RAMON CARENAN AND SONNY CARENAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PASCUAL DE JESUS, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioners pray for the invalidation of a Kasunduan on the ground that it does not express the true
intention of the parties and was in fact vitiated with fraud.  We are asked in effect to deviate from the parol evidence rule under which there can be no evidence of
the terms of a written agreement other than the writing itself.

The Kasunduan^[1]
was executed on February 6, 1978,
by Ramon Carenan, one of the herein petitioners, and
private respondent Pascual de Jesus.  It was written in Tagalog
and duly acknowledged before a notary public. 
By this agreement, De Jesus lent one-half hectare of his land to Carenan for the crop years 1978-80 under a sharing
arrangement “in accordance with existing law.”

After the expiration of
the agreed term, De Jesus filed a complaint against Ramon Carenan
and his son Sonny Carenan, the other petitioner in this case.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had
constructed their houses on the land without his permission and had refused to
demolish the same, as well as to vacate his property, despite his repeated
demands.  He invoked the Kasunduan.  He asked
for the removal of the houses and the return of the land, besides moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.^[2]

In their answer, the
petitioners impugned the Kasunduan and averred that
they had been cultivating the land as
early as 1969 as tenants of the plaintiff on a 50-50 sharing
arrangement.  In fact, they said, they
were tenants not only of one-half hectare of the plaintiff’s land
but of its entire area of one and one-half hectares.  The Kasunduan was a sham agreement which De Jesus had
tricked Ramon Carenan into signing.  De Jesus had pretended he only needed the
document to support a pending
loan application he had filed with a bank
and had assured Carenan that it would not affect
their tenancy relationship.  The defendants argued that as they could not
be ousted from the land under the law, the complaint for ejectment should be dismissed.  They also counterclaimed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and the costs of the suit.^[3]

The plaintiff himself
testified at the trial that he had lent the one-half hectare of his land to
Ramon Carenan only out of compassion for him and to
help him with the education of his son. 
He denied that the defendants were his tenants.  Notary Public Catalino
Alano declared that he had read the Kasunduan to the parties and that it reflected their true
agreement.^[4] The other corroborating witnesses were Paulino de Jesus, a relative and neighbor of the plaintiff,
and Fernando Alday, barangay
captain.  They stated under oath that
Ramon Carenan was only a hired laborer of the
plaintiff and worked as a “cargador” or
“loader” of sugar cane in the latter’s land.^[5]

Only Ramon Carenan testified for the defense, and incompletely at
that.  The continuation of his direct
examination was reset on joint motion of the parties but it was never resumed because of the non-appearance of both
Carenan and his counsel on the scheduled date and
hour.  This prompted the trial court to
declare the case submitted for decision.^[6] Carenan’s testimony
was not subjected to cross-examination nor was it formally offered in evidence
by the defense.

The trial court found for
the defendants, holding that they were tenants of the plaintiff.  Although agreeing that they had admitted the
authenticity and due execution of the Kasunduan,
Judge Inocencio U. Nakalinao
nevertheless rejected it in the end, finding that there was what he called
“the requisite proof to overcome the recitals of (the) public
document.”^[7] He was, however, reversed by the Court of
Appeals.^[8] Its decision, which is now before us in this
petition for review, sustained the Kasunduan under
the parol evidence rule.  The respondent court held that the defendants
had not succeeded in showing that the agreement was not truly
expressive of the will of the parties.

The parol
evidence rule is embodied in Rule 130, Section 7, of the Rules of Court as
follows:

Sec. 7. 
Evidence of written agreements.  – When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing, except in the following cases:

(a)     Where a mistake or
imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by
the pleadings;

(b)     When there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

The term “agreement” includes wills.

The rule is based on the
presumption that the parties “have made the writing the only repository
and memorial of the truth and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived and abandoned.”^[9] As
Wigmore would put it, “When a jural act is embodied in a single memorial, all
other utterances of the parties on that topic are legally immaterial for the
purpose of determining what are the terms of their act.”^[10]

In upholding the Kasunduan, the respondent court declared:

We find that the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to establish
his cause of action on the basis of the “Kasunduan,”
the authenticity and due execution of which was admitted by defendants in their
answer.  The said Agreement expressly
provided that the area leased to defendants was 1/2 hectare, and that the same
was to be returned or surrendered upon the expiration of the agreement.  The
lawyer who prepared, typed and notarized the document testified that the same
reflected the agreement of the parties, to whom he personally read the contents
of the deed (t.s.n. Dec. 17, 1985). 
Defendant had made no pretense or allegation that he was misled by
plaintiff’s misrepresentation into signing the “Kasunduan.”
As a public instrument which enjoys the presumption of regularity, clear and
convincing evidence is necessary to contradict the terms thereof; and since
there is no allegations of any intrinsic ambiguity in the writing, nor of
mistake or imperfection thereof, parol evidence is
not admissible to vary the contents thereof (Rule 130, Sec. 7).

In rejecting the Kasunduan as
a simulated agreement which the
defendants were deceived into signing, the trial court correctly declared that
fraud “cannot be presumed but must be established by clear and sufficient
evidence.” Yet, disregarding the very rule he had stressed, the judge
readily accepted Ramon Carenan’s unsupported and
self-serving testimony that the Kasunduan did not
“express the true intent and agreement of the parties.”^[11]

The trial court relied on
the testimony of Alday and Paulino
de Jesus that the petitioners’ houses had been constructed on the land earlier
than 1978.  That is hardly the convincing
evidence to prove that Ramon Carenan had been
deceived when he signed the Kasunduan.  The connection is tenuous and the conclusion far-fetched.  At
the same time, and for no valid (or given) reason either, the judge ignored the
testimony of these same witnesses that the petitioners were merely hired
laborers and not tenants of the private respondent.

As for Ramon Carenan himself, the respondent court was correct in
disbelieving him when, while insisting that he was a tenant rather than a
hireling, he could nevertheless not remember what his share was in the proceeds
of the crop years 1969-70 and 1970-71.^[12] Even if he had finished only
Grade III, as underscored in the petition, it is not likely that a farmer like him would forget such an important matter as his share in the yield of the land he had worked and cultivated.  A farmer does not need formal schooling to
remember this basic and important detail. 
If he was really a tenant, as he claims, he could not easily have
forgotten his participation in the fruits of his labors during the crop years
in question.

And going back to the Kasunduan, which
he signed despite his limited education, the Court notes that it was written in
Tagalog, Carenan’s native
tongue, and was actually read to him by witness Alano
before it was notarized.  There could not have been any
misrepresentation by the private respondent as to its contents nor have the
petitioners themselves complained on this score.

At any rate, we find that the petitioners have not established by
convincing evidence that the Kasunduan does not
reflect or express the true intent of the parties.  And as
they do not allege any of
the other exceptions to the parol evidence rule,
there is no justification for the Court to deviate from the said rule and to
hold that the parties are not bound by their agreement.

The only other point to
consider is the following stipulation in the Kasunduan
which the petitioners contend indicates that it was a tenancy agreement rather
than a contract of services:

2.  Na, ang
magiging ani sa naulit
ng dalawang pailo ay babahagiin ng NAGPAHIRAM at NANGHIRAM, matapos
na maawas ang lahat ng
gastos, ayon sa itinakda ng
batas na umiiral.

It cannot be denied that this paragraph, especially the last
phrase thereof, does suggest a tenancy sharing. 
However, the record does not show how such sharing was actually
effected, if at all, and, no less significantly, what the parties meant by the
existing law (“batas na
umiiral“), which could refer to the tenancy law
or to agricultural minimum wage
law.  Besides, and more importantly, the
petitioners cannot invoke the Kasunduan when it
serves their purpose and at the same time reject it when it operates against
their interests.  This is a convenience
the Court will not permit.

The same observation is
made of the private respondent’s objection to Carenan’s
testimony on the ground that it was neither subjected to cross-examination nor
formally offered.  Such objection is
inconsistent with his stand that that same testimony – especially Carenan’s inability to remember his share in the yield of
the land – belies the petitioners’ pretension that they are tenants and
not hired help.  It is clear that De
Jesus cannot invoke and challenge Carenan’s testimony in the same breath; he must either
accept it entirely or reject it in toto.

The Court is not unaware
of the tenderness of the Constitution and existing laws toward our farmers in recognition of their tremendous
contributions to the nation’s welfare and in line with the great policy of
social justice.  There is no need to
remind us of the need to improve their lot and to protect them from deception
and exploitation by rapacious landowners who have no compunction in
depriving the already deprived of what little they still have to enable them to
exist and survive.  But such protection is not called for in the
case at bar because the petitioners are not oppressed supplicants deserving of
the law’s compassion nor is the private respondent a heartless hacendero scheming to divest them of their legal
rights.  We see here no imposition or
injustice or deception calling for the sympathy and succor of this Court.

It cannot be repeated often enough that although the balance must
be tilted in favor of the less privileged, social justice, by its nomenclature
alone, is justice for all.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against the
petitioner.  It is so ordered.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exhibit “A”.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 20-23.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 24-27.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 40.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 41.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 31.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 35.

^[8]
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente,
Camilon and Ramirez, JJ.,
concurring.

^[9]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
5, 1970 Ed., p. 104.

^[10]
Ibid., p. 107.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 35.

^[12]
Rollo, p. 40.