G.R. No. 89762. August 07, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO LAZARTE Y MOGALLON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
SARMIENTO, J.:
At around 11:45 o’clock P.M.,
on October 8, 1986, Lorenzo
Lara was sleeping in his residence at Zone 5 Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila.
A knock at the door, awakened him.
He stood up and opened the door, but he saw nobody. Then, to his surprise, someone entered the
house through the window. It was Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana, the owner of the house which Lara was occupying
for free, as a caretaker.
Seeing Lara, Nonito embraced him. As Lara held Nonito,
he felt blood in the latter’s clothes and sensed that he had wounds in his
body. When he asked Nonito
what happened, the latter replied, “Tol, sinaksak ako sa
labas.” “Who stabbed you?” Lara
asked. “Tony, Suay,
Ric and Junior,” he answered. Nonito also
“shouted” twice, “Help me!” Frantically, Lara called out to
his neighbors for help. Neighbors came
running. When Nonito
was about to be placed on board a jeep, he collapsed. He was declared “DOA”, dead on
arrival, at the Nichols Airbase
Hospital.
Nonito sustained three stab wounds at
the back and died of hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds.
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, a medical
specialist, and the medico-legal officer and in-charge of the clinical
application of medicine, of the National Bureau of Investigation, opined that
of these three wounds, all at the back, only one was fatal which alone could
have caused the death of the victim. He
also testified that “(O)ne kind of single bladed
sharp pointed instrument produced the wounds,” albeit he admitted that it
is possible that there could have been more than one instrument.
The next morning, on October
9, 1986, at around eight o’clock,
Lara reported the incident to the Taguig Police
Station. The subsequent investigation,
sloppily and hapzardly conducted by the police
authorities, resulted in the finding that Nonito was
stabbed two meters away from a sari-sari store owned by Priscilla Flores,
married to a policeman of Taguig, at Libis St., Zone 5, Signal Village, Taguig,
Metro Manila. The store was about ten
meters away from Nonito’s residence. Drinking hard liquor was prevalent in that
store.
Solely on the deductions or conclusions of Lara that the four
nicknames or aliases allegedly “whispered” by Nonito
to him correspond to Antonio Lazarte for the nickname
or alias “Tony,” “Rodolfo Mundido”
for “Su-ay” or “Suway” (in his
direct testimony he said “Romulo Cahiwat“), while on cross-examination he mentioned
“Romulo Mundido,”
and Ricardo Ignacio for “Ric,” and “Eliseo Henares” or “Romulo Cahiwat” for
“Junior,” an information for murder was filed against the four aforenamed on October 14, 1986.2
Only Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon and Ricardo Ignacio were apprehended, as the other
two, “Rodolfo Mundido” and “Eliseo Henares,” were never
arrested, and remain at large.
Ricardo Ignacio was only apprehended during a “saturation
drive” conducted by the military and police authorities on August 30, 1987.3 He was acquitted on a demurrer to
evidence pursuant to the Resolution of the trial court dated February 9, 1989.4
The defense of Antonio Lazarte, the
appellant in the case at bar, consists of denial and alibi, and points to two
other persons–Mio Veloso and a certain Miguel–as
the assailants.
In his defense before the trial court, Antonio, 31, married with
eight children, testified that he was at the time of the incident a barangay tanod of his barangay, and an upholsterer in the Emaden
furniture shop in Pasay
City. He denied that he knew the deceased and
averred that he had never met him. He
narrated that he was inside his family residence at Libis St., Purok
15, Zone 5, Signal Village,
Taguig, M.M. at 11
o’clock in the evening of October
8, 1986. He had not gone out
the whole day as he was taking care of his sick child in the absence of his
wife, Amelia, a Food Terminal, Inc. employee who was assigned to the night
shift.
The following day, at around eight
o’clock in the morning, Lorenzo Lara and Melly
Castillo arrived at Antonio’s house, demanding that Antonio reveal the
identities of the assailants (allegedly Antonio’s townmates)
who had stabbed Nonito to death the night
before. Antonio professed no knowledge
of the incident.
Later that afternoon, at around 3
o’clock, Lorenzo and Melly returned to
Antonio’s house with Patrolwoman de los Santos
and Patrolman Amigo of the Taguig Police
Station. The police officers, without
any warrant of arrest, took Antonio forcibly to the police precinct where he
was investigated. Lara and Melly promised to release him from police custody if he
divulged the whereabouts of Mio Veloso and Miguel,
and threatened to get back at him, if he would not, but since Antonio knew
nothing of the case, he made no disclosures.
Three days later, while he was already in the municipal jail, Lara and Melly again went, for the third time to him and for the
third time tried to prevail upon him to reveal the whereabouts of the
assailants they suspected.
Antonio’s account on his whereabouts on the night of the stabbing
incident was corroborated by Teodora Damanhog, a faith healer.
She said that on October 8,
1986, she was summoned to treat Antonio’s child who had a
fever. She arrived at Antonio’s house in
the evening, and gave the child a “pangtapal”
and a lukewarm bath. To make sure that
the child’s fever went down, she remained in Antonio’s house until one o’clock after midnight. She testified with certainty that from ten o’clock in the evening of October 8, 1986 to one o’clock in the morning of October 9, 1986, Antonio stayed in
his house and never went out. She
assured that she was there with him.
Another witness for the defense, Fortunata
Abe, 61, testified that on October 8,
1986, at about 11:45 in
the evening, she and her daughter, Evelyn, and their neighbors, Caridad and Evelyn Irong, were
returning to their respective houses after attending a prayer meeting for a
deceased person. Along Libis Street, they passed in
front of the store of Priscilla Flores, where they witnessed a person being
stabbed several times by Miguel, a person known to her, and another person whom
Fortunata did not recognize. The victim fell down and was unable to
move. Frightened, the four women rushed
to their homes.
The testimony of Reynaldo de Paz, buyer of rejected meat from the
slaughter house in Taguig, dovetailed with the
recount of Fortunata Abe. Reynaldo recalled that on October 8, 1986,
between 11 o’clock and 12 o’clock midnight, while passing by the sari-sari
store of Aling Floriza
(referring to Priscilla Flores), he saw, from a distance of about ten meters, a
person being stabbed three times at the back by a certain Miguel, while Mio Veloso stood looking on.
At this juncture, Aling Fortunata
(referring to Fortunata Abe) and three other
companions were passing by.
Another witness, Norberto Lazarte, 32,
brother of the appellant, swore that on October 8, 1986, between 11 and 12
o’clock at night, while he was inside the house of his sister, Anastacia, at Libis St., Zone 5,
Signal Village, Taguig, M.M., Miguel knocked at the
door and sought permission to sleep in the house that night because, he said,
“Nakadisgrasya siya.”
Norberto assented. Miguel warned him not
to breathe a word about his sleeping in Norberto’s sister’s house to
anyone. Early the next morning, Miguel
left without saying where he was going.
The next witness, Amelia Lazarte, 33,
wife of the appellant, recalled that she was at work on the night of October 8, 1986, leaving her sick
child in the care of her husband. The
next morning, Lara and Melly went to her house to ask
her husband, Antonio, for Miguel’s and Mio Veloso’s
addresses. When her husband could not
tell them the desired information, Lara remarked, “Sige,
ikaw rin pag hindi mo itinuro.”
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense did not convince
the trial court of the innocence of the accused-appellant, and, in a decision
dated June 28, 1989 rendered a verdict of conviction, sentencing Antonio Lazarte to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the
heirs of victim Nonito Jambunganan
y Hundana in the amount of P30,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.5
Hence, this appeal.
The accused-appellant Antonio Lazarte y
Magallon submits the following assignment of errors.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
The trial court erred in admitting the dying declaration of the
victim.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crime of murder based solely on the dying declaration of the victim without any
eyewitness presented in court.
III
The trial court erred in finding that in the case at bar,
conspiracy was sufficiently established by
evidence.
IV
The trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to the
accused Antonio Lazarte’s claim or defense of alibi
and in disregarding the testimonies of defense witnesses Teodora Dumanhug
and Amelia Lazarte.
V
The trial court erred in concluding that the prosecution has proven
the guilt of the accused Antonio Lazarte beyond
reasonable doubt.
From the records of the case, it is clear that the conviction of
the appellant had been based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the
victim. It behooves us therefore to
determine not only the admissibility, but also appreciate the weight of the
oral dying declaration of the deceased Nonito Jambunganan testified on by the principal witness for the
prosecution, Lorenzo Lara.
As a rule a dying declaration is hearsay, and inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to the mandate of the Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 30,
which states:
SEC. 30. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
The above-quoted section of the Revised
Rules of Court expresses the hearsay rule in evidence. However, there are several exceptions to this
rule on inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one being a dying
declaration given under the circumstances specified in Section 31, likewise of
Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 31. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a
dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received
in a criminal case wherein his death is
the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
Thus, in order that a dying declaration may be admissible as
evidence, four requisites must concur:
1) That the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
2) That at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant was under a consciousness of an impending
death;
3) That the declarant
is competent as a witness; and
4) That the declaration is offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant
is a victim.6
Lara recalled that on the fateful night of October 8, 1986, Nonito,
who had multiple (5 according to him, 3 according to the NBI medico-legal
officer who also testified for the People), stab wounds, entered the house
through the window. Upon seeing Lara, Nonito embraced him and uttered the nicknames or aliases of
the persons who inflicted the injuries, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(Prosecution witness Lara under direct examination by Alberto S.
Lim)
Q What happened when he
entered thru the window?
A At the time when he
entered thru the window he suddenly embraced me and when I embraced him he said, “Sinaksak
ako sa labas.”
Q After
that, what happened?
A I asked him who stabbed
him.
Q What was his answer?
A When I asked him the
question he answered, “Tony,
Su-ay, Ric and Junior”.7
The quoted portion of the testimony of Lara may be accepted as
sufficient compliance with the first requisite
above specified. And it may be apt to
state that although a dying declaration may be made orally, that does not
militate against its admissibility.
Dying declarations are not necessarily either written or
spoken. Any method of communication
between mind and mind may be adopted
that will develop the thought, as the pressure of the hand, a nod of the head
or a glance of the eye.8
However, a close scrutiny of Lara’s testimony can not support, to
our mind, the finding of the trial court that the “victim was conscious of
his imminent death when he relayed the statement to Lorenzo Lara.”9
This finding is gratuitous and has no clear basis in the records. Although the words of the transcript are
already cold, they are nonetheless eloquent.
Let us examine them in full, even if we repeat portions already
hereinabove reproduced:
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know
a person by the name of Nonito Hambunganan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is he now?
A He is already dead, sir.
A Why do you know that?
A On the night of the
incident, I was the one who brought him to the hospital.
Q When was that?
A October 8, 1986.
Q Why did you bring Nonito Hambunganan to the
hospital?
A Because on the night of October 8, 1986 while I was sleeping
he knocked at my door.
Q At about what time was
that?
A About 11:45 p.m.
Q And what did you do?
A When I opened the door,
I was surprised when he entered thru the window.
Q Nonito
Hambunganan entered thru the window?
A. Yes, sir.
Q What happened when he
entered thru the window?
A At the time when he
entered thru the window he suddenly embraced me and when I embraced him he
said, “Sinaksak ako sa labas“.
Q After that, what
happened?
A I asked him who stabbed
him.
Q What was his answer?
A When I asked him the
question he answered, “Tony, Su-ay, Ric and
Junior”.
Q Do you know the persons
he was referring to?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that Tony? Is he present in Court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please identify him.
A (Witness going down the
witness stand and tapping the shoulder of a person who identified himself as
Antonio Lazarte, one of the accused in this case)
Q According to you, Nonito Hambunganan told you that
he had been stabbed. Did you see any blood?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see any wound on
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At his back. There were plenty.
Q You mean to say there
were more than one wound?
A There were five (5)
wounds.
Q All at the back?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that time did you
have occasion to talk also to Nonito Hambunganan after he
mentioned to you the persons who allegedly stabbed him?
A Yes, sir, when we
brought him to the hospital.
Q Did you ask him how he
felt?
A Yes, sir. I felt that he was grasping [sic] for breath
and I asked my neighbors to help me
take him to the hospital.
Q Did you find out from him
whether he felt that he would die or not?
A He shouted, “Help
me!”
COURT:
How many times did he shout
that?
A Two (2) times.
COURT:
What else did he say?
Q When he were (sic) about
to board the vehicle he suddenly collapsed when we arrived at Nicols he was already dead.
FISCAL:
Q How did you know that?
A I felt for his chest and
pulse and he was covered with blood.10
xxx xxx xxx
(Lorenzo Lara on direct examination by Fiscal Alberto S. Lim)
Q: And at that time did you have occasion to talk
also to Nonito Jambunganan
after he mentioned to you the persons who allegedly stabbed him?
A: Yes, sir, when we brought him to the
hospital.
Q: Did you ask him how he felt?
A: Yes, sir.
I felt that he was grasping [sic] for breath and I asked my neighbors to
help me take him to the hospital.
Q: Did you find out from him whether he felt that
he would die or not?
A: He shouted, “Help me!”
Q: How many times did he shout that?
A: Two (2) times.
Q: What else did he say?
A: When he was about to board the vehicle he
suddenly collapsed and when we arrived at
Nichols he was already dead.11
No ceremonial words are required to be uttered or written, no
special action or movement is needed, no incantation is necessary to invest
such words, action, or movement with the sanctity of a dying declaration as to
exempt it from the exclusionary effect of the hearsay rule. Even if death supervenes after such a
declaration is made is not primordial, all that is to be proven is that the
declaration was made under a “consciousness of impending death,”
which means simply that the declarant is fully aware
that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or
imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand,12
or there must be “a settled hopeless expectation.”13
In this case, the fact that (1) Nonito
sustained several wounds, (2) grasping for his breath, (3) shouted “Help
me” twice, and (4) thereafter died do not make his ante mortem statements a
dying declaration. For he did not
realize that he is going to die or he had a complete conviction that death is
at hand when he uttered the aliases of his assailants, or at any time after or
before that.
Nonetheless the ante mortem statements of Nonito
may be considered as part of the res gestae.14
In any event, whatever they are, even if they constitute part of
the res gestae or they
constitute indeed a dying declaration as foisted by Lara and accepted by the
trial court and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule, this admissibility
notwithstanding does not suffice to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt against any of the four accused, much less against the
accused-appellant.
Significantly, the ante mortem statements of Nonito
consists of no other than that “Tony, Suay, Ric, and Junior” were his assailants.15
Specifically, the trial court anchored the conviction of Antonio Lazarte on the premise that the name “Tony”
referred to him and to no other, which was deduced, concluded, or translated by
Lara in this wise:
(Lorenzo Lara under cross-examination by Atty. Francisco Bayona)
Q: Are we made to understand
that of the persons that Nonito Jambunganan
uttered, particularly the word Tony, you already believed that Nonito was referring to Antonio Lazarte?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because before his
death, we already knew about these (sic) person. He was his drinking
partner.
Q: Drinking partner when?
A: I do not know but at
times he stays (sic) for about six (6) minutes or more because he is a friendly person.
Q: Because of that reasoning
of yours and the fact that the deceased uttered the word Tony and nothing more,
you already concluded that Nonito must be referring
to Antonio Lazarte?
A: Because he said Tony our
friend outside.16 (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Your conclusion that the
person responsible for the death of Nonito is the
accused in this case Antonio Lazarte is because Nonito uttered to you the word Tony before his death and
for the fact also that you know Tony, the drinking
partner of the accused before his death.
That is the reason only (sic) why you say that Antonio Lazarte was the one responsible for the death of Nonito Jambunganan?
A: Because Nonito has a fish business and
sometimes Tony also sells fish from [sic] Nonito.17 (Emphasis
ours)
xxx xxx xxx
(Lorenzo Lara under direct examination by Fiscal Alberto S. Lim)
Q: When did you first come to know accused
Antonio Lazarte?
A: At Signal
Village.
Q: When, in relation to the incident?
A: For quite a time because he is also a
resident of Signal Village.
Q: About how many years?
A: Almost two (2) years.
Q: Do you know his family?
A: I do not know his family
but I know him.
Q: By what name did you know
him?
A: Tony.
Q: In that area, do you know
any other Tony?
A: None.18
(sic)
On the other hand, the accused-appellant rebutted these
statements and conclusions of Lara. He
categorically and unequivocably denied knowing at all
either the deceased or the witness Lara.
The accused-appellant denied he had been a drinking partner or even in
any drinking spree with either the deceased or the witness Lara.19
Q Also the same prosecution
witness, Lorenzo Lara testified that previous to that killing of the deceased, Nonito Jambunganan, there was
occasion you had a drinking spree with Nonito Jambunganan.
What can you say about that?
A There is no truth of
it. I do not know that person.
Q He also testified before
this Court that previous to the killing of Nonito Jambunganan, you had a drinking spree with him, with Lorenzo Lara. Again, what can you say about that statement?
A I do not know those
persons, sir.
Q My question is, did you
have any occasion to have a drinking spree with Lorenzo Lara before that date when Nonito
Jambunganan was killed?
A None, sir.
The appellant claimed to be an
upholsterer at a furniture store and a barangay tanod and not a fish vendor.
In criminal law, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.20 And to warrant conviction in
criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence,*
the circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as
to lead to a conviction that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.21
In the present case, the presentation that 1) the appellant had
been a drinking partner of the victim, that 2) the appellant and the victim
were fish vendors and that 3) the principal prosecution witness (Lorenzo Lara)
did not know of another “Tony” in the locality except the appellant,
even if all true, can not lead to the logical conclusion that the appellant,
Antonio Lazarte, was the “Tony” referred to
by the dying victim. Truly, there may be
hundreds of persons with the nickname “Tony” in the protagonists’
locality and environs. In other words,
the circumstances brought up in this case do not prove an unbroken link of
events that would give rise to a reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant
is the “Tony” mentioned in the dying declaration. Besides, an inference based on another
inference cannot sustain the conviction of the appellant.22
In order to convict Antonio Lazarte,
the trial court brought up the charge of conspiracy, to wit:
That there was conspiracy in this case was sufficiently established
by the evidence. While there was no
proof of prior agreement by all the accused, they nonetheless cooperated with
one another in stabbing the victim and
they were animated by one and the same purpose, that is, to liquidate the
victim.23
In what manner the four accused (Antonio Lazarte,
Ricardo Ignacio, Rodolfo Mundido, and Eliseo Henares) conspired with
one another in stabbing the victim is not discussed at all in the decision of
the trial court. And to think that
conspiracy must be also proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A detailed scrutiny of the record bears out the following:
No eyewitness to the crime was presented by the prosecution. Nobody testified that he or she saw Antonio
within the vicinity of the crime before, during, and after the commission of
the crime. Nor did anyone attest to
seeing Antonio in possession of a deadly weapon or of his being the hatchetman. Except
the supposed dying declaration there is no evidence whatsoever in the records
of the case on the stabbing of the deceased Nonito,
much less is there any testimony that the four accused ganged up on the
deceased victim. Specifically, no
evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to establishing the participation
of Antonio in the alleged conspiracy.
Nor is there evidence on the involvement of Rodolfo Mundido
and Eliseo Henares. As a matter of fact, the appellant’s
co-accused, Ricardo Ignacio, the one identified as the “Ric” in the ante mortem statements of Nonito, was discharged and acquitted by a mere demurrer to
evidence. This grant in favor of the
appellant’s co-accused, Ricardo, exposes the weakness of the evidentiary weight
of the ante mortem statements of Nonito.
In resume, the prosecution failed to prove that Antonio killed
the victim or acted in conspiracy with the one(s) who killed him.24
It is true that motive is not essential for the conviction of an
accused where there is no doubt of his identity as the culprit, but where the
identification proceeds from an unreliable source and the testimony is
inconclusive and not free from doubt, then evidence of motive becomes
necessary.25
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records any fact or circumstance
from which we can deduce or infer the existence of any possible motive on the
part of the appellant to commit the crime.
Even the prosecution witness, Melly Castillo,
and a relative of the deceased (“more than a cousin”)26
believed that the appellant was innocent of the crime charged.
Q Madam witness, you stated
that if ever accused Antonio Lazarte was implicated
because there was a mention of the name Tony. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Madam witness, you will
admit that in Tagig [sic], Rizal,
there is not only one person having that name Tony. Is that correct?
A There are several
persons in Tagig who has the name Tony but as far as
I’m concerned I know only one with the name Tony, sir. And he is my neighbor. He was selling fish for me, sir.
Q And then?
A That’s all, sir. When Lara mentioned to me the name Tony, we
have the same guess. The one who was pin
pointed as Tony, I never thought that he would do that, that is why I was wondering why his name was mentioned as
the person who killed. But as far as I
know, he has done nothing anything wrong to us.
I never believed that he is a killer.27
The trial court simply based its conviction on the ante mortem
statements of the victim and assumed and concluded that it was the appellant
Antonio Lazarte who killed the victim in conspiracy
with his three companions. No person can
be convicted on mere assumptions and conclusions.
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt. The prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrunity of the testimony (evidence) of the state,
both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment.28
As it stands now, the weakness of the appellant’s alibi can not
be held against him in view of the absence of his clear and positive
identification as one of the culprits.
And while the alibi may not have been proven so satisfactorily as to
leave no room for doubt, such an infirmity can not strengthen the weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence, the reason being that in a criminal prosecution the
State must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense.29
Alibi need not be inquired into if the prosecution’ evidence fails to satisfy
the test of moral certainty.30
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and appellant
Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon
is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
2
See Original Record, 1.
3
TSN, January 13, 1988, 16; rollo,
35.
4
Original records, 423.
5
Decision, 14, penned by Judge Martin Villarama, National Capital Region, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig; Rollo,
28.
6
5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 ed., 294; People v. Elizaga, No. 78794, November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 516.
7
TSN, September 18, 1987, 3.
8
Mockabee vs. Commonwealth, 78 Ky., 380, 382 cited in 5 Moran, supra,
302.
9
Decision, 10.
10
TSN, September 18, 1987, 2-3.
11 TSN, September
18, 1987, 3.
12 U.S. vs. Virrey,
37 Phil. 618, 625; People vs. Ortiz, 55 Phil. 993.
13 5 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 296, citing Shepard vs. U.S., 66, 78 L ed., p. 197. Decision, 10; rollo,
24.
14 Sec. 36,
Rule 130, Rules of Court; People v. Patian,
L-33049, November 29, 1976.
15 TSN, September
18, 1987, 3.
16 Ibid., 7-8.
17 Ibid., 8.
18 Ibid., 4.
19 TSN, February
9, 1989, 3-4.
20 People v.
Beltran, L-31860, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250.
* Sec. 5. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is
more than one circumstance;
b) The facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, The
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines)
21 People vs.
Austria, et al., G.R. No. 55109, April 8, 1991; People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463; U.S. vs. Indica,
17 Phil. 325; U.S. vs. Santos, 1 Phil. 222;.
22 Manning vs.
John Hancock, 100 U.S. 693, 698, cited in 6 Moran Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1980 ed. 164; People vs. Austria, et al., supra; U.S. v.
Ross, 92 U.S. 281, 284.
23 Decision,
12; Rollo, 26.
24 People v.
Elizaga, supra, 521.
25 People v.
Beltran, 61 SCRA 246, 255; People v. Herila,
51 SCRA 31; People vs. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769,
781; People v. Murray, 105 Phil. 591; U.S. v. Sespene,
et al., 102 Phil. 209, 210; People v. Caggavan,
94 Phil. 118; People v. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 153;
U.S. v. McMann, 4 Phil. 561;
26 TSN, September
14, 1988, 6-7; rollo, 85-86.
27 Id.,
6-7; rollo, 86-87.
28 People v.
Dramayo, L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59, 64.
29 People vs.
Somontano, L-45366-88, March 27, 1984, 128 SCRA 415, 426; People vs. Basuel, L-28215, October 13, 1972, 47 SCRA 207, 222.
30 People v.
Rodolfo Salguero y Llaneras,
et al., G.R. No. 89117, June
19, 1991; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 67858, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 432, 452.