G.R. Nos. 90907-12. August 07, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CONRADO DE LA CRUZ, CRISOSTOMO GALAW-EY Y CARPIO, AND CRESENCIA GALAW-EY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS. EDUARDO CASTILLO Y FERNANDEZ…
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an
automatic review of the Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet, First Judicial Region, Branch 8, La Trinidad Benguet, rendered in six criminal cases Nos. 84-CR-0105 to 84-CR-0110,
inclusive, imposing the penalties
of four reclusion perpetuas for four murders, and two
prision mayors to reclusion temporals for two frustrated murders upon the appellants Conrado de la Cruz and the spouses Crisostomo
Galaw-ey y Carpio and Cresencia Galaw-ey.
The facts are not in dispute.
On August 10, 1984,
at around 8:00 o’clock p.m., six (6)
persons inside the Western Valley Restaurant, Km. 12, Shilan,
La Trinidad, Benguet
Province, were suddenly fired upon
from outside of the restaurant. Four
persons died as a result thereof, namely, Mayor Johnny Ebes
of Kapangan, Benguet; Paulino Lubos, the District
Supervisor of Tublay, School District, Tublay, Benguet; Pfc. Walsie Bulasao of the La Trinidad
Police Station, La Trinidad, Benguet; and Rufino Salbino, a school janitor
at Balakbak Elementary School, Kapangan,
Benguet. Two
others, namely, Pfc. Robert Bakidol, a policeman
assigned with the office of the Deputy Regional Director for Administration,
Camp Bado Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, and Andres Pil-o,
a cook at the Western Valley
Restaurant, were seriously injured.
For the death of the four and the wounding of the two others, SPOUSES CRISOSTOMO GALAW-EY and
CRESENCIA GALAW-EY, of Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet, and CPL. CONRADO DE LA CRUZ, CPL. EDUARDO CASTILLO
y FERNANDEZ, CPL. TITO SEGUIN y SORIANO, CPL. ZOSIMO POQUIZ y DALIGDIG, and
CPL. FIDEL BRAVO y TORIO, all members of the Special Action Company, Philippine
Constabulary, were charged in separate Informations
for four counts of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and for Frustrated Murder on two counts, as defined and
penalized under Article 248 in relation to Articles 6 and 250 of the Revised
Penal Code.[2]
The identical informations for the four
murder cases filed on October 11,
1984, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 84-CR-0105 to 0108, read
as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 1984, at Km. 12, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then end there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot x
x x with the
use of a
firearm thereby inflicting gunshot wounds on the vital parts of the body
of the offended party, which
directly caused his death immediately thereafter.
That in the commission of this offense, the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity was present, the accused
having purposely sought the same to insure the commission thereof.[3]
The identical informations for the two
frustrated murder cases, filed on October
12, 1984 and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 84-CR-0109 to 0110,
allege the following:
That on or about the 10th day of August 1984, at Km. 12, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot x x x with a firearm, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds on
vital parts of the body of the offended party which would ordinarily cause his
death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce Murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attention given to the offended party
which prevented his death.
That in the commission of this offense, the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity was present, the accused
having purposely sought the same to insure the commission thereof.[4]
Of all the seven accused, only CPL. CONRADO DE LA CRUZ and
SPOUSES CRISOSTOMO GALAW-EY and CRESENCIA GALAW-EY were arraigned and tried;
all three pleaded “not guilty.” The four co-accused soldiers, namely,
Eduardo Castillo, Zosimo Poquiz,
Tito Seguin, and Fidel Bravo were, and still are, at
large after having been discharged from the military service because of their
alleged involvement in the
massacre of August 10,
1984. Thereafter the six cases were tried jointly against the three
accused abovenamed.
In proving the guilt of the three accused-appellants, the
prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence, as it did not present
anybody who actually saw the shooting. In
other words, there was no eyewitness to the crime who testified at the trial.
The prosecution theorizes that a pistol-whipping incident that
happened on April 10, 1984, involving Crisostomo Galaw-ey, one of the accused, and Roberto Bakidol, one of the victims, who, however, survived,
provided the motive for the despicable massacre.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in March 1984, Bakidol
had an altercation with Crisostomo Galaw-ey’s uncle in the Western Valley Restaurant where Bakidol was moonlighting as a security guard. At that altercation, Crisostomo
punched Bakidol on the face. Afterwards, or in the evening of April 10, 1984, Bakidol
and Crisostomo decided to patch up their differences
inside the same restaurant. However,
before they could talk, a stranger suddenly appeared, pulled out a gun and
pistol-whipped Crisostomo on the face, causing him
injuries. This incident, the prosecution
proffers, is the reason why Crisostomo Galaw-ey nursed a grudge against Bakidol
and wanted to get even with the latter that night of August 10, 1984.
That is the motive of this ghastly killing rampage accepted by the trial
court.
The prosecution would also have us believe that there was
conspiracy among all the seven accused ostensibly based on the following facts
as testified to by the prosecution’s witnesses:
1) All five co-accused soldiers, namely: Conrado dela Cruz, Tito Seguin, Fidel
Bravo, Eduardo Castillo and Zosimo Poquiz arrived together in Baguio City
from Bontoc, Mt.
Province carrying with them their
respective Armalite Rifles. Before they could arrive in Baguio City,
three of them, namely: Conrado de la Cruz, Tito Seguin
and Zosimo Poquiz alighted
at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet
and met with spouses Crisostomo and Cresencia Galaw-ey at their
residence at Tomay, La Trinidad. (One of the soldiers, Conrado
de la Cruz, is the brother-in-law of Crisostomo Galaw-ey; he being the brother of the latter’s wife, Cresencia)
2) Immediately before the shooting incident on August 10, 1984, Spouses Crisostomo Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey were in the
vicinity of the Western Valley Restaurant, the scene of the crime. They were seen with their Ford Fiera jitney with Plate No. AVC 778;
3) Near the Western Valley Restaurant and
shortly before the sound of gunfire was heard, Armalite
Rifles were seen inside the Ford Fiera jitney of
accused Spouses Crisostomo Galaw-ey
and Cresencia Galaw-ey. These Armalite
rifles were later taken by three men from said Ford Fiera jitney;
4) Three men with Armalite
rifles were seen near the door of the Western Valley Restaurant immediately
before and after gunshots rang out in said restaurant. One of the three men was identified as
accused Conrado de la Cruz;
5) Twenty one (21) of the thirty empty shells
recovered from the crime scene were fired from one of the five Armalite rifles of the five co-accused soldiers,
particularly Armalite Rifle SN-RP-163677, which was
issued to Eduardo Castillo. Likewise,
two of the slugs recovered from the body of Pfc. Walsie
Bulasao and one of the slugs recovered from the body
of Pfc. Roberto Bakidol were fired from the same Armalite Rifle;
6) Spouses Crisostomo
Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey arrived at the wake of Comising
Bogatan, their neighbor, at 9:00 P.M., August
10, 1984;
7) Accused Crisostomo
Galaw-ey was intercepted at the Camp Dangwa Checkpoint, La Trinidad, Benguet
on board his Ford Fiera jitney at 4:00 A.M., August
11, 1984 with three armed soldiers aboard;
8) The five co-accused soldiers were discharged
from military service on October 5,
1984. None of them protested
nor contested the order for their dishonorable discharge from military service;
9) All of the accused were nowhere to be found
shortly after the shooting incident on August
10, 1984.[5]
On the other hand, the accused put up the defenses of denial and
alibi, which may be summarized as follows:
The accused Crisostomo Galaw-ey denies that there is “bad blood” between
him and Robert Bakidol because whatever
misunderstanding they had was settled amicably on the night of April 10, 1984, four months before
the killings. As a matter of fact, they
even drank together up to 1:00 o’clock a.m. with Crisostomo paying for the
drinks. After that, they greeted each
other whenever they met in the streets.
The defense does not deny the arrival of the five accused PC
soldiers in La Trinidad, Benguet at about 3:00 o’clock p.m. on August 10, 1984.
It, however, avows that the three of the five soldiers went to the house
of the Galaw-eys to borrow fare money from Cresencia Galaw-ey, the older
sister of one of the soldiers, Conrado de la
Cruz. Afterwards, Crisostomo,
upon request of Conrado, his brother-in-law, brought
him and his companions to Baguio
City. (The municipality
of Trinidad is contiguous to Baguio City). They parted ways at the Dangwa
Terminal in Baguio
City, with Conrado
riding in Crisostomo’s jitney back to the Galaw-ey’s house in Tomay, La
Trinidad, to meet his wife there.
The Galaw-ey spouses admitted that they
were sitting in their Ford Fiera jitney which was
parked in front of the Morris Restaurant, which is near the Western Valley
Restaurant, more or less an hour before the shooting incident. But they explained their presence at that
place as part
of their daily routine as vegetable merchants.
Cresencia explained, however, that in the
afternoon of August 10, 1984,
they were to meet vegetable suppliers in Acop, Tublay, Benguet. While passing by Morris
Restaurant, Crisostomo
realized that he did not have enough gasoline, so, he decided to go back to the
family residence. In the process of
making a U-turn, a front wheel of the jitney got stuck in a canal
near the Morris Restaurant. Two male teen-agers, one of them the
prosecution witness Johnson Milo, helped push the jitney out of the canal. Then, Crisostomo
and his wife proceeded homeward to join the wake of a deceased neighbor.
Crisostomo Galaw-ey
denied that the two teen-agers,
Johnson Milo and his companion, Marcos Recana, rode
with them in his Ford Fiera jitney that late
afternoon of August 10, 1984; not having gotten inside the jitney at all, they
could not have stepped on what Milo testified as “scrap irons”
that turned out to be armalite rifles. He also
denied carrying soldier-passengers, emphasizing that it was only he and
his wife inside the jitney contrary to the version of Milo
and Recana.
Crisostomo also testified that he and
his wife were in the market of Baguio
City at 4:30 o’clock a.m. on August 11, 1984, thereby refuting the testimony of Pat.
Joseph Basquial that he (Crisostomo)
was seen at the Camp Dangwa checkpoint with his
Ford Fiera jitney with uniformed soldiers as passengers
that early morning of the said date. Crisostomo denied on the witness stand seeing again the
soldier-companions of Conrado de la Cruz after he had
taken them to Baguio
City on August 10, 1984.
On the issue of flight, the three appellants explained their
absence from Baguio
and La Trinidad more or less a month after the massacre of August 10, 1984 as due to fear for their lives and
safety in the wake of rumors and threats of their being “salvaged.”
On January 12, 1985,
however, Crisostomo Galaw-ey
and his wife decided to surrender to the authorities to clear their names once
and for all.
On his part, accused Conrado de la Cruz testified that in October 1984,
he learned that he and his four soldier-companions had been discharged from the
military service on account of their being suspects in the shooting incident at
the Western Valley Restaurant. While he
was in Sultan Kudarat in Mindanao, de
la Cruz met Pat. Benjamin Untalan, a member of the Baguio City Police Force who was
supposed to arrest him, and he went with him.[6]
On September 15, 1989,
the trial court rendered its Decision[7]
convicting all the three accused-appellants as charged, all as
co-principals in four (4) counts
of Murder and two (2) cases of Frustrated Murder, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in–
1. Criminal Case No. 84-CR-0105, finding
each of the accused Conrado de la Cruz, Crisostomo Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248, Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentencing each of said accused to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of the late District Supervisor Paulino
Lubos the amounts of P30,000.00 for his death;
P73,734.00 for loss of earning capacity; P100,000.00 moral damages; P50,000.00
exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fee; and to pay costs;
2. Criminal Case No. 84-CR-0106, finding
each of the accused Conrado de la Cruz, Crisostomo Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248, Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Mayor Johnny Ebes in
the amounts of P30,000.00 for his death; P108,480.00 for loss of earning
capacity; P100,000.00 for moral damages; P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; and to pay costs;
3) Criminal Case No. 84-CR-0107, finding each
of the accused Conrado de la Cruz, Crisostomo Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248, Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Pfc. Walsie Bulasao in the amounts of P30,000.00 for his death;
P46,512.00 for loss of earning capacity; P80,000.00 for moral damages;
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; P10,000.00 attorney’s fees; and to pay costs;
4) Criminal Case No. 84-CR-0108, finding each
of the accused Conrado de la Cruz, Crisostomo Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248, Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Rufino Salbino in the amounts of P30,000.00 for his death;
P36,632.00 for loss of earning capacity; P50,000.00 for moral damages;
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; P5,000.00 attorney’s fees; and to pay costs;
5) Criminal Case No. 84-CR-0109, finding each
of the accused Conrado de la Cruz, Crisostomo Galaw-ey and Cresencia Galaw-ey guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, defined and penalized under
Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentencing each of them under the Indeterminate
Sentence law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from Ten (10) Years of Prision Mayor to Eighteen (18) Years of Reclusion Temporal,
and to indemnify Andres Pil-o in the amount of
P1,000.00 nominal damages, and to pay costs;
6) Criminal Case No. 84-CR-0110, finding each
of the accused Conrado dela
Cruz, Crisostomo Galaw-ey
and Cresencia Galaw-ey
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 in connection with Article 6, Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentencing each of them under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from Ten (10) Years of Prision Mayor to Eighteen (18) Years of Reclusion Temporal,
and to indemnify Robert Bakidol in the
amount of P1,000.00 nominal damages; and to pay costs;
SO ORDERED.[8]
Conrado de la Cruz appealed the
Decision, assigning the following as the errors allegedly committed by the
trial court:
(1) The lower court erred in not finding the
evidence of the prosecution substantially insufficient to establish the guilt
of accused-appellant Conrado dela
Cruz beyond reasonable doubt in the cases at bar;
(2) The lower court erred in not giving weight
to the evidence of the accused- appellant Conrado de
la Cruz.[9]
The spouses Crisostomo and Cresencia Galaw-ey likewise
appealed, submitting a separate Appellants’ Brief the following assignment of
errors:
(i) The trial court erred in finding that the
accused-appellants Spouses Crisostomo and Cresencia Galaw-ey conspired with
the perpetrators in committing the crime charged;
(ii) The trial court erred in finding that
there was circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the accused-
appellants Spouses Galaw-ey’s guilty beyond
reasonable doubt;
(iii) The trial court erred in taking into
consideration in its judgment the alleged “flight” of the accused-
appellants Spouses Galaw-ey;
(iv) The trial court erred in not considering
that the accused-appellants Spouses Galaw-ey had no
possible motive in committing the acts charged against them;
(v) The trial court erred in not taking [into]
consideration the voluntary surrender of the accused-appellants Spouses Galaw-ey;
(vi) The trial court erred in not applying the
provisions of Article 48, Revised Penal Code.[10]
We
find both appeals meritorious.
It is the avowed policy of the law that “before an accused
is convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and
until thus proven guilty, he is presumed innocent. The
burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the State succeeds in
proving his guilt, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
applies.”[11]
This policy is embodied in the Bill of Rights, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987
Constitution, which states that “in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.” Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires
moral certainty–a “certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon it,” – may the presumption of
innocence be overcome.[12]
The prosecution relied solely, in all these six cases, on
circumstantial evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused-appellants.
There is nothing wrong with that.
In order, however, to sustain a conviction by bare circumstantial
evidence, three requisites explicitly provided by law must concur, to wit:
(1) There is more than one
circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.[13]
All these requisites must be complied
with if circumstantial evidence is to be the basis for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Every circumstance in favor of innocence must
be considered in a criminal case; the strongest suspicion must not be allowed
to sway judgment against the accused.[14] For the hard and fast rule in evidence
is that “before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the author of the crime.”[15]
In the case at bar, only one witness, Meriam
Agbuya, identified Conrado
de la Cruz as one of the three persons with
“long guns” at the scene of the shooting. While it is true that the testimony of only
one witness, if credible and positive, and satisfies the court beyond
reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict,[16]
this is not so in the instant case.
The narration of Meriam does not meet
the requirements of the testimony of a true eyewitness as the trial court
ruled, finding only as it did a circumstantial case against the
appellants. But whatever it is, be that
of an eyewitness or that of a mere vital witness, on the circumstances of the
shooting leading to the identification of the “soldier” who held the
“smoking gun,” so to speak, Meriam’s
testimony at the trial loses weight and importance when we consider the other
evidence on record.
First, Meriam Agbuya
did not mention that she recognized
one of the accused when the police took her statement[17]
barely three days after the incident, her reason being that “I (she) was
not asked.” It was only during the trial, or on April 23, 1985, that she implicated appellant Conrado in the killing of August 10, 1984.
This suppression for more than eight months of her obligation to speak
out to the police authorities the whole truth renders her subsequent
identification of Conrado dubious, to say the
least. We have held that the silence of
an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful x x x. The long delay in reporting a crime or
its author to the authorities not caused by threat, intimidation, or coercion,
renders the testimony untruthful.[18]
Meriam was never threatened, intimidated, nor coerced
not to divulge the identity of accused de la Cruz as one of the three soldiers at the scene of
the massacre immediately before and after it happened. She simply was not asked. But this is not a valid reason to withhold
the identity of a probable
perpetrator of such slaughter. It
behooves an eyewitness to the crime to report to the authorities not only its
commission but more importantly, the identity of all the criminals, so that the
ends of justice may be served. This is
especially so when said “eyewitness” is being investigated by the
police authorities regarding the same.
Failure to make such a full disclosure renders the later revelation or
sworn statement doubtful, at best, and can not, of course, serve as a basis of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second, during the hearing on April 23, 1985, Meriam Agbuya testified on matters that happened immediately
before and immediately after the shooting in the Western Valley
Restaurant. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(Before the shooting incident)
Q: You said that you were standing at the door
or [sic] your room, what can you see from the place you are standing, if any?
A: The three male persons holding guns.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When
you saw them, they were walking?
A: Yes,
Your Honor.
Q: They were following one another or were they
walking side by side with each other?
A: They
were walking side by side, Your
Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What
did you see of them? Their right side,
their left side, front side or their
back?
A: Their
front, Your Honor.
(After the shooting)
Q: Now,
what did you do if you did anything when you heard the gunshots?
A: I
went to our room, sir.
Q: Before
you went to your room, will you tell
this Court if you saw anything before you entered?
A: After
the gunfire and before I entered our room, I saw one of them look back.
Q: Who
is that one of them you are referring to?
A: The
three male persons who were running, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now
will you tell this Court if you know any of these three persons, if you know
them personally?
A.: There
was, sir.
Q: You
know one of them, two of them or the three of them?
A: I
only know one because they [sic] look [sic] back, I saw his face, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was
that the first time you saw his face, or there were previous occasions that you
saw his face?
A: None,
Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: If that person is in the courtroom,
can you identify that person?
A: Yes,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr.
Bias: x x x Witness x x x pointed to
the person of the accused Conrado de la Cruz.[19]
The foregoing is the nearest of an eyewitness account in the
entire record of this case. At the same
time, we find it incredulous that the witness Meriam Agbuya was able to recognize Conrado
de la Cruz after the shooting because the latter allegedly looked back while
running away from the restaurant. But
she did not recognize him before the shooting while de la Cruz and two other
soldiers were allegedly walking towards the restaurant facing her. We find this to be inconsistent with ordinary
human experience wherein it would be easier to recognize a person when one is
calm than when one is frightened and excited after hearing a fusillade of
gunshots.
Third, Meriam Agbuya
testified that the three soldiers she saw walking to and running away from the
Western Valley Restaurant where the shooting took place were wearing yellow
T-shirts.[20]
This was, however, contradicted by two other prosecution witnesses, Johnson
Milo and Joseph BasquiaI, who testified that the
soldiers were in fatigue uniform.[21]
Fourth, Ms. Agbuya also testified on direct examination that before the
shooting occurred, she was at the door of her room in a building separate from,
but near, the Western Valley Restaurant.
It was there that she saw three male soldiers holding armalite rifles parallel to the ground walking towards the
restaurant.[22]
However, in her sworn statement,[23]
she said that she was standing at the door of the girl’s toilet which was in another building, when three male
soldiers in yellow
T-shirts carrying long guns slung on their shoulders walked past her towards
the restaurant.
The lower court disregarded the above inconsistencies in the
testimony of Meriam Agbuya on
the ground of her being of tender age, i.e., 18 years old. But 18 years of age is not a tender age. In fact, 18 is now the age of majority. In any event, even if some of the
above-mentioned inconsistencies may be considered minor, they nevertheless put
in doubt not only the honesty and candor of the said witness, but her
believability. As we said, such
testimony fails to satisfy the criterion of moral certainty.
We can not also discount the fact that, according to Patrolman Joseph Basquial, a prosecution witness and a brother-in-arms of
two of the victims, the deceased Pfc. Walsie Bulasao and the wounded Pfc. Robert Bakidol
(who also testified for the prosecution), the appellant Conrado
de la Cruz was not among the three soldiers inside the jitney of the other
appellant Crisostomo Galaw-ey
in the early morning of August 11, 1984 when he (Basquial)
intercepted said jitney at the gate of Camp Dangwa. Only Fidel Bravo, Eduardo Castillo, and Tito Seguin were identified by him to be riding
in the jitney with Crisostomo.
Thus, during the hearing on March 12, 1985, Patrolman Basquial
testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
A: At about past 4:30 o’clock
in the morning, more or less, sir, I
stopped a Ford Fiera vehicle driven by one Crisostomo Galaw-ey and I stopped
it, sir.
Q: What did you see, if any, when you stopped
that motor vehicle?
A: I
approached it from the rear and
using my flashlight I saw three
men wearing fatigue uniform, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said you saw three men in fatigue. Where in the vehicle did you see them, was it
in front or at the back?
A: At the back, sir, two were sitted (sic) at my right side and the other one was sitted (sic) at my left with a rifle when I approached them
from the rear, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How
about the front seat, was there anybody there?
A: I noticed only the driver, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Who was driving?
A: Crisostomo Galaw-ey.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned three PC Soldiers that you saw
that morning. Did you have opportunity to meet with them after that date
again?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q: Where was that?
A: At the La Trinidad Police Station. That was more or less one week later after
the incident at the Western Valley Restaurant.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you do when Julius Binay-an was investigating these PC Soldiers?
A: I asked Sgt. Binay-an
what were the names of these PC Soldiers because they were the ones whom I saw
when I apprehended the vehicle of Crisostomo Galaw-ey at the gate of Camp Dangwa, sir.
Q: What did Julius Binay-an
say?
A: He told me that they are Fidel Bravo, Eduardo Castillo and Tito Seguin.[24]
Without the positive identification of the accused-appellant Conrado de la Cruz as one of the perpetrators of the crime,
the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor, stands unrebutted. As we
have earlier emphasized, a defendant in a criminal case must always be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven.
When his culpability is not satisfactorily shown, or in case of
reasonable doubt, he shall have the right to be acquitted, though his innocence
be doubted.[25]
It is better to acquit a dozen guilty criminals than let an innocent person
suffer unjustly, so it has been said and rightly so. Of course, the ideal would be for everyone to
get his or her just deserts.
On the criminal conspiracy found by the trial court, the paucity
of evidence is glaring.
To prove the alleged conspiracy by and among the Galaw-eys and their co-accused five soldiers, the
prosecution would rely so much on the fact that the former and their Ford Fiera jitney were “sighted” near the Western
Valley Restaurant a few minutes before and after the shooting incident. However, the presence of the Galaw-eys and their Ford Fiera
jitney near the scene of the crime is not by itself sufficient to establish
their criminal liability. In Saavedra,[26]
we said that “presence at the scene of the crime, without more, does not
imply conspiracy.” Well?settled is the rule that conspiracy
presupposes the existence of a pre-conceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the
existence of such circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly
engaged or connected with the same be present when the crime was
perpetrated. There must be a logical
relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators,
evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and among the latter,
such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design. x x x[27]
Neither the fact that one of the soldiers, Conrado,
is the younger brother of Cresencia, nor that he and
his soldier companions went to her house that afternoon of August 10, 1984,
would indicate his and the Galaw-eys‘ participation
in the criminal design. More is required
to fully support the prosecution’s theory that the three appellants were united
in pursuing a common unlawful purpose and that they, or any one of them fired
the fatal fusillade that killed four victims and seriously wounded two
others. The foregoing indicia of an
alleged conspiracy relied upon by the prosecution, even all together, do not
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Having fallen short of that quantum necessary to establish the accused-
appellants’ guilt, the prosecution’s case must fall. Only if we could arrive at a conclusion that the
crime had been committed precisely by
the persons on trial under the exacting test of proof beyond reasonable doubt should the sentence be one of
conviction. Every circumstance favoring
their innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the appellants must survive
the test of reason. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the appellants could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged. Moral certainty is a
must.[28]
The prosecution’s case against the appellants is cracked by the
actual ballistic examinations (Exhibits “C” and “D”) of the
firearms, slugs, and empty shells submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The findings of
that government office known for its competence, reliability, and fairness
indubitably showed that the armalite rifle belonging
to Conrado de la Cruz did not fire any of the shells
and slugs submitted in evidence.
Instead, it was the firearm belonging to accused Eduardo Castillo
(Exhibit “G”) bearing Serial No. 163677 that was found to have been
the gun used in the shooting where four (4) men died and two (2) others were
seriously injured. The NBI so declared
positively and definitely.
Thus, the NBI Ballistician, Rogelio G. Mumar,
testified, on cross-examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You have examined 30 shells recovered from
the scene of the crime, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:
And from the examination of the 30
shells, you have determined that at least some of those 30 shells were fired
from Exhibit “G”?
A: Yes, sir, you are right.
Q: And you have also examined Exhibit
“K” which are certain slugs, am I correct?
A: Those are fragments.
Q: And you have also determined that some of
these fragments were fired from Exhibit “G”?
A: Yes, sir, you are right.
Q: But apart from Exhibit “G”, which
is firearm with Serial No. 163677 recovered from Castillo, you have not made
any finding that any of the shells were fired from any other armalite rifle?
A: Yes, you are right.[29]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti
that Eduardo Castillo fired the fatal shots, such fact would be of no moment
and will not help the prosecution’s case as it had not proved beyond reasonable
doubt that there was a conspiracy among the seven accused. Absent the same, each of the accused can not
be held liable for the act or acts of his co-accused.
The trial court has also declared that “a motive has indeed,
been established by the prosecution.” To this end, it sustained the
conclusion of the prosecution that
x x x the accused were moved
by vengeance in committing the criminal acts for which they stand charged. It was too hurting for the Galaw-ey couple, most especially to Crisostomo
Galaw-ey to be pistol whipped and injured at a time
when he was ready to settle an earlier incident as only a “small
matter,” the fire of vengeance was lit them then and there.[30]
We
do not agree. If it was, indeed,
true that Crisostomo Galaw-ey
wanted to exact vengeance from Robert Bakidol that
fateful night of August 10, 1984, why the massacre of several people, including
innocent bystanders, among them highly respected members of the community, one
a town mayor and another a school district supervisor?
Why was Bakidol not killed, but only wounded
not even very seriously, if indeed, he was the apple of Crisostomo’s
vengeful eyes? Bakidol
could have been an easy target by any of the soldiers-accused especially with
the use of an armalite rifle which is an accurate
firing weapon. And to think that there
were three soldiers firing simultaneously at him (Bakidol)
each with an armalite rifle, how could have they
missed shattering Bakidol’s body and “blowing
him to Kingdom come” if he was really the target? “Moonlighting” as a security guard
in the Western Valley Restaurant (where he even has his own quarters, he said
he was a boarder), it would have been easy to isolate Bakidol
outside the said restaurant where he is supposed to stand on guard. It puzzles the Court why two high government
officials, innocent ones at that,
were included in the carnage. Could
either, or both, of them be the real targets for a variety of reasons? The prosecution has not provided the missing
pieces that would successfully weave its theory of revenge against Bakidol. It was not
even Bakidol who pistol-whipped Crisostomo
Galaw-ey. So,
why should the latter harbor rancor in his heart against the former? Although proof of motive is not indispensable
to conviction, yet a void in the evidence in this respect discloses a weakness
in the case for the prosecution.[31]
As early as People v. del Rosario
Murray,[32]
we have said that where the identity of a person accused of having committed a crime is in dispute, the motive that
may have compelled its commission is very relevant.
The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi is weak, as is the
general rule in the case of alibis. But
it is well-settled that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not rest on the weakness of that of the defense.[33]
Further, “where the identification of the accused as the author of the
crime is unreliable, his defense
of alibi assumes importance and may be given weight.”[34]
In view of our foregoing disquisition, all other issues raised in
this appeal have become academic.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court is REVERSED and the
accused-appellants are hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
“People v. de la
Cruz, et al.,” Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet, First Judicial Region, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, September 15, 1989; Nicodemo
T. Ferrer, Presiding Judge.
[2]
Appellants’ Brief for Spouses Crisostomo and Cresencia Galaw-ey; Rollo, 298-299.
[3]
Rollo, 41-48.
[4]
Rollo, 49-52.
[5]
Consolidated Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; Rollo, 414-416.
[6]
Rollo, 69, 72-77.
[7]
“People v. de la Cruz, et al.,” Supra,
note 6, 6.
[8]
Rollo, 91-92.
[9]
Appellant’s Brief for Conrado de la Cruz; Rollo, 108.
[10]
Appellants’ Brief for Spouses Cresencia and Crisostomo Galaw-ey; Rollo, 294-295.
[11]
People v. de Leon, No. 82882, February
5, 1991.
[12]
People v. Tolentino, No. 70836, October 18, 1988.
[13]
Rule 133, Sec. 5, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines;
People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 90255, January 23, 1991.
[14]
Perez de la Merced v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
76203-04, December 6, 1989.
[15]
People v. Tolentino (citing People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942)), supra, note 13.
[16]
People v. Salondro,
Jr., 170 SCRA 763.
[17]
Exh. TT, Supra.
[18]
People v. Besa, G.R. No. 78899, March 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 533, 544.
[19]
TSN, hearing on April 23, 1985,
44 and 60.
[20]
TSN, hearing on April 23, 1985,
41-42.
[21]
TSN, hearing on March 7, 1985,
18; hearing on March 12, 1985,
37.
[22]
TSN, hearing on April 23, 1985, 39-41.
[23]
Exhibit TT and 14-A, Q and A No. 6,
August 13, 1984.
[24]
TSN, hearing on March 12, 1985, 37, 39, 42, 43.
[25]
People v. Songcuan, G.R. No. 73070, August 11, 1989.
[26]
People v. Saavedra, G.R. No. L-48738, May 18,
1987.
[27]
Id., citing
People v. Custodio No. L-30463, October 30,
1972, 47 SCRA 289 (1972).
[28]
People v. Torre, G.R. No. 44905, April 25,
1990 (citing People v. Ramos, No. 76744,
June 28, 1988).
[29]
TSN, 40, hearing on March 4, 1985.
[30]
Decision, supra, notes 8 and 9.
[31]
People v. Lim, G.R. No. 86454, October 18,
1990, citing People v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36, 46 (1968).
[32]
105 Phil. 591 (1959), citing U.S. v. Mcmann, 4
Phil. 561; People v. Ragsac, 61 Phil. 146; People v. Batastas,
65 Phil. 654; People v. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147;
People vs. Cagguan, et al., 94 Phil. 118.
[33]
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 68993, September 26, 1988.
[34]
People v. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769.