CARLITO P. BONDOC, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE HONORABLE TANODBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

Section 4 (paragraph 3) of Presidential Decree No.1606, as amended, provides in part that^[1] –

“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they should be tried jointly
with said public officers or employees.”

Whether or not compliance with this requirement is mandatory in
every instance, and is indeed so essential as to cause the Sandiganbayan
to lose jurisdiction over a specific criminal case in the event of its non-fulfilment, is the main issue presented by the special
civil action of certiorari at
bar.  The issue is raised in the context
of the undisputed facts hereunder narrated.

Two (2) employees of the Central Bank — Manuel Valentino and
Jesus Estacio — and nine (9) private individuals,
were charged with several felonies of estafa thru
falsification of public documents in
three (3) separate informations filed by the Tanodbayan
with the Sandiganbayan on April 15, 1982. 
The actions were docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951.  They were assigned to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.

Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan
filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1984,
another set of three (3) indictments, this time against Carlito
P. Bondoc (Assistant Manager of the Greenhills Branch of CITIBANK) and Rogelio Vicente, also a
private individual, charging them with the same crimes involved in Cases No.
5949 to 5951 as principals by indispensable cooperation.  The
actions against Bondoc and Vicente were docketed as
Criminal Cases Numbered 9349 to 9351. 
They were assigned to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Bondoc moved to quash the informations on January 3, 1985 on the basic theory that as
a private individual charged as co-principal with government employees, he
should be tried jointly with the latter pursuant to Section 4 (paragraph 3) of
PD 1606, as amended, supra; hence, the separate proceedings
commenced against him were invalid, for lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over the offenses and his person.

The Third Division denied Bondoc’s
motion to quash, by Resolution dated February
22,1985.^[2]
It ruled that (a) the joint trial of private individuals and public employees
charged as co-principals, dealt with in the cited provision of law, is not a
jurisdictional requirement; (b) Bondoc’s theory would
practically make the Court’s “jurisdiction over a private individual
charged as co-principal, accomplice or accessory with a public officer or
employee dependent upon such private individual” (as by evading service of
legal processes until “joint trial is no longer feasible”); and (c)
it is the intention of the law, manifested
in the same Section 4, “to avert split jurisdiction (and) thus avoid
multiplicity of suits.”

Bondoc moved for reconsideration on March 4, 1985.  His motion was denied by Resolution dated March 28, 1985.  However, in order to obviate his objection to
a separate trial, which was the principal basis of his motion to quash, the
Third Division, in the same resolution, referred Bondoc’s
cases (No. 9349 to 9351) to the Second Division for consolidation with Cases
Numbered 5949 to 5951.^[3]

But by that time the trial of Criminal Cases No. 5949 to 5951 had
been terminated.  The Second Division thus resolved, on June 4, 1985,^[4]
to deny the proposed consolidation of the action and to return Criminal Cases No. 9349 to 9351 to the Third
Division.  In its Resolution, the Second
Division also made the following observation, to wit:

“In Our resolution dated April 9, 1985, We accepted the transfer of these cases and
directed the accused and counsel to ascertain the advisability of having them
consolidated and jointly tried with Criminal Cases Nos. 5949 to 5951 which have
been previously ordered reopened. 
However, at the hearing held on April 1, 1985, counsel for accused
Rogelio G. Vicente manifested that there is no possibility of the instant cases
being consolidated with Criminal Cases Nos. 5949 to 5951 or the adoption of
prosecution’s evidence adduced in said cases, as well as the fact that said
accused has a pending motion for reinvestigation with the Tanodbayan
* * *.’”

On receiving the criminal cases back from the Second Division,
the Third Division set the cases for arraignment and trial on August 1 and 2,
1985.

On June 26,
1985, Bondoc filed with this Court the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar.

He argues that the Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion in seeking to try him separately from the
Central Bank employees:

1.  In
accordance with the clear phraseology of paragraph 3, Section 4, PD 1606, it is
required that he shall be tried jointly with the government employees involved
in the same offenses, namely:  Manuel
Valentino and Jesus Estacio; the language is
mandatory, the requirement jurisdictional.

2.  Being
mandatory and jurisdictional, the provision should be given a strict
construction, citing American authorities^[5]
to the effect that if mandatory provisions prescribed by law are not followed,
the proceedings to which they relate are illegal and void.

3.  Since
the Sandiganbayan is a special court, with
jurisdiction over special cases which are removed from the jurisdiction of
regular courts; and since the governing law allows only one appeal from its
judgments of conviction and therefore the defendant’s chances of eventual
acquittal is thereby lessened, the law creating said Sandiganbayan
should be subject to strict interpretation because in derogation of general
jurisdiction and of rights of individuals.^[6]

4.  In sum, before the Sandiganbayan
may lawfully try a private individual under PD 606, the following
requisites must be satisfied:

a)  he must be charged with a public officer/employee,
and

b)  he
must be tried jointly.

Otherwise, ordinary courts should have jurisdiction.  Any other interpretation would render the
provision in question “useless, meaningless
and nugatory.”

5.  The
Third Division itself recognized the need for a joint trial when it referred
his cases to the Second Division for consolidation.

6.  Since
a joint trial was then already impossible, said mandatory and jurisdictional
provision can no longer be complied with; therefore, the Sandiganbayan
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the petitioner.

7.  Under
these circumstances, the petitioner has a right to be tried by civil courts
where his chances of acquittal are greater considering that therein, there are at least two levels of
appeal.

8.  The
prosecution should have amended the informations in
Criminal Cases No. 5949 to 5951 to include Bondoc as
additional accused (this being only an amendment in form); then it could ask
for suspension of the proceedings, so the evidence can be re-introduced as
against Bondoc.

9.  Finally,
the only public employee charged in Criminal Cases 5949-5951 is
janitor-messenger, Estacio.  The other Central Bank employee, Valentino,
had already been discharged as a state witness. 
He (Bondoc) was being made to stand trial in
the Sandiganbayan simply because an “errand
boy” in the Central Bank has also been accused of some complicity in the
crime.

The Solicitor General, for his part –

1) brands as absurd the
petitioner’s argument that the Sandiganbayan may
acquire jurisdiction only by a joint trial, this being contrary to the rule
that in criminal cases jurisdiction of the person is acquired by his arrest (or
voluntary submission to the Court), and over the offense, by the filing of the
indictment; and

2) asserts that Section 4
(3), PD 1606 merely prescribes the procedure when a private individual is
charged with a public officer or employee; once jurisdiction is acquired, it is
not lost by procedural error (Ramos, et al. v. CB, 41 SCRA 565; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al.,116 SCRA 451).

Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 vests the Sandiganbayan with exclusive original jurisdiction over specific
crimes and, as the Sandiganbayan has pointed out, supra, provides against split jurisdiction as regards the civil
liability arising from the crime.  It
declares that the Sandiganbayan shall have –

” ** Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1)  Violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2)  Other
offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.”

It also declares that –

“Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determlined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts (also vested with
jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers and employees), the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, However,
That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action
shall be considered abandoned.

Now, the crime with which Bondoc is charged — as co-principal by
indispensable cooperation with the Central Bank employees above mentioned (Valentino and Estacio) — in each of the three (3) indictments against
him is the complex felony of estafa thru
falsification of public documents under
Article 171^[7] in
relation to Articles 315^[8] and
48^[9] of
the Revised Penal Code.  The crimes are
“offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office,” in confabulation and conspiracy with him (Bondoc) and other private persons.  The penalty prescribed by law for each of the
three offenses is higher than the penalty set out in Section 4 of PD 1606 above
cited, i.e., prision correccional or
six years, or a fine of P6,000.00^[10] Each offense is therefore within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

It is indisputable that the Sandiganbayan
acquired jurisdiction of the offenses charged in the informations
against Bondoc and his co-accused, based on the
nature of the crimes as described in the indictments and the penalty prescribed
therefor by law. 
Also incontrovertible is that the Sandiganbayan
acquired jurisdiction of the persons of the accused through their arrest by
virtue of a warrant, or voluntary submission to the Court’s authority.

It is true that the law requires that Bondoc
and Vicente, as private individuals charged as co-principals with public
officers or employees, “be tried jointly with said public officers or
employees.” Given the peculiar circumstances of their cases, i.e., they (Bondoc and Vicente) were not investigated and indicted
until long after the criminal proceedings against their co-principals had
commenced, and the latter’s cases had already been submitted for decision when Bondoc’s and Vicente’s own cases came up for trial — the
question that now arises is whether or not the declaration of the Sandiganbayan that it was no longer possible or legally
feasible to try them jointly with the government employees accused of the same
offenses, had the effect of causing the Sandiganbayan
to lose jurisdiction over Bondoc’s cases, and whether
or not, as a consequence, those cases became cognizable by the regular courts
and should be transferred thereto for trial and adjudgment.

It must at once be evident that the seeming impossibility of a
joint trial cannot and does not alter the essential nature of the
crimes in question, as felonies perpetrated by public officers or employees in
confabulation with private persons.  It
should be as obvious, too, that assuming it is correct to construe the law in a
strictly literal sense, the indicated course of action would be to insist on
holding a joint trial regardless of whatever circumstances may appear to make
such a joint trial inappropriate, inconvenient, unfeasible.  Thus, for instance, the cases in the Second
Division, although already submitted for decision, should be reopened to allow
for the consolidation of Bondoc’s cases with those of
the defendants therein, and the reception of evidence against and for Bondoc.  Indeed, even
in the extreme hypothesis of appeal having already been taken by Bondoc’s co-accused, the course of action dictated by a
literal construction of the provision on joint trial is the remand of the
appealed case to the Sandiganbayan so that the joint
trial may be conducted.

To construe the law in the manner indicated, however, would be unreasonable, if not absurd (what
of the case, for instance, where the accused
public officers or employees have already been convicted and have appealed, or
are already serving sentence, or have been acquitted), and settled is the rule that courts should not give a
statute a meaning that would lead to absurdities;^[11]
general terms of a statute should be so limited in their application as
precisely to avoid absurdities, and it will always be presumed that the
legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid consequences of this
character.^[12] The provision in question should thus
be read as requiring that private
individuals accused in the Sandiganbayan, together
with public officers or employees, must be tried jointly with the latter
unless the attendant circumstances have made impossible or impracticable such a
joint trial, as in the cases at bar, in which event the trial of said private
persons may proceed separately from the public officers or employees whose own
trials have been concluded.

Besides, there is nothing so sacrosanct or important about a
joint trial as to justify a radical deviation from ordinary, orderly court
processes in order to have it, or as to affect
the very jurisdiction of the Court required to conduct it.  The evidence of the State or of the accused
does not become weaker or stronger whether presented at a joint or separate
trial; the rights of the accused are not enhanced or diluted by the character
of a trial as joint or separate;
the procedure prescribed in either
situation is essentially the same. 
Indeed, it is a gauge of the importance of a joint trial, in the eyes of
trial attorneys and of the law
itself, that there are as many lawyers moving for a separate trial as there are
for a joint trial, and that courts are granted the discretion, in case where two or more accused are
jointly charged with an offense, to order separate trials instead of a joint
trial, on motion of the fiscal or any accused.^[13]

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple
reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses.  As already above intimated, the inability of
the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, committed by government employee in conspiracy with private
persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within
the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by
the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

As to Bondoc’s only other argument, that his cases should be transferred to the
regular courts because he would there have two levels of appeal (i.e.. the
Court of Appeals, and then the Supreme Court), unlike in the Sandiganbayan where his
appellate recourse is only one, to the Supreme Court, it suffices to point out,
as the Sandiganbayan has, that the matter has long
since been laid to rest, in Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan.^[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Italics supplied

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 34-39

^[3]
Id., p. 49

^[4]
Id., pp. 56-57

^[5]
50 Am Jur 19, 22

^[6]
50 Am Jur 398

^[7]
Defining the felony of falsification by a public officer or employee, etc. and imposing
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos therefore

^[8]
Defining the felony of swindling (estafa), and imposing therefor
the penalty inter alia of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, providing for the imposition of the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period, adding also, one year for each additional 10,000
pesos, the total imposable penalty not to exceed 20 years

^[9]
Which provides inter alia that when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period

^[10]
See preceding footnotes 7-9

^[11]
Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, 1986, ed, p.
109, citing Automotive Parts & Equipment Co. v. Lingad,
30 SCRA 247 (1969); In re Allen, 2
Phil. 630 (1903); Ledesma v. Pictain, 79 Phil. 95 (11947); Pritchard v. Republic, 81 Phil. 244
(1948); Chartered Bank v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921); Director of
Lands v. Abaya, 63 Phil. 559 (1936); Peo. v. de Guzman 90 Phil. 132 (1951)

^[12]
Op cit., citing In re Allen, 2 Phil.
630 (1903)

^[13]
Sec. 8, Rule 119, Rule of Court, as
amended

^[14]
111 SCRA 433,449-451 (1982)