GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC. (INPORT), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ATTY. FLORENTINO G. DUMLAO, JR., RESPONDENTS.

In this Petition for
Review on Certiorari, petitioner assails the consolidated
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals * dismissing petitioners’ three (3)
Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed in said Court as AC-G.R. SP Nos. 04984,
05086 and 05114, promulgated on 25 June 1985, as well as the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
dated 25 July 1985.

The background facts disclose that private respondent, Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr., was a
retained counsel for petitioner company,
an arrastre and stevedoring operator since 1976 when it was established up to 1 June
1984.  As
retained counsel, he was given a
monthly fee of P1,000.00, representation
allowance of P500,00, and 100 liters per month as gasoline allowance.  On 1 March 1984 private respondent asked for an increase in retainership fee.  Instead
of giving the same,
petitioner discarded the previous arrangement and on 30
March 1984 proposed that
private respondent specify, instead,
the legal fee for every legal case to
be handled by him, effective 1 June 1984.

On 9 and 16 July
1984, in three pending cases handled by private respondent for petitioner before
the lower Courts, private respondent filed
Manifestations/Motions for the payment of attorney’s fees based on quantum
meruit. 
The same were granted by
the respective Trial Courts as follows:

(1) Order of Judge Eulalio D. Rosete in Civil Case No. 6776 dated July 20, 1984 awarding P20,000.00 to
private respondent as attorney’s fees in said case (AC-G.R.
Sp. No. 04984);

(2) Order of Judge Senen C. Penaranda in Criminal Case No. 1905 dated August 3, 1984 awarding to private
respondent the amount of P5,000.00 for
his legal services in
said case (AC-G.R. No. 05086).

(3) Order of Judge Eulalio D. Rosete in Civil Case
No. 6983 dated November 16, 1984
directing petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees (AC-G.R. SP. No.
05114).

Challenging the aforesaid Orders, petitioner resorted to Petitions for Certiorari, not
appeals, before the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
which decided against petitioner in a consolidated
Decision dated 25 June 1985, the
dispositive portion
of which reads:

“In the main, therefore, what petitioner should have done was
to appeal on time the questioned orders.  This, it failed to do, and at the very least if these petitions had only been interposed seasonably they
could have been considered the appeals. 
Then, even if We were for the moment to ignore the fatal procedural
error of petitioner of not appealing, and were We to treat the petitions for certiorari
as such, still no comfort and relief could be extended to petitioner, because
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judges had not been shown to exist.

“WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petitions, this Court
hereby dismisses the same, and the temporary restraining orders issued in
SP-05086 and in SP 05114 are
hereby lifted and vacated, without
pronouncement as to costs.” (pp.
31-32, Rollo)

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment was denied by the Appellate
Court.  Hence, this recourse.

In its Memorandum petitioner defines the issues, thus:

“I. WHAT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN THE PROPER LEGAL REMEDY TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER IN BRINGING THE THREE (3)
QUESTIONED ORDERS FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, APPEAL OR CERTIORARI?

“II. IS PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ATTY. FLORENTINO G. DUMLAO,
JR. LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALLEGED ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE THREE (3) CASES,
NOW THE SUBJECT OF THIS APPEAL BY CERTIORARI?” (p. 117, Rollo)

For an appeal to lie, Orders or Resolutions of any Court must be
final.  The test in determining whether
or not a judgment or order is final is whether or not something remains to be done by the Court.  A final judgment, order or decree is one that finally disposes
of, adjudicates or determines the rights
or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate
branch thereof, and which concludes them
until it is reversed or set aside (Puertollano,
et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73698, December 3, 1987, 156 SCRA 188).

In this case, the
Orders of the Trial Courts are, indeed, final in character because they finally disposed of the matter
of attorney’s fees, and nothing more remained
far the respective lower Courts to do. 
No further questions can come on the issue before the Trial Courts
except the execution of said Orders. 
They concluded the right of private respondent to said claim until
reversed or set aside.  As the Appellate Court had ruled, therefore,
appeal was the proper remedy.  But since
no timely appeals were interposed, the questioned Orders have become final and
the issue of private respondent’s entitlement to those fees deemed to have been
laid at rest.

Petitioner contends, however, that under the circumstances,
appeal is not possible because the main cases are still being litigated in the
lower Courts.  It relies on Section 39 of
BP Blg. 129 which reads:

“No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal.  In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be
transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively together with
an index of the contents thereof.”

In so arguing, Petitioner fails to take into account that a claim
for attorney’s fees may be asserted either
in the very action in which the
services in question have been rendered or in an independent action (Palanca vs. Pecson 94 Phil. 419 [1954]; Tolentino
vs. Escalona, L-26556, January 24, 1969, 26 SCRA 613). 
In the cases at bar, although private respondent sought to enforce his claim for attorney’s fees in the principal case, that issue remained separate and
distinct from the main litigation and resolution of the former will in no way
affect or disturb the latter as,
in fact, the cases below still pend, as petitioner itself admits
(p. 3, Memorandum).  And
on appeal only the pleadings and documents pertinent to the
issue of attorney’s fees need be presented to the Appellate Court.  Besides, although Section 39, of BP 129, supra, eliminates the Record on Appeal and requires instead the
transmission of the entire records, it also explicitly allows multiple appeals in “other cases under
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.”

Furthermore, the questions raised by petitioner delve on
“possible errors of judgment made by respondent Judges concerning facts
and law,” in which case, they are correctible only by appeal (People vs.
Vallarta, L-32728, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 476).

Contrary to petitioner’s submission, Certiorari will
neither lie. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous
conclusions of law or
fact.  As long as a Court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, will amount to nothing more
than errors of judgment which are reviewable
by timely appeal and not by a
special civil action of certiorari
(Santos, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, G. R. No. 56614, July
28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378).

As pointed out in Tolentino vs. Escalona, supra, having failed to interpose a timely appeal from the impugned Orders, petitioners may not avail of the Writ of Certiorari to offset the
adverse effects of their omission.

And even if Certiorari
were the proper remedy, petitioner has failed to show that the Orders complained of are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, meaning such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.  Abuse of
discretion alone is not sufficient. 
Rather, it must be grave as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
(Arguelles vs. Young, G. R. No. 59880, September 11, 1987, 153 SCRA 690).  That the Courts below were lawfully vested
with jurisdiction to hear and act on the Motions to fix attorney’s fees is beyond question.  Any alleged mistakes committed in the
exercise thereof would be errors of judgment not reviewable by a special civil action of Certiorari.  While petitioner claims that the Orders were
issued ex-parte, its filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, which was orally argued and subsequently supported by a memorandum and documents, had
cure that defect.

The broader interests of justice, as petitioner claims, do not
justify a contrary conclusion in the face of procedural lapses vis-a-vis valid and lawful Orders.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. 
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

*
Penned by Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by Justices Milagros A. German, Santiago M. Kapunan
and Alfredo M. Lazaro.