VIRON GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, CO., INC. AND DOLLY LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU) AND…

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction, of the decision dated November 21, 1990 issued by
the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-06-022-85-B,
dismissing petitioners’ appeal for failure to file the required cash or surety
bond under Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as well as the resolution dated January
31, 1991, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

On June 4, 1985, the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), Rodolfo Romero and others
filed a complaint charging petitioners Viron Garments and Dolly Lim with unfair
labor practice thru illegal shutdown, non-payment of wages and allowances for
the periods of February 1-15, and May 16-31, 1985, non-payment of five (5) days
service incentive leave pay from 1983-85 and illegal deduction of P50 to P100
from the private respondents’ wages during the months of September and October,
1984.

On December 20, 1988, Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludares
rendered a decision (pp. 57-63) finding the petitioners guilty of unfair labor
practice; ordering them, jointly and severally, to restitute the deductions
made from the wages of the private respondents Mila Buda, Milagros Colcol,
Imelda Patropis, Rodolfo Romero, Estellita Dumo, Shirley Monforte, Erlinda
Postalero, Erlinda Peñaloza and Emeteria Esperonzate; to immediately reinstate
them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights, with full
backwages and other benefits from June 1, 1985 up to June 1, 1988, without
deduction and qualifications.

The total award amounted to Five Million Four Hundred Sixty Nine
Thousand Sixty-One Pesos and 60/100 (P5,469,061.60). The employees in due time filed a Motion for Execution.

A Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was filed by the Company
on the ground, among others, that it had been
closed for the last three years and was no longer in operation.

On July 25, 1989, Labor Arbiter Saludares issued a Writ of
Execution.

The petitioners appealed to the NLRC.

On April 10, 1990, the NLRC directed the petitioners to post a
cash or surety bond equal to the monetary awards from a reputable and duly
accredited bonding company.

The petitioners asked to be excused from filing a bond until the
recomputation of the backwages was finally
resolved.

Petitioners were given a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
(from notice) within which to post a cash or surety bond, otherwise, their
appeal would be dismissed.

On July 6, 1990, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion
with an attached pleading entitled “Appeal Bond/Undertaking” which
they asked the Commission to consider as
substantial compliance with its resolution dated June 20, 1990.

On November 21, 1990, the NLRC dismissed their appeal for failure
to file the required cash or surety bond. The Commission denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and on
February 25, 1991, issued a Writ of
Execution which was served forthwith on the petitioners together with the
Sheriff’s Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Property.

The auction sale proceeded as scheduled on March 6, 1990. A lone bidder bidded the amount of
P512,000. A certificate of sale was
duly issued.

The petitioners came to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
assailing as a grave abuse of discretion,
the NLRC’s rejection of their appeal bond/undertaking.

Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
6715, provides:

“Art.   223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any
of the following grounds:

“xxx   xxx       xxx.

“In case of a  judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.” (Underscoring ours.)

Petitioners posit that the above provision was applied by the
NLRC very rigidly and literally; and that a cash or surety bond for the
perfection of an appeal is not mandatory as may be inferred from the phrase
“may be,” instead of “shall” used in the law.

There is no merit in that argument.

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable
requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer, is clearly limned in
the provision that an appeal by
the employer may be perfected “only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond.” The
word “only” makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the
posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by
which an employer’s appeal may be perfected.

The word “may” refers to the perfection of an appeal as
optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the posting of an appeal
bond, if he desires to appeal.

The meaning and the intention of the legislature in enacting a
statute must be determined from the language employed, and where there is no
ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Provincial Board of
Cebu vs. Presiding Judge of Cebu Court of First Instance, Branch IV, 171 SCRA
1).

The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to
perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if
they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor
upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from
using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligaiton to satisfy their
employees’ just and lawful claims.

The “undertaking” which the petitioners signed, binding
themselves to answer and pay the judgment or award would not assure
satisfaction of the monetary awards if they (the judgment debtors) became
insolvent during the pendency of the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order which this Court issued is hereby
lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.