FRANCISCA VILUAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PATRICIO HUFANA AND GREGORIO HUFANA, RESPONDENTS.

Seven
persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La
Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were
riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree.
The bus, owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came
from San Fernando, La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur.

It
appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school
building in the municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by
Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but
that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and
raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a
result of which it hit a post, crashed against a tree and then burst
into flames.

Among
those who perished were Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca Lacsamana, Narcisa
Mendoza and Gregorio Sibayan, whose heirs sued petitioner and the
latter’s driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, for damages for breach of
contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured, also sued
petitioner and the driver for damages. The complaints were filed in the
Court of First Instance of La Union.

In their answer,
petitioner and her driver blamed respondent Gregorio Hufana for the
accident. With leave of court, they filed third party complaints
against Hufana and the latter’s employer, Patricio Hufana.

After
trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together with
their respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages.

The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

“IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
plaintiffs entitled to damages to be paid jointly and severally by the
defendants and third-party defendants as follows:

(1) For
plaintiff Juliana C. Vda. de Mapanao for the death of her son Timoteo
Mapanao, the sum of P5,000.00 for actual damages, P1,000.00 as moral
damages and P250.00 as attorney’s fees;

(2) For plaintiff
Leon Lacsamana for the death of his daughter Francisca Lacsamana, the
sum of P4,000.00 as actual damages, P1,000.00 as moral damages and
P250.00 as attorney’s fees;

(3)
For plaintiff Juan Mendoza and Magdalena Mendoza for the death of their
mother Narcisa Mendoza, the sum of P4,000.00 for actual damages,
P1,000.00 for moral damages, and P250.00 as attorney’s fees;

(4)
For plaintiffs Agustina Sabado, Quintin Sibayan, Julita Sibayan,
Primitivo Sibayan and Avelina Sibayan, the sum of P4,000.00 for actual
damages, P1,500.00 for moral damages and P250.00 as attorney’s fees.

(5)
For the injured passenger Carolina Sabado, P649.00 for actual damages,
P1,500.00 for moral damages and P250.00 for attorney’s fees.

All
such amounts awarded as damages shall bear interest at the legal rate
of six per cent (6%) per annum from the date of this decision until the
same shall have been duly paid in full.

Defendants and third-party defendants are further ordered to pay proportionate costs.”

Both
petitioner and her driver and the respondents therein appealed to the
Court of Appeals. While affirming the finding that the accident was due
to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of both the Viluan and the
Hufana buses, the Court of Appeals differed with the trial court in the
assessment of liabilities of the parties. In its view only petitioner
Francisca Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of
contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, cannot be made
jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the
latter’s employee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage.
The court added, however—

“Hermenegildo
Aquino is not entirely free from liability. He may be held liable,
criminally and civilly, under the Revised Penal Code (Article 100 and
103), but not in a civil suit for damages predicated upon a breach of
contract, such as this one (Aguas, et al. vs. Vargas, et al.,
CA G.R. No. 27161-R, Jan. 22, 1963). Furthermore, the common carrier,
Francisca Viluan, could recover from Aquino any damages that she might
have suffered by reason of the latter’s negligence.”

Neither
may respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be held liable in
the opinion of the appellate court because the plaintiffs did not amend
complaints in the main action so as to assert a claim against
respondents as third party defendants.

The appellate court
likewise disallowed the award of moral damages for P1,000 to Carolina
Sabado, there being no showing that the common carrier was guilty of
fraud or bad faith in the performance of her obligation. Accordingly,
it rendered judgment as follows:

“IN VIEW
OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we hereby find defendant-appellant Francisca
Viluan solely liable to the plaintiffs-appellees for the damages and
attorney’s fees awarded to them by the court below and further declare
null and void the lower court’s award of moral damages in the amount of
P1,000.00 in favor of plaintiff Carolina Sabado. Thus modified, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs in
this instance against defendant-appellant Francisca Viluan.

From
this judgment petitioner brought this appeal. In brief, her position is
that since the proximate cause of the accident was found to be the
concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses, then she and
respondent Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should have been held equally
liable to the plaintiffs in the damage suits. The fact that the
respondents were not sued as principal defendants but were brought into
the cases as third party defendants should not preclude a finding of
their liability.

We agree with petitioner’s contention. To
begin with, the Court of Appeals’ ruling is based on section 5 of Rule
12 of the former Rules of Court,^[1]
which was adopted from Rule 14-a of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. While the latter provision has indeed been held to preclude
a judgment in favor of a plaintiff and against a third party defendant
where the plaintiff has not amended his complaint to assert a claim
against a third party defendant,^[2]
yet, as held in subsequent decisions, this rule applies only to cases
where the third party defendant is brought in on an allegation of
liability to the defendants. The rule does not apply where a third
party defendant is impleaded on the ground of direct liability to the
plaintiffs, in which case no amendment of the plaintiff’s complaint is
necessary.^[3] As explained in the Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. vs. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (1943):

“From
the sources of Rule 14 and the decisions herein cited, it is clear that
this rule, like the admiralty rule, ‘covers two distinct subjects, the
addition of parties defendant to the main cause of action, and the
bringing in of a third party for a defendant’s remedy over.’ * * *

“If
the third party complaint alleges facts showing a third party’s direct
liability to plaintiff on the claim set out in plaintiff’s petition,
then third party “shall” make his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and
his counterclaims against plaintiff as provided in Rule 13. In the case
of alleged direct liability, no amendment is neceesary or required. The
subject-matter of the claim is contained in plaintiff’s complaint, the
ground of third party’s liability on that claim is alleged in third
party complaint, and third party’s defense to his alleged liability on
the claim is set up in his answer to plaintiff’s complaint. At that
point and without amendment, the plaintiff and third party are at issue
as to their rights respecting the claim.

“The provision in
the rule that, “The third-party defendant may assert any defenses which
the third-party plaintiff may assert to the plaintiff’s claim,’ applies
to the other subject, namely, the alleged liability of third party
defendant. The next sentence in the rule, “The third-party defendant is
bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff’s liability to
the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the
third-party plaintiff,’ applies to both subjects. If third party is
brought in as liable only to defendant and judgment is rendered
adjudicating plaintiff’s right to recover against defendant and
defendant’s right to recover against third party, he is bound by both
adjudications. That part of the sentence refers to the second subject.
If third party is brought in as liable to plaintiff, then third party
is bound by the adjudication as between him and plaintiff. That refers
to the first subject. If third party is brought in as liable to
plaintiff and also over to defendant, then third party is bound by both
adjudications. The next sentence in the rule, ‘The plaintiff may amend
his pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any claim
which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third-partjr
defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant,’ refers to the
second subject, that is, to bringing in third party as liable to
defendant only, and does not apply to the alleged liability of third
party directly to plaintiff.”

In
this case the third party complaints filed by petitioner and her driver
charged respondents with direct liability to the plaintiffs. It was
contended that the accident was due “to the fault, negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of the third party defendant Gregorio
Hufana” and, in petitioner’s motion for leave to file a third party
complaint, it was stated that “Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana were
not made parties to this action, although the defendants are entitled
to indemnity and/or subrogation against them in respect of plaintiff’s
claim.”

It should make no difference therefore whether the
respondents were brought in as principal defendants or as third-party
defendants. As Moran points out, since the liability of the third-party
defendant is already asserted in the third-party complaint, the
amendment of the complaint to assert wuch liability is merely a matter
of form, to insist on which would not be in keeping with the liberal
spirit of the Rules of Court.^[4]

Nor
should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs
from contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. As
early as 1931, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177,^[5]
that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which he was riding and of o£ the driver of
another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles
are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the
Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are
liable on quasi-delict.

Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that petitioner
as well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana are jointly
and severally liable for the damages awarded by the trial court. The
disallowance of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 is correct and
should be affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

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^[1] This provision, which is not reproduced in the new Rules of Court, is as follows:

Complaint amendment.—The plaintiff may amend his pleadings
to assert against the third-party defendant any claim which the
plaintiff might have asserted against the third-party defendant had he
been joined originally as a defendant.

^[2] See e.g., Thompson vs. Cranston, Brown vs. Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270 (1942).

^[3] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (1943); Lommer vs. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., 4 F.R.D. 104 (1944)

^[4] I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 205 (1957).

^[5] See also Paulan vs. Sarabia, G. R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958.