JOSE B.L. REYES, IN BEHALF OF THE ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), PETITIONER, VS. RAMON BAGATSING, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.

This Court, in this case of first impression, at least as to some
aspects, is called upon to delineate the boundaries of the protected area of
the cognate rights to free speech and peaceable assembly,^[1]
against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing.  Petitioner, retired Justice J.B. L. Reyes, on
behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to
hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park,
to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away.  Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held.^[2]
During the course of the oral argument,^[3]
it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based
on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for
General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases
held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of
its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States
Ambassador.  The march would be attended
by the local and foreign participants of such conference.  There was like­wise an assurance in the
petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and
assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it “to ensure a
peaceful march and rally.”^[4]

The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative
prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was due to the fact that as of
that date, petitioner had not been in­formed of any action taken on his request
on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. 
On October 25, 1983,
the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor
General Eduardo G. Montenegro.^[5]
It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied.  Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the
denial was sent by ordinary mail.  The
reason for refusing a permit was due to “police intelligence reports which
strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time
and at the place applied for.”^[6]
To be more specific, reference was made to “persistent intelli­gence
reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a
large number of people is expected to attend.”^[7]
Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of
the police authorities, that “a permit may be issued for the rally if it
is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other
enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general
public may be ensured.”^[8]

The oral argument was heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the answer was
filed.  The Court then deliberated on the
matter.  That same afternoon, a minute
resolution was issued by the Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for
on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.  On this point, the Court was unanimous, but
there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the ground
that the holding of a rally in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila.  The last sentence of such minute resolution
reads:  “This resolution is without
prejudice to a more extended opinion.”^[9]
Hence this detailed exposition of the Court’s stand on the matter.

1.     
It is thus clear that the Court is
called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and
peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit.  The Constitution is quite explicit:  “No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.”^[10]
Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment.^[11]
There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits,^[12]
prosecution for sedition,^[13]
or action for damages,^[14]
or contempt proceedings^[15]
unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
[the State] has a right to prevent.”^[16]
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern.^[17]
It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect.  It is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.^[18]
Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and
complements the right of free speech.^[19]
To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins,^[20]
it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and
of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the govern­ment for redress of
grievances.  All these rights, while not
identical, are inseparable.  In every
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this
right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation.  The sole
justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to
the maintenance of democratic insti­tutions, is the danger, of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.^[21]

2.     
Nowhere is the rationale that
underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed
than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter:  “It must never be forgotten, however,
that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment.  Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the
peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. 
It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon
rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a
generous scope.  But utterance in a
context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and be­come
part of an instrument of force.  Such
utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.”^[22]
What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance,
whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence.  It must always be remembered that this right
likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give
vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of
opinion.  For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the
only alternative.  Nor is this the sole
reason for the expression of dissent.  It
means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or
who is dissatisfied with things as they are. 
Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing
from the dissenter.  That is to ensure a
true ferment of ideas.  There are, of
course, well-defined limits.  What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly.  One
may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much
less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.  The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly.  Resort to
force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.  The utmost calm though is not required.  As pointed out in an early Philippine case,
penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado:^[23]
“It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch
of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling,
the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders
over their irresponsible followers.”^[24]
It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous
conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided.  To give free rein to one’s destructive urges
is to call for condemnation.  It is to
make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our
scheme of values.

3.     
There can be no legal objection,
absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on
the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace
rally would start.  The Philippines is
committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of
Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO:^[25]
“Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.  Such use of
the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”^[26]
The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias
v. Fugoso.^[27] Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality
of Cavite
v. Rojas,^[28]
a 1915 decision, where this Court cate­gorically affirmed that plazas or parks
and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that
leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. 
Reference was made to such plaza “being a promenade for public
use,”^[29]
which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve.  To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a
permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a
public park that is the Luneta.

4.     
Neither can there be any valid
objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two
blocks away at the Roxas
Boulevard.  Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved
any lurking doubt on the matter.  In
holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of
Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared:  “Our conclusion finds support in the
decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S.,
569.  In that case, the statute of New
Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that ‘no parade or procession
upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the
town or from licensing committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire as not confer­ring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to
refuse to grant the license, and held valid. 
And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941)
penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme
Court, held that ‘a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a
parade or procession to procure a special license therefor
from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights
of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited,
in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner
of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience
and of affording an opportunity to pro­vide proper policing, and are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *.’ “^[30]
Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of
the opinion be ignored:  “Civil
liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would
be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. 
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure
the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of
the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
depend.  The control of travel on the
streets of cities is the most familiar illus­tration of this recognition of
social need.  Where a restriction of the
use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience
in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of
some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection.”^[31]

5.     
There is a novel aspect to this
case.  If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as noted, would have arisen.  So, too, if the march would end at another
park.  As previously mentioned though,
there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two
gates of the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard.  That would be followed by the handing over of
a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the
Anti-Bases Coalition.  The Philippines
is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in
1961.  It was concurred in by the then
Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965
and the instrument of ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.  As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines.  The second paragraph of its Article 22
reads:  “2.  The receiving State is under a special
duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against
any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the
mission or impairment of its dignity.”^[32]
The Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, * * *.”^[33]
To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the
land.^[34]
That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion
or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its
dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as
the terminal point would be the Embassy. 
Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius
of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for other
purposes.  Unless the ordinance is
nullified, or declared ultra vires, its
invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the
primacy accorded the consti­tutional rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly.  Even if shown then to be
applicable, that question still confronts this Court.

6.     
There is merit to the observation
that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation,
the judgment must be confined within the limits of previous decisions.  The law declared on past occasions is, on the
whole, a safe guide.  So it has been
here.  Hence, as noted, on the afternoon
of the hearing, October 25,
1983, this Court issued the minute resolution granting the
mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally scheduled for the
next day.  That conclusion was inevit­able
in the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a
legitimate public interest.  There was no
justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly.  These
rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.^[35]
The participants to such assembly, composed primarily of those in attendance at
the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta,
proceeding through Roxas
Boulevard to the gates of the United States
Embassy located at the same street.  To
repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks
and streets, there is freedom of access. 
Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit,
whether an individual or a group.  If it
were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to
an equal protection question.  The prin­ciple
under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these
words:  “The question, if the rights
of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the
auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of
the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.”^[36]
There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were
marked by turbulence.  That would deprive
it of its peaceful character.  Even then,
only the guilty parties should be held accountable.  It is true that the licensing official, here
respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted.  It is not, however, unfettered
discretion.  While prudence requires that
there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably
occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there.  The exercise of such a right, in the language
of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be
“abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”^[37]

7.     
In fairness to respondent Mayor,
he acted on the belief that Navarro v. Villegas^[38]
and Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP) v. Bagatsing,^[39]
called for application.  While the general
rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold
their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be
designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.  In the Navarro and the Pagkakaisa
decisions, this Court was persuaded that the clear and present danger test was
satisfied.  The present situation is
quite different.  Hence the decision
reached by the Court.  The mere as­sertion
that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not
suffice.  Not that it should be
overlooked.  There was in this case,
however, the assur­ance of General Narciso Cabrera,
Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force,
that the police force is in a position to cope with such emergency
should it arise.  That is to comply with
its duty to extend protection to the participants of such peaceable
assembly.  Also from him came the
commendable admission that there were at least five previous demonstrations at
the Bayview Hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of
the United States Embassy where no untoward event occurred.  It was made clear by petitioner, through
counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in
the Philippines would take place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this
opinion, “all the necessary steps would be taken by it ‘to ensure a
peaceful march and rally.’ “^[40]
Assistant Solicitor General Montenegro expressed the view that the presence of
policemen may in itself be a provocation. 
It is a sufficient answer that they should stay at a discreet distance,
but ever ready and alert to cope with any contingency.  There is no need to repeat what was pointed
out by Chief Justice Hughes in Cox that precisely, it is the duty of the city
authorities to provide the proper police protection to those exercising their
right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression.

8.     
By way of a summary.  The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when it will take place. 
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. 
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.  It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached.  If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter.  Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity.  Thus if so minded, they can
have recourse to the proper judicial authority. 
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.  It cannot be too strongly stressed that on
the judiciary, – even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights.  No verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes “as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment.” Nonetheless, the presumption must be
to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

9.     
Respondent Mayor posed the issue
of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius
of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for other
purposes.  It is to be admitted that it
finds support in the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.  There was no
showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate
is less than 500 feet.  Even if it could
be shown that such a condition is satisfied, it does not follow that respondent
Mayor could legally act the way he did. 
The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.  It could be argued that a
case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the
right of peaceable assembly presents itself. 
As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500
feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated.  Should it come, then the qualification and
observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside.  The high estate accorded the rights to free
speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

10. 
Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of
this character is to set aside the denial or the modification
of the permit sought and order the respondent official to grant it.  Nonetheless, as there was urgency in this
case, the proposed march and rally being scheduled for the next day after the
hearing, this Court, in the exer­cise of its conceded authority, granted the
mandatory injunction in the resolution of October 25, 1983. 
It may be noted that the peaceful character of the peace march and rally
on October 26 was not marred by any untoward incident.  So it has been in other assemblies held else­where.  It is quite reassuring then that both on the
part of the national government and the citizens, reason and moderation have
prevailed.  That is as it should be.

WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is
granted.  No costs.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs with a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., with the qualification
that, in case of conflict, the Philippine Constitution – particularly the Bill
of Rights – should prevail over the Vienna Convention.

Plana, J., see separate opinion.

Aquino, J., dissenting, voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
holding of the rally in front of the US Embassy violates the Ordinance No. 7295
of the City of Manila.

Abad Santos, J., to add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief
Justice is like bringing coal to New Castle.  I just want
to state for the record that I voted for the issuance ex-parte of a preliminary
mandatory injunction.

De Castro, J., on sick leave

^[1] Section 9, Article IV of the Constitution.

^[2] Petition, par. 4.

^[3]
Petitioner was represented by Professor Haydee Yorac of the College
of Law, University of the Philippines,
assisted by former Senator Jose W. Diokno.  Respondent was represented by Assistant
Solicitor General Montenegro.

^[4] Petition, 2.

^[5]
He was assisted by Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.

^[6] Answer of Respondent, 2, Annex 1.

^[7] Ibid,
Annex 1-A.

^[8] Ibid,
Annex 1.

^[9]
Minute resolution dated October 25,
1983, 4.

^[10]
Article IV, Section 9 of the Constitution.

^[11]
Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 US 88 (1940).  Justice Malcolm
identified freedom of expression with the right to “a full discussion of
public affairs.” (U.S. v. Bustos,
37 Phil. 731, 740 [1918]). 
Justice Laurel was partial to the ringing words of John Milton,
“the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties.” (Planas
v. Gil, 67 Phil. 81 [1939]). 
Justice Johnson spoke of freedom of expression in terms of “a full
and free discussion of all affairs of public interest.” For him then, free
speech includes complete liberty to “comment upon the administration of
Government as well as the conduct of public men.” (U.S. v.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58, 62 [1922]). 
When it is remembered further that “time has upset many fighting
faiths” there is likely to be a more widespread acceptance of the view of
Justice Holmes “that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas, – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” (Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616, 630 [1919]).

^[12] U.S. v.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); Quisumbing
v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510 (1935).

^[13] U.S. v.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58 (1922).

^[14] Yap
v. Boltron, 100 Phil. 324 (1956).

^[15]
People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 (1939); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); People v.
Castelo H. Abaya, 114 Phil.
892 (1962); Bridges v. Cali­fornia,
314 US 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 US 331
(1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 US
367 (1947); Woods v. Georgia,
370 US 375 (1962).

^[16]
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 857.

^[17]
Cf. Ibid.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19]
Cf. United States
v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

^[20] 323
US 516 (1945).

^[21]
Cf. Schneider v. Irvington,
308 US 147 (1939).

^[22]
Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 US
287, 293 (1940).

^[23] 7 Phil. 422.

^[24] Ibid, 426.

^[25]
307 US 495.

^[26] Ibid, 515.

^[27] 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

^[28] 30 Phil. 602.

^[29] Ibid, 606.

^[30] 80 Phil. at 78.

^[31]
312 US at 524.

^[32]
Cf. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,
2nd ed., 339-341.

^[33]
Article II, Section 3 reads in full: 
“The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of inter­national law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.”

^[34]
The Philippines can rightfully take credit for the acceptance, as early as
1951, of the binding force of the Universal Decla­ration of Human Rights even
if the rights and freedoms therein declared are considered by other
jurisdictions as merely a state­ment of aspirations and not law until
translated into the appro­priate covenants. 
In the following cases decided in 1951, Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70; Borovsky v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 107; Chirskoff v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 256; Andreu v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347, the Supreme Court applied the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

^[35] According to its Article 19: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex­pression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.” The first paragraph of Article 20 reads:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association.”

^[36] De Jorge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 364 (1937).

^[37] Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 163 (1939).

^[38] G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970, 31 SCRA 731.  Two
justices dissented, Justice, later Chief Justice, Castro and the present Chief
Justice, then a Justice.

^[39]
G.R. No. 60294, April 30, 1982.

^[40] Opinion citing par. 4 of Petition.

175

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