G.R. Nos. 63253-54. April 27, 1989
PABLO RALLA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, AND LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND MARINELLA RALLA, RESPONDENTS.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition seeks the nullification of the Order of respondent
Judge Romulo P. Untalan,[1]
dated July 16, 1981,
excluding from the probate proceedings sixty-three parcels of land, as well as
the Orders issued by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel
Reyes,[2]
denying the petitioner’s motions for reconsideration of the same Order of Judge
Untalan dated July
16, 1981.
The petition’s beginnings are traced to January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a
petition for the probate of his own will in
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
564. In his will, he left his entire
estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein who, upon his death during the pendency of this petition, was substituted by his heirs),
leaving nothing to his other son,
Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of the estate of
their mother, Paz Escarella; this was docketed as Civil Case No. 2023.
In the course of the hearing of the probate case (Special
Proceedings No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late
father, Rosendo Ralla, for
its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. (The
latter court agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that, indeed, the
petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed
because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory
of the estate of Rosendo Ralla
149 parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and
receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who was being deprived of his successional
rights over the said properties.) The
denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court (in G.R.
No. L-26253).[3]
On the scheduled hearing on November
3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the
probate of the subject will.
Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho,
declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should share
equally upon the division of the latter’s estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to compromise in the partition
case (Civil Case No. 2023). On December
18, 1967, they entered into a project of partition whereby
sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased
mother, Paz Escarella, were amicably divided between
the two of them. This project of
partition was approved on December
19, 1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda.
Eleven years later, or on February
28, 1978, Joaquin Chancoco,
brother-in-law of the petitioner (Pablo) filed a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1106, for the probate of the same will of Rosendo
Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him
P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla
then filed a manifestation stating
that he had no objections to the probate; thereafter, he filed a “Motion
to Intervene as Petitioner for the Probate of the Will.” This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite the
written opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate was
granted; Teodorico Alimine,
son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed special administrator, again, over
and above the objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, in taking possession of the
properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla. Teodorico Almine also took
possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by the project of
partition mentioned earlier.
Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the
private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid
parcels of land.
In an Omnibus Order dated August 3, 1979,[4]
respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan
ruled, inter alia,
that the sixty-three parcels of land should be included in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo
Ralla and that said proceedings (both Special
Proceedings No. 564 and Special Proceedings No. 1106, which were ordered
consolidated by this Court) should proceed as probate proceedings.
About two years later, or on June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a
“Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of
67 (sic) Parcels Of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition In Civil Case No.
2023.”[5]
ln his Order of July 16, 1981, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order, to wit:
Premises considered, Order is hereby issued reconsidering the
Omnibus Order of this Court dated August
3, 1979, more particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive
portion thereof. The Project of
Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty three (63) parcels referred
to therein should be excluded from the probate
proceedings and, likewise from the administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Thereafter, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the
same was denied[7] by respondent
Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes, to whose sala
Special Proceedings No. 564 and No.
1106 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for reconsideration
was filed the same, however, was also denied.[8]
In assailing the
aforesaid Order of July 16, 1981,
the following arguments are raised in the present special civil action for certiorari.
The first argument is
stated as follows:
x x
x The extra judicial partition of the 63 parcels made
after the filing of the petition for the probate of the Will, and before said
Will was probated, is a NULLITY,
considering that as already decided by this Court in the case or Ernesto M. Guevara, vs. Rosario Guevara et
al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among the heirs
till after the Will had been probated. x
x x[9]
The above argument is
obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that the aforementioned
partition was made in the civil case for partition or the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the
probate of the will of Rosendo
Ralla.
Verily, the rule is that
there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This,
of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will. Thus, the rule
invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases
(Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No.
564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively)
comprising dissimilar properties.
In his second and third
arguments,[10] the petitioner claims that the Order of August 3,
1979 mentioned
earlier could no longer be validly reversed by the court two years after it was
issued. Thus, it is alleged that by flip-flopping,
Judge Untalan committed a grave abuse of discretion.
An examination of the
August 3, 1979 Order would reveal that the same resolved a
number of divergent issues (ten as enumerated)[11] springing from four separate special
proceedings,[12] all of which were pending in Branch I of the
then Court of First Instance of Albay; accordingly, there are at least nine[13] specific directives contained therein. However, a distinction must be made between
those directives that partake of final orders and the other directives that are
in the nature of interlocutory orders.
Two closely related
orders are the following quoted portions of the said August 3,
1979 Order of
respondent Judge Untalan:
x x
x
2. The 149 parcels
referred to in our elucidation on issue No. 2 as well as the 63 lots also mentioned therein all of which may be
summed up to 212 parcels, except those already validly disposed, conveyed, or
transferred to third persons, should be submitted, at least provisionally, to
the probate or testate proceedings.
Hence, the Motion to exclude the 149 parcels filed on June 2, 1979, by
petitioner intervenor Pablo Ralla thru counsel in Special Proceeding 1106 and the motion for exclusion
filed by the heirs of Pedro Ralla thru counsel in
Special Proceedings 564 and 1106 are hereby Denied; (Emphasis supplied.)
3. The Project of
partition, for purposes of these proceedings, is hereby stripped of its
judicial recognition;[14]
x x x
As regards the abovequoted
paragraph 2, this Court finds that the same is interlocutory in character
because it did not decide the action with finality and left substantial proceedings still to be had.[15]
The foregoing order of inclusion of the subject parcels of land was a mere
incident that arose in the settlement of the estate of Rosendo
Ralla. It is
elementary that interlocutory orders, prior to the rendition of the final
judgment, are, at any time,
subject to such corrections or amendments as the court may deem proper. Thus, in issuing the questioned Order dated July 16,
1981, which reversed the aforementioned interlocutory order and
upheld the project of partition, respondent Judge Untalan
acted well within his jurisdiction and without grave abuse of discretion.
There is, however, a more important reason why we do not find any
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned Order dated July 16, 1981. Consider the following undisputed facts: the
properties involved in the present petition were the subject of the project of
partition signed by both the petitioner, Pablo Ralla,
and Pedro Ralla in Civil Case No. 2023; the lower
court approved the said project of partition on December 19, 1967; subsequently,
Pablo and Pedro Ralla jointly manifested that they had
already received “the ownership and possession of the respective parcels
of land adjudicated to them in the said
project of partition,”[16]
and upon their motion Judge Ezekiel Grageda declared
the partition case closed and terminated in its Order of December 29, 1967;
there was no appeal made from this decision within the reglementary
period to do so, consequently, it attained finality.
Furthermore, the Court had occasion to rule that:
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a
judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such
partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property
assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity
or any part of it.[17]
Likewise:
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is
no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without
the petitioners’ knowledge, the partition
barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the
property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition
according to the tenor of the partition … They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to
do in this case.[18] (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, the Order of August 3, 1979 setting aside the
project of partition was clearly erroneous.
Realizing this and the fact that it was not yet too late for him to
correct his mistake, respondent Judge Untalan issued
the questioned Order of July 16, 1981.
In fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and
binding upon the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as
this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective
shares in the inheritance from their mother, the late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division
agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition.
Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of
the lands subject of the partition from the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo
Ralla. Could
it be that the petitioner’s keen interest in including these lands in the
estate proceedings is directly related
to the fact that his son-in-law is the administrator of the said estate
of Rosendo Ralla?
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
Branch I, Court of First Instance of Albay.
[2]
Branch III, Court of First Instance of Albay.
[3]
Rollo, 113 A.
[4]
Rollo 22-32.
[5]
Rollo, 35-38.
[6]
Rollo, 42-45.
[7]
Rollo, 52.
[8]
Rollo, 57.
[9]
Ibid., 7.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Rollo, 22-23.
[12]
Spec. Proc. Nos. 564, 1078, 1106, and
M-8674.
[13]
Rollo, 31-32. Should be ten, as discussed in the body of the Order.
[14]
Rollo, 31.
[15]
People vs. Doriquez, Nos. L-24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163.
[16]
Rollo, 129. 163
[17]
Torres vs. Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July
31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.
[18]
Ibid., 682.