PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CESAR ESQUILLO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant, Cesar Esquillo
was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, with the crime of
rape in a criminal complaint filed by the victim, Dahlia P. Castro, dated October 21, 1983.  The complaint reads:

“That on or about the 17th day of October, 1983, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned DAHLIA CASTRO Y PINGUL, without the consent
and against the will of the latter, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as maybe awarded to her under the
provisions of the New Civil
Code.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p. 35, Rollo)

The Solicitor General has summarized the facts of the case as
follows:

“On October 17, 1983, at about 4:00 p.m., Dahlia P. Castro, a
schizophrenic patient, was in the clinic of Dr. Robert Walter in the UST Hospital for her monthly
check-up.  (TSN, Feb. 15, 1984, p. 3)
While there, Dahlia unwittingly slipped away from her companions (her mother
and brother) and wandered about alone in the city streets until she got lost
(TSN, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 7).  While
walking, she noticed that somebody was following her.  She looked back and saw that it was the accused (Ibid, p.
10).  Suddenly, without any provoca­tion,
the accused grabbed and pulled her, forc­ing her to go with him.  Dahlia cried out for help but to no avail
(Ibid, p. 11).  She re­sisted from the
clutches of the accused but he boxed her several times whenever she strug­gled
(Ibid, p. 9).  Frightened and weak,
Dahlia could no longer keep up a fight until the accused succeeded in bodily
handling her and forcing her inside a house. 
The accused gave her a drink after which she felt dizzy and fell asleep (Ibid, p.11)

“Taking advantage of Dahlia’s unconscious state, the accused
ravished her (Ibid, p. 11).  When Dahlia
woke up the following morning (Oct. 18, 1983), she was raped again.  She shouted and cried for help when she saw
the accused insert his penis into her vagina, but no one was there to hear her
pleas (Ibid, p. 12).

“When they left, the accused forced Dahlia inside a jeepney (TSN, Jan. 11, 1984, p. 10) and he brought her to
another house where he raped her again several times (Ibid, p. 10).  Dahlia constantly struggled but her attempts
to resist were met by blows on her face and body (Ibid, p. 10).

“Sometime later, they departed and both ended up near the vicinity of Quiapo underpass at about 8:30 p.m.  While there, Cpl. Manuel Dalumpines
(Policeman, Western Police District) spotted them arguing.

“Dalumpines approached them and
asked them why they were fighting. 
Dahlia answered that she did not know this man (the accused) who was
forcing her to go with him.  (Ibid, p. 5)
Hence, Dalumpines took Dahlia and the accused inside
the police station for investigation. 
From here they were indorsed
to the Quezon City Police, it appearing that the
latter had jurisdiction over the crime (Ibid, p. 5).  The accused was detained but Dahlia was
released.

 “Dahlia then wandered
around by herself until her mother and brother
found her the following day at 12:15 a.m., in front of Luzon Restaurant in Quiapo.  (TSN, Feb. 14, 1984, p. 4) Dahlia informed them what happened to her and they proceeded to the Quezon City Police Station where Patrolman Edmund Rivera took down the statements of Dahlia and
her brother (TSN, Jan. 5, 1984,
p. 6).  Patrolman Rivera likewise
investigated the accused and took down his extra-judicial statement which
was read to him before he signed it. (TSN, March 19, 1984, p.
5).” (pp. 2-4, Appellee’s
Brief)

Upon arraignment, on November 7, 1983, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.  Trial ensued.

The appellant admits having picked up Dahlia P. Castro at the Quiapo Underpass and taking her to his home.  He,
however, denies the charge of rape and claims he left Dahlia with his mother, went to his brother’s
house elsewhere and upon returning
home, decided to bring Dahlia to her residence in Project 7, Quezon City but they were apprehended while on a jeepney to Quiapo.

On May 10, 1984, the trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused
guilty of the crime of rape.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Cesar Esquillo y Albanilla, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape,
and pursuant to Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the aggrieved party, Dahlia P. Castro, in the sum of P12,000.00 (Art
345), and to pay the costs.” (p. 82, Orig. Records).

Not satisfied with the above decision, the accused interposes
this appeal.

The accused-appellant claims that the trial court committed the
following errors:

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING
APPELLANT’S SWORN STATEMENT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM;

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT;

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 
(p. 1, Appellant’s Brief)

In the first assigned error, the accused-appellant contends that
his sworn statement should be held inad­missible against him inasmuch as the same was made without the presence and
assistance of his counsel.  We agree with
the appellant on this
point.  With the amend­ment in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, parti­cularly with reference to the rights of
the accused, a discussion of the absence or presence of force, intimi­dation or
duress in extra-judicial confessions has become academic.  Art. 3, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution
specifically provides that the rights of the accused, among them the right to
counsel, cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel
(People v. Pineda and Garcia, G.R. No. 72400, Jan. 15, 1988).  In the case of People v. Newman
(G.R. No. 45354, July 26, 1988), we specifically reiterated that the waiver
must be made in the presence of
counsel.

However, even without the questioned extra-judicial confession, evidence against the accused remains
strong in the face of the proofs
presented by the prosecution.  The medical findings of Dr. Dario L. Gajardo of the PC Crime Laboratory, for one, corroborated
the victim’s assertion that the accused inflicted injuries on her when she resisted his sexual assaults.  The multiple contusions, ecchymosis,
and abrasions on various parts of her body plus the deep, healing laceration in the hymen confirm the testimony on the sexual
assault coupled with force.  Thus, even if the
confession was set aside, the overriding evidence points to the guilt of the
appellant (People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446
[1986]).  The fact is that the trial
court did not merely rely on the confession
at arriving at the judgment of conviction.  There were other evidence duly proved.

Anent second assigned error, the accused- appellant insists that the testimony of the
complainant should not have been given credence.

Despite the victim’s mental ailment, she was shown to be able to perceived, make known her
perception and remember traumatic incidents, as testified to by her
psychiatrist, Dr. Walter (TSN, Jan. 11, 1984, p. 6).  Throughout the trial, her testimony was
consistent, clear and convincing.  The
testimony was replete with details and showed she was coherent while on the
stand and could
clearly recall the traumatic event she experience.  The trial court was convinced from the
testimony and other corroborative evidence that the accused was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.  There is no reason for
us to reverse this finding.

The accused-appellant has likewise failed to show any ill motive
which could induce the victim to charge him with such a crime as rape when he himself has stated that he took pity on the girl so that she was bathed,
clothed, and fed.  Even a mentally ill
person would have remembered such
kindness.

Oh
the contrary, she consistently pointed to the accused as her attacker even
when asked on different occasions.

This Court has consistently held that the testimony of a rape
victim as to who abused her is credible where she has no motive to testify
against the accused (People v. Lopez, 141 SCRA 385 [1986]).  There was no ill motive of the complainant in
filing the rape charge (People v. Ocampo, 143 SCRA
428 [1986]).

Lastly, the accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.  We find the appellant’s contention without
merit considering that his defense is mainly denial and alibi.  The appellant’s brief states that he left
Dahlia with his mother in Quezon City while he went
to his brother’s house in Quiapo to sleep there.  According to the trial court, however, Esquillo claims he merely went downstairs and slept
with his cousins while Dahlia was upstairs with his mother.  The Court has ruled that the appellant’s
alibi cannot stand against the positive identification made by the rape victim
(People v. Mesias, Jr., 127 SCRA 792 [1984]).  The accused’s
denial is self-serving.  Denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence has no weight in the law.

The appellant’s argument that he took care of the victim is of no
moment as it would not make him less guilty. 
It would even tilt the balance against him on account of his having
taken advantage of the victim’s mental condition.

The appellant likewise contends that the victim might have been
raped during the intervening periods that she disappeared thus implying that
the injuries and the sexual assault were inflicted at some other place.  This argument does not hold water.  There is absolutely no evidence that any
other person took ad­vantage of Dahlia elsewhere.  What matters is that he was positively
identified as the rapist and of the rape having been committed before her
disappearance from the police station. 
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, assuming someone else raped
her during her first disappearance and before he picked her up, surely, the
accused would have noticed certain peculiar details from her bodily appearance
that some­thing untoward happened to her in which case he would have mentioned
this during trial to negate his culpa­bility. 
But he did not.

Not only is the accused’s testimony
inconsistent on material points.  The
testimony of the other witness of the defense, who happens to be the mother of
the accused likewise showed untruthfulness. 
The trial court’s findings on her credibility show that the mother’s
testimony was motivated only by the desire to protect her son so that she would
do anything to ensure his acquittal. 
When the court ordered her temporary exclu­sion from the courtroom, the
mother stood up but still lingered inside.

Furthermore, the accused failed to present other witnesses such
as his cousin whom he said were
with them in the house.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the aggrieved party
is ordered indemnified in the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.