PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FARHARD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 105, Quezon City, convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and
No. Q-11868.

The dispositive portion
of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Farhad Hatani y Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice
of medicine in violation of R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of
1959 (Secs. 8, 10) penalized by Section 28 thereof with “a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one
year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court; and considering the circumstances of the case and the
ignominy caused by him to his two teen-aged, female, then unmarried victims,
this Court exercising its discretion granted under said Section 28 of the law,
hereby SENTENCES said accused FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
AND to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay the costs.

This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence
the accused be deported as undesirable alien” (Rollo, p. 35).

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No.
Q-11868 reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby SENTENCES said accused to suffer life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the complainant, Precila
Borja, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay costs”
(Rollo, p. 41).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant
with illegal practice of medicine, in violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise
known as the Medical Act of 1959, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that he has not
satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination, neither is he a
bolder of a valid Certificate of Registration
duly issued by the Board of
Medical Examiners, as in fact he does not even appear to have taken or completed the course leading to a medical
degree, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for
compensation, fee and salary, paid to him directly, physically examined
Priscila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, diagnosed, treated
and administer injections on the persons of Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and
Wilma Borja Y Loquero, in Violation of Section 10, in relation to Section 28,
Republic Act No. 2382” (Records, Vol. I,
p. 1).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appelant with
Rape, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, and while she was
deprived of reason or unconscious after having been drugged or administered
medicine, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO, without her
consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may
be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code” (Records, Vol. II, p.
1).

It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja
visited her comadre, Maura Fontreras, and requested malunggay
leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter, Precila, who had high fever
and loose bowel movement. Upon learning
that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura’s daughter, introduced Agustina to her
husband, appellant herein, whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat
Precila and Agustina agreed.

Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he
examined Precila. He gave her tablets
to take and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the
second at noon. After each injection,
Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.

It was appellant’s diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and
required further observation and treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina
agreed in the belief that her daughter was a drug addict.

In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant
and Marita and was brought to appellant’s house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to
sleep. When she awoke, she realized
that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on the bed and was fondling her private
parts. Shocked, Precila called for her
mother and tried to get up. Appellant,
however, punched her on the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected
her again, causing her to fall asleep.

When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed
with her. He was naked and fondling her
private parts. The pain all over her
body lingered. When Precila touched her
private parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave her another injection
rendering her unconscious.

The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras’ residence, she
went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and
appellant both asleep and naked. She
hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home.

When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her
mother was crying. Precila remained dizzy,
with throbbing pains all over her body. When talked to, she was incoherent.

That evening, Precila’s oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by
profession, came home and saw Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying, narrated what
she had witnessed that morning. She
also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another
sister, Wilma whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the
bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty
capsules of dalmane and empty vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied that a
second shot of plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug
addiction. Josefina told appellant to
stop but he persisted. Only upon threat
that she would call the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his wife then left the Borja residence.

The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and
Wilma to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where Josefina and Wilma gave their statements (Exhs. “D” and
“F”). Precila was physically
examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that Precila’s hymen had
“deep, healing lacerations” and that “subject is in non-virgin
state physically” (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were also found on Precila’s arms and
buttocks.

A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed
that she too had a needle puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh.
“L”).

Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance of appellant’s residence was
conducted. Subsequently, a search
warrant was secured from Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. Armed with the warrant,
CANU agents raided appellant’s residence on July 15, 1979.

Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as
prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. “H” –
“H-4”) and other medical instruments, such as a “thermometer, a
hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.”

The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. “I”) on the
prescription slips showed that these were written by the appellant
himself. The report on the chemistry
examination of the seized tablets and capsules (Exhs. “J” –
“J-1”) confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.

After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for
rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382 were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.

The defense’s version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976,
Agustina and Precila Borja visited the mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura
Fontreras. In the course of the
conversation, Agustina asked Marita if she could help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of
Precila for the night and allow her to sleep in her bedroom.

Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was
not really sick. She merely related her
personal problems, involving her parents. She also admitted her vices, such as drinking, smoking and taking drugs.

Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during
their conversation, appellant would occasionally enter the room but he never
joined their discussion.

Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant, who was wearing only his pajama pants, slept on the
floor at the opposite end of the room.

The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of
Precila’s problems. Nothing untoward
happened that day and Agustina headed for home while Precila and Marita
followed later.

At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU
agents in the house of the appellant under the supervision of CIC Agustin
Timbol, Jr. The raid was made upon
Josefina’s complaint for illegal possession of drugs.

Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while
three men remained. Later, appellant
was called to join them in the bedroom and he was shocked to see assorted drugs
scattered around. Appellant denied
owning them. Photographs were taken of
him with the drugs. A barangay official
was called to attest to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant, however, refused to sign the said
list.

CIC Timbol offered to fix the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant demanded to see the search
warrant. CIC Timbol failed to show a
warrant on the pretext that they were military men without need of any
identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife and brother-in-law were forced to join CIC Timbol
for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon
boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing CIC Timbol and both
exchanged victory signs.

The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the
appellant of both crimes. In finding
appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine, considerable weight was given
to the presecution’s exhibits.

The Professional
Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of
registered physicians nor among those with special permit to practice medicine in a limited scope (Exh. “K”).

Appellant failed to
refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. “I”) released by
the PC Crime Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. “H”
– “H-4”) prescribing medicine belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid
(Exhs. “G” – “G-8”) undeniably reveal several medical
equipment used by practicing physicians.

Notwithstanding the trial
court’s finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it concluded that
circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was consummated by appellant
considering the following:

“1. The medico – legal
examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25 in the morning or
less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6, 1979 found “hymen with
deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o’clock position”; thus indicating
that the lacerations were recent as they are in the process of healing; (Exh.
“A-1”)

2. The above undeniable findings of the expert
confirms the statement of the victim, a young girl of 16 or 17 years of age,
that when she held private parts which were painful then, she noticed
blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp.
4-5)

“The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal
assault.” (People vs. Ocampo, L-47335, Aug. 13, 1986)

3. In the two short waking moments of the
victim she noticed she was naked and beside her on the same bed was the
accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma, Feb.
9, 1984, pp. 3-5)

4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the
prime of youth, and the unconscious girl beside him was just 16 or 17 years of
age, thus in the full bloom of womanhood. The sexual excitement on the part of the accused was therefore exceedingly
great.

5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the
room of the accused that early morning of July 7, 1979 she saw her daughter and
the accused on the same bed and both naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)

6. The medico-legal found several needle
puncture marks on the arms and buttocks of Precila (Exh. “A”); thus
confirming Precila’s testimony that she had been injected by the accused,
rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May
21, 1984, pp. 3-­6; also pp. 29-30).

7. The medico-legal found the victim ‘in
non-virgin state physically.’ (Exh. “A-1”)

8. At the time of the medico-legal examination,
i.e. morning of July 8, 1979, the victim was found to be ‘incoherent.’ (Exh.
A)-after effect of the injections or drugs.

9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979)
the Borjas and Frontreras (sic) were ‘comadres’ and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among them.

10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her
mother, and sisters, on the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before
the incident. There is absolutely
absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her family to file
the serious charge of rape which would expose her to embarrassment of
examination of her private parts and public trial” (Rollo, pp. 38-39).

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after
four years when she took the witness stand. This argument is misleading. The
record shows that the day after the rape, Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied
by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at Camp Crame. Agustina gave her statement twice on
separate days. Precila did not give any
statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied that she was
instead physically examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico-Legal Report
(Exh. “A”) indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that
Precila was no longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by Precila, such
is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her two sisters and the
medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v.
Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).

Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was
sexually abused. We find her testimony
consistent and credible. While her
testimony is limited to the times when she would gain her consciousness, it is
not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind
even four years after.

Appellant’s assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of
his misdeeds is explainable. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and
incoherent as a consequece of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically
examined by the doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN,
March 31, 1980, pp. 7-8).

Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts
allegedly committed by him against Precila, the medico-legal report fails to
specify any injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason
that she was under sedation. The
absence of the injuries does not negate the commission of rape (People v.
Torrevillas, 203 SCRA 576 [1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 SCRA 172 [1991]) for
rape may be committed after rendering a woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised
Penal Code; People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).

Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that
fateful day and that her bleeding was actually the start of her menstrual
cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that
virginity is not an essential element of rape (People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121
[1991]; People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 [1991]). To claim that Precila’s menstrual cycle began on that day is
highly speculative.

Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs.
“D”, “E” and “F”) were antedated and were
prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He also cites some inconsistencies in said
statements. We find the claim to be
devoid of merit. It is only now on
appeal that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were presented and offered as evidence,
appellant failed to raise such objections and to refute them.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses merely refer to minor details, which cannot destroy their credibility
(People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This is also true where statements made while on the witness stand are
claimed to be inconsistent with the affidavit, which are generally incomplete
(People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991]; People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427
[1988]).

With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists
that his conviction arose from insufficient evidence and his failure to prove
his innocence.

Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are
more than sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken
within 48 hours from the commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had
“deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o’clock position” and
Precila was “in non-virgin state physically” (Exh.
“A”). Furthermore, the report
confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and swellings,
which confirm that appellant had injected her several times.

On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated
that appellant was with her on the bed and that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both
attempts from accused, but, he made her unconscious through injections (TSN,
February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5). This is corroborated
by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together naked
on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused actually raped Precila.

As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is
given to the findings of the trial court where the rape victim’s testimony is
buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother and the medico-legal
report, as well as the report of the police investigator.

It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission
of the crime, Precila was just sixteen years old. No young lady at
the prime of her youth would concoct a story
of defloration, allow an examination of her intimate parts and later
bare herself to the disgrace brought to her honor in a public trial unless she
was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to
justice (People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991]; People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571
[1991]).

Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was
violated. He cites the trial court’s
decision holding that it –

“x x x finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic)
pieced together the prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden
shifted on the defense to show the contrary” (Rollo, p. 40).

Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of
sur-rebuttal evidence. The statement of
the trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction unless
the defense is able to provide evidence to the contrary.

With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine,
appellant presented inconsistent claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team; while on the
other hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.

If indeed the evidence
were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the prescription
pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A
perusal of the photographs showing accused during the raid, fails to indicate
any protestation by him. In fact, the
other photographs (Exhs. “G-1”, “G-2”, “G-4” –
“G-8”) do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant’s
testimony that his room was made into a mess during the raid.

The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to present
its return (Exh. “ZZ”) and we are satisfied that indeed a lawful
search warrant was obtained. Besides,
the judge who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially heard
both criminal cases. It can therefore
be presumed, that the search was made with a search warrant and absent of any
showing that it was procured maliciously, the items seized are admissible in
evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]).

The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and
diagnosed Precila and Wilma Borja. The
positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the
medico-legal reports (Exhs. “A”, “A-7”, “C”,
“L” and “L-­1”) which attest to the needle marks; the
Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs.
“G-1” – “G-8”) showing assorted drugs and medical equipment
in appellant’s room; and the chemistry reports (Exhs. “J” – “J-­1”)
prove that appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no
proof of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not done
for a fee.

Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination
that she was in school the whole day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore
impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her on that date. An accurate reading of the transcript,
however, will show that Precila’s testimony was in response to a question
regarding her school schedule for that day.

Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both
decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said judge was thus deprived of
the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Admittedly, the ponente’s participation was limited to the
resolution of the cases. The fact that
the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment, and
for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case,
does not render the judgment erroneous (People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237
[1991]; People v. Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially where the
evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.