CHING JUAT, PETITIONER, VS. BONIFACIO YSIP, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, RESPONDENT.

Maria Ching was found guilty by the respondent judge of illegal marriage, as
punished by article 350 of the Revised Penal Code, for marrying Co Heong on June
21, 1946, because at the time of her marriage she was only 16 years old, that
is, lacking the required age to marry. Due to her minority, sentence against her
was suspended and her commitment to the Welfareville Correctional Institution at
Mandaluyong, Rizal, was ordered.

Having appealed in due time, she was allowed to be released on bail upon
posting a bond in the sum of P1,000 in an order issued by respondent on August
27, 1946. Petitioner impugns the validity of the order because by the minor’s
release on bail, she was taken by her husband and co-accused Co Heong, who was
able to have and to hold her, and petitioner was illegally deprived of his
patria potestas as father of the minor.

Petitioner’s complaint has no ground in law. A minor found guilty, in the
lower court, of a criminal offense is not deprived, because of the fact of his
minority, of the right to appeal. The decision or judgment finding him guilty
and ordering his commitment to a correctional or educational institution as
provided by article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, is stayed and is unenforceable
until it becomes final and executory. Appeal suspends its effects. This is
logical, because appeal may result in reversal. When a minor appeals from a
judgment finding him guilty of a criminal offense, he is generally entitled, as
all other accused, to be allowed provisional release on bail. The order to
commit him to the custody of a correctional or educational institution should
not be enforced in the meantime, because the order of commitment provided by
article 80 of the Revised Penal Code becomes only executory when the decision or
judgment upon which it is based becomes final and executory. There is no reason
why a minor should be excluded from the benefits of constitutional and legal
provisions on bail. A minor is entitled to more protection from the law, never
to less.

That upon the minor’s release on bail, instead of going to her father’s
custody, she sought to join her husband’s company, is no reason for petitioner
to complain of the lower court’s action in issuing the order of August 27, which
was within his legal power to issue, nor is it a ground for the petitioner to
advance the novel theory that he was deprived of his patria potestas.
Deprivation of patria potestas is a negative action and cannot result
from the affirmative action of the lower court in allowing Maria Ching to be
released on bail. The freedom granted to her could not have the effect of
depriving petitioner the right to have her under his custody, in the hypothesis
that he still retains patria potestas over his daughter. Unfortunately
for petitioner, it is not even possible to entertain such an hypothesis, because
by his daughter’s marriage, the latter became emancipated from her parent’s
custody, her marriage having the effect of transferring her to her husband’s
care and protection, there being no question that the marriage is valid, as the
offense of which the newly-weds were found guilty by the lower court cannot
affect the validity of the marriage. Petitioner himself had not even attempted
to put in doubt its validity. Petition denied.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria,
Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

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BRIONES, M.:

Estoy conforme con la parte dispositiva de la sentencia por el unico
fundamento de que lo que plantea y discute en su apelacion Maria Ching es
precisamente la cuestion de su edad; ella alega y arguye que cuando se caso ya
tenia mas de 18 años de edad, o que, por lo menos, asi le habian asegurado sus
padres, y que, por tanto, no infringio el articulo 350 del Codigo Penal Revisado
(E. U. contra Peñalosa y Rodriguez, 1 Jur. Fil., 111). Resulta evidente
que la apelante tiene una causa meritoria; asi que el Juzgado no abuso de su
discrecion al concederle libertad provisional mediante la prestacion de la
correspondiente fianza.

Sobre si en un caso en que no hay controversia
respecto de la edad la menor apelante tiene derecho a prestar fianza durante la
pendencia de la apelacion, es cosa acerca de la cual no estoy preparado ni
dispuesto a emitir mi opinion.

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TUASON, J.:

The right to be released on bail is guaranteed by the Constitution. An
accused minor comes under this protection. The purported aims of a confinement
and the name and atmosphere of the place count for little. An accused cannot be
deprived of the right to be bailed by a process of reasoning premised on
man-made legal fictions. Such deprivation to be sanctioned must rest on a more
solid foundation. The court will regard substance rather than form; will look at
realities rather than what may seem logic. Freedom from restraint is a living,
vital thing to be dealt with in the light of cold facts. The point I am trying
to get at is, one cannot be denied the constitutional right to file a bail bond
before final conviction simply because the place of incarceration is called a
school, and confinement therein purports to be educational or correctional in
its objective instead of punishment. The bitter taste of a medicine is not
changed by giving it a sweet name. In spite of the suspension of sentence and
legal theories and noble intentions, confinement for a crime before final
conviction in a so-called reformatory school or correctional institution
actually inflicts almost, if not quite, the same degree of moral pains and
physical hardship and affliction, and leaves the same stinging rebuke and stains
on reputation as does detention in a common jail.

“Statutes which include or
provide within their scope for commitment for strictly criminal offenses without
requiring the constitutional procedure in prosecutions for public offenses
generally have been declared unconstitutional.” (31 C. J., 1105.) The Juvenile
Delinquency Act does not speak of bail, and I do not believe that matter even
entered into the thought of the Legislature. This is all the more reason for
sustaining the order of the lower court granting the accused provisional liberty
during the pendency of her appeal.