G.R. Nos. 38215, 38216. December 22, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FAUSTINO RIVERA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
BUTTE, J.:
is an appeal filed by the Attorney-General from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas sustaining demurrers to the two amended
informations and dismissing the cases filed against the appellee
Faustino Rivera. The amended information in G. R. No. 38215 is as
follows:
“El Fiscal Provincial que
suscribe, acusa a Faustino Rivera, del delito de ‘inculpacion de un
inocente’, previsto y castigado en el articulo 363 del Codigo Penal
Revisado, cometido como sigue:“Que en o hacia el dia 23 de
junio de 1932, en el Municipio de Lucena, Provincia de Tayabas, Islas
Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado, el referido
acusado Faustino Rivera voluntaria, ilegal y maliciosamente ejecuto un
acto que directamente tendio a inculpar a Domingo Vito la comision de
un delito de hurto siendo este inocente de dicho delito, consistiendo
el acto ejecutado por el acusado en la presentacion de una denuncia por
escrito y bajo juramento en el Juzgado de Paz de Lucena, Tayabas (causa
criminal No. 6543), acusando, falsamente y sin causa probable alguna, a
Domingo Vito de dicho delito, causa que fue sobreseida definitivamente
por falta de pruebas. Con infraccion de la ley.”
The amended information in G. R. No. 38216 is as follows:
“El
Fiscal Provincial que suscribe, acusa a Faustino Rivera, del delito de
‘inculpacion de un inocente’, previsto y castigado en el articulo 363
del Codigo Penal Revisado, cometido como sigue:“Que en o
hacia el dia 23 de junio de 1932, en el Municipio de Lucena, Provincia
de Tayabas, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este
Juzgado, el referido acusado Faustino Rivera voluntaria, ilegal y
maliciosamente ejecuto un acto que directamente tendio a inculpar a
Felisa Moreno la comision de un delito de hurto siendo esta inocente de
dicho delito, consistiendo el acto ejecutado por el acusado en la
presentacion de una denuncia por escrito y bajo juramento en el Juzgado
de Paz de Lucena, Tayabas (causa criminal No. 6543), acusando,
falsamente y sin causa probable alguna, a Felisa Moreno de dicho
delito, causa que fue sobreseida definitivamente por falta de pruebas.
Con infraccion de la ley.”
To these
informations the defendant interposed a single demurrer alleging that
the facts averred in said informations do not constitute the crime
defined and punished by article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The
court below heard the two cases together and sustained the demurrer.
Upon the Government’s declining to amend the cases were dismissed, and
this appeal brought.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
“1.
In not holding that the facts alleged in the informations filed in
these two cases properly fall under article 363 of the Revised Penal
Code; and“2. In sustaining the demurrer interposed to said informations and in dismissing both of these cases.”
It appears from the record in criminal case No. 6543 of the justice of
the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, that on June 23, 1932, the
defendant-appellee Faustino Rivera signed and swore to a complaint
(Exhibit A) before said justice of the peace which is as follows:
“The undersigned accuses Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno, of the crime of theft, committed as follows:
“That
on or about the 22 day of June, 1932, in the municipality of Lucena,
Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without the use of force upon
things, took and carried away, one white American suit, containing one
eye glass, to the value of P30, and one buntal hat, valued at P3, two
buttons at P3 each, total value, is P39, to the prejudice of the
undersigned.“Act committed is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided:
“Witnesses:
“1. NlCANOR ZOLETA
“2. Sgt. RANAS, Q.“(Fdo.) FAUSTINO RIVERA
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of June, 1932, in Lucena, Tayabas.
FEDERICO M. UNSON
On June 29, 1932, the justice of the peace entered the following decision (omitting the caption):
“Comparecen
los acusados Domingo Vito y Felisa Moreno, ambos vec. de Lucena,
Tayabas, acompañados de sus abogados. Estos hicieron constar no
culpables. Oidas las pruebas de los testigos de cargo el Juzgado
sobresee el asunto por falta de pruebas con costas de oficio.“Lucena, junio 29, 1932.
“Asi se ordena.
FEDERICO M. UNSON
After
the justice of the peace rendered his decision on June 29, 1932,
dismissing the complaint filed against Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno,
the latter filed separate complaints against Faustino Rivera before the
same justice, charging Rivera with the offense of incriminating an
innocent person (article 363 of the Revised Penal Code) by the act of
filing the said information charging them with the crime of theft. The
defendant raised the same question and objection which he repeated in
the Court of First Instance on appeal, namely, that the facts alleged
did not fall under the condemnation of article 363 of the Revised Penal
Code.
There is no doubt that the facts alleged in the
informations above-quoted fall within the definition of the offense of
“acusacion” or “denuncia falsa” which is contained in article 326 of
the Codigo Penal, which was superseded on January 1, 1932, by the Revised Penal Code.
This article is as follows:
“Art.
326. Se comete el delito de acusacion o denuncia falsa imputando
falsamente a alguna persona hechos que, si fueren ciertos constituirian
delito de los que dan lugar a procedimiento de oficio, si esta
imputacion se hiciere ante funcionario administrativo o judicial que
por razon de su cargo debiera proceder a su averiguacion o castigo.“No
se procedera, sin embargo, contra el denunciador o acusador sino en
virtud de sentencia firme o auto, tambien firme, de sobreseimiento del
tribunal que hubiere conocido del delito imputado.“Este
mandara proceder de oficio contra el denunciador o acusador, siempre
que de la causa principal resultaren meritos bastantes para abrir el
nuevo proceso.”
Article 326 of the Codigo Penal
does not appear in the Revised Penal Code, which contains no offense
denominated “acusacion o denuncia falsa” or its equivalent. But the
Solicitor-General contends that article 363 of the Revised Penal Code
should be construed to embrace the crime of false accusation or
complaint as formerly penalized under article 326 of the Codigo Penal.
Article 363 in the Spanish text which is decisive is as follows, under the heading of “Asechanzas Inculpatorias”:
“Art. 363. Inculpacion de un inocente.—El
que, de cualquier manera que no constituyere falso testimonio,
ejecutare un acto que tienda directamente a inculpar o imputar a un
inocente la comision de un delito, sera castigado con la pena de
arresto mayor.”
As article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code is new and this is the first case before the court
calling for its interpretation, a comparison of the article with
article 326 of the former Penal Code seems expedient in view of the
argument of the Government that the former “is a reproduction of both
the crime of false accusation or complaint and the crime of calumny
described under said article 326 and article 452 of the old Penal Code.”
In passing it may be stated that if article 363 of the Revised Penal
Code could be construed to include article 452 of the old Penal Code it
would have no application to the case that we are considering because
article 452 of the old Penal Code which is as follows:
Art.
452. Calumny is the false imputation of a crime upon which a
prosecution might be instituted by the government of its own motion.”
does not refer to false accusations or denuncias made before an
administrative or judicial officer whose duty it is to investigate or
punish such crime.
Comparing now article 363 of the Revised
Penal Code with article 326 of the old Penal Code, it will be observed
that under article 326 of the former Penal Code, the gravamen of the
offense is the imputation itself when made before an administrative or
judicial officer, whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code the
gravamen of the offense is performing an act which “tends directly” to
such an imputation. Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes false
prosecutions whereas article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any
act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution.
It
is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear, it is
improper to resort to a caption or title to make it obscure. Such
secondary sources may be resorted to in order to remove, not to create
doubt. (Cf. People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil., 499.) In the present
case we think it proper to call attention to the title immediately
preceding article 363 of the Revised Penal Code which is as follows:
“Asechanzas Inculpatorias”, as throwing some light on the classes of
acts which tend directly to lead to false prosecutions. The word asechanza, as defined in standard dictionaries, means as follows:
“Intriga,
lazo, red, zancadilla, tranquilla, amaño, engaño, artificio, trama,
treta, especie de maquinacion urdida, de celada dispuesta contra
alguno, bien sea para perderlo enteramente, bien para jugarle (sin
hundirlo) alguna mala pasada. Engaño o artificio para hacer daño a
otro. Usase, por lo comun, en el plural, asechanzas. Accion y efecto de asechar.” It seems to us a forced extension of the term asechanza to bring a formal criminal complaint within the conception of intriga, engaño, artificio,
etc. It seems the more reasonable and sensible interpretation to limit
article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to acts of “planting” evidence
and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecutions
but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.
It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and
so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)
It is to be noted that article 326 of the old Penal Code contains the
provision that the accuser could be prosecuted only on the order of the
court, when the court was convinced upon the trial of the principal
cause that there was sufficient basis for a charge of false accusation.
Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code contains no such safeguard. If we
extended said article by interpretation to administrative and judicial
proceedings, it is apparent that we would open the door to a flood of
prosecutions in cases where the defendants were acquitted. There is no
reason to believe that the Legislature intended such a result.
The judgment below is affirmed with costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and Imperial JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.
CONCURRING IN THE RESULT
DIAZ, J.:
I concur in the result. The acts committed by the defendant-appellee
according to the version thereof given in the majority opinion do not
constitute the crime of incrimination of an innocent person as defined
and penalized in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, but that of
libel by means of writings as defined and penalized in article 355 in
connection with article 353 of the said Code, or that of false
testimony in one of its forms stated in article 183, depending upon the
circumstances present during the commission thereof. In the first case,
all the essential elements of the said crime are present, to wit: (1)
malicious imputation of a crime, which is that of theft, (2) committed
by means of writing, and (3) with publicity, inasmuch as the
defendant-appellee necessarily gave publicity to such imputation, which
was found to be untrue, when he delivered his written charges falsely
accusing Felisa Moreno and Domingo Vito of the crime of theft, to the
justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas. In the latter case, the only
thing to be proven is whether or not the defendant acted knowingly
therein. But under the terms of the informations filed in these cases,
neither the crime of libel nor that of false testimony could be proven,
nor could the accused be found guilty of the aforesaid crimes in view
of the fact that the informations in question are not in accordance
with the law. I am compelled to express this opinion in order to offset
any belief to the effect that the defendant-appellee is not liable.
DISSENTING
VICKERS, J.:
I dissent.
The facts alleged in the informations in question constitute the crime
of perjury as defined and punished in article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code, because it is charged that the defendant falsely and maliciously
accused the offended party in a verified complaint of the crime of
theft. With respect to the nature of the offense contemplated by
article 363, I cannot agree to restricting: it as proposed in the
majority opinion, because when the article refers to “any act not
constituting perjury” it is clear that it is not limited to “planting
evidence” or similar acts. The effect of the majority opinion is that a
person may falsely and maliciously accuse another of a crime in a
complaint under oath without incurring in any criminal responsibility.
If he should publicly make the same statements orally or in writing he
would be guilty of slander or libel, but because he made oath to his
statements and filed them in court he is exempt from criminal
responsibility, no matter how false and malicious his accusation may
have been. I cannot believe that such was the-intention of the
Legislature. The suggestion is unwarranted that the victim of a crime
will be deterred from denouncing the perpetrator for fear of being
prosecuted himself in case the person accused of committing the crime
should be acquitted. It must be alleged and proved that the original
accusation was false and malicious.