VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA, RUBEN ARROZA, JUAN GACUTNO, LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDR…

Before the Court en banc
is a motion to re­consider the decision promulgated on July 20, 1982 which set
aside the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission and
reinstated the decision of the National Seamen Board.

To better understand the
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, we reiterate the background
facts of the case, taken from the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission:

“It appears that on different dates in December, 1978 and
January, 1979, the Seamen entered into separate con­tracts of employment with
the Company, engaging than to work on board M/T ‘Jannu’ for a period of twelve (12)
months. After verification and approval
of their contracts
by the NSB, the Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.

“On
10 January 1979, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cable
from the Company advising him of the possibility that the vessel might be
directed to call at ITF-controlled ports and at the same time informing
him of the procedure
to be followed in the computation of the special or additional compensation of
crew members while in said ports. (‘ITF’ is the acronym for the International Transport Workers
Federation, a militant international labor organiza­tion with affiliates in
different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port
by preventing its loading or unloading. This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment of its
wages rates for seafarers, the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew
members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its prescribed
rates.) In the same cable of the Company, it expressed its regrets for not
clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special compensation as it
thought that the vessel would ‘trade in Caribbean ports only.’

“On 22 March 1979, the
Company sent another cable to complainant Bisula, this time informing
him of the respective amounts each of the officers and crew members would
receive as special compensation when the vessel called at the port of Kwinana,
Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This was followed by another cable on 23 March 1979, informing him that the
officers and crew members had been
enrolled as members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and that the membership fee for the 28 personnel complement of the vessel
had already been paid.

“In answer to the Company’s cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in representation of the other
officers and crew members, sent on 24 March 1979 a cable in­forming the Company that the
officers and crew members were not agreeable to its ‘suggestion’; that they
were not contented with their present salaries ‘based on the volume of works,
type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a worldwide trade; that the
‘officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if not actually paid
with ITF rate’; that their ‘demand
is only 50% increase based on present basic salary’; and that the
proposed wage increase is the
‘best and only solution to solve ITF problem’ since the Company’s salary rates ‘especially in tankers (are) very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila x x
x.’

“In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic
pay of the complainant crew members, although it claimed that it would ‘suffer
and absorb consi­derable amount of losses.’
The proposal was accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions which
were accepted by the Company. Conformably with the agreement of the
parties which was effected through the cables abovementioned, the Seamen were
paid their new salary rates.

“Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to
cancel the contracts of employment of
the Seamen, claiming that its principals had ter­minated their manning
agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen. The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director in a letter
dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter,
the Company cabled the Seamen informing them that their contracts would be
terminated upon the vessel’s arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979 they were asked to disembark from the vessel, their
contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen were
given the opportunity to at least comment on the Company’s request for the
cancellation of their contracts, although they had served only three (3) out of the twelve (12) months’ duration of their
contracts.”

The private respondents
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with
the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen
Ship­ping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of
contract and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the private
respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB
rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached their employment
contracts when they demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were
ordered suspended.

The seamen appealed the
decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the
petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of
the contract by the petitioner was without valid cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.

The private respondents
submit the following issues in their motion for reconsideration:

“A. THIS HONORABLE
COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD THAT
THE SEAMEN VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF FACT
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR CONTRACT.

“B. THIS HONORABLE
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIRJEN’S HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN’S BASIC WAGE WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.

“C. THIS HONORABLE
COURT ERRED WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING THAT
THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED THE SAME.

“D. THIS HONORABLE
COURT ERRED WHEN IT FID NOT FIND PETITIONER VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE
EXPIRY DATE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH
TERMINATION.

“E. THIS HONORABLE
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS
AND THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN BAD FAITH.

“F. THIS HONORABLE
COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.”

At the outset, we are faced
with the question whether or not the Court en banc should give due course to
the motion for reconsideration inspite of its having been denied twice by the
Court’s Second Division. The case was
referred to and accepted by the Court en banc because of the movants’
contention that the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated from Wallem
Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-37, February 20, 1981), a
First Division case with the same facts and issues. We are
constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative.

A fundamental postulate
of Philippine Constitu­tional Law is the fact that there is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their
bearings. (Albert v. Court of First
Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of
Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The majority of
the Court’s work is now performed by its two Divisions, but the Court remains
one court, single, unitary, com­plete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that,
while individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another,
when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be
as clear as possible.

Any doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or in Division, may be modified
or reversed only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare instances when one
Division disagrees in its views with the other Division, or the necessary votes
on an issue cannot be had in a Division, the case is brought to the Court en
banc to reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier
decision, and to declare the Court’s doc­trine. This is what has happened in this case.

The decision sought to be
reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court’s decision, speaking
through the First Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of
Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced with
two seemingly conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two
Divisions, the Court, therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en
banc. Parenthetically, the petitioner’s
comment on the third motion for reconsideration states
that the resolution of the motion might be the needed vehicle to make the
ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more in line with the underlying
principles of the Labor Code. We agree
with the petitioner.

After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspi­cacious
consideration of the motions for reconsideration and the comments, replies, and
other pleadings related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the
motions. To grant the motion is to keep
faith with the constitutional
mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers, to
self-organization and to just and humane conditions of work. We sustain the decision of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission.

There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common
thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal
prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sus­tained by this Court, we would
in effect “kill the hen that lays the golden egg.” In other words,
Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain
satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensa­tion, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of
employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable
the side con­tracts which require them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations,
pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the
increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their
right to ask for
improved terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer
instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with
no protection from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the peti­tioners contend that Filipinos would no
longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the
still unemployed would be left hopeless.

This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the
threat of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the
interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of
employment would be characterized as pre­judicing the interests of labor as a
whole.

In 1867 or one hundred
sixteen years ago, Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was
ponente of the court’s opinion declaring as a conspiracy the threat of
workingmen to strike in connection with their efforts to promote unionism.

It is difficult to believe that a right exists in law which we can
scarcely conceive can produce, in any posture of affairs, other than injurious results. It is simply the right of workmen, by concert
of action, and by taking advantage of their position, to control the business
of another. I am unwilling to hold that
a right which cannot, in any event, be advantageous to the em­ployee, and
which must always be hurtful to the
employer, exists in law. In my
opinion this indictment sufficiently shows that the force of the confederates
was brought to bear upon their employer for the purpose of oppression and
mischief and that this amounts to a conspiracy. (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867. Cited in
Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13. Emphasis supplied)

The same arguments have
greeted every major advance in the rights of the workingman. And they have invariably been proved unfounded and false.

Unionism, employers’
liability acts, minimum wages, workmen’s compensation, social security and
collective bargaining to name a few
were all ini­tially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of government and society as “killing the hen or goose which lays the golden eggs.” The claims of workingmen were
described as outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so to the
employees themselves before these
claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as
“rights” and before these were proved beneficial to the management,
labor, and the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.

The case before us does
not represent any major advance in the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights
already established. No matter how much
the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the entire
industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino
seamen or that it can speak for them.

The contention that
manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant case is
not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on
February 20, 1981. There have been no
severe repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and
none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be an exception?

The wages of seamen
engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose
primary function is recruitment and who usually gets a lump
sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and the determination
of their compensation is subject to the interplay of var­ious market factors
and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local manning office and
the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are
met. And costs include salaries of
officers and crew members.

Filipino seamen are
admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the
world. Otherwise, there would not be so
many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this
globe. It is competence and
reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same
high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and
other developed nations. But certainly
they are entitled to government protec­tion when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employers and when they exercise the right to petition for
improved terms of employment, especially when they feel that these are
sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to inter­nationally
accepted rules. In the domestic scene,
there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their
employees – one in keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the
sub-standard wages that the employees really receive. The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums
required by fair labor standards legislation but even go way above the minimums
while earning reason­able profits and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no reason why this Court and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment or its agencies and commissions should come
out with pro­nouncements based on the standards and practices of unscrupulous
or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without resorting to
tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government main­taining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and
law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign.

If any minor advantages
given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the profits of local man­ning
agencies and foreign shipowners,
that is not sufficient reason why the NSB or the NLRC should not stand by the
former instead of listening to unsubstantiated fears that they would be killing
the hen which lays the golden eggs.

Prescinding from the
above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board nor the National
Labor Relations Commission should, as a matter of official policy, legitimize
and enforce dubious arrangements where shipowners and seamen enter into
fictitious contracts similar to the addendum agree­ments or side contracts in
this case whose purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies should present a more honorable and proper
posture in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our desire to have
as many job openings both here and abroad for our workers. At the very least, such a sensitive matter
involving no less than our dignity as a people and the welfare of our
workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form of policy
legislation, not from administrative rule making or adjudication.

Another issue raised by
the movants is whether or not the seamen violated their contracts of
employment.

The form contracts
approved by the National Sea­men Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen
not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums
which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code.) They are not collective bargaining agreements or
immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the
course of the agreed period of time. To
state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for
higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to
established principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from
decisions he of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.

The respondent Commission
ruled:

“In the light of all the fore­going facts, we find that the cable
of the seamen proposing an
increase in their wage rates was not and could not he have been intended as a
threat to compel the Company to accede to their proposals. But even assuming, if only for the sake of
argument, that the demand or proposal for a wage increase was accompanied by a
threat that they would report to ITF if the
Company did not accede to the contract revision – although there really
was no such threat as pointed out
earlier – the Seamen he should
not be held at fault for asking such a demand. In the same case cited above, the Supreme Court held:

“‘Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents
was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the
Labor Code. This conten­tion is not well-taken. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents’ behavior should not be censured because it is but
natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, the refusal to abide
with the
terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the sane. They were only acting in the exercise of their rights,
and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and
public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which
would justify respondents’ dismissal
just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation
it entered into without any
coercion, specially on the part
of private respondents.’ (underscoring
supplied).”

The
above citation is from Wallem.

The facts show that when
the respondents boarded the M/T Jannu, there was no intention to send their
ship to Australia. On January 10, 1979,
the peti­tioner sent a cable to respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of
the procedure to be followed in the computation of special compensation of
crewmembers while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not having
earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the vessel would trade in
Carribean ports only.

On March 22, 1979, the
petitioner sent another cable informing Bisula of the special compensation when
the ship would call at Kwinana, Australia.

The following day,
shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and crews were not
interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates and that their only demand
was a 50 percent increase based on their then salaries. Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates
were “very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila.”

In reply, Vir-jen counter
proposed a 25 percent increase. Only
after Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount given
monthly to Vir-jen was the
decision to terminate the respondents’ employment formulated.

The facts show that
Vir-jen initiated the discussions which led to the demand for increased
wages. The seamen made a proposal and
the petitioner answered with a counter­proposal. The ship had not yet gone to Australia or any ITF controlled port. There was absolutely no mention of any
strike, much less a threat to strike. The seamen had done no act which under Philippine law or any other civil­ized
law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or mali­cious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild
compared to accepted and valid modes of labor activity.

We reiterate our ruling
in Wallem:

“Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents
was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contem­plated by the Labor Code. This
contention is
not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any
threat. But even if there had been such
a
threat, respondents’ behavior should not
be censured because it is but
natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner,
who refused to abide with the
terms of the Special Agree­ment, to honor and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of
their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy.x x x”

Our dismissing the
petition is premised on the as­sumption that the Ministry of Labor and
Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the working­man’s interests
and, of course, the nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in his com­ments reefer to
the issue of allowing what the
petitioner importunes under the
argument of “killing the hen which lays the golden eggs”. This is one of policy which should perhaps
be directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country’s other policy makers
for more specific legislation on the matter, subject to the constitutional
provisions protecting labor, promoting social justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement
of the freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with the movants that there is no
showing of any cause, which under the Labor Code or any current applicable law,
would warrant the termination of the respondents’ services before the
expiration of their contracts. The
Constitution guarantees State assur­ance of the rights of workers to security
of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II,
Constitution). Presumptions and
provisions of law, the evidence on record, and fundamental State policy all
dictate that the motions for reconsideration should be granted.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby
GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, and Relova, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., see separate
opinion.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., no part.