ZAIDA G. RARO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES), RESPONDENTS.

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of
late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the government
agencies enforcing the employees’
compensation law.  The strongly lingering
influence of the principles of “presumption of compensability” and
“aggravation” found in the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Act but
expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict
and inconsistency in employees’ compensation decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of
“proof of increased risk.” There are two approaches to a solution in
cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not
listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant’s working
conditions.  The one espoused by the
petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work
connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be
presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. 
On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of
the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law
says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when
employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional
office on March 17, 1975.  About four years later, she began suffering
from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision.  Forced to take sick leaves every now and
then, she sought medical treatment in Manila.  She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.

The petitioner was
diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor.  By that time, her memory, sense of time,
vision, and reasoning power had been lost.

A claim for disability
benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) was denied.  A motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied.  An
appeal to the Employees’ Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission’s
affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are
raised in this petition:

“1.  Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown
but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation
laws.

“2.  Whether the presumption of compensability is
absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational
disease.” (p. 17, Rollo)

The key argument of the
petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively
identify the causes of various types of cancer. 
It is a disease that strikes people in general.  The nature of a person’s employment appears
to have no relevance.  Cancer can strike
a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in
water, or in the bowels of the earth.  It
makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white
collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a
resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to
say that all cancers are not compensable.

The list of occupational
diseases prepared by the
Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely —

(Annex A, Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation)

The petitioner
questions the above listing.  We see no arbitrariness in the
Commission’s allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be
compensated for brain cancer.  There are
certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific
causes.  Heavy doses of radiation as Chernobyl,
USSR, cigarette smoke
over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and
asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of
contracting specific cancers.  What the
law re­quires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law
itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines
defines “sickness” as follows:

ART. 167.  Definition of
Terms.  – As used in this Title,
unless the context indicates otherwise:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“(1)    Sickness
means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.  For this purpose, the
Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational disease and
work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar
hazards of employment.  (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).”

Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. 
It provides:

“SECTION 1.

xxx                            xxx                               .xxx

“(b)  For
the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of these rules with the conditions
set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must
be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.” (Emphasis supplied)

The law, as it now stands
requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – that the illness
was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions.  To say that
since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to
pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be
adduced.  The existence of otherwise
non-existent proof cannot be presumed.

In Navalta
v. Government Service Insurance System (G.
R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a
disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life,
employed or unemployed.  Unless it be
shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions
(e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear
radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot
conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of
contracting the disease.

To understand why the
“presumption of compensability” together with the host of decisions
interpreting the “arising out
of and in the course of employment.” provision the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go
into the distinctions between the old work­men’s compensation law and the
present scheme.

On January
1, 1975, the
Workmen’s Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor
Code.  The new law discarded, among
others, the concepts of “presumption of compensability” and
“aggravation” and substituted a system based on social security
principles.  The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance System
and Social Security System — under the Employees’ Compensation
Commission.  The intent was to restore a
sensible equili­brium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s
compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected
death or disability.  (Sulit v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483
[1980]; Armena v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,
122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al., G. R. No. 65680,
May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family
against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular
premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the
trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees’
Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity
of the new law by explaining the
present system as follows:

“We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner’s attack
against he constitutionality of the new law on
employee’s compensation.  It must be
noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law.  It was only when his claim was rejected that
he now questions the constitutionality
of this law on appeal by certiorari.

“The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and
has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions.  We find
in it no infringement of the worker’s constitutional rights.”

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by
the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees.  The injured worker does not have to litigate
his right to compensation.  No employer
opposes his claim.  There is no notice of
injury nor requirement of controversion.  The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation
Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting
papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid.  The payment of benefits is more prompt.  The cost of administration is low.  The amount of death benefits has also been
doubled.

“On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the
regular monthly premiums to the scheme. 
It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies.  It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

“The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s
compensation.  The Commission administers
and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control.  The employer
does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the
past, over payment of benefits.  The open
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation.  A covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

“Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for
compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance.  The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for
equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is
now absent.  x x x.”

“The petitioner’s challenge is really against the desirability
of the new law.  There is no serious
attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

“The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen’
s compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and
Congress, not to this Court.  Whether or
not the former workmen’s compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of
payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political
departments.  The present law was enacted
in the belief that it better complies
with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater
number of working men and women.  Until
Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to
apply it.” (at pp. 4, 5, and 6).

The non-adversarial nature of employees’ compensation proceedings
is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme.  There is a widespread misconception that the
poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich
corporate employer.  Hence, he must be
given all kinds of favorable presumptions. 
This is fallacious.  It is now the
trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid claimants
who are not entitled under the law.  The
employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved.  The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused
by employment.  It is a government
institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance
Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims.  The employee; this time assisted by his
employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the important
feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees’ compensation is based on social security
principles.  All covered employers
throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums
or contributions to a trust fund for their employees.  Benefits are paid from this trust fund.  At the time the amount of contributions was
being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. 
The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file
claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the trust
fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who
are and in amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court.  If diseases not intended by the Iaw to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly
included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered.  Compassion for the victims of diseases not
covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund which the tens of
million of workers and their Families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths
occur.  As earlier stated, if increased
contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who
are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper
actuarial studies.  This Court cannot
engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching
implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security
System are continually evaluating the acturial
soundness of the trust funds they administer. 
In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be
included in the list of covered occupational diseases.  Or legislation may be recommended to Congress
either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit
payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement.  We regret that these are beyond the powers of
this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly
supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees’
Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)] Nemaria
v. Employees’ Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166
(1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.  The questioned decision of the public
respondents is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras and
Sarmiento, JJ., dissents in a separate opinion.