PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. WILFREDO G. CAINGLET, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On December 13, 1962 Wilfredo G. Cainglet was prosecuted before the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for falsification of
public and/or official documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 2230 and 2231
under two informations which we quote hereunder:

“That on or about April 22, 1959, in the
municipality of Ipil, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused, Wilfredo G. Cainglet, a private individual, in order to
deceive the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in, rendering
a decision in Cadastral Case No. N-19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-184,
declaring Lot No. 8492, Pls-248 and its Improvements as the private
property of the herein accused, thru false and fraudulent
representations, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with full knowledge of the falsity of its contents,
prepare and/or caused to be prepared the hereinbelow described
document, to wit:

“Judicial Form No, 106,
otherwise known as an Answer under Section 9 of Act No. 2259, duly
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Andres Bersales, a person
duly authorized by law to administer oath, wherein the accused
deliberately made the following untruthful statement of facts: (1) That
he is the owner of Lot No. 8492, Pls-248; (2) That he is the owner of
the buildings and improvements existing on the land; (3) That he has
been in possession of said land as owner for over 3 years; (4) That the
said land was acquired by occupation and purchase from a predecessor in
Interest; (5) That his predecessor in interest had been in possession
thereof for almost 30 years; (6) That there is no person having
interest to the said land; which allegation of facts as contained in
the above-mentioned document are necessary and essential, as required
under Section 9 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act,
in order that any person claiming to have an interest on the land
subject of the cadastral proceedings, may present his claim and thus
preventing the Court from declaring the land as public land;

once
the above document was accomplished, the herein accused, with full
knowledge of the falsity of any and all his allegations, and knowing
fully well that he has never possessed nor occupied the land at
anytime, as in fact, the land is actually possessed and occupied by
Mindet Elon since before the war, did then and there file and/or caused
the same to be filed in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No.
N-184 for Lot No. 8492, Pls-248, which cadastral proceedings was then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur,
with a view of misleading the/Court in issuing an order declaring Lot
No. 8492, Pls-248 as the private property of the herein accused, as in
fact, a decision dated October 30, 1959 was rendered by the Honorable
Judge Tito V. Tizon of the Court of First Instance of Pagadian,
Zamboanga del Sur, declaring among others that Lot No. 8492, Pls-248
with its Improvements is the private property of the accused WILFREDO
G. CAINGLET.”

“That on or about April 22, 1959, in the
municipality of Ipil, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and
in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused Wilfredo G. Cainglet, a private individual, in order to
deceive the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in rendering a
decision in Cadastral Case No. N-19, LRC Rec. No. N-184, declaring Lot
No. 8479, Pls-248 and its improvements as the private property of the
herein accused, thru false and fraudulent representations, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with full knowledge of the
falsity of its contents, prepare and/or caused to be prepared the
hereinbelow described document, to wit:

“Judicial
Form No. 106, otherwise known as an Answer under Section 9 of Act No.
2259, duly subscribed and sworn to before Andres Bersales, a Notary
Public, a person duly authorized by law to administer oath, wherein the
accused deliberately made the following untruthful statement of facts:
(l) That he is the owner of Lot No. 8479, Pls-248; (2) That he is the
owner of the buildings and improvements existing on the land; (3) That
he has been in possession of said lot as owner for over 4 years; (4)
That the said land was acquired by occupation and purchase of
possessory rights from a predecessor; (5) That his predecessor in
interest has been in possession thereof for at least 30 years; (6) That
there is no person having interest to the said land; which allegation
of facts as contained in the above-mentioned document are necessary and
essential as required under Section 9 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known
as the Cadastral Act, in order that any person claiming to have an
interest on the land subject of the cadastral proceedings may present
his claim and thus preventing the Court from declaring the land as
public land;

once the above document was
accomplished, the herein accused, with full knowledge of the falsity of
any and his allegations, and knowing fully well that he has never
possessed nor occupied the land at anytime, by himself or his
predecessor in interest, as in fact, the land has been actually
occupied by Nicolas Calero and Pedro Trabajado by virtue of their
Homestead Application, did then and there file or caused the same to be
filed in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. N-184 for Lot No.
8479, Pls-248, which cadastral proceedings was then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, with a view in
misleading the Court in issuing an order declaring Lot No. 8479,
Pis-248 as the private property of the herein accused, as in fact, a
decision dated October 30, 1959 was rendered by the Honorable Judge
Tito V. Tizon of the Court of First Instance of Pagadian, Zamboanga del
Sur, declaring among others that Lot No. 3479, Pls-248 with its
improvements is the private property of the accused Wilfredo G.
Cainglet.”

On January 16, 1963, before arraignment, the accused moved to quash
the afore-quoted informations on the ground that they contain
averments, which if true, would constitute an excuse or justification,
invoking Section 2(g) of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.^[1]
The averments referred to consist in the statements in the informations
that in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur declared Lots Nos. 8479 and 3492
with improvements thereon to be the private properties of Wilfredo G.
Cainglet. Such judicial pronouncement which has become final, as can be
inferred from the informations, allegedly runs counter to the charge
that accused falsely claimed said real estate to be his own private
properties.

The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the aforequoted
informations. Hence the provincial fiscal appealed to this Court.

The issue is whether or not the final judgment in Cadastral Case No.
19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 declaring Wilfredo G. Cainglet owner
of Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 bars his subsequent prosecution for falsely
stating in his answers in said Cadastral Case that he possessed and
owned Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492.

The lower court holds the opinion and appellee maintains that for
the falsification cases to prosper, the trial court must necessarily
find that the latter’s allegations of possession and ownership in his
answers filed in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184
are false. Allegedly, this matter has already been directly adjudged in
said cadastral case, and the judgment therein is conclusive In
subsequent proceedings, pursuant to Sections 44 and 45 of Rule 39 in
relation to Section 48 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. Appellee then
submits to the proposition that a judgment of guilt of the accused in
the falsification cases would nullify the validity and conclusiveness
of the previous cadastral proceedings, subject the cadastral titles to
collateral attack and destroy the indefeasibility of the Torrens titles
Issued.

It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding—a proceeding in rem—is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world. Reason is that public
policy and public order demand not only that litigations must terminate
at some definite point but also that titles over lands under the
Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the
stability of the country’s economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of lands
is not absolute. It admits of exceptions. Public policy also dictates
that those unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by
reason of the operation of our registration laws be afforded remedies.
Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance of property^[2] or a personal action for recovery of damages against the party who registered his property through fraud^[3],
or in case of insolvency of the party who procured the registration
through fraud, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines for
recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund.^[4]
Through these remedial proceedings, the law, while holding registered
titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to prevent one from
enriching himself at the expense of others. Necessarily, without
setting aside the decree of title, the issues raised in the previous
registration case are relitigated, for purposes of reconveyance of said
title or recovery of damages.

In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for
perjury the party who obtains registration through fraud, such as by
stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in
cadastral proceedings. For Section 116 of the Land Registration Act
states:

“SEC. 116, Whoever knowingly swears falsely to any
statement required to be made under oath by this Act shall be guilty of
perjury and liable to the penalties provided by laws for perjury.”

And in this case, Section 116 of the Land Registration Act is
applicable to cadastral proceedings under Act 2259, by virtue of
Section 11 thereof.

From its wording, Section 116 applies to all and does not
distinguish between those who make false statements and successfully
procure registration by such statements,, and those whose statements
were not given credence by the land registration court. The law
therefore applies with equal brunt on both types of offenders. This is
rightly so, for to give immunity from prosecution to those successful
in deceiving the registration court would, in effect, be putting a
premium on perjury and making the punishment therefor dependent upon
the non-realization of the object of its commission.

For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee’s view would be to
unduly discriminate in the prosecution of persons charged with
falsification or perjury. While public policy, on one hand, demands an
end to litigation, and hence puts forward the doctrine of res judicata,
yet, on the other hand, every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow
technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the
laws.^[5] It is the policy of the
law that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from
fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth,
and that they be punished if they do not.^[6]

As afore-stated, a judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not
undermine the indefeasibility of the titles over Lots Nos. 8479 and
8492. Neither would the criminal proceeding for falsification or
perjury be a collateral attack on the titles in question. The
prosecution for falsification or perjury is a proceeding in personam
which inquires into the criminal liability of the accused. Not being an
attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment rendered
therein would leave said titles undisturbed.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and
this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings. No costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Now Section 2(g), Rule 117.

^[2] Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil. 620; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Dizon vs. Lacap, 50 Phil. 193; Garcia vs. Reyes, 51 Phil. 409; Angeles vs. Samia, 66 Phil. 444.

^[3] Manotoc vs. Choco, 30 Phil 628.

^[4] Estrellado vs. Martinez, 48 Phil. 256.

^[5] Jay vs. State, (1916, 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137.

^[6] People vs. Niles, 300 III, 458, 133 N.E. 252, 37 A.L.R. 1284. 1289.