JOSE BUMANGLAG, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MELECIO BARAOIDAN AND HILARION BARAOIDAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal taken by Jose Bumanglag from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte in Civil Case No. 1098 dismissing his complaint against Melecio
and Hilarion Baraoidan, on the ground of res judicata.

On December 31, 1949, appellant commenced the present action against
appellees in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to recover the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in sitio Darasdas, Barrio
Lippas a Bassit, Municipality of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, alleging in his
complaint that he had inherited it from his parents; that in the year 1930, his
father assigned a portion thereof, with an area of 4 hectares, 28 ares and 40
centares, to Juan Baraoidan, father of appellees, for the latter to clear and
cultivate, with the understanding that all the products to be harvested
therefrom would belong to him until the total area of the land was fully
developed, in which case tile produce thereof would be divided equally between
the parties; that after the death of Juan Baraoidan, appellees occupied the same
portion of land as tenants of appellant’s father under the same conditions; that
as appellees began asserting title over the property by clandestinely declaring
the same for taxation in their names, an action to recover its possession was
instituted by appellant’s father sometime in 1935; that despite repeated demands
of appellant for them to surrender and vacate the property, appellees refused to
do so.

Appellees moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
prescription of action, alleging that on March 29, 1935 Gregorio Buinanglag,
appellant’s father, commenced Civil Case No. 3841 in the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte against appellees for the recovery of the land subject-matter of
the present action; that the latter filed their answer therein claiming
exclusive ownership over the property; that when the case was called for trial,
the court, upon motion of plaintiff Bumanglag, dismissed the same in its order
dated October 9, 1936; and that the present action was filed thirteen years
after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3841.

Meanwhile, appellant filed an amended complaint which the lower court
admitted on February 8, 1959, denying at the same time appellees’ motion to
dismiss the original complaint.

On February 9, 1950, appellees moved to dismiss the amended complaint upon
the same ground relied upon as , AI against the original complaint. The Court
having denied the motion, appellees filed their answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint and interposing the affirmative defenses of res
judicata and prescription.

On June 2, 1955, Manuela R. Ablan and Rogue Ablan, Jr., widow and son of the
late Governor Roque Ablan of J IIocos Norte, respectively filed a motion for
leave to intervene, claiming that appellees had ceded a portion of the land in
question to the latter as his professional fee in Civil Case No. 3841, but this
motion does not appear to have been granted.

On October 4, 1958, tile Court set aside its previous order denying
appellees’ motion to dismiss and issued the appealed order dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the present action was barred by the order of
dismissal issued in Civil Case No. 3841 mentioned heretofore.

The complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3841 was exclusively for the purpose of
“evicting” the defendants from the property subject matter thereof, and to
recover from them, jointly and severally, the total sum of P900.00 as damages.
It was filed in the Court of First Instance for the reason that, according to
the complaint, the defendants had unlawfully taken possession of the land “four
years before the commencement of this (the) suit”. It also appears that the
order dismissing said case was issued upon motion of the plaintiff therein, with
the conformity of the defendants. As it was issued on October 9, 1936, its
effects are to be determined by the provisions of Section 127 of Act 190,
according to which, the Court may, in its discretion, allow a plaintiff to
dismiss his action even after the trial had begun and at any time before final
judgment, said dismissal not being “a bar to another action for the same cause.”
If it does not bar a second action for the same cause, we may conclude, a
fortiori, that it can not bar another action, like the one before Us, which
principally involves ownership.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, and this case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes J.
B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.