PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BR. X, GUMACA, QUEZON, AND GREGORIO MALCO, RESPONDENT-APPELLEES.

The crux of the instant
petition is the validity of the judgment of acquittal penned by a trial judge
detailed to a vacant branch of the court but promulgated after a permanent
judge has been duly appointed to the vacancy.

In an Information^[1] dated 25 May 1976, private respondent
Gregorio Malco was charged before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon
with attempted rape, docketed as Crim. Case No. 463-G and raffled to Branch X
of the same court then presided by Judge Mapalad A. Nañadiego. On 15 October 1977,
after the defense rested, the case was submitted for decision.^[2] However, on 17 April 1978, Judge Nañadiego
retired without deciding the case.

Meanwhile, Judge Juan B. Montecillo, Presiding Judge of Branch
III, was designated pro tempore to take over Branch X. Among the cases submitted to him for
decision was this case of respondent-appellee Gregorio Malco, which the judge
decided on 22 May 1978.

On 9 June 1978, Judge Conrado R. Antona was appointed Presiding
Judge of Branch X. He took his oath and
assumed office the following day,^[3]
terminating ipso facto the temporary designation of Judge Montecillo.

On 20 June 1978, Special Deputy Clerk of Court Mateo M. Cabangon
promulgated said decision of Judge Montecillo dated 22 May 1978 acquitting
private respondent Malco of attempted rape.^[4] On 30
June 1978, Special Counsel Hjalmar P. Quintana moved to set aside the judgment
of acquittal. On 10 July 1978, Judge
Antona denied the motion on the ground that the trial court was without
jurisdiction “to review and declare illegal the actuation of a co-equal
Court.”^[5]
On 8 August 1978, the Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied,^[6]
thus sustaining the acquittal of private respondent. This prompted Provincial Fiscal Dante H. Diamante, with authority
from the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the present petition
contending in essence that the decision of Judge Montecillo was null and void
since he was no longer judge-designate of Branch X when his decision was
promulgated as Judge Antona had already been appointed and qualified.

Still, the Solicitor General, tasked to submit the Brief for
Petitioner, maintained that the appointment and qualification of Judge Antona
to preside over Branch X had the effect of immediately terminating the
temporary assignment of Judge Montecillo thereto, hence, his decision
promulgated after the expiration of his temporary detail was null and void and
that, as a consequence, the trial court then presided by Judge Antona should
have set aside the judgment of
acquittal penned by Judge Montecillo.

The petition must fail. A
trial judge whose temporary detail to a vacant branch has expired remains to be
the incumbent judge of the branch of
the court where he is permanently
assigned. Thus, he may still decide cases submitted to him
for decision during his temporary detail in the vacant branch even after the
vacancy has been filled. In one case,^[7]
it was held that it was not unusual for a judge
who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record since the trial
judge who tried the case may have already died or retired. In fact, as early as 1915, this Court
already ruled that “[t]here is no law which prohibits a judge from deciding a case because he did not see
some of the witnesses when they testified therein. In the absence of any express prohibition of
this kind, we cannot imply one.”^[8] The Court also said then –

“[T]o-day, when stenographers are employed in the courts in
the trial of cases and when a complete, authentic record of everything that
transpires during the trial is kept and when from said record, every one x x x
may read x x x x said record, and
be informed fully of every act, objection, or exception taken or made during
the trial, there seems to be but little reason for asserting that one qualified
person may not be able to reach a just and fair conclusion from said record x x
x x Every person may ascertain for
himself the correctness of any disputed fact in said record.”^[9]

As if realizing the
practicability and validity of this procedure, the Supreme Court
En Banc issued
a Resolution dated 10 February 1983 laying down the guidelines in the
distribution of cases in the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1981 (B.P. Blg.129) par. I subpar. 1, of which provides –

“1. Cases already
submitted for decision shall be decided by the Judge to whom they were
submitted, except cases submitted for decision to judges who were promoted to
higher courts or to those who are no longer in the service.”

Quite apparently, the foregoing provision does not state that the
judge to whom the case was submitted for decision must be the same judge who
heard the case, totally or partially, although that would be ideal. It does not even require that he heard any
of the witnesses for the parties.

As may be noted, the pertinent portion of the Resolution of 10
February 1983 merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an
incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a judge of the same court, albeit now
assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is promulgated.

Consequently, in the instant case, the judgment of acquittal
penned by Judge Montecillo must be declared valid. It is not necessary that he be the presiding judge of Branch X at
the time his decision was promulgated since even after the expiration of his
temporary designation at Branch X he continued to be an incumbent of Branch
III. After all, where a Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) is divided into several branches, each of
the branches is not a court distinct and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in
the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before one branch
or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch of the judge alone, to
the exclusion of the others.^[10]

Judge Montecillo penned
the decision on 22 May 1978 while his temporary designation at Branch X expired
only on 10 June 1978 when Judge Antona qualified for the position. And, Judge Montecillo was still an incumbent judge of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, being then the permanent judge of Branch III, at
the time his decision was promulgated. Thus, he continued to possess authority to dispose of the case. In fact, even after his temporary
designation, he continued to have authority and could decide the case as it was
one of those submitted to him for decision during his detail.

Besides, we have reviewed
the records and we fail to find any evidence of bad faith on the part of Judge
Montecillo in preparing and signing the decision, nor on the part of Special Deputy
Clerk of Court Cabangon in promulgating it. As adverted to, when Judge Montecillo took over Branch X in an acting
capacity, this case was one of those submitted to him for decision. Consequently, he worked on the case, read
and studied the records, and thereafter penned the decision. Except for the authority of Judge Montecillo, who was not legally without
jurisdiction, neither the petitioner nor the Solicitor General ascribes any
irregularity in the manner the case was resolved. The petition does not question the soundness of the decision, but
merely points to a technicality to annul the judgment of acquittal. Suffice it to say that the Court frowns upon
technicalities, especially so if these are used to put in jeopardy the
acquittal of an accused who should be benefitted by a liberal construction of
the rules. In fine, the questioned
decision being in accord with law and the facts, there is no reason to disturb
it; otherwise, double jeopardy will set in.

What is more, Judge Antona adopted the judgment of
acquittal by denying the motions filed by the prosecution. After all, the decision of Judge Montecillo
cannot be said to be a decision
of another court, but of the same Court of First Instance of Quezon, and Judge
Montecillo penned the decision in fact as Presiding Judge of Branch X. To rule otherwise would be disruptive of an
orderly judicial process, for then the new judge would again have to start
reviewing the case from its inception until he can formulate his own
decision. This is not the concept of a
judge on detail to a vacant branch.

Indeed, it would have been different altogether if the judge
whose decision was promulgated had, prior to
its promulgation, died, resigned, retired, been dismissed, promoted to a
higher court, or appointed to another office with inconsistent functions. Then, he would no longer be an incumbent member of a court of equal
jurisdiction, and his decisions written thereafter would be invalid.

A word of caution. Let not this case be considered by trial
judges as a precedent for them to continue to exercise authority over courts
where there are already incumbent judges,
except where the circumstances fall squarely within the ambit of the instant case. Detailed judges or those on special
assignments are strongly advised that
before acting on any case of the
branch where they are assigned temporarily to ascertain whether they have
authority over such case. Needless to stress, judges should be extra
careful and prudent in determining their authority over specified cases to
avoid any imputation or inference of irregularity, misdeed or wrongdoing.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED, consequently, the decision of respondent Court ACQUITTING
private respondent GREGORIO MALCO
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 27.

^[2]
Id., p. 29.

^[3]
Letter of Judge Conrado R. Antona to the
Provincial Fiscal, dated 30
September 1978; Rollo, p. 30.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 31-36.

^[5]
Id., p. 44.

^[6]
Id., p. 49.

^[7]
People v. Collado, G.R. No. 88631, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 519.

^[8]
United States v. Abreu, 30 Phil.
402, 411 (1915).

^[9]
Id., p. 415, citing Enriquez v. Watson, 3 Phil. 279 (1904).

^[10]
People v. Gorospe, G.R. No.
51513, 15 May 1984, 129 SCRA 233, citing Lumpay v. Moscoso, 105 Phil 968
(1959).