PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY. ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER…

There was muffled excitement among the workers of the
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) because its collective
bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and
Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14,
1990. Other unions were seeking to
represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already
plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when
the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan
(SAMADA) filed a petition for
certification election. The consent
signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were
submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.

On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

Still another petition for certification election was filed by the
Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May
11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.

The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint
decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU
filed a motion to dismiss them
on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:

In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise
where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is
questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the
Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret ballot
if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective
bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day
freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied upon the
filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance
with the requirement for the 25% consent signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the
Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated
petitions.^[1]

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing
that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be
submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. The Principal petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP’s
appeal.^[2]

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded on September 28,
1990. This was ratified on October 7,
1990, by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e.,
910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent in the application of Article 256 of the Labor
Code. This article provides in part as
follows:

ART. 256. Representation
issue in organized establishments. – In
organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of
Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an
election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the
written consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in
the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit. x x x.

The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter
should automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition
is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with
the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after
filing the petition. The petitioner
complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election,
including its own petition for intervention, had the effect of indirectly
certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
ICTSI employees.

Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based
on Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of
the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules,
decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and
unappealable.

ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v.
Inciong:^[3]

We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General, while the petition of TUPAS for a
certification election may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the
workers of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the
rival union of TUPAS) has a clear majority of the said workers, as shown by the
fact that 499 workers out of the total working force of 641 have not only
ratified the collective bargaining agreement concluded between UMI and
LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so that there is no
more need for holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)

For its part, APCWU questions PWUP’s personality in these
proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its petition, and
argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or
PEALU, which had not appealed. The
private respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of
the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an affirmation of their
membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.

In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the
petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of
the law. He submits that Article 256
should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code,
stating as follows:

Article 4. Construction in
favor of labor. – All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the Parties in their respective pleadings and finds
for the petitioner.

We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision
guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and collective bargaining,
“the constant and unwavering policy of this Court” has been “to
require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor
organization should be the collective bargaining representative.”^[4]

The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious
method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as
their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are
working.^[5]
As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja,^[6] the
holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.

This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of
the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs. Trajano:^[7]

x x x it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is
indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to arrive
in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor
organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept, this
Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound
discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to
meet the 30% requirement. (Scout Ramon
V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial
Workers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])

In line with this policy, we feel that the administrative rule
requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the
filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to
frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the
workers. Significantly, the requirement
in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the
regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of
a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis
for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election,^[8]
subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,^[9] where
we declared:

… even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the
labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly complied
with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that it be held precisely
for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor organizations)
shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative. (National Mines and Allied Workers Union v.
Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)

It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did
not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not
applicable to a petition in
intervention. We so held in PAFLU v.
Ferrer-Calleja thus:^[10]

It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite
written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies
to petitioners for certification election only and not to motions for
intervention. x x x As long as the
motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention
would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so
even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate
in the Certification Election. After
all, the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.

The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the
principal petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal order is also not
acceptable. We repeat that the
certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a
non-adversary character where the rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.^[11]
Technical rules and objections should not hamper the correct ascertainment of
the labor union that has the support or confidence of the majority of the
workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with
management.

The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for
the holding of the election although it was
initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the
other petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their
petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact being reversed
here. The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied
with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article
256. Hence, its intervention should not
be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA
and PEALU.

It is correct to say that as
a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be
deemed automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should not be
allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the
workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and
collective bargaining.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents,
the Court has modified that decision in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja,^[12]
where we held:

Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent
Director on the ground that “the ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement renders the certification election moot and academic”.

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule
where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during the
lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into
apparently in an attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election.

Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the
need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative.^[13]
Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the
authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor
of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of
Free Labor Union vs. Estrella,^[14] any
stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by
the law must be subordinated to the employees’ freedom to choose their real
representative.

The private respondents contend that the overwhelming
ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their membership in the bargaining
agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and conclusively
barring the holding of a certification
election thereon. That conclusion does
not follow. Even Tupas did not say that
the mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their
affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, and second,
affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in the case at
bar as the record does not show that the majority of the workers, besides
ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.

Section 4, Rule V, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules
implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not be
adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the
last 60 days of a subsisting agrement
or during the pendency of the
representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at
the time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it
cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.

On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on
certification election is final and inappealable, this Court held in San Miguel
Corp. v. Secretary of Labor^[15]
that:

It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in
the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute. (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56). x x x judicial review is
proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of
law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v.
Secretary of Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson
Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).

There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they dismissed
the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not
been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus remains open and awaits
settlement. Following the rulings
above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute
a bar to the holding of a certification
election.

It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification
election, in which event the new CBA it concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and
recognized. It is also possible that
another union will be chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own
negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having
expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of the
workers with the management. For this
reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU
shall remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and effects
of the certification election to be called.

The certification election is the best method of determining the
will of the workers on the crucial question of who shall represent them in
their negotiations with the management for a collective bargaining agreement
that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be no collusion against this objective
between an unscrupulous management and a union covertly supporting it while
professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not
frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its
approval and support. It is therefore
sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be
resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the
voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will
exalt procedure over substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and
hold certification election among the workers of the International Container
Terminal Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., no part did not
participate in the deliberations.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 22-29.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 19.

^[3]
115 SCRA 847.

^[4]
National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, 83 SCRA 127.

^[5]
National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,
164 SCRA 12.

^[6]
168 SCRA 184.

^[7]
196 SCRA 622.

^[8]
Associate Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer?Calleja, 179 SCRA 127.

^[9]
69 SCRA 132.

^[10]
169 SCRA 491.

^[11]
Associated Labor Unions (ALU) vs. Ferrer-Calleja, supra.

^[12]
175 SCRA 490.

^[13]
Foamtex Labor Union-Tupas vs. Noriel, 72 SCRA 371.

^[14]
170 SCRA 378.

^[15]
64 SCRA 56.