JUAN CASTRO AND FELICIANA CASTRO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL AND BENITA C. NAVAL, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on
certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. Nos. 47262
and 47263-R, which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in Civil Case Nos. 3762-3763.  The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision
reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants
and against plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases:

“1)     Declaring defendant
Benita Castro Naval a duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro;

“2)     Awarding the sum of
P2,000.00 to defendants by way of attorney’s fee and expenses of litigation
(one-half to be paid by plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in Civil Case No.
3762 and one-half by plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3763); and

“3)     Pending the
partition or distribution of the properties involved herein in appropriate
proceedings or by mutual agreement, and so as to preserve the status quo, the
writ of preliminary injunction of February
10, 1967 shall continue to remain in full force and effect.

“With costs against plaintiffs, one-half chargeable to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and the other half to plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 3763.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 137-138)

Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and
sister of the late Eustaquio Castro while respondent
Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio.  Respondent Cipriano
Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.

The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the case
as follows:

“In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of
properties against the defendant alleging, among other things, that they are
the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc,
Tarlac on May
27, 1923 (p. 6, Record on Appeal).

“In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina
Bautista also filed an action for partition of properties against defendant
Benita Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also compulsory
heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on August 24,
1961 and that they are entitled to the partition of the properties of said
deceased (p. 32, Record on Appeal).

“The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege
that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio
and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro
Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of action (p. 25,
Record on Appeal).

“With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended
complaints whereby they converted the original action for partition into an
action for quieting of title. 
Defendant’s husband Cipriano Naval was
forthwith impleaded as party-defendant (p. 32, Record
on Appeal).

“In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for
appointment as receiver and for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No.
3762.  The trial court, however, denied
said petition for appointment of receiver, but granted the petition for writ of
preliminary injunction and also adjudged Marcelina
Bautista who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P100.00 (p. 97, Record on Appeal).

“Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a
receiver and preliminary injunction as well as the motion for contempt were related to the merits of the case, the parties
stipulated that evidence therein be considered as evidence in the trial on the
merits.

“During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue
to be resolved in this case is as to whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged natural
child of Eustaquio Castro.  In view of this stipulation, defendant Benita
Naval was allowed to introduce evidence to show that she was indeed the
acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro.

“The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio
Castro who was already dead were the children of the
deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago.  Marcelina Bautista,
one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3763, is the surviving spouse of the
deceased Eustaquio Castro.  Eustaquio Castro
died on August 23, 1961 and
Pricola Maregmen
died on September 11, 1924.

“It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919 in San Bartolome,
Tarlac (Exhibit A). 
Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration
of said birth gave the date indicated in the civil registry that he was the
father.  Benita Castro was later baptized
in the Roman Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the baptismal certificate appeared that her
parents are deceased Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit
C).  When Eustaquio
Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the family in
mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro
Naval (Exhibits D and D-1).  On this
score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 admitted that
defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced heir of Eustaquio
Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro in
Civil Case No. 3763.

“The evidence further shows that Pricola
Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita C. Naval who
was a resident of Mayantoc, Tarlac,
was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling, Camiling, Tarlac against her
wishes on May 23, 1913.  While the
celebration of the wedding in Anoling, Camiling, Tarlac
was going on, the guests soon found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party and went to the
house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio Malacampa,
also in Anoling, Camiling, Tarlac, and there she cried that she did not want to get
married to Felix de Maya.  That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San Bartolome,
Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she
united with her real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro,
the father of Benita Castro Naval.

“”Antonio Maregmen, the
brother of Pricola Maregmen
who was then in the wedding party learned of the disappearance of his sister.  He finally found her living with Eustaquio Castro.  A
few days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied by two
persons went to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac and informed them that Pricola
was already living with him as husband and wife.  Pricola’s parents
merely submitted to their daughter’s wishes, so Eustaquio
Castro and Pricola Maregmen
lived as husband and wife until the death of
Pricola on September 11, 1924.

“There is no dispute that Eustaquio
Castro at the time he lived with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry Pricola.  As a result
of their cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein defendant,
was born on March 27, 1919.  After the death of her mother, when she was
only five years old, she continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until his death on August
22, 1961 (Exhibit
11).  Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval
got married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in marriage.  Even after Benita’s marriage, she was taken
care of by her father.” (Rollo, pp. 11-13)

The trial court ruled that
respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized child
of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition of the
properties left by him.  These properties
are the subject of the civil cases.  As
stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not
respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child of Eustaquio Castro.

The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the private
respondent is an acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio
Castro in the following manner:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“x x x The recognition of Benita Castro
as a natural child of Eustaquio Castro appears in the
records of birth and partition. 
Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or any authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code).  It was a voluntary recognition already
established which did not need any judicial pronouncement (Gut, 68 Phil. 385;
Root v. Root, (CA), 71 O.G. 3061).  In Javelona v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, the Supreme Court clarified the
distinction between voluntary recognition and compulsory recognition.  In the first place, a voluntary recognition
is made in a public document, whereas in the indubitable writing under Article
135 is a private document.  (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579).  The father would ordinarily be more
careful about what he said in a public document than in a private writing, so that even an incidental mention of
the child as his in a public document deserves
full faith and credit.  In the
second place, in an action on Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the natural
child merely asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his having been
acknowledged as such, and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to
make the acknowledgment, whereas the action based on Article 135 is to compel
the father or his heirs to recognize the child. 
In the former case, acknowledgment has been formally and legally
accomplished because the public character of the document makes judicial
pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter case, recognition is yet to be
ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty
and higher authenticity of a public document, is not self-executory.  A judgment in favor of the
status of a natural child according to Art. 135 must therefore be based on an express recognition so found and declared
by the court after hearing.  At this
juncture, it is to be noted that an action based on voluntary
acknowledgment may be brought after the death of the father, but not an action
to compel acknowledgment, as a general rule, (Art. 137, Civil Code) which shows
the liberality of the law as to voluntary recognition, and its strictness
toward compulsory acknowledgment.

“While it is true that
Pricola Maregmen, Benita’s
mother was married to Naval (sic), it is the rule, however, that in case the
recognition is made by only one of the parents, it will be presumed that the
child is natural if the
parents recognizing it had the legal
capacity to contract marriage at the time of the conception (Art. 277, Civil Code; Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643;
Capistrano v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135).  The presumption arises from the act of recognition.

“What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended complaint
admitted that Benita Castro was the compulsory heir of Eustaquio
Castro.  They cannot now contradict their
own allegations (Cunanan v. Amparo,
80 Phil. 232).” (Rollo, pp. 14-15)

The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but the
petitioners contend that it erred in applying these principles to the facts of
this case.

The law which now governs paternity and filiation
is Title VI of the Family Code of the Philippines,
Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987 as amended by Executive Order No.
227, July 17, 1987.  We have to examine the earlier provisions,
however, because the Family Code provides in its Article 256 that:

“This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.” (Underlining supplied)

There is no question that the private respondent is an
illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.  Her father Eustaquio
was a widower when Pricola Maregmen,
her mother, went to live with him.  The
two could not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola
fled from her own wedding party on May
23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been solemnized.  In other words, the marriage was celebrated
although it could not be consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to
join the man she really loved.

Under the Civil Code, whether “new” or “old”,
illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were
generally classified into two groups: 
(1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of
lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.  (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269,
new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous, or illicit,
were those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to
marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.

Since Eustaquio
Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is his natural
child.  (See Borres and Barza v. Municipality
of Panay, 42 Phil. 643, 647 [1922]). 
However, from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting marriage
to Felix de Maya, Benita was her spurious child.

Under the Civil Code, for
an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be
recognized voluntarily or by court action. 
(Berciles v. Government Service Insurance
System, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Vda.
de Clemeña v. Clemeña, 24
SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1965]; Paulino
v. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles,
et al. v. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]; and
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).  This arises from the legal principle that an
unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from her parents
or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation
or blood relationship but from the child’s acknowledgment by her parent.  (Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479
[1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 95
Phil. 795 [1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91
Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda,
81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano,
et al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra).  In other words, the rights of an illegitimate
child arose not because she was the true or real child of her parents but
because under the law, she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.

This brings us to the question whether or not the private
respondent is an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.

Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment —
voluntary and compulsory.  The provisions
on acknowledgment are applied to natural as well as spurious children (Clemena v. Clemena, supra;
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra). 
Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment
by the father or mother, while Article 135 and Article 136 of the same Code
provide for the compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother
respectively.

Article
131 of the old Civil Code states that “The acknowledgment of a natural
child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public
document.”

In these cases, the appellate court ruled that the private
respondent was voluntarily recognized by her father, Eustaquio
Castro through the record of birth, hence there was no need for any judicial
pronouncement.

The record of birth referred to by the appellate court is
actually the birth certificate of the private respondent.  It appears in the certificate that Eustaquio Castro is the respondent’s father.

The petitioners take
exception to the respondent court’s ruling on voluntary recognition.

Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for
purposes of recognizing a child must be signed
by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone
otherwise she may be penalized.  (Section 5, Article 3753; Madridejo v. de
Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]).  What is signed is a loose form whose contents
are later transferred by a municipal employee to the local registry book of births
which is preserved.  An examination of
Exhibit F, Birth Certificate of Benita Castro, Folder of Exhibits, p. 112, shows that this “birth certificate”
was in turn copied on October 17,
1961 from Book I, Page No. 28, and Registry No. 47 of the book
bound records where “Eustaquio Castro” appears under the column “Remarks.”
There is no question that Eustaquio himself reported
the birth of his daughter but this record is not determinative of whether or
not he also signed the easily lost looseleaf form of
the certificate from where the entry in book bound or logbook record was taken
in March, 1919.

The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar
of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958]) and Berciles
v. Government Service Insurance System (128
SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and
gave all the data about his daughter’s birth. 
In Berciles we find no participation whatsoever in the
registration by Judge Pascual Berciles,
the alleged father.

We likewise see no
application of the statement in Madridejo v.
de Leon (supra), that the father,
apart from furnishing the necessary data must also sign the certificate
itself.  In that case, Pedro Madridejo, the father was still alive when the 1930
case was brought to court.  Pedro himself
testified that Melecio Madridejo
was conceived and born to him, a bachelor, and Flaviana
Perez, a widow.  The two were validly
married when Flaviana was about to die.  If the situation of Benita Castro Naval were
similar, there would be no need to even discuss whether or not the father
signed the birth certificate.  Under the
present law, the subsequent wedding of a man and woman whose child was
conceived when there were no legal impediments to a valid marriage gives that child
the rights of a legitimate offspring.  The situation is different in the
present case.

We apply the more liberal
provisions of the new Family Code considering the facts and equities of this
case.

First, Benita Castro
Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio
Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born.  From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the father’s death on August
22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and
care that a parent bestows on an only child.  The private respondents, themselves, admitted
in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.

Second, the rule on
separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special
relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio.  There are
no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of
Benita.

Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and
registered.  There is no indication in
the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919
that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have
signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years.  Or that he should have taken all legal steps
including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary
period to do so.

Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano
Naval.  The couple continued to live with
the father even after the
wedding and until the latter’s death.

Fifth, the certificate of
baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under
the Civil Code (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza,
127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434
[1968]; Capistrano, et al. v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135
[1907]) but they add to the equities of this case favoring the petitioner.

To remove any possible
doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code
which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have
no clear vested rights in their favor.

Under the Code’s Title VI on Paternity and Filiation,
there are only two classes of
children – legitimate and illegitimate.  The fine distinctions among various
types of illegitimate children have been eliminated.

Article 175 provides that
“Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.”
(Underscoring supplied).

Articles 172 and 173 on
establishing the filiation of legitimate children
provide:

“Art. 172. The filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) 
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or

(2)
 An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1)  The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or

(2)  Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.  (265a, 266a; 267a)

Art. 173.  The action to
claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity.  In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.  (268a)”

There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending
her status in this case is similar to an “action to claim legitimacy”
brought during her lifetime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.  The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.