G.R. Nos. 140779-80. December 03, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. LAURITO ARRIOLA Y SANTANDER, APPELLANT.
CORONA, J.:
Branch 53, in Criminal Case Nos. 97-130 and 97-131, convicting appellant
Laurito Arriola of the crime of rape on two counts committed against
Judylou Verso and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death
for each count.
The two separate informations charging Laurito Arriola of the crime of
rape read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 97-130
“That on or about the month of May 1995, at Barangay Marao, in the
Municipality of Padre Burgos, Province of Quezon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the step-father of the offended party, with lewd design,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
Judylou C. Verso, a minor, 9 years of age, against her will.Contrary to law.”[2]
Criminal Case No. 97-131
“That on or about the 5th day of January 1997, at Barangay Marao,
in the Municipality of Padre Burgos, Province of Quezon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the step-father of the offended party, with lewd design,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
Judylou C. Verso, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will.Contrary to law.”[3]
When arraigned, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Enrico Joaquin
Villanueva, counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged.[4]
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued with the two cases (Criminal Case
Nos. 97-130 and 97-131) jointly tried by the trial court. On September
8, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds Laurito
Arriola y Santander guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape.In Criminal Case No. 97-130 he is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death and he is ordered to indemnify Judylou Verso in the sum
of P75,000.00 and to pay the costs.In Criminal Case No. 97-131 he is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death and he is ordered to indemnify Judylou Verso in the sum
of P75,000.00 and to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.”[5]
The antecedent facts, as culled from the testimonies of the witnesses,
follow.
On January 23, 1997, at 3:40 p.m., Olivia Paulo (hereafter, Olivia), a
teacher at the Padre Burgos Elementary School in Quezon Province, was
practicing some pupils for a dance number at the school’s hall.
Suddenly, she heard a noise as if a desk was being dragged. She and
Teresita Bejerano, the other teacher inside the hall, went to the
adjacent classroom where the noise came from. They saw Judylou Verso
(hereafter, Judylou) crying. The accused, Laurito Arriola, was also
inside the classroom. Olivia asked the classmates of Judylou why she was
crying. They told her that Laurito Arriola, Judylou’s stepfather,
wanted to fetch Judylou but she refused to go with him. Olivia told her
co-teacher, Teresita Bejerano, to take Laurito Arriola out of the
classroom. Arriola, who appeared drunk, obliged but when he reached the
door of the hall, he boxed the wall. Sensing something wrong, Olivia
told Judylou to go with her to the non-formal room which was then
vacant. There she asked Judylou why she refused to go with her
stepfather. At first, Judylou who looked frightened refused to talk.
Eventually, because of Olivia’s motivation, Judylou told Olivia that
Arriola had sexually molested her (“ako ay ginalaw niya“).[6] Olivia then told Teresita
Bejerano (hereafter, Teresita), Judylou’s teacher-in-charge, to also
talk with Judylou. Teresita got the same information. With this
disturbing information, Olivia sent the janitor of the school to the
Padre Burgos police station to fetch some policemen. The chief of
police, who headed the responding policemen, ordered his men to look for
Arriola and advised Olivia to bring Judylou to a physician for physical
examination.[7]
Judylou Verso was immediately brought to Dr. Grace Santiago, municipal
health officer of Padre Burgos, Quezon for physical examination.[8] The findings of Dr. Santiago,
based on the medico-legal certificate she issued dated January 23, 1997,
read:
” watery vaginal discharge; erythematous vaginal wall; (+) hymenal
tear; (+) healed lacerations on posterior vaginal fourchette; cervix is
closed, long; uterus is small upon palpation.Recommendation:
Advised psychological follow-up with psychiatrist for emotional
preparation & stabilization.”[9]
Judylou, who gave her age as eleven[10]
when she took the witness stand on September 29, 1997, testified that,
one night in May of 1995 inside their house in Barangay Marao, Padre
Burgos, Quezon Province, she woke up to find the appellant Laurito
Arriola whom she had came to consider as her father (“kinagisnang
ama“)[11] on top of her.
Laurito stood up to remove her t-shirt, shorts and panty and then he
undressed himself. He again went on top of Judylou and inserted his
penis into her vagina.[12] The
accused moved his buttocks up and down.[13] While on top of her, accused told Judylou not to tell
anybody of what he was doing to her or else he would kill her and all
members of her family.[14]
Judylou could not do anything but cry. She felt pain because of what
Laurito was doing to her but she did not say anything; she just
continued crying.[15] Not long
after, something came out of Laurito’s penis. Laurito put on his brief
and shorts, and repeated his threat to Judylou not to tell anybody or
else he would kill all of them.[16]
Fearful of the threat made by Laurito whom she called Papa,[17] Judylou kept to herself what
Laurito did to her.[18]
In the evening of January 5, 1997, Laurito again lay beside
Judylou. He repeated what he did to Judylou before — he removed her
t-shirt, shorts and panty; he undressed himself; he went on top of her;
he inserted his penis into her vagina; and he moved his buttocks up and
down.[19] While on top of her,
he again repeated his warning to Judylou not to tell anybody what he
was doing.[20] He kissed
Judylou on the lips but Judylou just kept on crying.[21] Just like before, Laurito stopped when
something came out of his penis. He then stood up, put on his shorts and
brief and again repeated his warning.[22]
Sometime thereafter, Judylou’s mother, Lorena Calalo, returned to the
Philippines from Hongkong where she was working as a domestic helper.
Judylou told her mother what her stepfather did to her. Lorena cried and
uttered bad things at Laurito (“nagmura po siya“) in Judylou’s
presence. Before going back to Hongkong, Lorena left Judylou and her
younger stepbrother and stepsister, aged 3 and 6 respectively, with
their maternal grandmother, Anastacia Calalo.[23]
On January 23, 1997, Laurito tried to fetch Judylou from her school but
Judylou created a commotion because she refused to go with him.[24] Judylou was afraid that he
might rape her again.[25]
When it was the turn of the appellant to present his evidence, his
counsel, Atty. Enrico Joaquin Villanueva, filed his withdrawal as
counsel de oficio on the ground that he had irreconciliable
differences with the accused in the conduct of his defense. After
talking to the appellant, the court found the ground for withdrawing
cited by Atty. Villanueva as unmeritorious and denied the same. The
appellant agreed that Atty. Villanueva would continue to defend him.
However, in a subsequent hearing, the appellant informed the court that
his family had decided to secure the services of another lawyer. The
court relieved Atty. Villanueva as counsel de oficio. But when,
after several settings, no counsel de parte of the appellant
appeared, the court, upon the request of the appellant himself,
appointed Atty. Rodel Ambas as counsel de oficio.[26]
To the charge of raping his stepdaughter, Judylou Verso, the appellant
set up the defense of denial. He testified that he did not know anything
of the charges filed against him nor the reasons why Judylou charged
him with rape.[27]
The trial court, taking into account the straightforward testimony of
Judylou Verso and her demeanor while she testified, found the appellant
guilty of the two counts of rape filed against him. The trial court did
not believe the lame denial of the accused that he did not know anything
of the charges filed against him. The trial court also rejected the
insinuation of the defense that it was the anger and ill-feeling that
Judylou felt towards her stepfather (the appellant) for treating her and
her siblings badly that drove her to file the rape charges against the
appellant.[28]
The trial court said that, Judylou, in her young and innocent mind,
could not have concocted the story. She told her teachers of the sexual
abuse, and only after some prodding, because it was true. Also, the
trial court noted, it was not difficult to deduce that Judylou refused
to go with the appellant when he went to fetch her from school in the
afternoon of January 23, 1997, because the memory of the sexual assault
by the appellant on January 5, 1997 (only about three weeks before) was
still fresh in her mind and she was afraid that the appellant was going
to do the same thing to her again. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Grace
Santiago gave credence to the allegation of Judylou that she had been
raped. Dr. Santiago testified that the genitalia of Judylou had a healed
laceration and admitted two fingers with ease during the physical
examination. This indicates that she was no longer a virgin and that
there was frequent penetration by the male organ. The trial court
accordingly convicted the appellant of two counts of rape and sentenced
him to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each count.[29]
Hence, the instant automatic review by us of the decision of the trial
court. The appellant raises the following errors for our consideration:
I
That the Honorable Trial Court gravely erred in believing the claim
of the complainant of her being raped by the accused;
II
That the Honorable Trial Court gravely erred in totally discarding
the admission of the complainant’s examining physician that the victim
(complainant) had self induced her laceration;
III
That the Honorable Trial Court likewise gravely erred in
disregarding the admission by the complainant of vindictiveness as her
motive in falsely accusing the accused; and
IV
That the Honorable Trial Court gravely erred in convicting the
accused.
The main argument of the appellant is that the trial court gravely erred
in convicting him of the crime of rape in the light of (1) the
admission of Dr. Santiago, the examining physician, that the victim
self-inflicted the laceration found in her genitalia and (2) the
admission of the victim herself that her motive in accusing the
appellant of the crime of rape is to vindicate the bad treatment
accorded her and her younger stepbrother and stepsister by the
appellant.[30]
The argument of the appellant does not hold water.
Appellant wants to make it appear that Dr. Santiago categorically stated
that the cause of the laceration in Judylou’s vaginal fourchette is
self-inflicted. However, this is not true. The testimony of Dr.
Santiago, taken as a whole, shows that she merely stated the possible
causes of the laceration. She did not categorically state that the
laceration was self-inflicted by the victim. Pertinent portions of her
testimony are as follows:
In the internal examination there was hymenal tear and healed
laceration on the posterior fourchette, sir.Will you explain it in layman’s language?
posterior fourchette of the vagina meaning near the opening of the anus
sir.
certificate your honor.
admit and upon examination of the cervix it was closed and the uterus is
small and there was unremarkable adnexae sir.
ease the two fingers, what does it mean?
statement, your honor.
physical virginity sir.
genitalia of a woman admits two fingers with ease does it mean there was
previous penetration of male organ?
honor.
the genitalia of Judylou Verso it admitted two fingers, what could have
caused the easiness of admittance?
sexual intercourse or penetration of male organ sir. It
could be one possibility.
grandmother and the teacher you were already briefed or informed that
the precise purpose is for a finding for sexual abuse?
determine that sexual abuse had been committed, it was already in your
mind?
self induced (sic) the laceration, sir.
was brought to you for examination because of inference or accident
met?
healed laceration in the vulva and you admitted that it would be of
multifarious causes?
male organ that can cause laceration in the genitalia?
possibilities, that it was not only a male organ that caused the
physical laceration you found out in the genitalia of the victim Judylou
Verso?
pregnant, when you said that intercourse was one of the possibilities
that cause the laceration, in the finding of your examination made on
Judylou Verso, will you enlighten us what other possibilities that would
cause the same laceration to the victim as young as Judylou Verso?
cm produced laceration in the vaginal outlet, any accident that would
hit the posterior fourchette near the anus would create laceration, sir.
cause laceration?
concluded by you and other examinations conducted by other doctors on
other patients are based on hypothetical assumption supported by medical
facts?
accurate, some medical sciences are not exact science?
anatomical make up.”[31] (emphasis
ours)
Clearly, the testimony of Dr. Santiago merely provided the possible
causes of the laceration. In her direct testimony, Dr. Santiago stated
that the cause might be the frequent penetration by the male organ and,
in her cross-examination, she stated other causes like accident,
self-infliction or penetration of the vagina by an object 6 to 7 cm in
size. She never said, in her entire testimony, that the laceration in
Judylou’s vaginal fourchette was caused by self-infliction, as what the
appellant now avers.
What is important in the testimony of Dr. Santiago is that she
identified and affirmed[32]
the medical certificate she executed on January 23, 1997 and, in that
medical certificate, she stated her findings that Judylou’s hymen was
torn and there was a healed laceration in her posterior vaginal
fourchette.[33]
We observe that the appellant gives much emphasis to the alleged
admission of Dr. Santiago when the best evidence is the medical
certificate she executed. In any case, it must be stated that, in a rape
case, what is most important is the credible testimony of the victim.
The medical certificate is merely corroborative in nature. The testimony
of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused
of the crime.[34]
The appellant next attacks the credibility of the victim by arguing that
Judylou just made up the charges against him because she wanted to
avenge the bad treatment he had been according her and her younger
stepbrother and stepsister. He pointed out the admission of such fact
made by Judylou in her cross-examination.
We, however, find that the alleged admission of Judylou was taken out of
context. The appellant cannot isolate portions of Judylou’s testimony
to suit his purpose.
First, we find it highly inconceivable that Judylou, a child 11 years of
age,[35] with all her naivete
and innocence, will fabricate a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter submit herself to public
trial, gossip or ridicule, if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape
and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.[36] No woman or
girl will subject herself to such humiliation just because her
stepfather treated her and her younger stepbrother and stepsister badly.
What the appellant fails to realize is that Judylou was naturally angry
with him, not because of the alleged ill-treatment which the defense
failed to elaborate on in the first place,[37] but because of the fact that the appellant actually
raped the victim not just once but twice. Not only that. The appellant
repeatedly[38] threatened the
victim, a child of tender years, not to tell anybody or else he would
kill her and all the people to whom she divulged the sexual assault.
Naturally such child lived in fear and anger. She could be raped by her
stepfather anytime in their house and she could not even tell anybody
about it.
This is precisely the reason why, on January 23, 1997, Judylou created a
commotion – crying and dragging her table and/or chair, when the
accused tried to fetch her from school.[39] Judylou was fed up with the heavy feeling of fear she
had been carrying in her heart for two years. She finally told her
teachers about it, and only after some prodding, that fateful afternoon
of January 23, 1997.
Thus, when Judylou admitted, in all honesty, in her cross-examination
that she had ill-feelings toward the appellant, that she looked at the
appellant as a bad person and she entertained thoughts of vindictiveness
against him, we consider that in her favor. She answered all the
questions propounded to her honestly and candidly. And so, when asked
during her cross-examination if she wanted the appellant to pay for the
bad things he had done to them, she naturally said “yes” because she was
angry at him for raping her.
Taken therefore in the proper context, Judylou’s ill-feelings are
expected, believable and within the realm of human experience.[40] In fact, her spontaneous
emotional breakdown towards the end of her narration of the sexual
assault completely bolstered her credibility.[41]
From the credible testimony of the victim, the fact of carnal knowledge
has been sufficiently established. Carnal knowledge is the single most
essential element of statutory rape.[42]
In sum, we find no serious flaw in the testimony of the victim
and in the conclusions of the trial court. The mass of physical and
testimonial evidence in this case clearly establishes the appellant’s
guilt.
We now come to the proper penalty to be imposed.
Under RA 7659[43] which
amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship of
stepfather and stepdaughter makes the imposition of the death penalty
mandatory. RA 7659 provides:
“The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
- When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
Since the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the guilt of
the appellant in raping his stepdaughter twice,[44] the penalty of death for each count of rape
would have been correctly imposed by the trial court.
However, the prosecution failed to present any independent evidence like
the victim’s birth certificate or school records to prove that she was a
minor (below 18 years of age) when raped by the appellant. The
allegation in the informations that the victim was only 9 and 10 years
old, respectively, when raped by the appellant in two separate occasions
is not sufficient evidence. Nor is the testimony of the victim herself
to that effect sufficient evidence of minority. Thus, this Court is
constrained to lower the penalty of death imposed by the trial court
upon the appellant to reclusion perpetua, in line with recent
jurisprudence requiring independent proof of minority of the victim.[45]
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Tipay,[46] where we ruled that:
“This does not mean however, that the presentation of the
certificate of live birth is at all times necessary to prove minority.
The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below 10 is quite
manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.”
We hold, however, that the circumstances in that case do not exactly
jibe with those in the case at bar.
As to the award of damages, the imposition by the trial court of P75,000
as civil indemnity for each count of rape should be reduced to P50,000
for each count (or a total of P100,000) because the death penalty was
not imposed.[47] We also add
the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 for each count (or a
total of P100,000) because the trial court failed to grant one. This is
in line with current rulings which automatically grant moral damages in
rape cases without need of proof. The reason for this is that the
mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by the victim is too
obvious to still require proof at the trial.[48]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City, Branch 53, finding the appellant Laurito S. Arriola guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape for two counts and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each count and
ordering him to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 for each
count is hereby MODIFIED.
The penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape and the civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000 for each count (or a
total of P100,000). The amount of P50,000 for moral damages is also
awarded for each count of rape (or a total of P100,000) in line with
current jurisprudence.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Puno, J., on official business.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
[1] Penned by Judge Guillermo
R. Andaya; Rollo, pp. 12-19.
[2] Rollo, p. 6.
[3] Rollo, p. 7.
[4] Rollo, pp. 27-30.
[5] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[6] TSN, September 16,
1997, p. 8.
[7] TSN, September 16,
1997, pp. 4-12.
[8] TSN, September 16,
1997, pp. 12, 16.
[9] Records, p. 4.
[10] TSN, September 29,
1997, p. 1.
[11] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
[12] Ibid., pp. 4-5.
[13] Ibid., p. 5.
[14] Ibid., p. 5.
[15] Ibid., pp. 4, 6.
[16] Ibid., p. 7.
[17] Ibid., p. 9.
[18] Ibid., pp. 9-10.
[19] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[20] Ibid., p. 8.
[21] Ibid., p. 8.
[22] Ibid., p. 9.
[23] Ibid., pp. 16-17.
[24] TSN, September 16,
1997, pp. 4-7.
[25] TSN, September 29,
1997, p. 11.
[26] Records, p. 25.
[27] TSN, June 9, 1999,
pp. 5-6.
[28] RTC Decision; Rollo,
p. 6.
[29] Ibid., Rollo, pp.
18-19.
[30] Appellant’s Brief;
Rollo, pp. 53-55.
[31] TSN, September 16,
1997, pp. 19-29.
[32] TSN, September 16,
1997, p. 23.
[33] Records, p. 5.
[34] People vs. Julian
et. al., 270 SCRA 733 (1997).
[35] TSN, September 29,
1997, p. 1.
[36] People vs. Conde,
G.R. No. 138445-50, April 3, 2002, citing People vs. Dado, 244
SCRA 655 (1995); People vs. Portugal, G.R. No. 143030, March
12, 2002.
[37] Appellee’s Brief;
Rollo, p. 14.
[38] TSN, September 29,
1997, pp. 5, 7-9.
[39] TSN, September 16,
1997, pp. 4-5; TSN, September 29, 1997, pp. 10-11.
[40] People vs.
Portugal, G.R. No. 143030, March 12, 2002, citing People vs.
Lacaba, 302 SCRA 301 (1999).
[41] TSN, September 29,
1997, p. 10; People vs. Marcellana, G.R. No. 137401-03,
February 6, 2002, citing People vs. Sancha, 324 SCRA 646, 663
(2000); People vs. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367, 374 (1999); People
vs. Bea Jr., 306 SCRA 653, 659 (1999); People vs. Ramos,
312 SCRA 137, 147 (1999); and People vs. Mosqueda, 313 SCRA
694, 707 (1999).
[42] In rape cases, the
essential element that the prosecution must prove is the absence of the
victim’s consent to the sexual congress. The prosecution must establish
that the sexual assault was committed using force or intimidation, or
that it was committed against a woman deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious. On the other hand, in statutory rape or rape of a woman
under twelve years of age, all that needs to be proven is that the
accused had sexual intercourse with the child – her consent and other
circumstances relating to the sexual intercourse being immaterial. See People
vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 (1998); People vs. De la Peña,
276 SCRA 588 (1997).
[43] Entitled “An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws,
and For Other Purposes,” which took effect on December 31, 1993.
[44] Each and every charge
of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. See People vs. Dulay, 217 SCRA
132 (1993); People vs. Baring Jr., G.R. No. 137933, Jan. 28,
2002.
[45] People v. Geraban,
358 SCRA 213 (2001).
[46] 329 SCRA 52 (2000).
[47] People vs. Tablon,
G.R. No. 137280, March 14, 2002, citing People vs. Tahop, 315
SCRA 465 (1999); People vs. Robles, 305 SCRA 273 (1999).
[48] People vs. Tablon,
G.R. No. 137280, March 14, 2002; People vs. Villamor, 297 SCRA
262 (1998); People vs. Arofo, G.R. No. 139433, April 11, 2002,
citing People vs. Villanueva, 339 SCRA 482, 503 (2002) and People
vs. Rebato, G.R. No. 139552, May 24, 2001.