G.R. No. 40889. December 22, 1933
ISIDORO YBOLEON, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO MA. SISON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, GRACIANA ACUÑA DE YBOLEON AND TAISHO MARINE & FIRE INSURANCE CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Yboleon against the Honorable Pedro Ma. Sison, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Graciana Acuña de Yboleon and Taisho Marine
& Fire Insurance Co., Inc., wherein he prays that, for the reasons
alleged therein and after proper proceedings, the order of November 23,
1933, be declared null and void, on the ground that it had been issued
by the court in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the original
judgment rendered therein in accordance with the stipulation and
compromise entered into and submitted by the parties in civil case No,
44219 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein Graciana Acuña
de Yboleon was plaintiff and Isidoro Yboleon and the Taisho Marine
& Fire Insurance Co., Inc., were defendants, be declared final and
executory, with costs against the respondents.
The following pertinent facts are necessary for the solution of the question raised in these proceedings:
On April 19, 1933, Graciana Acuña de Yboleon, through her attorneys
Messrs. Amador Constantino and Juan M. Geraldo, filed a complaint under
oath against the herein petitioner Isidoro Yboleon and the respondent
Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Inc., in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying that she be declared the rightful owner of
one-half of the proceeds of a certain fire insurance policy issued by
the then defendant Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Inc., in the
name of the therein defendant Isidoro Yboleon, on the ground that the
property covered by the insurance policy and destroyed by fire belonged
to the conjugal partnership formed by her and her aforesaid husband
Isidoro Yboleon (Annex A).
On May 17, 1933, the aforesaid
plaintiff therein and respondent in this case, through her new
attorneys Messrs. Sotto and Astilla, filed a reamended complaint also
under oath, wherein alleged that the property covered by the insurance
policy in question was her paraphernal property and prayed that the
total amount of the policy issued by Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance
Co., Inc., be adjudicated to her as such absolute owner of said
property (Annex B).
Isidoro Yboleon the then defendant and
petitioner herein, filed an answer to the reamended complaint alleging,
by way of special defense, that the house covered by the insurance was
conjugal partnership property, and by way of cross-complaint or
counterclaim, he alleged that the land on which the house in question
was built belonged to the conjugal partnership, and that the
corresponding Torrens title having been issued in the name of the
plaintiff therein and respondent in the present case Graciana Acuña de
Yboleon, with the consent of her husband, the defendant therein and
petitioner in this case Isidoro Yboleon, he asked for the cancellation
of the said title and the issuance of another in the name of the
conjugal partnership formed by and between him and his aforesaid wife
Graciana Acuña de Yboleon (Annex C).
After said civil case
No. 44219 of the Court of First Instance of Manila had been set for
hearing, the parties thereto with the assistance of their respective
counsel, entered into the following compromise:
“The
plaintiff Graciana Acuña de Yboleon and the defendant Isidoro Yboleon,
with the intervention of their respective counsel respectfully submit
to the Honorable Court the following stipulation:“1. The
plaintiff admits the fact that the house destroyed by fire belonged to
the conjugal partnership and that the policy covering the same was
legally issued by the insurance company in the name of the defendant
Isidoro Yboleon.“2. The plaintiff further admits that the
land covered by certificate of title No. 9998 belongs to the conjugal
partnership and consents to the issuance of another certificate in the
name of the conjugal partnership formed by and between the plaintiff
Graciana Acuña and the defendant Isidoro Yboleon.“3. The
plaintiff and the defendant covenant and agree that the check for the
amount of the policy be issued by the defendant Taisho Marine &
Fire Insurance Co., Inc., in the name of their attorneys Messrs.
Cardenas and Sotto, who, upon receipt thereof, are authorized to
retain, respectively, one-half of the amount thereof to be delivered to
their respective clients.“4. The plaintiff considers her
complaint for support—civil case No. 44865 of this court—definitely
withdrawn, and definitely waives her right to demand support from the
defendant, as well as the costs.“5. The plaintiff binds
herself to deliver to the defendant, through her attorney Mr. Sotto,
within three days from the date of the judgment a letter prepared by
the said attorney and signed by her children Sofia and Rafael Yboleon,
whereby said children shall withdraw their slanderous charges against
the honor and dignity of the defendant in connection with the burning
of the house.“6. The litigants waive the reglementary
periods and ask that the judgment to be rendered in this case be
immediately made final and executory.“Wherefore, the litigants pray this Honorable Court to render judgment in accordance with this stipulation, without costs.
“I. YBOLEON “ISIDORO YBOLEON “GRACIANA ACUÑA “GRACIANA ACUÑA DE YBOLEON
“Witnesses: “M. L. “MANUEL LIM “Attorney for Taisho Marine “J. PEREZ CARDENAS “J. P. CARDENAS “Attorney for the defendant (Sgd.) “VICENTE SOTTO “VICENTE SOTTO
After
the said compromise had been submitted to the court, the corresponding
judgment was rendered on September 19, 1933, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
“Wherefore, the
court approves this stipulation and declares that the house destroyed
by fire formed part of the conjugal partnership property of the
plaintiff and the defendant; that the insurance policy covering the
house in question was validly issued in the name of the defendant; that
the land covered by certificate of title No. 9998 likewise belongs to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses; that the proceeds of the
policy should be apportioned share and share alike between the
plaintiff and the defendant, the corresponding check to be issued by
the defendant Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., in the name
of Attorney Vicente Sotto, counsel for the plaintiff and of Attorney
Jose Cardenas, counsel for the defendant. The register of deeds for the
Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to cancel certificate of title No.
9998 in the name of the plaintiff, and to issue another in lieu thereof
in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant, as partnership property
of both; and the parties are further ordered to comply with the other
conditions set forth in the said stipulation, without costs. So
ordered.”
Forty-eight hours later, that is, on September 21, 1933, the plaintiff filed an urgent ex parte petition praying that “for reasons of justice and equity the court, motu proprio,
ordered the immediate modification or amendment of the aforesaid
stipulation and judgment, in the sense that the parcel of land in
question be divided equally between her and her defendant spouse, and
the corresponding certificate of title issued to each of them.” (Annex
D.)
The therein defendant and petitioner herein Isidoro
Yboleon filed his opposition to this petition of the plaintiff Graciana
Acuña de Yboleon, alleging (a) that the court did not have
jurisdiction to amend a judgment which was final, executory and
unappealable, by express will of the parties; (b) that the
stipulation submitted to, and approved by the court had the nature of a
contract executed in the most solemn manner under the law, the
enforcement of which could not be made to depend upon the will and
discretion of only one of the contracting parties, and (c)
that the proposed amendment would deprive the defendant, as
administrator of the conjugal partnership, of one of his essential
rights recognized by law, which said defendant is not disposed to
waive. (Annex E.)
On September 22, 1933, the respondent judge issued the following order, to wit:
“ORDER
“In
connection with the urgent petition filed yesterday and set for hearing
tomorrow, the effects of the judgment rendered in this case on the 19th
instant, are hereby suspended until the petition in question is
decided. So ordered.“Manila, P. I., September 22, 1933.
“PEDRO MA. SISON
Before
the aforesaid urgent motion and the opposition thereto could be acted
upon, the plaintiff on September 25, 1933 filed an amended motion under
oath praying “that in view of the opposition of the defendant Yboleon
to the amendment or modification of that paragraph of the stipulation
and decision, in accordance with her petition of the 2nd instant—which
paragraph, drafted without her intervention, does not convey the true
intent of the plaintiff who affixed her signature thereto through an
excusable mistake—the judgment rendered in the above entitled case be
set aside as well as the stipulation submitted by the plaintiff, which
served as a basis for said judgment; that the attorney for the
defendant Isidoro Yboleon be ordered to return immediately the
duplicate of certificate of title No. 9998 to the attorney for the
plaintiff, and that this case be set for hearing” (Annex F).
The petitioner likewise filed his opposition to this amended motion on
the same grounds stated in his former opposition (Annex E), copy of
which is filed with the record and designated as Annex G.
On October 5, 1933, the litigants in the afore-cited case filed a petition which reads as follows:
“Come
now the parties litigant through their undersigned attorneys and to
this Honorable Court respectfully pray that in view of the conformity
of the plaintiff and the defendant to the compromise submitted, and
explained by the public instrument presented by the defendant, the
defendant Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co. be ordered to pay
immediately the amount of the policy in question, in accordance with
paragraph 3 of the stipulation of September 19, 1933.“Manila, P. I., October 5, 1933.
“J.PEREZ CARDENAS “Attorney for the defendant Yboleon”
On the same date, October 5, 1933, the respondent judge issued an order which reads as follows:
“Upon
consideration of the petition of even date filed by the attorneys for
the plaintiff Graciana Acuña and for the defendant Isidoro Yboleon, and
taking into consideration that the order suspending the effects of the
judgment rendered on September 22, 1933, referred only to that part of
the stipulation involving the land in question, and it appearing that
said petition is just,“Therefore, the defendant Taisho
Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., is hereby ordered to pay
immediately the amount of policy No. 668 to Attorneys Jose P. Cardenas
and Vicente Sotto, in accordance with the stipulation of the parties
and the decision of this court of September 19,1933. So ordered.”
On October 11, 1933, the therein plaintiff and respondent herein
substituted her attorney Vicente Sotto with attorney Manuel Escudero.
The latter, in a supplementary petition, asked the respondent judge who
took cognizance of the case, to set aside the judgment rendered therein
as well as the order of payment of the insurance policy and other
incidental petitions (Annex H).
On the same date, October
11, 1933, the former attorney for the plaintiff filed a petition
entitled “Rights of Retention of the Attorney for the plaintiff”, in
accordance with the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 190.
On October 13, 1933, the therein defendant and petitioner herein
Isidoro Yboleon filed his opposition to the said supplementary petition
of the plaintiff alleging that there existed no fraud, error, deceit
nor any other defect which would annul the stipulation of September 19,
1933.
On November 23, 1933, the respondent judge, passing
upon the above-mentioned petitions, issued an order the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
“Wherefore,
the court hereby sets aside the judgment rendered on September 19th
last, only with respect to the ownership of the land described in
certificate of title No. 11168. However, it maintains the said judgment
with respect to the sum of P6,000 representing the proceeds of the
insurance policy and orders that, out of the said P6,000, the Taisho
Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Inc. deliver the sum of P3,000 to the
defendant Isidoro Yboleon or his attorney Mr. Jose Perez Cardenas, and
deposit the remaining P3,000 corresponding to the plaintiff with the
clerk of this court, subject to Attorney Sotto’s lien. The clerk is
hereby instructed to set this case for hearing immediately in
connection with the alleged grounds for the reopening thereof. So
ordered.”
On November 29, 1933, the
attorney for the defendant Isidoro Yboleon filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that “the court absolutely lacks
jurisdiction to declare null and void, that part of the stipulation and
its judgment relative to the land in question, and in so doing in its
order of November 23, 1933, it exceeded its jurisdiction inasmuch as it
annulled part of its decision which, to all intents and purposes, is
legal, executory and final by will of the parties and by the lapse of
the period for ordinary appeal therefrom” (Annex J).
The
question to decide in these proceedings is whether or not the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside his
decision rendered by consent of the parties and based on a compromise
entered into by them with a waiver of all reglementary periods and a
petition to the effect that the judgment rendered therein be made final
and executory, by virtue of a motion which is not based on any of the
grounds specified in article 1817 of the Civil Code, that is, error,
deceit, violence, or forgery of documents, and without first
determining whether or not such grounds existed.
Article 1809 of the Civil Code defines the nature and juridical effects of compromise as follows:
“Art.
1809. Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in
interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something avoids the
provocation of a suit or terminates one which has already been
instituted.”
According to the legal
provision cited above, a compromise may either be judicial or
extrajudicial, depending upon whether its purpose be to terminate a
suit already instituted or to avoid the provocation thereof. In the
former case, the compromise is deemed judicial while in the latter
extra judicial.
Whether it be judicial or extrajudicial, a compromise has, with respect to the parties, the same authority as res judicata
with the sole difference that only a compromise made in court may be
enforced by execution, in accordance with the provisions of article
1816 of the Civil Code. Although a judicial compromise has the
authority of res judicata as if a final judgment had been
rendered therein, and may be executed in the manner provided for by the
Code of Civil Procedure, if the parties submit it for the consideration
and approval of the court praying that the suit be considered
terminated and the thing agreed upon be made effective (Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Arzadon, 20 Phil, 452; Hernandez vs. Barcelon,
23 Phil., 599, 610; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 22,
1911), the judgment rendered to that effect shall be subject to the
provisions of said Code of Civil Procedure, except that, as a judgment
by consent, it may not be amended, modified, nor corrected in any of
its essential parts without the consent of all the parties to the
compromise, on the ground that if the court changes it wholly or in
part without such consent, it ceases to be a judgment agreed upon by
them. Such exercise of judicial power would be tantamount to depriving
the aggrieved party of his right to be heard in the manner provided for
by law (3 Freeman on Judgments, p. 2776, sec. 1352; 34 Corpus Juris, p.
418, sec. 668). Neither can such judgment be reopened or set aside
without the consent of the parties who applied for it to sanction and
approve their compromise, converting said compromise into a judgment to
terminate the suit, or without sufficient evidence that the compromise
was obtained through error, deceit, violence, or forgery of documents,
which are the only grounds authorized by article 1817 of the Civil Code
on which to base on an action for the nullity of a judicial or
extrajudicial compromise already perfected. (See Freeman on Judgments, vol. 3, p. 2776, sec. 1352; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 419, sec. 670.)
The compromise under consideration is judicial inasmuch as it is for
the purpose of terminating two suits between the respondent Graciana
Acuña de Yboleon and her husband the herein petitioner Isidoro Yboleon,
designated as civil cases Nos. 44219 and 44865 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and was submitted to the respondent judge for his
approval and final determination of said suits.
Under the
legal provisions and cases afore-cited, the respondent judge really
acted in excess of his jurisdiction in setting aside his judgment upon
a motion in writing filed by the respondent Graciana Acuña de Yboleon,
without the consent of the petitioner Isidoro Yboleon and without first
hearing both parties and receiving evidence for the purpose of
determining the existence of any of the grounds for the annulment of a
compromise, enumerated in the aforesaid article 1817 of the Civil Code.
Inasmuch as the compromise in question has been converted into a
judgment, the annulment of the latter implies that of the former which,
as we have already said, cannot be done without the consent of the
parties or without evidence showing that the compromise has been
vitiated by error, deceit, violence, or forgery of documents. The mere
filing of a motion for a rehearing based on any of the aforesaid
grounds, without hearing the parties nor receiving evidence to
determine the existence of the alleged ground, is not sufficient
justification for the court to reopen or annul a judgment by consent.
Furthermore, the motion for the annulment of the judgment and the
compromise on which the order in question was based, is predicated on
the alleged failure of the movant to understand the meaning and scope
of the words “conjugal partnership property” by which the land in
dispute was designated. This ground is not included among those
enumerated in the law as grounds for annulment. Therefore, the
respondent judge also acted in excess of his jurisdiction in setting
aside his judgment on the aforesaid ground.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Arzadon (20 Phil., 452), cited above, this court said:
“A
party after having, in writing, requested and consented to the entry of
a judgment, lays no foundation for reopening such judgment and a
rehearing of the case by an allegation of his attorney that he had not
read the instrument in which his consent and request were embodied, and
that he gave such consent and made such request by mistake.”
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so
hold that a judge or court, which sets aside a judgment rendered upon
consent of the parties and based on a compromise entered into by them,
which is converted into such judgment, cannot amend or set it aside
without the consent of the said parties, or without first having
declared in an incidental preliminary hearing that such compromise is
vitiated by any of the grounds for nullity enumerated in article 1817
of the Civil Code.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied
for is hereby granted and the order setting aside part of the judgment
of September 19, 1933, issued by the respondent judge on November 23,
1933, is hereby declared null and void, with costs against the
respondent Graciana Acuña de Yboleon.
The petition in
question is hereby dismissed in so far as it affects the respondent
Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Inc., without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.