinado del gobierno, no es permisible una investigacion
judicial de si la misma fue o no aprobada debida y propiamente por el Congreso;
y que, por tanto, esta Corte, Suprema carece de jurisdiccion para conocer y
enjuiciar los puntos suscitados por los recurrentes en relacion con la validez y
constitucionalidad de la resolucion en cuestion.

Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos
alegan, por via de segunda defensa especial, que la resolucion
controvertida fue aprobada con los votos de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de todos
los miembros cualificados del Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando
separadamente, en consonancia con el Articulo XV, apartado 1, de la
Constitucion, y que consiguientemente la ley de la Republica No. 73 que ordena
su planteamiento ante el pueblo para su ratificacion o desaprobacion, señala una
fecha para la celebracion de esta consulta plebiscitaria y consigna fondos
publicos para tal fin, es valida y constitucional.

Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertada entre las partes, pero
no se extracta aqui para no alargar innecesariamente esta disidencia, pero se
hara particular referencia a ella mas adelante a medida que las exigencias de la
argumentacion lo demanden.

Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parses han hecho cumplida
justicia a la tremeiula importancia del asunto haciendo. extensos estudios y
pacientes investigaciones de la jurisprudencia pertinente, en particular la
americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia profunda y decisiva de aquel pais en
nuestras ideas politicas y constitucionales en virtud de la historica y estrecha
convivencia de casi medio siglo.

Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede deeirse, sin exageracion, que excepto
en cuatro momentos culminantes de su historia—el primer grito de rebelion contra
España en Agosto de 1896, la ruptura de hostilidades contra America en Febrero
de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de Independencia en el plebiscito nacional de
1935, y la guerra contra el Japon en 1941—en ningun momento, en los ultimos 60
años, ha sido llamado el pueblo filipino a rendir una decision tan importante,
de trascendencia e implicaciones tan graves, tan tremendas, como la que tiene
que hacer en el plebiscito de 11 de Marzo proximo con motivo de la Resolucion
congresional discutida en el presente asunto.

Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que para bien o para mal
sacuden los cimientos de un pais tal que si fuese un fenomeno cosmico; que
determinan el curso de su existencia y destinos nacionales; que deciden, en una
palabra, de la suerte de generaciones ya existentes y de generaciones que no han
nacido toda via. Es una de esas decisiones que para hacerla los pueblos deben
hincarse humildemcnte de rodillas, de cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de los
pueblos y naciones la gracia de una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita
sabiduria * * *.

II

Para los efectos de una amplia perspectiva historica que permita destacar en
toda su plenitud los contomos de los formidables “issues” o puntos
constitucionales debatidos en el presente asunto, parece conveniente que
repasemos, siquiera brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no cabe en el
mismo texto de esta disidencia),^[1] los
preceptos basicos de la Constitucion que se trata de reformar con la Resolucion
congresional de que tantas veces se ha hecho merito. Helos aqui:

“ARTICLE XIII.—CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES

“SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government estbalished under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

ARTICLE XIV.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

* * * *
* * *

“SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the
Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of
the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or
right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the public interest so requires.”

Como queda dicho, la reforma propuesta es en el sentido de que, no obstante
lo dispuesto en los preceptos arriba transcritos, “durante la efectividad del
Convenio Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre el Presidente de Filipinas y el
Presidente de los Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al tenor de las
disposiciones de la Ley del Commonwealth No. 733, pero que en ningun caso se
extendera mas alla del 3 de Julio de 1974, la disposicion, explotacion,
desarrollo y utilizacion de todos los terrenos agricolas, forestales y minerales
de dominio publico, de aguas, minerales, carbon, petroleo y otros minerales
petroliferos, de todas las fuerzas y fuentes de energia potential, asi como de
otros recursos de Filipinas, y la operacion de utilidades publicas, si abiertos
para cualquier persona, quedan abiertos para los ciudadanos de los Estados
Unidos y para todas las formas de negocio y empresa de la propiedad o
controladas, directa o indirectamente, por ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos, de
la misma manera y bajo las mismas condiciones impuestas a los ciudadanos de
Filipinas o a las corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o controladas por
ciudadanos de Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta del Congreso filipino,
supra).

Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial—pues, sobre ser historia contemporanea,
se trata de las labores y procesos deliberativos de la misma Asamblea
Constituyente—de que los preceptos capitales arriba transcritos constituyen la
expresion acabada de toda la madurez de juicio, de toda la prudencia y sabidurfa
de que eran capaces no solo los autores de la Constitucion y los Delegados que
la aprobaron, sino el pueblo filipino que la ratifico en el correspondiente
plebiscito nacional convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta
firmeza y tan fuerte unanimidad entre nuestros partidos politicos y sus
caudillos como en esa recia y constructiva afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nada
mejor, creo yo, que las siguientes palabras para definir el espiritu, la
filosofia que informa esas provisiones:

“This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing the
outworn Regalian doctrine which, it is suggested, may serve to retard the
economic development of the Philippines. The best encomium on this provision is
probably the very criticism launched against it. It is inconceivable that the
Filipinos would liberalize the acquisition, disposition and exploitation of our
natural resources to the extent of permitting their alienation or of depriving
the people of this country of their heritage. The life of any nation depends
upon its patrimony and economic resources. Real freedom, if it is to be lasting,
must go hand in hand with economic security, if not economic prosperity. We are
at most usufructuaries of our domains and natural resources and have no power to
alienate them even if we should want to do so. They belong to the generations
yet unborn and it would be the height of folly to even think of opening the door
for their untrammelled disposition, exploitation, development or utilization to
the detriment of the Filipino people. With our natural resources in the hands of
foreigners what would be there left except the idealism of living in a country
supposedly free, but where freedom is, after all, an empty dream? We would be
living in a sumptuous palace that is not ours! We would be beggars in our own
homes, strangers in our own land!

“Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the protection
of the legitimate interests of the Filipino people. There is no antagonism or
hostility towards foreigners but sane nationalism and self-protection which
every country of the world is practising today in the interest of
self-preservation.” (The Three Powers of Government, by Laurel, pp. 117,
118.)

Los criticos de la enmienda constitutional propuesta pueden discutir
libremente, eomo cumple a los ciudadanos de un pais democratico, los meritos y
demeritos de la misma. Pueden combatirla con toda clase de razones—morales,
politicas, economicas, financieras, internacionales, y hasta de decencia—y
naturalmente defenderla tambien sus partidarios desde todos los angulos. Podrian
los opositores hacer una minuciosa diseccion de su fraseologia y acaso hallar en
sus repliegues peligrosas implicaciones, posibles riesgos, eomo en ese par de
adverbios “directa o indirectamente”, a cuyo socaire podrian acogerse
corporaciones o asociaciones extranjeras controladas solo indirectamente por
ciudaoanos americanos para concurrir en la explotacion de nuestros terrenos
publicos y recursos naturales, y en la operacion de utilidades piiblicas. Todo
esto lo pueden hacer, y algo mas. Pero es obvio, elemental que semejante
discusion no compete a esta Corte Suprema, sino en todo caso a otros poderets
constituidos.

Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar la bondad o maldad de la
enmienda propuesta. Lo unico que nos incumbe hacer, ya que la cuestion se halla
propiamente planteada ante nosotros, es resolver si la enmienda ha sido aprobada
por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato expreso de la Constitucion en materia
de enmiendas; si los requisitos que la Constitucion señala para poder
enmendarla—requisitos que son mandatorios, categoricamente imperativos y
obligatorios—se han cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo bien en el asunto de
Gray vs. Childs ([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), “* * * No podemos decir que
el estricto requerimiento relativo a las enmiendas se puede renunciar a favor de
una buena enmienda e invocar en contra de otra mala. * * * No compete a los
tribunales el determinar cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y cuando no lo
es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver con la sabiduria de la politica. Pero
es deber de los tribunales, cuando se les pide que lo hagan, el determinar si o
no el procedimiento adoptado para la aprobacion de la enmienda es el señalado
por los terminos de la ley organica.”

Todo lo que se ha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relieve la filosofia de
nuestra Constitucion en materia de recursos naturales y utilidades publicas, se
ha dicho no como expresion de un criterio propio, sino tan solo para subrayar
toda la gravedad, toda la densidad del asunto, y prevenir en todo caso los
peligros de una rutinaria y complaciente liviandad. Como tambien se dijo en el
citado asunto de Gray vs. Childs, “la enmienda de la ley organica del
Estado o nacion no es una cosa para ser tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de
lance o al azar. Es una cosa seria. Cuando la enmienda es aprobada, viene
a ser parte de la ley fundamental del pafs y puede significar el bienestar o
maldicion de las generaciones de la nacion donde se hace parte del codigo
fundamental.”

Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una
consigna en el presente caso en que la reforma propuesta afecta vitalisimamente
al patrimonio nacional del pueblo filipino. ¿No son los recursos naturales y las
utilidades publicas el tesoro de una nacion, la base que sustenta su existencia,
la espina dorsal de su economia? Por tanto, jamas se podra exagerar el celo, la
vigilancia que el pueblo y sus organos naturales ejercen para que las
salvaguardias impuestas por la misma Constitucion en relacion con el proceso y
tramitacion de toda enmienda constitucional se cumplan y observen con el maximo
rigor.

Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabe escudarse tras la
doctrina de la separacion de poderes que la mayoria de esta Corte invoca para
justificar su inaccion, su pasividad, su politica de “manos fuera”, alegando que
el presente asunto es coto vedado para nosotros, algo que cae fuera de nuestra
jurisdiccion, eso que en derecho politico y constitucional se llama materia
politica no-justiciable.

III

La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice que
versa sobre una cuestion politica, y las cuestiones politicas caen fuera de la
competcncia de los tribunates de justicia. Creo que esto es un error, dicho sea
con todos los respetos debidos a mis ilustres compañeros que sostienen tal
opinion. ¿Hay acaso algun documento mas politico que la Constitucion? Si la
opinion de la mayoria fuese valida y acertada, practicamente ninguna violacion
de la Constitucion podria ser enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual
menos, casi todas las transgresiones constitucionales, sobre todo las que comete
el poder legislativo o el poder ejecutivo, tienen caracter politico. Bajo esa
opinion la Constitucion seria una letra muerta, un simple pedazo de papel: los
poderes constituidos, los individuos que los componen, podrian infringir
impunemente la Constitucion sin que ningun arbitro constitucional pudiera
intervenir ordenadamente para restaurar la suprema majestad de la ley
fundamental violada. Es claro que esto podria conducir facilmente al caos, a la
anarquia, a la revolucion, dependiendo solo el resultado de la mayor o menor
docilidad del pueblo, del grado de elasticidad politica de las masas. Y es claro
que ninguno puede querer este triste destino para nuestro pais.

Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro sistema
de gobierno que esta esencialmente calcado en el americano, es que bajo la
teoria relativa de la separacion de poderes, ningun poder es superior al pueblo
cuya voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los poderes no son mas que
agentes, mandatarios, servidores: el pueblo es el amo, el mandante, el soberano.
Y el pueblo ordena y manda por medio de la Constitucion—esta es su voz el verbo
hecho carne politica y social, el soplo vital que traduce y transmuta su
espiritu en postulados esenciales de regulacion y gobierno.

Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello, dicen los
sostenedores absolutistas de la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Pero se
pregunta: ¿quien señala la voluntad del pueblo tal como esta plasmada en la
Constitucion? ¿Quien es el profeta que desciende del Sinai para revelar las
tablas de la ley? ¿Quien ha de arbitrar en los conflictos constitucionales, o
quien ha de decidir los litigios propiamente planteados en que se ventilan una
infraccion de la Constitucion? ¿Hay un peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo
constitucional, o por el contrario, los resortes estan todos bien situados,
capaces de operar y funcionar adecuada y eficientemente? Esto es precisamente el
busilis, la cuestion batallona.

No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro
sistema de gobierno e! poder judicial es el llamado a señalar, a interpretar la
ley; y en los conflictos o transgresiones constitucionales esta Corte Suprema
tiene la ultima palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremo y final. Bajo nuestra
mecanica constitucional, igual que bajo la americana, se da la aparente paradoja
de que la superior facultad, el supremo negocio de interpretar la voluntad del
pueblo tal como esta expresada mas o menos permanentemente en la Constitucion,
no corresponde propiamente a ninguno de los poderes electivos, los que se
renuevan periodicamente, sino al poder que si bien es de nombramiento en su
origen, tiene, sin embargo, sentido de perpetuidad, quiero decir, es vitalicio
en la complexion y funcion de los individuos que lo componen—el poder judicial.
La sabiduria peculiar, la originalidad del sistema consiste precisamente en eso:
en haber alojado el supremo arbitraje con relacion a los conflictos y
transgresiones constitucionales en un poder del Estado al cual deliberadamente
se le ha dotado de un clima psicologico y moral el mas propicio posiblc a la
objetividad y desasimiento de las disputas politicas y discordias civiles,
situandosele por encima de los vaivenes de la politica al uso y las veleidades
de la suerte electoral. “Esto es lo que va implicito en la expresion
supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la facultad de revision judicial
bajo la Constitucion” (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil.,
171).

“The very essence of the American conception of the separation of powers is
its insistence upon the inherent distinction between law-making and
law-interpreting, and its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a
notion which, when brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial
review.” (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, p. 146.)

En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal
Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de su gran Chief Justice John
Marshall, en terminos inequivocos definio y explico las facultades de la
judicatura para poner en vigor la Constitucion como la suprema ley del pais, y
declaro que es terminantemente de la competencia y deber del departamento
judicial el decidir cual es la ley que rige.

“The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. Webster says:
‘The Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of course, that every act of
the Legislature contrary to the law must be void. Hut who shall decide this
question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution
ceases to be legal and becomes only a moral restraint for the legislature. If
they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be conformable to the
Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not legally
binding; because, if the construction of it rest wholly with them, their
discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous
constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case arises, must
decide upon the validity of particular acts.’ Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30.”
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 1, 2d edtion, pp. 4,
5.)

En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos
tambien lo siguiente:

“* * * Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por arbitro final,
frena con efectividad a los demas departamentos en el ejercicio de su facultad
de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos ejecutivos y
legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.”

Esta doctrina se reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil.,
62), a saber:

“* * * As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds ‘neither the
sword nor the purse’ it is by constitutional placement the organ called upon to
allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in
appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Section 2 [1], Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the
judiciary restrains the other departments of the government and this result is
one of the necessary corollaries of the ‘system of checks and balances’ of the
government established.”

No es que con esto el poder judicial asume un complejo de superioridad sobre
los otros poderes del Estado, no. Se trata simplemente de que, dentro de las
limitaciones de toda creation humana, alguien tiene que arbitrar y dirimir los
conflictos y las transgresiones a que puede dar lugar la Constitucion, y se
estima que el poder judicial, por la razon de su ser y de sus funciones, es el
mas llamado a ser ese arbitro. Se trata de una propia y graciosa inhibicion de
los otros poderes en virtud de una necesidad impuesta por unas teorias y
practicas de gobierno que han resistido la prueba del tiempo y el choque con la
realidad y la experiencia. En mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra
Avelino (77 Phil., 192), hablando sobre este particular dije lo siguiente y lo
reitero ahora, a saber:

“En parte, el argumento expucsto es corrccto y acertado. No se pucde discutir
que los trcs poderes del Estado son iguales e indepen dientes entre si; que
ninguno de ellos cs superior al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial que entre
los tres es el menos fuerte y el mas precario en medios e iniplementos
tnateriales. Tampoco se puede discutir que bujo la Constitucion cada poder tiene
una zona, una esfera de accion propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera
un cumulo de facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de
esa esfera y en el uso de esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discre cion
y ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so pretexto de quo
alguien los cuestiona o tacha de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o
insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la separacion llega solo hasta aqui. Desde
Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasla nuestios dias, el principio de
la separacion de poderes ha sufrido tremendas modificaciones y limitaciones. El
consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la separacion de
poderes queda condicionada por una mecanica constitucional—la mecanica de los
frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States, tomo
3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.^a edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es
absoluto dentro de la esfera que le asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego
de sus facultades y funciones no se puede coartar. Pero cuando se sale y
extravasa de esa esfera invadiendo otras esfeias constitucionales, ejerciendo
facultades que no le pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya no le atnpara, la
Constitucion que es superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe y le achica
dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones anti-constitucionales. La
cuestion ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestro sislenia de gobierno hay un
niecanismo que permite restablecer el juego normal de la Constitucion cuando
surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos que podriamos llamar de fronteras
constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen esos
conflictos, un ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo tiene algun
remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion y las leyes, y quien puede
concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica, cardinal en
este asunto.

“Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen—son los
tribunales de justicia.”

La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica
no-justiciable ni las materias o casos que caen dentro de su significado. “The
difficulty lies”—dice la ponencia—”in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition,
and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of
the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of
the political departments of the government.” Pero razonando por analogia cita
un precedente, una autoridad—el caso de Coleman vs. Miller decidido no
hace muchos años por la Corte Suprema Federal de los Estados Unidos. La mayoria
cree que este es el caso mas semejante al que nos ocupa. Creo que la mayoria
padece error: el caso de Coleman contra Miller es precisamente un buen
argumento en favor del recurso.

Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los Estados
Unidos propuso una reforma a la Constitucion, conocida por “Child Labor
Amendment” (enmienda sobre el trabajo infantil). En Enero, 1925, la Legislatura
del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion rechazando la enmienda y una copia
certificada de la resolucion se envio al Secretario de Estado de los Estados
Unidos. En Enero, 1937, o sea 12 años despues, una resolucion conocida como
“Resolucion Concurrente del Senado No. 3” se presento en el Senado del Estado de
Kansas para ratificar la propuesta enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Al considerarse
la resolucion 20 Senadores votaron en favor y 20 Senadores en contra. El
Teniente Gobernador, que era entonces el Presidente del Senado en virtud de la
Constitucion estatal, emitio su voto en favor de la resolucion, rompiendo asi el
empate. La resolucion fue posteriormente adoptada por la Camara de
Representantes de Kansas mediante una mayoria de los votos de sus miembros.

Fue entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un recurso
de mandamus por los 20 Senadores adversos a la resolucion y por otros 3
miembros de la Camara de Representantes. El objeto del recurso era (a)
compeler al Secretario del Senado a borrar el endoso favorable de la resolucion
y poner en su lugar las palabras “no ha sido aprobada”; (b) recabar la
expedicion de un interdicto contra los oficiales del Senado y Camara de
Representantes prohibiendoles que firmaran la resolucion y contra el Secretario
de Estado de Kansas prohibiendole que autenticara dicha resolucion y la
entregara al Gobernarlor. La solicitud cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente
Gobernador a emitir su voto decisivo en el Senado. Tambien se planteaba en la
solicitud el hecho de que la resolucion habia sido rechazada originariamente y
se alegaba, ademas, que durante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre Junio,
1924, y Mayo, 1927, la enmienda habia sido rechazada por ambas Camaras de las
Legislaturas de 26 Estados y solo se habia ratificado en 5 Estados, y que por
razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse ratificado dentro de un tiempo
razonable la enmienda habia perdido su validez y vitalidad.

La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre los
hechos, asumio competencia sobre el caso y sostuvo que el Teniente Gobernador
tenia derecho a emitir su voto decisivo, que la proyectada enmienda conservaba
su vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo transcurrido, y que la resolucion,
“habiendo sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes y por el Senado, el acto
de ratificacion de la propuesta enmienda por la Legislatura de Kansas era final
y completo.” Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.

Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta asumio
jurisdiccion sobre el caso, con la concurrencia y disidencia de algunos
Magistrados que opinaban que el recurso debia rechazarse de plano, sin mas
ceremonias, por la razon, segun los disidentes, de que los recurrentes no tenian
personalidad ni derecho de accion para pedir la revision de la sentencia de la
Corte Suprema de Kansas, y porque ademas se trataba de una cuestion puramente
politica, por tanto no-justiciable. Bajo la ponencia de su Presidente el Sr.
Hughes, la Corte Suprema Federal conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y
resolviendo las cuestiones planteadas. He aqui sus palabras: “Our authority to
issue the writ of certiorari is challenged upon” the ground that the
petitioners have no standing to seek to have the judgment of the state
court reviewed and hence it is urged that the writ of certiorari should be
dismissed. We are unable to accept that view.” Esto viene a ser como una
replica a las siguientes palabras de los disidentes: “It is the view of Mr.
Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice
Frankfurter) that the petitioners have no standing in this Court.” De lo
dicho resulta evidente que la Corte Federal no adopto la actitud de “manos
fuera” (hands off), sino que actuo positivamente sobre el caso,
encarandolo.

La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante
extensa, esta consagrada enteramente a discutir la cuestion de la jurisdiccion
de la Corte. Ya hemos visto que esta cuestion se ha resuelto enteramente en
favor de la jurisdiccion, en virtud de las razones luminosas que alli se
explanan y que no reproduzco por no ser necesario y para no alargai
indebidamente esta disidencia. La segunda parte es bien breve, apenas
consta de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la cuestion de si el voto del Teniente
Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no valido. La Corte no lo resuelve,
porque dice que sus miembros se dividieron por igual sobre si era una cuestion
politica y, por tanto, no- justiciable. La tercera parte, tan extensa
como la primera, esta dedicada a estudiar y discutir las siguientes
proposiciones: (a) Si habiendo sido rechazada originariamente la
enmienda, una ratificacion posterior podia validamente dejar sin efecto dicho
rechazamiento y tomarse como una ratificacion legal al tenor de la Constitucion;
(b) si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la
ratificacion—unos 13 años—no habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la
repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo.

El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es muy
interesante y desde luego acabado. Se estudian y comentan luminosamente los
precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si el rechazamiento de una enmienda propuesta
impide que la niisma sea ratificada posteriormente, se puntualiza lo siguiente:
que el articulo V de la Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta fraseado en
terminos positivos, es decir, habla de ratificacion y no de rechazamiento, y que
por tanto “el poder para ratificar lo confiere al Estado la Constitucion, y que,
como poder ratificante, continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo
rechazamiento.” Luego la Corte dice, examinando Jos precedentes, que el
Congreso, en el ejercicio de su control sobre la promulgation de las enmiendas a
la Constitucion, ha resuelto esta cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido
indicado, esto es, considerando inefectivo el previo rechazamiento frente a una
positiva ratificacion; y la Corte concluye que esta accion del Congreso es
valida, constitucional; por consigniente, los tribunales no estan autorizados
para revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la Corte dice que se trata de
una cuestion politica no-justiciable, es decir una cuestion que cae dentro de
la zona constitucional exclusiva del Congreso; por tanto, se trata de una
accion valida, constitucional. Pero no hay nada en esa decision que diga, o
permita inferir, que cuando el Congreso viola un mandato expreso de la
Constitucion, como en el caso que nos ocupa, los tribunales no pueden
intervenir, bajo el principio de la supremacia judicial en tratandose de
interpretar la Constitucion, para resolver el conflicto o enjuiciar la
transgresion, y conceder el remedio propiamente pedido. En otras palabras, en el
caso de Coleman contra Miller la Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el
Congreso, al declarar valida la ratificacion de la enmienda constitucional sobre
trabajo infantil (Child labor), no habia infringido el articulo V de la
Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, y la Corte lo razona diciendo, con la vista de
los precedentes, que el referido articulo V habla de ratificacion y no de
rechazamiento, y que, por tanto, “el poder para ratificar continua y persiste
a pesar de un previo rechazamiento.” De suerte que, en realidad de verdad,
no es eierto que la Corte Suprema Federal declaro injusticiable la materia, pues
ique mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum categorico, positivo y
terminante?

Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el
rechazamiento y la ratificacion—unos 13 años—no habia tenido el efecto de dar
caracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico
definitivo, la Corte Suprema Federal fallo que no, es decir, declaro valida la
ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso de tiempo, aduciendo razones muy atinadas,
entre ellas lu de que las condiciones de caracter moral, medico, social y
economico que aconsejaban la prohibicion del trabajo infantil en las fabricas
eran tan validas y existentes, si no mas, cuando se sometio la enmienda por
primera vez para su ratificacion como 13 años despues. Y luego la Corte cita
autoridades y precedentes en apoyo de su conclusion, entre ellos el caso tipico
y decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U. S., 368; 65 Law. ed., 994; 41 Sup.
Ct., 510). En este caso la Corte declaro que el Congreso, al proponer una
enmienda a la Constitucion, puede fijar un tiempo razonable para su
ratificacion, y sostuvo la action del Congreso al disponer en la proyectada
18.^a Enmienda que la misma seria ineficaz a menos que se ratificase
dentro de siete años.

Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo
contrario: el Congreso no habia fijado ningun plazo para la ratificacion. En
vista de esto, los recurrentes pretendian que la Corte supliera la omision del
Congreso declarando lo que era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuenta los
precedentes judiciales y el precedente congresional de 7 años ya sostenido en el
caso citado de Dillon contra Glass; y que desde luego el periodo de 13
años era demasiado largo para ser razonable. La Corte Suprema dijo que no, que
no eran los tribunales los que debian fijar ese tiempo razonable; que en esta
cuestion entraban muchos factores de naturaleza varia y compleja—politicos,
economicos y sociales—que solo el Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar
ya mediante la correspondiente legislacion como en el caso de la 18.^a
Enmienda, ya en cada caso concreto de ratificacion al ejercer su control sobre
la promulgacion de las enmiendas. Ahora bien, pregunto: ¿no es esto un
dictum judicial? ¿no es esto justiciar? ¿no esta aqui la Corte
Suprema Federal sentandose en estrados y emitiendo judicialmente su opinion
sobre una materia juridica y constitutional sometida a su consideracion? En
realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que la Corte ha dejado de resolver
es la validez o nulidad del voto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador, por la razon
de que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la misma decision, la opinion del
Tribunal estaba igualmente dividida. Todas las demas cuestiones han sido
enjuiciadas, resueltas, y esta accion de la mayoria, asumiendo plena
jurisdiccion sobre el caso y las materias en el discutidas, es lo que ha
motivado la disidencia de 4 Magistrados los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y
Douglas. En efecto, estos disidentes no disimulan su desagrado al ver que la
Corte asume en el caso, siquier implicitamente, el poder de
interpretacion judicial, y aun van mas alla—expresan un notorio desencanto al
ver que la Corte “trata el proceso enmendatorio provisto por la Constitucion,
como sujeto a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y en otros
sujeto a la autoridad final del Congreso”, y al ver tambien que en la decision
“no hay desaprobacion de la conclusion establecida en el asunto de Dillon
contra Glass, de que la Constitucion requiere tacitamente que una
enmienda propiamente sometida debe darse por muerta, a menos que se ratifique
dentro de un tiempo razonable.” Es decir, los Magistrados disidentes
esperaban que la Corte revocase y abrogase lo hecho por ella en el citado asunto
de Dillon contra Glass en donde la Corte, en vez de abstenerse de conocer
del caso por tratarse en el, segun los disidentes, de materia politica
no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el mismo asumiendo su poder
tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y declarando valida la ley del
Congreso que fijaba un plazo de 7 años para la ratificacion de la
18.^a Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de reproducir las
mismas palabras de la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo que yo pueda decir,
demuestran de modo inconcuso las irreconciliables diferencias de criterio entre
la mayoria, representada por el ilustre ponente Sr. Hughes, y los disidentes,
pues mientras por un lado el ponente justicia decididamente el caso
considerando, discutiendo y resolviendo todas las cuestiones planteadas, menos
la cuestton del voto del Teniente Gobernador, citando profusamente autoridades y
precedentes, los disidentes, en su opinion, preconizan una actitud de absoluta
abstencion, de “manos fuera” (hands off), por tratarse, segun ellos, de
una materia politica no-justiciable que cae exclusivamente bajo el control del
Congreso. He aqui las palabras de los disidentes:

“* * * To the extent that the Court’s opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the
exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification
of amendments, we are unable to agree.

“The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption. However, it
is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation
of a ‘reasonable time’ within which Congress may accept ratification; as to
whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or
voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once taken
upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only
with an ultimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this
must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution
solely to the political branch of government.

“The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some
respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the
final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass, that the Constitution
impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die unless ratified
within a ‘reasonable time’. Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior
assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made
clear that only Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is
any such implication in article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the
Court’s opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the
political questions of whether a State whose legislature has once acted upon a
proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether in the
circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an
‘unreasonable’ time has elapsed. No such division between the political and
judicial branches of the government is made by article 5 which grants power over
the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that
process has been given by the article exclusively and completely to Congress.
The process itself is ‘political’ in its entirety, from submission until an
amendment becomes part of the Constitution and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point.

“Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process,
subject to no judicial review, the views of any court upon this process cannot
be binding upon Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs. Glass attempts
judicially to impose a limitation upon the right of Congress to determine final
adoption of an amendment, it should be disapproved. * * *” (Coleman
vs. Miller, 122 A. L. R., 695, 708, 709.)

La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en el
referido asunto de Coleman vs. Miller es algun tanto confusa, como han
podido notar los mismos comentaristas; asi que necesita de alguna explicacion.
Es cierto que no suscriben la ponencia mas que 3 Magistrados, a saber: el
ponente Sr. Hughes y los Sres. Stone y Reed, pero en cuanto a la jurisdiccion
plena que la Corte asumio sobre el caso y la materia hay que añadir los votos de
los Sres. McReynolds y Butler. Estos dos ultimos no solo concurrian
implicitamente en la accion de la Corte al enjuiciar el caso, sino que inclusive
opinaban que debia concederse el recurso, esto es, que debia anularse la
ratificacion cardia de la Enmienda sobre Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor) hecha
por la Legislatura de Kansas. De modo que en cuanto al “issue” de la
jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad del caso, la votacion era de 5
contra 4—por la jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad, el ponente Sr. Hughes,
y los Magistrados Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la actitud de
absoluta abstencion, de “manos fuera” (hands off), los Magistrados Sres.
Black, Frankfurter, Roberts y Douglas.

Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de
ser una autoridad a favor de los recurridos, juntamente con el caso de Dillon
vs. Glass constituyen precedentes decisivos en la jurisprudencia federal
americana a favor de los recurrentes.

V

Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de la tesis de que tenemos
jurisdiccion para enjuiciar y decidir el presente caso, en el ejercicio de
nuestras supremas funciones como interprete de la Constitucion bajo el principio
firmemente establecido de la supremacia judicial en asuntos propiamente
planteados sobre conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, la jurisprudencia
de los Estados es todavia mas indubitable e inequivoca, mas terminante y
decisiva. La importancia de esto sube de punto si se tiene en cuenta que, mas
que con el gobierno federal, nuestra analogia, nuestros puntos de contacto en lo
politico, constitucional y juridico es mas bien con los diferentes Estados de la
Union americana. Nuestro sistema de gobierno es unitario. Aqui nuestras
provincias no son Estados autonomos y semi-independientes como lo son los
Estados americanos. Asi que la cedula, la unidad politica mas semejante a la
nuestra no es la federal, sino la estatal. Por eso si bien es cierto que las
constituciones de los Estados, como la nuestra, todas estan fundamentalmente
calcadas en el patron de la Constitucion federal, se vera que en ciertos rasgos
caracteristicos del sistema unitario nuestra Constitucion se aproxima
evidentemente mas a las de los Estados que a la federal. Esa semejanza es sobre
todo notabilisima en la parte que se refiere al proceso enmendatorio de la
Constitucion. Es que, en realidad, los Estados de la Union americana, para todos
los efectos de la vida interior, domestica, son practicamente naciones
independientes; asi que nuestra evolucion, nuestro transito de la condicion de
Commonwealth a la de Republica soberana e independiente si bien nos distingue de
ellos en el derecho internacional, ninguna diferencia, sin embargo, ha operado
en el campo constitucional, ora en la parte dogmatica de la Constitucion, ora en
la parte organica. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que con la independencia no
hemos tenido necesidad de cambiar de Constitucion: la misma que nos servia
cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir, cuando estabamos sujetos a la
soberania americana, es la misma que nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos Republica; y
no cabe duda de que nos serviria perfectamente bien si no la tuvieramos
asendereada y malparada en nuestras pecadoras manos con repetidas violaciones,
con frecuentes asaltos contra su integridad * * *.

Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquiera a que señale un caso,
un solo caso en la jurisprudencia de los Estados de la Union americana en que
los tribunales de justicia se hayan negado a conocer y enjuiciar una violacion
constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupa por la razon de que se trataba de
una cuestion politica no-justiciable. No hay absolutamente ninguno; por eso que
los recurridos, a pesar de las pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que denota
su habil y concienzudo alegato, no han podido citar ni un solo caso.

En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de varios Estados dan cuenta de casos
identicos al que nos ocupa y en todos el los se ha declarado invariablemente que
la violacion de la Constitucion en lo que se refiere al precepto que regula el
proceso de las enmiendas a la Ley organica es una cuestion judicial, y ninguna
Corte Suprema de Estado se ha lavado jamas las manos bajo la teoria de la
separacion de poderes. Es mas: creo que ni siquiera se ha planteado seriamente
la objecion fundada en el argumento de la injusticiabilidad.

Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citar mas que algunos
casos los mas conocidos y representativos, tomados de la jurisprudencia de
algunos Estados, a saber: Florida, Minnesota, Georgia e Indiana. De la Corte
Suprema de Florida tenemos dos casos: el de Crawford vs. Gilchrist y el
de Gray vs. Childs.

En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963; Ann.
Cas., 1914B, 916), se trataba de una accion de prohibicion interpuesta por el
Gobernador del Estado, Albert W. Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de Estado, H.
Clay Crawford, para impedir que cierta propuesta enmicnda a la Constitucion se
publicara y se sometiera al electorado en un plebiscito para su ratificacion o
rechazamiento. Es decir, lo mismo de que se trata en el caso que tenemos ante
nosotros. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes de
Florida con el voto necesario y constitucional de tres quintas (3/5), y fue
enviada al Senado para su concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo con el voto
de tres quintos, pero esta votacion fue reconsiderada posteriormente. Asi estaba
el asunto, pendiente de reconsideracion cuando se clausuro la Legislatura.
Despues, sin embargo, diose por aprobada la propuesta enmienda y el Secretario
de Estado trato de dar los pasos para su publicacion y ratificacion
plebiscitaria. De ahi la accion de interdicto prohibitorio, fundada en la
alegacion de que la enmienda no habia sido aprobada debidamente por la
Legislatura de acuerdo con los metodos prescritos en la Constitucion de Florida.
Igual que en el presente caso tambien hubo alli una batalla forense colosal, con
un tremendo despliegue de habilidad y talento por cada lado. El ponente no se
recata en alabar el esfuerzo de las partes y dice: “* * * we think the parties
to this litigation are to be commended, both for taking the proceedings that
have brought these unusual questions before the court for determination and for
the great ability with which their counsel have presented them to this
court.”

¿Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose incompetente para
conocer del asunto por la razon de que se trataba de una cuestion politica y,
por tanto, no justiciable? De ninguna manera. La Corte asumio resueltamente su
responsabilidad y poder tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y fallo el
asunto en su fondo, declarando que la cuestion era propiamente judicial y que la
enmienda constitucional propuesta no se habia aprobada de conformidad con los
requisites establecidos por la Constitucion para el proceso y tramitacion de las
enmiendas. Por tanto, se denego la peticion de supersedeas interpuesta
por el recurrido para enervar el recurso; es decir, el recurrente gano su
inusitado e historico pleito. Y las esferas politicas de Florida no se
desorbitaron por esta decisiva derrota de la teoria de la separacion de poderes.
Vale la pena reproducir algunas de las doctrinas sentadas en el asunto, a
saber:

“Constitutional Law—Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action by
Legislature in Proposing Constitutional Amendment.

“A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has been validly
proposed and agreed to by the Legislature is to be had in a judicial
forum where the constitution provides no other means for such
determination.

“Injunction—Subject of Relief—Act of Secretary of State in Certifying
Proposed Amendments.

“The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the county
commissioners proposed amendments to the constitution is in its nature
ministerial, involving the exercise of no discretion, and if the act is illegal
it may be enjoined in appropriate proceedings by proper parties, there being no
other adequate remedy afforded by law.

“Injunction—Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as
Defendant.

“The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen,
taxpayer, and elector, is a proper complainant in proceedings brought to
enjoin the secretary of state from publishing at public expense and certifying
proposed amendments to the constitution upon the ground that such proposed
amendments are invalid because they have not been duly ‘agreed to by
three-fifths of all the members elected to each house’ of the legislature.

“Amendment to Constitution—Eflect of Ignoring Mandatory Provisions of
Constitution.

“If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in
amending the constitution, it violates the right of all the people of the state
to government regulated by law.

“Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.

“It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the
existing constitution.

“Mandatory Provisions of Constitution as to Manner of Amending
Constitution.

“The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the
constitution to ‘be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each
house’ of the legislature is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that such
amendments shall be agreed to by the deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the
requisite number of the members of each house at a regular” session.

“Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect—Mandatory Character
of Provisions.

“Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended meaning and
effect, and essential provisions of a constitution are to be regarded as being
mandatory.” (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas., 1914B, pp. 916,
917.)

El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. En 1934 otro
asunto constitucional importante, el de Gray contra Childs, se decidio en
virtud de la autoridad y sentencia dictada en dicho asunto de Crawford.

En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.),
tambien se trataba de una demanda de prohibicion para impedir la publicacion de
una propuesta enmienda constitucional que iba a ser sometida al electorado de
Florida para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una eleccion general o
plebiscito fijado para Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la
Camara de Representantes con el voto de tres quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado
hubo cierta confusion acerca del texto finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura,
antes de clausurarse aprobo una resolucion conjunta autorizando a ciertos
oficiales de las Camaras para que despues de la clausura hiciesen ciertas
correciones en las actas y en el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la verdadera
historia de los procedimientos y compulsar el texto de la enmienda tal como
habia sido aprobada. Se alegaba en la demanda que esto era ilegal y
anticonstitucional. El tribunal de circuito estimo el recurso de prohibicion.
Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema del Estado, la misma
confirmo la sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto prohibitorio. He aqui
los pronuncia mientos de la Corte que parecen estereotipados para el caso que
nos ocupa, a saber:

“(4, 5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method by
which the Constitution may be amended. It requites that a proposed amendment
shall be entered upon the respective Journals of the House of Representatives
and of the Senate with the yeas and nays showing a three-fifths vote in
favor of such amendment by each House. The proposed amendment here under
consideration nowhere appears upon the Journals of the Senate, and therefore it
is unnecessary for us to consider any other questions presented or any
authorities cited.

“The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a thing to be
lightly undertaken nor to be accomplished in a haphazard manner. It is a serious
thing. When an amendment is adopted, it becomes a part of the fundamental law of
the land, and it may mean the weal or woe of the future generations of the state
wherein it becomes a part of the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict
requirements pertaining to amendments may be waived in favor of a good amendment
and invoked as against a bad amendment. If the Constitution may be amended in
one respect without the amendment being spread upon the Journals of one of the
respective Houses of the Legislature, then it may be amended in any other
respect in the same manner. It is not for the courts to determine what is a wise
proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom of the policy the
courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the courts, when called upon
so to do, to determine whether or not the procedure attempted to be adopted is
that which is required by the terms of the organic law.

“Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above pointed
out, the decree appealed from should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed on
authority of the opinion and judgment in the case of Crawford vs.
Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 953; Ann. Cas., 1914B, 916.” (Gray vs.
Childs, 156 Southern Reporter, pp. 274, 279.)

Notese que la clausula sobre enmiendaa en la Constitucion de Florida es
semejante a la nuestra, a saber: (1) la propuesta enmienda tiene que ser
aprobada por la Legislatura, en Florida con el voto de tres-quintos (3/5) de los
miembroa, en Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los sies y
los nos tienen que hacerse constar en el diario de sesiones (Articulo VI,
seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1, Constitucion de Filipinas); (3)
despues de aprobada la enmienda por la Legislatura se somete al electorado en
una eleccion o plebiscito, para su ratificacion o rechazamiento.

El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal
americana es diferente, a saber: el Congreso puede proponer la enmienda bien (1)
mediante la aprobacion de dos tercios (2/3) de sus miembros; bien (2) mediante
una convencion que se convocara al efecto a peticion de las Legislaturas de dos
tercios (2/3) de los diferentes Estados. En cualquiera de ambos casos la
enmienda sera valida para todos los efectos y fines como parte de la
Constitucion siempre que fuera ratificada por las Legislaturas de tres cuartos
(¾) de los Estados, o por convenciones de tres cuartas-partes de los mismos,
segun que uno u otro modo de ratificacion hubiera sido propuesto por el
Congreso.

Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digo mas arriba, me
inclina a sostener que la jurisprudencia constitucional propiamente aplicable a
Filipinas es la jurisprudencia de los Estados, puesto que es con estos con los
cuales tenemos analogia o paridad constitucional en lo quo toca a la forma y
manera como se puede reformar la Constitucion.

Seguire ahora citando mas casos.

Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el
asunto de In re McConaughy (106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408), tambien se
suscito la cuestion de si una propuesta enmienda constitucional habia sido
aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos señalados en la Constitucion de
Minnesota. Alli como aqui tambien hubo disputa sobre si esto era una cuestion
judicial o una cuestion politica no justiciable. La Corte Suprema de aquel
Estado declaro sin ambajes que era una cuestion judicial. He aqui sus palabras
que no tienen desperdicio:

“The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a
constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements
of an existing constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt
that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute
duty of the judiciary to determine whether the constitution has been amended in
the manner required by the constitution, unless a special tribunal has been
created to determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that
the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law. There is
some authority for the view that when the constitution itself creates a special
tribunal, and confides to it the exclusive power to canvass votes and declare
the results, and makes the amendment a part of the constitution as a result of
such declaration by proclamation or otherwise, the action of such tribunal is
final and conclusive. It may be conceded that this is true when it clearly
appears that such was the intention of the people when they adopted the
constitution. The right to provide a special tribunal is not open to question;
but it is very certain that the people of Minnesota have not done so, and this
fact alone eliminates such cases as Worman vs. Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27
Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A., 716, and Miles vs. Badford, 22 Md., 170; 85 Am.
Dec., 643, as authorities against the jurisdiction of the courts.” (In re
McConaughy, 106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408.)

Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs. Clark
(136 Ga., 313; 71 S. E., 479; 38 L. R. A. [N. S.], 77), se suscito igualmente
una disputa sobre si una enmienda habia sido aprobada de acuerdo con los
requisitos de la Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o no. La Corte Suprema
de aquel Estado declaro afirmativamente. He aqui su inequivoca
pronunciamiento:

“Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the
governor declaring that the amendment was adopted was conclusive, and that the
courts could not inquire into the question. To this contention we cannot assent.
The constitution is the supreme state law. It provides how it may be amended. It
makes no provision for exclusive determination by the governor as to whether an
amendment has been made in the constitutional method, and for the issuance by
him of a binding proclamation to that effect. Such a proclamation may be both
useful and proper, in order to inform the people whether or not a change has
been made in the fundamental law; but the constitution did not make it
conclusive on that subject. When the constitution was submitted for ratification
as a whole, a provision was made for a proclamation of the result by the
governor. Const. art. 13, section 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But
in reference to amendment there is no such provision. Const. article 13, section
1, par. 1 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6610). In the absence of some other exclusive
method of determination provided by the constitution, the weight of authority is
to the effect that whether an amendment has been properly adopted according to
the requirements of the existing constitution is a judicial question.” (Hammond
vs. Clark, 136 Ga., 313; 71 S. E., 479; 38 L. R. A. [N. S.],
77.)

Tambien tenemos el siguiente caso de Indiana:

“(1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part of
appellees that this court has no jurisdiction to determine the questions in
issue here. In the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind., 336, 391; 99 N.
E., 1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C, 200), this court, after reviewing many decisions as
to the power of the courts to determine similar questions, sums up the whole
matter as follows:

” ‘Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body,
or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been followed or
have been violated (italics supplied) may become a judicial question, and
upon the courts the inevasible duty to determine it falls. And so the power
resides in the courts, and they have, with practical uniformity, exercised the
authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification
of change in the organic law. Such is the rule in this state‘—citing more
than 40 decisions of this and other states.

“(2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case
entitling him to equitable relief. The trial court found that the officers of
the state, who were instructed with the execution of the law, were about to
expend more than $500,000 under the law, in carrying out its provisions; indeed,
it was suggested, in the course of the oral argument, that the necessary
expenditures would amount to more than $2,000,000. This court, in the case of
Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, involving the submission to the people
of the Constitution prepared by the Legislature, answered this same question
contrary to the contention of appellees. See pages 413 and 414 of that
opinion.” (186 Ind., 533; Bennett vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter,
Vol. 116, pp. 921, 922.)

Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia amcricana tanto federal como de
Estado sobre este punto, esto es, cuando es judicial la cuestion y cuando no lo
es, se halla bien definida en el tomo 12 del Corpus Juris, en la parte que lleva
el encabezamiento de “Constitutional Law” y bajo el subepigrafe que dice:
“Adoption of Constitution and Amendments” (12 Corpus Juris, 880, 881). Es
un compendio cuidadosamente elaborado en que se da un extracto de la doctrina
con las citas sobre autoridades al pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero omitiendo
las citas para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas
no tiene mas que consultar el tomo. En realidad, leyendo este extracto se ve que
parece un resumen del extenso analisis que llevo hecho sobre la doctrina tanto
federal como estatal. Su meollo es, a saber: la cuestion de si o no una nueva
constitucion se ha adoptado la tienen que decidir los departamentos politicos
del gobierno; pero la cuestion de si una enmienda a una constitucion
existente ha sido debidamente propuesta, adoptada y ratificada de acuerdo con
los requisitos provistos por la Constitucion, para que venga a ser parte de la
misma, es una cuestion que los tribunales de justicia tienen que determinar y
resolver, excepto cuando la materia ha sido referida por la Constitucion a
un tribunal especial con poder para llegar a una conclusion final. He aqui el
sinopsis:

“SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments.—Whether or not
a new constitution has been adopted is a question to be decided by the political
departments of the government. But whether an amendment to the existing
constitution has been duly proposed, adopted, and ratified in the manner
required by the constitution, so as to become part thereof, is a question for
the courts to determine, except where the matter has been committed by the
constitution to a special tribunal with power to make a conclusive
determination, as where the governor is vested with the sole right and duty of
ascertaining and declaring the result, in which case the courts have no
jurisdiction to revise his decision. Rut it must be made clearly to appear that
the constitution has been violated before the court is warranted in interfering.
In any event, whether an entire constitution is involved, or merely an
amendment, the federal courts will not attempt to pass on the legality of such
constitution or amendment where its validity has been recognized by the
political departments of the state government, and acquiesced in by the state
judiciary.” (12 C. J., pp. 880, 881.)

VI

Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recurso es que la copia
impresa de la resolucion en cuestion aparece certificada por los presidentes de
ambas Camaras del Congreso; que en esa certificacion consta que dicha resolucion
fue debidamente aprobada por el Congreso con los votos de las tres
quintas-partes (3/5) de sus miembros; que, por tanto, la debida aprobacion de
dicha resolucion no se puede cuestionar, es una prueba concluyente para todo el
mundo y para los tribunales de justicia particularmente. Este argumento se funda
en la doctrina inglesa llamada “enrolled act doctrine,” cuya traduccion mas
aproximada al español es “doctrina de la ley impresa.” Esto, por un lado.

Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige y
prevalece en esta jurisdiccion no es la doctrina inglesa o “enrolled act
doctrine,” sino la doctrina americana que se conoce con el nombre de “journal
entry doctrine,” en virtud de la cual la prueba de si una ley o una resolucion
ha sido debidamente aprobada por el Congreso debe buscarse en el diario de
sesiones mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de sesiones es concluyente y
final.

Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se resolvio
por esta Corte en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (34 Jur.
Fil., 772), que ambas partes discuten en sus respectivos informes. Una de las
defensas del acusado era que la Ley No. 2381 de la Legislatura Filipina en
virtud de la cual habia sido condenado era nula e ilegal porque se aprobo
despues ya del cierre de las sesiones especiales que tuvo lugar el 28 de Febrero
de 1914, a las 12 de la noche; es decir, que, en realidad de verdad, la
aprobacion se efectuo el 1.° de Marzo, pues la sesion sine die del dia
anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion haciendose parar las manecillas del
reloj a las 12 en punto de la noche. Esta Corte, sin necesidad de ninguna
otra prueba, examino el diario de sesiones correspondiente a la referida
fecha 28 de Febrero, y habiendo hallado que alli constaba inequivocamente
haberse aprobado la mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo que esta prueba era final
y concluyente para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mtmdo. La
Corte desatendio por completo el “enrolled act,” la copia impresa de la ley,
pues dijo, a saber: “Pasando por alto la cuestion relativa a si la Ley Impresa
(Ley No. 2381), que fue aprobada por autorizacion legal, constituye prueba
concluyente sobre la fecha de su aprobacion, investigaremos si los Tribunales
pueden consultar otras fuentes de informacion, ademas de los diarios de las
sesiones legislativas, para determinar la fecha en que se cerraron las
sesiones de la Legislatura, cuando tales diarios son claros y
explicitos.” Y la Corte dijo que no habia necesidad de consultar otras
fuentes, que el diario de sesiones era terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la
causa en contra del apelante.

Y no era extraño que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria americana,
familiarizada y compenetrada naturalmente con la jurisprudencia pertinente de su
pais ¿Que de extraño habia, por tanto, que aplicasen la doctrina americana, la
doctrina del “journal entry,” que es mas democratica, mas republicana, en vez de
la doctrina inglesa, el “enrolled act doctrine,” que despues de todo tiene
cierto tinte monarquico, producto del caracter peculiar e influencia
tradicionalista de las instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs.
Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., 371; Del.) Firman, como se sabe, la decision el ponente Sr.
Trent, y los Magistrados Sres. Torres, Johnson, Moreland y Araullo, sin ningun
disidente. Y notese que cuando se promulgo esta sentencia todavia estaba en
vigor el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, tal como estaba
reformado por la Ley No. 2210, que entre otras cosas proveia lo siguiente: “* *
* Entendiendose, que en el caso de las Leyes de la Comision de Filipinas
o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando existe una copia firmada por los
Presidentes y los secretarios de dichos cuerpos, sera prueba concluyente de las
disposiciones de la ley en cuestion y de la debida aprobacion de las mismas.”
¿Que mejor prueba de la voluntad expresa, categorica, de hacer prevalecer la
doctrina americana sobre la doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para esta Corte
hubiera sido aplicar el citado articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil.
No lo hizo, paso por alto sobre el mismo, yendo directamente al diario de
sesiones de la Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si aqui hay
algun respeto a la regla del stare decisis, esta es una magnifica ocasion
para demostrarlo. Una regla bien establecida no ha de abrogarse asi como asi;
sobre todo cuando de por medio anda la Constitucion como en el presente caso en
que se ha formulado ante nosotros la queja de que la ley fundamental ha sido
violada en un respecto muy importante como es el capitulo sobre enmiendas, y la
queja no solo no es temeraria sino que se halla apoyada en buenas y solidas
razones.

Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en la citada causa de los
Estados Unidos contra Pons (1916, Agosto 12) adoptando en esta
jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del “journal entry” en lugar de la inglesa
del “enrolled act,” en nuestra Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la Ley
Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de 1902, no habia ninguna disposicion que
proveyera mandatoriamente que en el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura se
hiciesen constar los sies y los nos en la votacion de cualquier
proyecto de ley o resolucion, consignando especificamente los nombres de los
miembros que hayan votado en pro y en contra, ni tampoco habia ninguna
disposicion estatutoria a dicho efecto. De modo que en aquella epoca el diario
de sesiones de la Legislatura carecia aun de las fuertes garantias de veracidad
que ahora posee en virtud de esa disposicion que hace obligatoria la constancia
o consignacion de los sies y nos, disposicion incorporada en la
Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica. (Vease Constitucion
de Filipinas, Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1; seccion
21, inciso 2.)

Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no
puede haber duda. Ese articulo, que equivale a una regla de prueba, no se ha
incorporado en el Reglamento de los Tribunales. No tratandose de una regla
fundada en un principio general y unanimemente establecido, sino de algo
peculiar aislado, acerca del cual las autoridades estan divididas, con una
mayoria de los Estados de la Union americana decididamente en contra, su no
inclusion en el Reglamento de los Tribunales tiene que considerate
necesariamente como una derogacion. Indudablemente esta Corte, al no incluir
dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, ha querido derogarlo en vista
de lo resuelto en la citada causa de Estados Unidos contra Pons y de la
novisima disposicion insertada en la Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la
Republica, que exige la consignacion en el diario de sesiones de los sies
y nos en cada votacion final de proyecto de ley o resolucion conjunta,
con especificacion de los nombres de los que han votado.

Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen mas razones para reanrmar
en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del “journal entry” o “constancia en
el diario de sesiones” (1) porque el citado seccion 313 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento de los Tribunales;
(2) porque esa disposicion de nuestra Constitucion que hace obligatoria la
consignacion de los sies y nos en la votacion de cada bill o
resolucion, con especificacion de los nombres de los que hayan votado en favor y
en contra, hace del diario de sesiones la mejor prueba sobre autenticidad de los
actos legislativos y es, por consiguiente, la ley sobre la materia en este pais,
con entera exclusion de la doctrina inglesa o “enrolled act doctrine.” Las
autoridades americanas son contestes en que siempre que en un Estado de la Union
Federal la Constitucion contiene una disposicion semejante a la nuestra sobre
sies y nos la regla de prueba no es la copia impresa de la ley o
“enrolled act,” sino el “journal entry” o constancia en el diario de sesiones.
(Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)

Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no fuera
porque los abogados de los recurridos arguyen fuertemente en favor de la
doctrina de la copia impresa o “enrolled act doctrine,” y la mayoria de esta
Corte acepta sus argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el asunto federal de Field
vs. Clark en apoyo de la doctrina.

He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda la
diligencia de que he sido capaz y he llegado a la conclusion de que nuestros
predecesores en esta Corte merecen todo encomio por su indubitable acierto al
adoptar en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra
Pons, supra, la doctrina americana del “journal entry” o constancia en el
diario de sesiones legislativas. No cabe duda de que esta doctrina es mas
democratica, mas liberal, y tambien mas humana y mas Concorde con la realidad.
La doctrina inglesa del “enrolled act” o copia impresa de la ley esta basada en
el derecho comun y se adopto en Inglaterra donde, como se sabe, no hay
constitucion escrita y la forma de gobierno es monarquica, y se adopto en un
tiempo en que el poder del Parlamento que era tambien el mas alto tribunal de
justieia, era absoluto y transcendente y las restricciones sobre el mismo eran
muy ligeras. Por eso un tribunal americano ha dicho: “Because such a rule
obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a monarchial form of
government, that cannot be regarded as a very potent reason for its
application in this state, where the will of the sovereign power has been
declared in the organic act.” (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra,
pag. 379; cito con frecuencia este asunto famoso de Delaware porque es en el
mismo donde he hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre ambas
doctrinas: la americana del “journal entry” y la inglesa del “enrolled
act.”)

Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a
favor de la doctrina del “journal entry.” Lo resuelto en el asunto federal de
Field contra Clark, en que tanto enfasis ponen los recurridos, no ha
hecho mas que fortalecer ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va envuelta la
inferencia de que cuando la Constitucion establece ciertos requisitos para la
aprobacion de una ley o resolucion, con la consignacion de los sies y
nos y los nombres de los que han votado afirmativa y negativamente, el
diario de sesiones es el que rige y prevalece como modo e instrumento de
autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y representativo de Union
Bank vs. Commissioners of Oxford (199 N. C., 214; 25 S. E., 966; 34 L. R.
A., 487), la Corte Suprema de North Carolina ha declarado lo siguiente:

“According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated cases
in the courts of last resort in 30 states, and also by the Supreme Court of the
United States, that when a state Constitution prescribes such formalities in the
enactment of laws as require a record of the yeas and nays on the
legislative journals, these journals are conclusive as against not only a
printed statute, published by authority of law, but also against a duly
enrolled act. The following is a list of the authorities, in number 93,
sustaining this view either directly or by very close analogy. * * * It is
believed that no federal or state authority can be found in conflict with
them.

“Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr vs. Coke (116 N. C.,
223; 22 S. E. 16; 28 L. R. A., 737; 47 Am. St. Rep., 801, supra, to the
effect that, where the Constitution contains no provision requiring entries on
the journal of particular matters—such, for example, as calls of the yeas
and nays on a measure in question—the enrolled act cannot, in such case,
be impeached by the journals. That, however, is very different proposition from
the one involved here, and the distinction is adverted to in Field vs.
Clark, 143 U. S., 671 (12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.” (Rash vs.
Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 377.)

Y en el asunto de Ottawa vs. Perkins la Corte Suprema de los Estados
Unidos ha dicho lo siguiente:

“But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of South Ottawa
vs. Perkins, 94 U. S., 260; 24 Law., ed., 154, on appeal from the United
States court for the Northern district of Illinois (Mr. Justice Bradley
delivering the opinion); said: ‘When once it became the settled construction of
the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be deemed a valid law, unless by
the journals of the Legislature it appears to have been regularly passed by both
houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal
entries in that regard. The courts of Illinois may decline to take that,
trouble, unless parties bring the matter to their attention, but on general
principles the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one and must
be so regarded by the courts of the United States.” (Rash vs. Allen, 76
Atl. Rep., p. 387.)

Se dice que el interes publico exige que el “enrolled act” o copia impresa de
la ley firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso se declare
concluyente y final, porque de otra manera habria caos, confusion: cualquiera se
creeria con derecho a atacar la validez de una ley o resolucion, impugnando la
autenticidad de su aprobacion o de su texto. Pero esto pone en orden las
siguientes preguntas que se contestan por si mismas: ¿no es el diario de
sesiones un documento constitucional, exigido por la Constitucion que se lleve
por las dos camaras del Congreso, controlado y supervisado por dichas camaras y
por los oficiales de las mismas? ¿que mejor garantia de autenticidad, contra la
falsificacion, que ese requerimiento constitucional de consignar
obligatoriamente en el diario, en la votacion de todo bill o resolucion,
los sies y los nos, y haciendo constar los nombres tanto
afirmativos como negativos? ¿se ha producido por ventura caos y confusion en los
Estados americanos que han adoptado esta regla y que, sogiin admiten los mismos
recurridos, forman una decisiva mayoria? ¿es acaso posible concebir que el
sentido americano, tan practico, tan utilitario, tan realista, optase por una
regla que fuese origen de caos y confusion? Prescindiendo ya de la
jurisprudencia que, ya hemos visto, esta decididamente inclinada a favor de la
doctrina americana del “journal entry” ¿que dicen los tratadistas mas
autorizados, los de nombradia bien establecida, y sobre todo los especialistas
en derecho constitucional?

El Juez Cooley, en su celebrada obra sobre Constitutional Limitations, 7th
ed., 193, dice lo siguiente a favor del “journal entry rule”:

“Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., 193), says:
‘Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings which is a public record, and of
which the courts are at liberty to take judicial notice. If it would appear from
these journals that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in
respect to it the Legislature did not follow any requirement of the Constitution
or that in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted, the
courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void. Rut whenever it
is acting in apparent performance of legal functions, every reasonable
presumption is to be made in favor of the action of a legislative body. It will
not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that either
house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a constitutional requirement in
the passage of legislative acts, unless when the Constitution has expressly
required the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it
requires the yeas and nays to be entered.”

Sutherland, en su tambien celebrada obra sobre Statutory Construction,
seccion 46 y siguientes, tambien se declara a favor del “journal entry rule” con
el siguiente pronunciamiento:

“The presumption is that an act properly authenticated was regularly passed,
unless there is evidence of which the courts take judicial notice showing the
contrary. The journals are records, and, in all respects touching proceedings
under the mandatory provisions of the Constitution, will be effected to impeach
and avoid the acts recorded as laws and duly authenticated, if the journals
affirmatively show that these provisions have been disregarded. * * * The
journals by being required by the Constitution or laws, are record * * *.

“When required, as is extensively the case in this country, by a paramount
law, for the obvious purpose of showing how the mandatory provisions of that law
have been followed in the methods and forms of legislation, they are thus made
records in dignity, and are of great importance. The legislative acts regularly
authenticated are also records. The acts passed, duly authenticated, and such
journals are parallel records; but the latter arc superior, when explicit and
conflicting with the other, for the acts authenticated speak decisively only
when the journals are silent, and not even then as to particulars required to be
entered therein.” (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p.
378.)

Desde luego la opinion de Wigmore, en que se apoya la mayoria, merece toda
clase de respetos. Pero creo no se me tachara de parcial ni ligero si digo que
sobre el punto constitucional que estamos discutiendo, me inclino mas y doy
mayor peso a la opinion del Juez Cooley y de Sutherland, por razones obvias.
Wigmore nunca pretendio ser especialista en derecho constitucional. Con mucho
tino el ponente en el tantas veces citado asunto de Rash contra Allen
dice lo siguiente de la opinion del celebrado constitucionalista:

“We have quoted Judge Cooley’s language because of the great respect
that his opinions always command, and also because of the fact that it is upon
the authority of his opinion that many of the decisions in support of the
American rule have been based.” (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p.
378.)

Un detenido y minucioso examen de la jurisprudencia y de los tratados sobre
el particular lleva a uno al convencimiento de que la tendencia actual en
America es a tomar la substancia, el fondo mismo de las cosas en vez de la
simple forma, el caparazon, a prescindir del artificio, de la ficcion legal,
para ir a la realidad misma. Y no cabe duda de que el “enrolled act” se presta a
veces a tener mas apoyo en el artificio y ficcion legal, mientras que el diario
de sesiones, con las fuertes garantias de autenticidad como las que se proveen
en nuestra Constitucion y en Constituciones similares americanas, reproduce y
refleja la realidad de los liechos relativamente con mas exactitud y fidelidad.
Tomemos como ejemplo el presente caso. La copia impresa de la resolucion
cuestionada, firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso, reza que
la misma fue aprobada debidamente con los votos de las tres cuartas- partes (¾)
del Congreso, pero esto no es mas que una. opinion, una conclusion legal de los
presidentes, pues no consta en dicha copia impresa el numero concreto de votos
emitidos, ni el numero concreto de la totalidad de miembros actuales de cada
camara. Tampoco constan en dicha copia impresa, tal como manda la Constitucion,
los sies y nos de la votacion, con los nombres de los que votaron
afirmativa y negativamente. Asi que, con solo esa copia impresa a la vista, no
podemos resolver la importantisima cuestion constitucional que plantean los
recurrentes, a saber: que la votacion fue anticonstitucional; que
arbitrariamente fueron excluidos de la votacion 11 miembros debidamente
cualificados del Congreso—3 Senadores y 8 Representantes; que, por virtud de la
exclusion ilegal y arbitraria de estos 11 miembros, el numero de votos emitidos
en cada camara a favor de la resolucion no llega ni constituye las tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere la Constitucion; y que, por tanto, la
resolucion es ilegal, anticonstitucional y nula. Para resolver estas cuestiones,
todas tremendas, todas transcedentales, no hay mas remedio que ir al fondo, a
las entrañas de la realidad, y todo ello no se puede hallar en el
“enrolled act,” en la copia impresa de la ley, que es incolora, muda sobre el
particular, sino en el diario de sesiones donde con profusion se dan tales
detalles. ¿No es verdad que todo esto demuestra graficamente la evidente,
abrumadora superioridad del “journal entry” sobre el “enrolled act,” como medio
de prueba?

Mi conclusion, pues, sobre este punto es que el giro de la legislacion y
jurisprudencia en los diferentes Estados de la Union es decididamente. en favor
de la doctrina americana del “journal entry”; que en Filipinas desde 1916 en que
se promulgo la sentencia en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Pons la
regla es el “journal entry rule”; que esta regla se adopto por este Supremo
Tribunal en un tiempo en que estaba vigente el articulo 313 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil y cuando el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura no gozaba
de los prestigios de que goza hoy, en virtud de las rigidas y fuertes garantias
sobre autenticidad de las votaciones legislativas provistas en nuestra
Constitucion; que ahora que el referido articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil ya ha sido derogado por el Reglamento de los Tribunales y se hallan
vigentes esas garantias constitucionales que son mandatorias, la regla
indiscutible y exclusiva sobre la materia es el “journal entry rule”; que la
regla americana es mas liberal y mas democratica que la regla inglcsa, la cual
tiene un evidente sabor monarquico; que el pueblo filipino jamas tolerara un
sistema monarquico o algo semejante; que el cambiar de regla ahora es un paso
muy desafortunado, un injustificado retroceso, un apoyo a la reaccion y puede
dar lugar a la impresion de que las instituciones de la Republica filipina
tienden a ser totalitarias; que la doctrina inglesa del “enrolled act” es un
instrumento harto inadecuado, ineficaz, para resolver conflictos
constitucionales que se iran planteando ante los tribunales, e inclusive puede
fomentar groseros asaltos contra la Constitucion; que, por el contrario, la
doctrina americana del “journal entry” es amplia, eficaz, y permite que con toda
libertad y desembarazo so puedan resolver los conflictos y transgresiones
constitucionales, sin evasivas ni debilidades; y, por ultimo, que nuestro deber,
el deber de esta Corte, es optar por la doctrina que mejor asegure y fomente los
procesos ordenados do la ley y de la Constitucion y evite situaciones en que el
ciudadano se sienta como desamparado de la ley y de la Constitucion y busque la
justicia por sus propias manos.

VII

La mayoria, habiendo adoptado en este asunto una posicion inhibitoria, estima
innecesario discutir la cuestion de si los 3 Senadores y 8 Representantes que
fueron excluidos de la votacion son o no miembros del Congreso. Es decir, lo que
debiera ser cuestion fundamental—el leitmotiff, la verdadera ratio
decidendi en este caso—se relega a termino secundario, se deja sin discutir
y sin resolver. No puedo seguir a la mayoria en esta evasion: tengo que
(liscutir este punto tan plenamente como los otros puntos, si no mas, porque es
precisamente lo principal—el meollo del caso.

Comencemos por el Senado. Los 3 Senadores excluidos eran miembros actuales
del Senado cuando se voto la resolucion cuestionada, por las siguientes
razones:

(a) Segun la estipulacion de hechos entre las partes y los ejemplares
del diario de sesiones que obran en autos como anexos, dichos Senadores fueron
proclamados por la Comision de Elecciones como electos juntamente con sus 21
compañeros. Despues de la proclamacion participaron en la organizacion del
Senado, votando en la eleccion del Presidente de dicho cuerpo. De hecho el
Senador Vera recibio 8 votos para Presidente contra el Senador Avelino que
recibio 10. Tambien participaron en algunos debates relativos a la
organizacion.

(b) Tambien consta en la estipulacion de hechos y en el diario de
sesiones que prestaron su juramento de cargo ante Notarios particulares
debidamente autorizados y calificados para administrarlo, habiendose depositado
dicho juramento en la secretaria del Senado. Se dice, sin embargo, que ese
juramento no era valido porque no se presto colectivamente, en union con los
otros Senadores. Esto es un error. La Ley sobre la materia es el articulo 26 del
Codigo Administrativo Revisado, a saber:

“By whom oath of office may be administered.—The oath of office may be
administered by any officer generally qualified to administer oath; but the oath
of office of the members and officers of either house of the legislature may
also be administered by persons designated for such purpose by the respective
houses.”

Este articulo es demasiado claro para necesitar mas comentarios. Es evidente
que el Senador y Representante puede calificarse prestando el juramento de su
cargo ante cualquier funcionario autorizado para administrarlo; y la disposicion
de que tambien pueden administrar ese juramento personas designadas por cada
camara es solo de caracter permisivo, opcional. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que
antes del advenimiento de la Republica el Senado habia reconocido la validez del
juramento de cargo prestado ante un Notario Publico por otros Senadores de la
minoria los Sres. Mabanag, Garcia, Confesor y Cabili. A menos que estas cosas se
tomen a broma, o la arbitrariedad se erija en ley—la ley de la selva, del mas
fuerte—no es concebible que el juramento ante Notario so declare valido en un
caso y en otro se declare invalido, concurriendo las mismas circunstancias;

(c) Tambien consta, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los
ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en autos como anexos, que los
Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero han estado cobrando todos sus sueldos y
emolumentos como tales Senadores desde la inauguracion del Senado hasta ahora,
incluso naturalmente el tiempo en que se aprobo la resolucion cuestionada. Es
violentar demasiado la argucia el sostener que un miembro de una camara
legislativa puede cobrar todos sus haberes y emolumentos y, sin embargo, no ser
legalmente miembro de la misma. El vulgo, maestro en la ironia y en el sarcasmo,
tiene una manera cruda para pintar esta situacion absurda: “Tiene, pero no hay”.
¿Como es posible que las camaras autoricen el desembolso de sus fondos a favor
de unos hombres que, segun se sostiene seriamente, no estan legalmente
cualificados para merecer y recibir tales fondos?

(d) Se arguye, sin embargo, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero no
son miembros del Senado porque, en virtud de la Resolucion Pendatun, se les
suspendio el juramento y el derecho a sus asientos. Respecto del juramento, ya
hemos visto que era valido, segun la ley. Respecto de la suspension del derecho
al asiento, he discutido extensamente este punto en mi disidencia en el asunto
de Vera contra Avelino, supra, calificando de anticonstitucional y
nula la suspension. Pero aun suponiendo que la misma fuera valida, los
recurrentes alegan y arguyen que no por eso han dejado de ser miembros los
suspendidos. La alegacion es acertada. La suspension no abate ni anula la
calidad de miembro; solo la muerte, dimision o expulsion produce ese efecto
(vease Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100, 101; vease
tambien United States vs. Dietrich, 126 Fed. Rep., 676). En el asunto
de Alejandrino contra Quezon hemos declarado lo siguiente:

“Es cosa digna de observar que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en toda su
larga historia no ha suspendido a ninguno de sus miembros. Y la razon es obvia.
El castigo mediante reprension o multa vindica la dignidad ofendida de la Camara
sin privar a los representados de su representante; la expulsion cuando es
peimisible vindica del mismo modo el honor del Cuerpo Legislativo dando asi
oportunidad a los representados de elegir a otro nuevo; pero la suspension priva
al distrito electoral de una representacion sin que se le de a ese distrito un
medio para llenar la vacante. Mediante la suspension el cargo continua
ocupado, pero al que lo ocupa se le ha impuesto silencio.” (Alejandrino
contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100, 101.)

La posicion juridica y constitucional de los 8 Representantes excluidos de la
votacion es todavia mas firme. Consta igualmente, en virtud de la estipulacion
de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones obrantes en autos, que
dichos 8 Representantes tambien se calificaron, al inaugurarse el Congreso,
prestando el juramento de su cargo ante Notarios Publicos debidamente
autorizados; que su juramento se deposito en la Secretaria de la Camara; que han
estado cobrando desde la inauguracion hasta ahora todos sus sueldos y
emolumentos, excepto dos los Representantes Taruc y Lava que han dejado de
cobrar desde hace algun tiempo; que tambien han participado en algunas
deliberaciones, las relativas al proyecto de resolucion para suspenderlos.

Pero entre su caso y el de los Senadores existe esta diferencia fundamental:
mientras con respecto a estos ultimos la Resolucion Pendatun sobre suspension
llego a aprobarse adquiriendo estado parlamentario, en la Camara de
Representantes no ha habido tal cosa, pues la resolucion de suspension se endoso
a un comite especial para su estudio e investigacion, y hasta ahora la Camara no
ha tomado sobre ella ninguna accion, ni favorable ni adversa. De modo que en el
caso de los Representantes hasta ahora no hay suspension, porque de tal no puede
calificarse la accion del Speaker y del macero privandoles del derecho de tomar
parte en las deliberaciones y votaciones. Para quo una suspension produzca
efectos legales y, sobre todo, constitucionales, tiene que decretarla la Camara
misma, por medio de una resolucion debidamente aprobada, de acuerdo con los
requisitos provistos en la Constitucion. Nada de esto se ha hecho en la
Camara.

El Articulo XV de nuestra Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, dice que “El
Congreso, en sesion conjunta, por el voto de tres cuartas partes de todos los
miembros del Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando separadamente,
puede proponer enmiendas a esta Constitucion o convocar una convencion para
dicho efecto.” Donde la ley no distingue no debemos distinguir. La frase
todos los miembros debe interpretarse como que incluye todos los miembros
elegidos, no importa que esten ausentes o esten suspendidos; mas naturalmente
cuando no estan suspendidos como en el caso de los ya citados 8 Representantes.
El Juez Cooley, en su ya citada obra Constitutional Limitations, hace
sobre este particular los siguientes comentarios que son terminantes para la
resolucion de este punto constitucional, a saber:

“For the vote required in the passage of any particular law the reader is
referred to the Constitution of his State. A simple majority of a quorum is
sufficient, unless the Constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by
the Constitution, a two-thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the
passage of any particular class of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a
quorum will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate that this
proportion of alt the members, or of all those elected, is intended. (A
constitutional requirement that the assent of two-thirds of the members elected
to each house of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating
the public money or property for local or private purposes, is mandatory, and
cannot be evaded by calling a bill a ‘joint resolution’.)

(Footnote: “Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be thus
frittered away.” Allen vs. Board of State Auditors, 122 Mich., 324; 47 L.
R. A., 117.)

(Footnote: “By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on some
particular subjects, are required to be adopted by a majority vote, or some
other proportion of ‘all the members elected,’ or of ‘the whole representation.’
These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into account
whether present or not. Where a majority of all the members elected is
required in the passage of a law, an ineligible person in not on that account to
be excluded in the count. (Satterlee vs. San Francisco, 23 Cal.,
314.)” (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, p. 291.)

VIII

Los recurridos no cuestionan la personalidad o derecho de accion de los
recurrentes para plantear el presente litigio. Sin embargo, en nuestras
deliberaciones algunos Magistrados han expresado dudas sobre si los recurrentes
tienen interes legal suficiente y adecuado para demandar y, por tanto, para
invocar nuestra jurisdiccion en el presente caso. La duda es si el interes que
alegan los recurrentes no es mas bien el general y abstracto que tiene cualquier
otro ciudadano para defender la integridad de la Constitucion, en cuyo caso
seria insuficiente para demandar ante los tribunales, los cuales, segun el
consenso de las autoridades, no estan establecidos para considerar y resolver
controversias academicas y doctrinales, sino conflictos positivos, reales, en
que hay algun daño y perjuicio o amago de daño y perjuicio.

Creo que la personalidad o derecho de accion de los recurrentes es
incuestionable. En primer lugar, 11 de ellos son miembros del Congreso, y alegan
que se les privo del derecho de votar al considerarse la resolucion cuestionada
y que si se les hubiese permitido votar dicha resolucion no hubiese obtenido la
sancion de las tres cuartas-partes (¾) que requiere la Constitucion. ¿Que mayor
interes legal que este? Ellos dicen que sus votos hubieran sido decisivos, que
con su intervencion parlamentaria hubiesen salvado al pais de lo que consideran
amago de una tremenda calamidad publica—la concesion de iguales derechos a los
americanos para explotar nuestros recursos naturales y utilidades publicas. ¿No
es este amago de daño, para ellos individualmente y para el pais colectivamente,
adecuado y suficiente para crear un interes legal? En el asunto de Coleman
vs. Miller, supra, se suscito esta misma cuestion y se resolvio a
favor de los recurrentes. Como ya hemos visto, estos eran 20 Senadores del
Estado de Kansas que alegaban que en la propuesta ratificacion de la
18.^a Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal sus votos quedaron abatidos
por el voto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador. La Corte Federal declaro que
esto constituia interes legal suficiente y adecuado.

En segundo lugar, los recurrentes alegan ser ciudadanos, electores y
contribuyentes de Filipinas. Naturalmente, como tales tienen derecho a
participar en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales y operacion de
utilidades publicas, con exclusion de los americanos y otros extranjeros. De
ello se sigue logicamente que cualquier acto legislativo que anule y abrogue esa
exclusividad afectara personalmente a sus derechos, amagandolos de un probable
perjuicio. Esto, a mi juicio, crea un interes legal adecuado y suficiente para
litigar. Esto no es un interes meramente academico, abstracto. (Vease
Hawke vs. Smith, 253 U. S., 221, 227; 64 Law. ed., 871, 875; 40 Sup. Ct.,
495; 10 A. L. R., 1504; veanse tambien Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.
S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 571 ; 42 Sup. Ct., 217; Coleman vs.
Miller, 122 A. L. R., 698.)

En el asunto de Hawke vs. Smith, supra, el demandante alegaba
ser “ciudadano y elector del Estado de Ohio, y como elector y contribuyente del
Condado de Hamilton, en su nombre y en el de otros similarmente situados,
presento una solicitud de prohibicion ante el tribunal del Estado para que se
prohibiera al Secretario de Estado a que gastara fondos publicos en la
preparacion e impresion de balotas para la sumision al electorado de la
18.^a Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal para su ratificacion. La
Corte Suprema Federal fallo que el demandante tenia interes legal y, por tanto,
personalidad y derecho de accion para demandar.

En el asunto de Leser vs. Garnett, supra, los demandantes
alegaban ser electores cualificados de Maryland y solicitaban la exclusion de
ciertas mujeres del censo electoral por el fundamento de que la Constitucion de
Maryland limitaba el sufragio a los varones y la 19.^a Enmienda a la
Constitucion Federal no habia sido validamente ratificada. La Corte Suprema
Federal fallo tambien que los demandantes tenian interes legal suficiente y
adecuado.

IX

Cuando se celebraron las audiencias en este asunto se le pregunto a uno do
los abogados de los recurridos, creo que el mismo Secretario de Justicia, cual
seria el remedio legal para los recurrentes, ya que se sostiene que en el
presente caso se trata de una materia no judicial, injusticiable, y que, por
tanto, los tribunales nada tienen que hacer. El Secretario de Justicia contesto:
ninguno. Lo unico que los recurrentes pueden hacer es esperar las elecciones y
plantear el caso directamente ante el pueblo, unico juez en las controversias de
caracter politico. Esto mismo se dijo en el caso de Vera contra Avelino,
supra, y reitero lo que alli he dicho sobre este argumento, a saber:

“Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente, desalentador de que
el caso que nos ocupa no tiene remedio ni bajo la Coustitucion ni bajo las leyes
ordinarias. A los recurrentes se les dice que no tienen mas que un recurso:
esperar las elecciones y plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo
elector. Si los recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara
eligiendoles o elevando a su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
recurridos o a su partido. Algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de este
argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es expedito ni
adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido elegidos para un periodo
de seis años, asi que no se les podra exigir ninguna responsabilidad por tan
largo tiempo. Se podria decir tambien que en una eleccion politica entran muchos
factores, y es posible que la cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y
tan palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por otros ‘issues’ mas
presionantes y decisivos. Tambien se podria decir que, independientemente de la
justicia de su causa, un partido minoritario siempre lucha con desventaja contra
el partido mayoritario.

“Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento es que no cabe
concebir que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina hayan dejado en medio de
nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligroso vacio en donde quedan paralizados los
resortes de la Constitucion y de la ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, impotente
frente a lo que el considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los
redactores de la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro sistema de
gobierno—sistema presidencial. Sabian muy bien que este no tiene la flexibilidad
del tipo ingles—el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en los paises que siguen su
sistema hay una magnifica valvula de seguridad politica; cuando surge una grave
crisis, de esas que sacuden los cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se
disuelve y se convocan elecciones generales para que el pueblo decida los
grandes ‘issues’ del dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre,
sin violencia. El sistema presidencial no tiene esa valvula. El periodo que
media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, por ejemplo, el
periodo es de seis años para el Senado, y de cuatro años para la Camara de
Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y municipales. Solamente se celebran
elecciones especiales para cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones
generales y otras. Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi es harto
peligroso, es jugar con fuego el posibilitar situaciones donde el individuo y el
pueblo no puedan buscar el amparo de la Constitucion y de las leyes, bajo
procesos ordenados y expeditos, para proteger sus derechos.” (Vera contra
Avelino, pags. 363, 364.)

Fue Jefferson quien dijo que como medida de higiene politica era conveniente
que el pueblo americano tuviera una revolucion cada veinte años. Parece que el
gran democrata dijo esto no por el simple prurito de jugar con la paradoja, con
la frase, sino convencido de que la revolucion es el mejor antidoto para la
tirania o los amagos de tirania.

Grande como es el respeto que merecen las opiniones del inmortal autor de la
Declaracion de Independencia, creo que la revolucion es siempre revolucion, la
violencia es siempre violencia: caos, confusion, desquiciamiento de los resortes
politicos y sociales, derramamiento de sangre, perdida de vidas y haciendas,
etcetera, etcetera. Asi que normalmente ninguno puede desear para su pais la
violencia, aun en nombre de la vitalidad, de la salud publica.

Estoy convencido de que el mejor ideal politico es la revolucion sin sangre,
esa que no pocas veces se ha consumado v. gr. en la historia
contemporanea de Inglaterra, y aun de America misma. Y ese ideal es
perfectamente realizable permitiendo el amplio juego de la Constitucion y de las
leyes, evitando pretextos a la violencia, y no posibilitando situaciones de
desamparo y desesperacion.

Por eso creo sinceramente que la mejor politica,
la mejor doctrina judicial es la que en todo tiempo encauza y fomenta los
procesos ordenados de la Constitucion y de la ley.

---

^[1] Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E.
Romero.

^[2] Senadores: Alejo Mabanag, Carlos P.
Garcia, Eulogio Rodriguez, Tomas Confesor, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno, y Jose E. Romero.

Representantes: Juvenal Almendras, Paulino Alonzo, Apolinario Cabigon, Floro
Crisologo, Gabriel Dunuan, Cosme B. Garcia, Agustin Y. Kintanar, Vicente
Logarta, Francisco A. Perfecto, Cipriano P. Primicias, Nicolas Rafols, Jose V.
Rodriguez, Juan de G. Rodriguez, Felixberto M. Serrano, Conrado Singson, George
K. Tait, y Leandro A. Tojong.

Presidentes de Partido: Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Emilio Javier y
Sofronio Quimson, Nacionalista Party, Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y
Philippine Youth Party, respectivamente.

^[3] Comision de Elecciones: Jose Lopez
Vito, Francisco Enage y Vicente de Vera, respectivamente. Marciano Guevara,
Paciano Dizon y Pablo Lucas, Tesorero, Auditor y Director de Imprenta,
respectivamente.

^[1] La politica de nacionalizacion de
los recursos naturales y utilidades publicas incorporada en nuestra Constitucion
no es una politica nueva, sino que trae bu origen de nuestro pasado remoto, de
la historia colonial misma de España en Filipinas. Los primeros conflictos de
los filipinos con los conquistadores tenfan por causa la propiedad de la tierra;
los filipinos se esforzaban por reivindicar el dominio del suelo que creian
dctentado por los colonizadores. Estos conflictos fueron agravandose con el
tiempo condensandose en la formidable cuestion agraria que en las postrimerias
del siglo diecinueve fue en gran parte la causa de la revolucion contra España.
Las campañas de Rizal y de los laborantes, y el Katipunan de Bonifacio tomaron
gran parte de su fuerza, de su valor combativo, de los agravioa provocados por
la cuestion agraria. La Liga Filipina de Rizal estaba fundamentalmente basada en
un ideario economico nacionalista, de control y dominio sobre la riqueza y
recursos del pais.

“Cuando America establecid aqui su soberanta su mayor acierto consistio en
echar los cimientos de su politica fundamental de ‘Filipinas para los
filipinos.’ Primero el Presidents McKinley, y despues los Presidentes Taft y
Wilson, consulidaron esta politica. El congreso aprobo leyes tendentcs a la
conservacion de terrenos publicos y recursos naturales, entre ellas la Ley de
1.° de Julio de 1902 conocida por Ley Cooper. En estas leyes se limitaba y
restringia la adquisicion y uso de bienes de dominio publico por
particulares.

“Una prueba palmaria del celo del Congreso americano por mantener rigidamente
la politica de conservacion del patrimonio de los filipinos fue la investigacion
congresional provocada por el Congresista Martin, de Colorado, en relacion con
la venta de terrenos de los frailes en Mindoro, a una compañia americana en
exceso de las 1,024 hectareas fijadas en las leyes de terrenos publicos. Esto
dio lugar a uno de los episodios mas famosos en la carrera del Comisionado
Residente Quezon. Este relata su campaña en su autobiografia ‘The Good Fight,’ a
saber:

” ‘My next address to Congress took place when a congressional investigation
was being urged by Congressman Martin of Colorado to determine how the
Government of the Philippines was carrying out the policy laid down by Congress,
that limited to 1024 acres the maximum area of government land that could be
sold to corporations or individuals. This law had been enacted soon after the
United States had taken the Philippines to prevent the exploitation of the
Filipino people by capitalists, whether foreigners or natives. American capital
interested in the sugar industry had acquired two very large tracts of land
which the Philippine Government had bought from the friars with the funds from
bonds issued under the security of the Philippine Government. The avowed purpose
in buying these extensive properties from the Spanish religious orders was to
resell them in small lots to Filipino farmers, and thus to do away with absentee
landlordism which had been the most serious cause of the Philippine rebellion
against Spain. The reasons given for the sale of these lands to American capital
by the American official in charge of the execution of the congressional policy
were twofold: First, that the act of Congress referred only to lands of the
public domain but not to lands acquired by the Government in some other way. And
second, that the sale of these lands was made in order to establish the sugar
industry in the Philippines on a truly grand scale under modern methods, as had
been done in Cuba. It was further alleged that such a method would bring great
prosperity to the Philippines.

” ‘I spoke in support of the proposed investigation, contending that the
establishment of the sugar industry under those conditions would mean the
debasement of the Filipinos into mere peons. ‘Moreover,’ I argued, ‘large
investments of American capital in the Philippines will inevitably result in the
permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States.’ At the climax of
my speech I roared: ‘If the preordained fate of my country is either to be a
subject people but rich, or free but poor, I am unqualifiedly for the
latter.’

” ‘The investgation was ordered by the House of Representatives, and although
the sales already made were not annulled, no further sales were made in defiance
of the Congressional Act. (The Good Fight, by President Quezon, pp.
117-119.)’

“Para implementar la politico de nacionalizacion el gobierno filipino bajo la
Ley Jones y la Ley del Commonwealth fundo con una gruesa capitalizacion las
corporaciones economicas del Estado como el Philippine National Bank, National
Development Company, National Cement Company, National Power Corporation, y
otras.

“Para reglamentar y supervisar las utilidades y servicios publicos se creo la
Comision de Servicios Publicos.”