IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIA PASTOR DE TEVES, AND PEDRO TEVES, PETITIONERS, TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED PEDRO TEVES, MARIANO TEVES, EXECUTOR-PE…

Pedro Teves and Maria Pastor were husband and wife, residing in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental. Maria Pastor died on February 22,
1937, and was survived by her husband and three children, named
Concepcion Teves, of age; Jose Teves (now deceased), who left no
legitimate heirs (except his father and a natural child); and Asuncion
Teves, also deceased, who was survived by her husband Luciano Imbo and
her children named Jesusa, 24; Jose, 23; Maria, 22; Remedios, 21;
Corazon, 17; Mariano, 14; and Luciano, Jr., 13.

On December 12, 1949, Pedro Teves, applied for letters of Administration in the CFI of Negros Oriental, Sp. Proc. No. 675,
and was appointed administrator of the estate of his deceased wife
Maria Pastor on May 9, 1951. On June 2, 1951, Concepcion Teves, was
appointed as co-administratrix of the estate.

On December 15, 1954, Pedro Teves died, leaving a will and
testament, which was presented to the same Court for probate on January
8, 1955, in Sp. Proc. No. 1010 of said Court. The court on
February 25, 1955, allowed the said will and admitted the same to
probate. On January 26, 1955, Dr. Jose T. Imbo, was appointed as
co-administrator of the estate in Sp. Proceeding No. 675, in
place of the deceased Pedro Teves and said Dr. Imbo, qualified as such
administrator on January 28, 1955. Mariano Teves, named executor of the
will of Pedro Teves was, on February 24, 1955, appointed by the Court
as such, with a will annexed in Sp. Proc. No. 1010. The properties of
Maria Pastor inventoried under Sp. Proc. No. 675, and the properties of
Pedro Teves inventoried under Sp. Proc. No. 1010, are the same conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses.

The last will and testament of the late Pedro Teves, partitioned and
divided most of the real properties of the deceased among the heirs
(Paras. X to XVII of the Will). And among the adjudications in the
will, were the ones made in favor of Concepcion Teves, to wit:

“XI. It is my wish to give as share of Concepcion
Teves, lots Nos. 6272 (No. 5) and 1932 (No. 2) both large coconut
plantations, situated near the land of Ramon Amores.”

With respect to this adjudication, Dr. Imbo and all the heirs, on
October 20, 1956, made a Joint Manifestation in Court, of the following
tenor:-

“5. That in view of the fact that the only
properties of the intestate Maria Pastor de Teves now remaining and the
testate Pedro Teves are their conjugal and undivided properties and
in view of the further fact that the legal heirs of the said intestatm
we in conformity with the disposition of the Will of the said testate,
which also covers all said conjugal properties, thereby including the
intestate properties, it would be to the convenience of all parties if
the aforesaid two proceedings x x x be considered either jointly or
simultaneously.”

In her capacity as heir and devisee of lots Nos. 1932 and 6272,
Concepcion Teves, on June 28, 1955, sold, for valid and sufficient
consideration, the said lots, to the spouses Dr. Conrado A. Habana and
Rosario Remollo. On August 10, 1956, Concepcion filed a motion asking
that the executor be required to sell a part of the estate, for the
purpose of finally liquidating and settling the estate in accordance
with previous orders of the Court. On September 1, 1956, the executor
and other heirs filed an opposition which partly reads as follows:

“2. That the disposal of the properties of the
deceased is not reasonable inasmuch as said properties have already
been adjudicated to the respective heirs of the deceased by virtue of a
Will and a disposal of any of the properties aforementioned would be
prejudicial to the interest of the heir to whom said property have been
assigned”;

“8. That the petitioner has lost all her rights
and interest in the estate of the deceased due to the fact that she has
already sold all her shares and participation in the properties of the
deceased without getting the approval of this Hon. Court nor give
notice to the herein executor.”

On October 4, 1956, the Court granted the motion and ordered the
sale of “some of the properties mentioned in the will, preferably those
which are referred to in No. XVIII, page 5 of the same, within sixty
(60) days from date of receipt by the executor of this Order”.
Paragraph XVIII of the Will, referred to by the Court, reads as
follows:

“There are some parcels of land which are not
mentioned in this will but it is my wish that these lands he divided in
equal shares by nine (9) children—these of my children by the first and
second wife.”

On November 8, 1956, the executor in an ex-parte motion, prayed for authority to sell lots 1932 and 6272,
alleging, “5. That it would be to the best interest of all the legal
and testamentary heirs if the sale of the properties in the next
preceding paragraph (lots 1932 and 672) were the ones sold, because the
legatee Concepion Teves has already disposed of her rights in the said
premises”. This information, notwithstanding, on December 10, 1956, the
lower court, granted the motion and authorized the executor to sell
again the two lots, together with the improvements thereon. On December
21, 1956 (10 days later), the said lots were sold to Dr. Jose T. Imbo,
the Judicial Administrator. On the same day (Dec. 21, 1956), the Court
approved the sale, by merely printing the phrase “granted as prayed
for”, with a rubber stamp, at the foot of the motion’s last page. It
does not appear that notice thereof was served to the parties.

On February 7, 1957, devisee-vendor Concepcion Teves asked the Court
to declare the sale to Dr. Imbo, null and void. On February 15, 1957,
upon hearing of such sale, and the approval of the Court, Dr. and Mrs.
Habana, also filed a motion in the consolidated Sp. Proceedings Nos.
675 and 1010, asking that the sale of lots Nos. 1932 and 6272 in favor
of Dr. Imbo, be declared null and void, on the ground that such sale
was made in bad faith, because the purchaser knew that said lots were
adjudicated by will to Concepcion Teves as her share, with the
conformity of all the heirs, and the same were already sold to Dr. and
Mrs. Habana, for valid and sufficient consideration. Oppositions were
filed by the other heirs and on August 80, 1957, the lower court denied
the said motion of Dr. and Mrs. Habana, stating that “the said two lots
were sold to the petitioners (Dr. and Mrs. Habana) at the back
of the Court,” before the adjudication to the heirs of their respective
shares in the testate estate, were effected, and such act did not give
the said petitioners any personality to impugn or seek the annulment of
the sale of the two lots in question which was known to the heirs. In
said Order, the lower Court considered the petition of February 7,
1957, withdrawn; denied the motion of Atty. P. E. Remollo and ordered
it stricken off the record.

Dr. and Mrs. Conrado Habana, filed the corresponding Record on
Appeal and appeal bond. However, before these were approved by the
lower court, Dr. Imbo presented a “motion to rescind sale”, paragraph 6
of which recites:

“6. That it would be to the interest of all persons
concerned, therefore, if the sale of the above-mentioned Lots Nos. 1932
and No. 6272 to the said Jose T. Imbo be rescinded, so that the said
appeal would be abandoned and so that said lots would be reverted to
their original condition as part of the estates of the deceased Pedro
Teves and Maria Pastor de Teves.”

Acting upon said motion, on November 7, 1957, the lower Court
rescinded the sale of lots 1932 and 6272 to Dr. Imbo and for that
reason, the appeal of Dr. Habana and his wife was discontinued and the
cash appeal bond was ordered returned to them.

On March 19, 1958, barely four (4) months after said rescission, the executor filed another motion, praying that same lots 1932 and 6272 and all improvements thereon,
be sold again for the same price of P10,000.00. So, in April, 1958, the
espouses Dr. and Mrs. Habana again filed an opposition thereto, on the
grounds that said lots 1932 and 6272 no longer belonged to the estate.
This opposition was supplemented with a petition that the oppositors be
given possession of said lots, subject only to a lien in favor of the
estate, for the payment of any unpaid obligation of the estate, should
other properties of the estate be insufficient to pay all debts.

On October 21, 1958, Concepcion Teves, surprisingly enough,
filed a pleading styled “Conformidad”, to the motion to sell anew said
lots, filed by the executor, for which reason, on October 25, 1958, Dr.
and Mrs. Habana presented a motion, praying that Concepcion Teves be
cited for contempt of Court for “double dealing” and that the case be
endorsed to the City Fiscal, for appropriate action.

On January 7, 1959, the Court issued an Order (a) over ruling the
opposition and motion of Dr. and Mrs. Habana, and disregarding the sale
of lots 1932 and 6272, executed by Concepcion Teves in favor of the
appellants herein and (b) granting the petition of the executor to sell
anew the said lots to any third person or persons, for a price not
lower than P10,000.00. Hence, this appeal interposed by Dr. and Mrs.
Conrado Habana.

Appellants, in their brief, submit that the lower court erred:

1) In not holding that Concepcion Teves, could
validly sell her hereditary rights over lots 1932 and 6272 in question,
in their favor, without prior approval of the Court;

2) In
not holding that the executor and all the heirs of Pedro Teves are
precluded from assailing the validity of the sale of said lots to
appellants;

3) In not holding that the second petition to sell the same lots was filed in bad faith in order to circumvent the illegality of the previous sale executed in favor of Dr. Jose T, Imbo, judicial administrator, and

4)
In ordering the sale of said two lots to pay debts of the estate
despite the fact that they had previously been sold to them
(appellants), and in not ordering instead the sale of the undisposed
and unencumbered properties of the estate.

After a careful perusal of the facts as elicited from the pleadings
and documentary proofs before Us, for no testimonial evidence was
presented, We are of the opinion that the stand of the lower court and
the appellees herein, is untenable.

The distribution made in the Will of Pedro Teves, whereby, among
others he said, it was his “wish to give as share of Conception Teves
lots Nos. 1932 (No. 2) and 6272 (No. 5), both large coconut
plantations, situated near the land of Ramon Amores”, is in accordance
with article 1080 of the Civil Code, which provides that “Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter-vivos, or
by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as at does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs”. There was no showing
that said distribution ever prejudiced the legitmie of the compulsory
heirs herein, and as a matter of fact all the heirs gave their express
conformity to the said distribution (see joint manifestation, supra).
There was not even a vague suggestion of unfairness with respect to the
disposition of the legitimes. Conception Teves by operation of law,
became the absolute owner of said lots because “A partition legally
made confers each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him” (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of
her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and,
she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law (Arts, 657, 659 and 661, Civ. Code). Conception
Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as a part of her
share of the estate of the deceased, even before the approval of the
proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the
present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her
co-heirs; for “there is no provision of law which prohibits a co-heir
from selling to a stranger his share of an estate held in common before
partition of the property is approved by the Court” (Cea vs. C.A. G.R.
No. L-1776, Oct. 27, 1949; Beltran vs. Doriano, 32 Phil. 66). An heir
may also sell the rights, interest or participation, which he has or
might have in the property under administration, or in custodia legis
(Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). The executor of the will and all
other heirs of the late Pedro Teves should be precluded from
questioning the validity of the sale of the lots in question in favor
of appellants, Dr. and Mrs. Habana; rather, they should comply with the
lawful provisions of the Will of the testator, for it has been well
provided that “should a person make a partition of his estate by an act
inter-vivos, or by will, (as in this case), such partition shall be respected, in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs” (Art. 1080, Civil Code).

But the appellees allege that other properties were not sufficient
to pay the debts of the estate, and, therefore, it was necessary for
the administrator to retain these two lots (sec. 3, Rule 85). The
Executor informed the Court on June 9, 1955, that the total obligation
of the estate was P9,976.00 and on August 10, 1956, Concepcion Teves
told the court that out of this amount, only P5,000.00 remained unpaid,
which was apportioned among the heirs and that her share was paid By
her in full. The Executor also informed the Court on December 21, 1956
that the obligation of the estate to the Philippine National Bank, was
paid and that the claim of Eng Suy Huat & Co. in the sum of
P3,186.40 was left unpaid. Concepcion Teves can well be considered free
from the obligation of the estate, and that lots 1932 and 6272 were
also free, and could be sold, as they were sold, to any party “without
any strings attached”. However, should there be any doubt as to the
full payment of the obligations of the estate, particularly the share
of Concepcion Teves, who, according to unrebutted disclosure in the
records, had paid her share, or as to the sufficiency of the remaining
properties to pay all the obligations of the estate (which was not the
case), a notation of a lien in favor of the estate, may/can be made on
the T.C.T. of said Lots Nos. 1932 and 6272. It appears that appellants,
without renouncing any of their rights granted by law, would be willing
to allow such notation, to guarantee that all the obligations of the
estate, will be met, and thus expedite the delivery of said lots to
them. We are of the opinion that such procedure would not violate the
rights of the parties concerned, in the present case.

It may be observed in passing, that the second petition to sell lots
1932 and 6272, was characterized with bad faith, and made to circumvent
the illegality of the previous sale executed to Dr. Imbo, the judicial
administrator. Dr. Imbo knew fully well that said lots were adjudicated
by will to Concepcion Teves, to which adjudication he had given his
conformity and that the said Concepcion had already disposed of her
rights thereon. As judicial co-administrator of the estate (Sp. Proc.
No. 675), Dr. Imbo was aware of these facts, but without apprising the
Court about the status of these lots, had bought them, thereby causing
prejudices upon the first purchasers-appellants Dr. and Mrs. Habana
(Art. 1491, Civ. Code). And the rescission of alleged sale made to him,
was tinged with even intenser color of bad faith, when he, as
co-administrator, hastened to ask for such rescission so that the
appeal of the appellants against the order given to sell again the said
lots would be abandoned, and the same reverted to their original
condition. Lulled by a feeling of false security appellants abandoned
the appeal, only to be harassed again four (4) months later, with a
petition of the executor and the heirs. Dr. Imbo, inclusive, to sell
the same lots to pay the obligations of the estate. The subsequent
conduct of Concepcion Teves, heretofore mentioned, simply reveals a
resolve on the part of the heirs, particularly Concepcion Teves, to
continue a questionable procedure to sell her said lots, as many times
as she could benefit by the sale thereof. A double dealing should not
be invoked as a justification for any act, or serve as a mantle of
protection for any one.

As heretofore adverted to, the executor was ordered to sell the
properties mentioned in paragraph XVIII of the Will (supra). It was the
duty of the executor to sell properties belonging to the estate which
had not been disposed of by the respective heirs. It is unfair, to say
the least, to let Concepcion Teves shoulder the whole burden alone and
pay more than her true and actual share in the obligations of the
estate, which she claims to have been already paid, before she made a volte face.
If she had not paid her share, she still has other properties which can
be sold by the executor, such as the properties mentioned under
paragraphs XVIII, XIV, XV and XVII of the Will. There was no
justification for choosing the particular lots 1932 and 6272, which are
now the subject of a litigation, to be sold. It seems to be a sound
principle to follow that if there is need to sell properties of an heir
to pay debts, the properties still belonging to such heir should be
sold first.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered reversing the order of the Court,
dated January 7, 1959, authorizing the executor to enter into a
contract to sell anew lots 1932 and 8272, and REMANDING the case to the
Court of origin for further proceedings, with instructions to sell
other undisposed or unencumbered properties of the estate, or the
undisposed or unencumbered properties of any of the heirs, should there
be any obligation of the estate will unpaid, in conformity with law as
in such cases provided, reserving the right, if any, upon any
authorized party to question the validity of the sale made by
Conception Teves to appellants herein, in the proper Court. Costs
against the appellees.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla J., took no part.