C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA, EFREN DIONGON AND PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

The same issue of jurisdiction that was raised in Solid Homes v. Payawal^[1]
is raised in the case at bar.  The same
ruling laid down in that earlier case must be applied in the present
controversy.

The
petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation
sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren
Diongon.  The installment
payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the
delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land.  When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville
complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance and
damages in the Regional Trial Court of _pNegros
Occidental. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3514.  The two defendants each filed an answer with
cross-claim and counterclaim.  The
plaintiff filed a reply and answered the counterclaims.  Pre-trial was scheduled and heard and trial
briefs were submitted by Pleasantville and Diongon.  The case was set for initial hearing.  It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent
body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The motion was heard and Diongon later file an
opposition. On September 17, 1987 the trial court^[2] denied the motion to dismiss in an order
reading as follows:

Before this Court for resolution is the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendant C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. alleging among other things, that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the present
action falls within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board by virtue of Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986.

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the said, motion to dismiss
traversing the allegations therein stated.  A perusal of both pleadings and the complaint
filed by plaintiff, the issuer: to be determined are basically governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code, particularly on contracts.  The complaint is one for specific performance
with damages which is a justiciable issue under the
Civil Code and jurisdiction to hear the said issue is conferred on the regular Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Big. 129.

It is therefore, the finding of this Court that jurisdiction as
conferred by law is vested in the regular courts and not in the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board.  The Motion to
Dismiss is therefore DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner is now before this Court on certiorari
to question this order.

In holding that the complaint for specific performance with damages was
justiciable under the Civil Code and so came under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts under B.P. 129, the trial court failed
to consider the express provisions of P.D. No. 1344 and related decrees.  It also erred in supposing that only the
regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code, to the
exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies.

P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as
“The Subdivision and Condominium Bayers‘ Protective
Decree,” provides that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.

The scope of the regulatory authority lodged in the National
Housing Authority is indicated in the second and third paragraphs of the
preamble, thus:

WHEREAS, the numerous reports reveal that many real estate
subdivision owners, developers. operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems,
lighting systems and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the
health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling
and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value.  (Emphasis supplied)

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered
the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement
of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction
of the agency as follows:

SECTION 1.  In the exercise
of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:

A.  Unsound real estate business
practices;

B.  Claims involving refund
and an/other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C.  Cases involving
specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broke
or salesman.  (Emphasis supplied)

Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory
functions conferred on the National Housing Authority under P.D. Nos. 957, 1344
and other related laws were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission,
which was renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board by E.O. No. 90 dated
December 17, 1986.

It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above, quoted PD No. 1344
that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Diongon, with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board.  Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific
performance of the seller’s obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate
of title.

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims
resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the
fast-changing times.  There are hundreds
of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid
authorization from the legislature.  This
quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident
of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities
falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case, for example, the Court affirmed the
competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages
although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the
courts of justice.  This departure from the
traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency or the
need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing
problems of the modern world.

Thus we have held:

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies
exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited
extent only.  Limited delegation of
judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g. the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission)
is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special
competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of
questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition
that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged.^[3]

x        x          x

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its ramified activities. 
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal
with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected
from the legislature or the courts of justice. 
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers in what is now unreasonably called the fourth department
of the government.^[4]

x        x          x

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain dispute and controversies
falling within the agency’s special expertise. 
The very definition of administrative agency includes its being vested
with quasi-judicial powers.  The ever
increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies
recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in
matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in, countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.^[5]

The argument of the private respondents that the petition is
premature because no motion for reconsideration of the questioned order of
trial court had been filed stresses the rule but disregards the exception.  It is settled that the motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with if the issue raised is a question of law,^[6]
as in the case at bar.  The issue pleaded
here is lack of jurisdiction.  It could
therefore be raised directly and immediately with this Court without the
necessity of an antecedent motion for reconsideration.

We hold, in sum, that the complaint for specific performance and
damages was improperly filed with the respondent court, jurisdiction over the
case being exclusively vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.  We also hold that the order denying the motion
to dismiss was subject to immediate challenge before this Court as the filing
(and denial) of a. motion for reconsideration was not an indispensable
requirement.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED.  The questioned Order
of September 17, 1987, is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 3514 in the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Occidental is hereby DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the filing of the proper complaint with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board if so desired.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco,
Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Solid Homes. Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72.

^[2]
Through Judge Romeo J. Hibionada.

^[3]
Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. NHA, 153 SCRA 399.

^[4]
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, supra.

^[5]
Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA. 152 SCRA 540.

^[6]
Quirino vs. Gorospe, 169
SCRA 702; Gonzales, Jr. vs. IAC, 131 SCRA 468; PALEA vs. PAL, 111 SCRA 215.