G.R. No. 146030. December 03, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., REPRESENTED BY ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FEL…
PANGANIBAN, J.:
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained
through fraud or misrepresentation is void. Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public
Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property
acquired through such means.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the November 15, 2000 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44568. The decretal portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED, SET ASIDE
and RECALLED.”[2]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA
thus:
“On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. x x x filed
with the District Land Office, Roxas City, Free Patent Application No. (VI-2)
8442 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Mli-06-000020-D, with an
area of .3899 hectares, more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. “A”;
Exh “9”). It appears that on December
27, 1978, when the application was executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land
Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and verification of the land
to the District Land Office, Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer
of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to
the applicant. On March 16, 1979, the
patent was also ordered to be issued and the patent was forwarded to defendant
Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration and issuance of the
corresponding Certificate of Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 Free Patent No.
(VI-2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by defendant Register of Deeds.
“On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel
in a letter-complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an
investigation of the District Land Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional
Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for irregularities in the issuance of the title
of a foreshore land in favor of [respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising
Special Investigator, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau
of Lands) submitted his Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management Bureau, Manila,
recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the
cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 in the name of [respondent].
“In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan under the
Cottage Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by the defendant Philippine National
Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount ofP100,000.00
on August 18, 1981. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. The promissory note of appellant was
annotated at the back of the title.
“On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General
instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and
Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of
Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel
of land with an area of .3899 hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas
City.
“On November 17, 1990, while the case is pending hearing, [respondent]
died. He was substituted by his wife
Roqueta Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette Alejaga, Lynnette Alejaga,
Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga. Roqueta Alejaga, Jennifer Alejaga and
Felipe Alejaga III.
x x x x x x x
x x
“After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion
decreed as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring that the approval of
Free Patent Application No. 3358 and issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. P-15 in the name of Felipe Alejaga is by means of fraud hence, null and
void ab initio and the court orders:
‘a) the cancellation of
the approval of the application No. (VI-2) 8442 covering Lot No. 1,
Mli-06-000020-D with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less, located at
Dumulog, Roxas City;
‘b) the cancellation of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-15, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 in the name
of Felipe Alejaga;
‘c) the land covered
thereby as above described is reverted to the mass of the public domain;
‘d) the defendants, Heirs
of Felipe Alejaga Sr. or defendant, Philippine National Bank, Roxas City
Branch, to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of above described Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15 to the Register of Deeds (now Registries of Land
Titles and Deeds), Roxas City;
‘e) the defendant,
Register of Deeds, Roxas City, to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. P-15
and the owner’s duplicate copy of said title surrendered by above stated
defendants;
‘f) defendant’s,
Philippine National Bank, cross-claim is dismissed.
“Costs against the defendants Heirs of Felipe, Alejaga, Sr.’”[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to
prove its allegation that respondents had obtained the free patent and the
Certificate of Title through fraud and misrepresentation.[4]
The appellate court likewise held that, assuming there was misrepresentation or
fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for reversion should have been
brought within one (1) year from the registration of the patent with the Registry
of Deeds.[5]
Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s
testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation
on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.[6] The CA added that petitioner had failed to support
its claim that the lot covered by respondent’s free patent and title was
foreshore land.[7]
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
“I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the case
is already final and executory as against respondent PNB.
“II
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that petitioner has
proven the allegations to the Complaint.
“III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the action
for reversion is unavailing.”[9]
Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the efficacy of the grant of the free
patent and (2) the indefeasibility of the Certificate of Title issued in
consequence thereof.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First
Issue:
Efficacy of the Grant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of
Respondent Alejagas’ free patent and Certificate of Title.[10]
It also avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a
vested right over the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their
proven open, actual, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land for more
than 30 years.[11]
At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show
receipt by Respondent PNB of a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on
October 3, 1993 as alleged by petitioner.[12]
Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the
15-day reglementary period.
In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in
this Petition — the presence of fraud — is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters.[13]
However, the instant case falls under one of the exceptions, because the
findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the evidence on
record.[14]
We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule
that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of
proof.[15]
The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate
it in each case.[16]
It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many
different ways.[17]
Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear and convincing evidence.[18]
In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a
preponderance of evidence before the trial court, showing manifest fraud in
procuring the patent.[19] This
Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over the lot under
scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which
were[20]
ignored by the Court of Appeals.[21]
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in
accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act.[22]
Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true.[23]
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires
sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located,
in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.[24]
Note that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of
land are to be conducted after an application for free patent has been
filed with the Bureau of Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.’s Application for Free
Patent[25]
was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation
& Verification Report[26]
prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the
Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had
conducted the “necessary investigation and verification in the presence of the
applicant.” Even if we accept this
statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot be condoned
because, obviously, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and
investigation allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale
of the Public Land Act.[27]
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and verification
should have been done only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous
for Recio to conduct his own investigation and verification on December 27,
1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent.[28]
It must also be noted that while the Alejagas
insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that
it preceded the filing of the application.[29]
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual
investigation was conducted is not sustained by the Verification &
Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.[30]
Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty[31]
is thus misplaced. Since Recio’s
signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no
presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was
actually conducted. Strangely,
respondents do not proffer any explanation why the Verification &
Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will later on be explained, this alleged
presumption of regularity — assuming it ever existed — is overcome by the
evidence presented by petitioner.
Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P.
Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually
conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s alleged
admission may be considered as “independently relevant.” A witness may testify as to the state of
mind of another person — the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith
— and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant
without violating the hearsay rule.[32]
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself
to cross-examination, the Investigation Report[33] he
had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report
that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay.[34]
On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered as independently relevant.[35]
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as
proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements
is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue[36]
or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.[37]
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the
investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence,
properly admitted by the trial court.[38]
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioner’s
contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void.[39]
Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title.[40]
The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate
of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of
the former.[41]
Verily, we must uphold petitioner’s claim that the issuance of the Alejagas’
patent and title was tainted with fraud.[42]
Second
Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner contends that the State has an imprescriptible right
to cause the reversion of a piece of property belonging to the public domain.[43] On the other hand, the Alejagas claim that,
pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529[44] —
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree — the one-year period for
reversion has already lapsed.[45]
Thus, the State’s Complaint for reversion should be dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the
public domain and becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter.[46]
However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by
fraud and misrepresentation.[47]
Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the
Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrant’s already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.[48]
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[49]
the State — even after the lapse of one year — may still bring an action for
the reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted
to private individuals.[50]
Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State
as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is
to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in securing the title.[51]
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of
title cannot be invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by
means of fraud.[52]
Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be allowed to
benefit from their misdeed.[53]
Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to
recover its own property acquired through fraud by private individuals.[54]
This is settled law.[55]
Prohibition Against Alienation
or
Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas’ title was validly
issued, there is another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141[56]
proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or
homestead within five years from its grant.[57]
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a
proviso attached to the approval of every application.[58]
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any
right or title to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or
homestead patents; or any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from
enjoying such right, title or interest, if they have not secured the consent of
the grantee and the approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other
than education, charity, or easement of way.[59]
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358[60]
was approved and issued on March 14, 1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15[61]
was issued on the same date. On August
18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga
Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan[62]
in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement on the title certificate itself that the land granted
under the free patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a
real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land covered
by OCT No. P-15.[63] In
his testimony, Gabriel D. Aranas Jr., then Cashier III of respondent bank, even
admitted that the PNB was aware of such restriction.
“COURT You testified Mr. Aranas that you inspected
the title also when you credit investigated the loan applicant Felipe Alejaga
and you have personally examined this?
A Yes, your
Honor.
COURT Do you conclude that this Original
Certificate of Title is a [free] patent?
A Yes, your
Honor.
COURT And this [free]
patent was granted on March 19, 1979.
A Yes, your
honor.
COURT And as such [free] patent it cannot be
alienated except [to] the government or within five years from its issuance?
A Yes, your
honor.
COURT Why did you recommend
the loan?
A Because it is
just a mortgage.”[64]
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely within the term encumbrance
proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.[65]
A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of
the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.[66]
As early as Pascua v. Talens,[67]
we have explained the rationale for the prohibition against the encumbrance of
a homestead — its lease and mortgage included — an encumbrance which, by
analogy, applies to a free patent. We
ruled as follows:
“It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens
for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of
the patent.”
Further, an encumbrance on a parcel of land acquired through free
patent constitutes sufficient ground for the nullification of such grant, as
provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, which we quote:
“SEC. 124. Any acquisition,
conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen,
one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two,
and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and
void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling
the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.”
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent
grant nullifies the award and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the
property to the state, as we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals:[68]
“The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance
of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years
from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant
and the reversion of the land to the public domain.”[69]
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent,
within five years from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel land
granted to him. The mortgage he made
over the land violated that condition.[70]
Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain, pursuant to
Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the RTC of Roxas City (Branch 15) dated October 27, 1993 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on
official business.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-38. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in by
Justices Ruben T. Reyes (Division chairman) and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
(member).
[2]
Assailed CA Decision, p. 12; rollo,
p. 38. Emphasis in the original.
[3]
Id., pp. 1-5.
[4]
Id., p. 6; rollo, p. 32.
[5]
Id., p. 12; id., p. 38.
[6]
Id., p. 7; id., p. 33.
[7]
Id., p. 11; id., p. 37.
[8]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on April 15, 2002, upon the Court’s
receipt of Respondent Alejagas’ Memorandum signed by Atty. Benjamin B. Distura.
Respondent PNB’s Memorandum, filed on July 20, 2001, was signed by Atty. Edwin
M. Alaestante. Petitioner’s Manifestation, adopting its Petition as its
Memorandum was filed on July 20, 2001 and signed by Assistant Solicitor General
Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Solicitor
Brigido Artemon M. Luna II.
[9]
Petition for Review, p. 10; rollo, p.
15. Original in upper case.
[10]
Id., p. 13; id., p. 18.
[11]
Respondent Alejagas’ Memorandum, p. 29; rollo,
p. 321.
[12]
See records, p. 349.
[13]
Tando v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127984, December 14, 2001.
[14]
Lercana v. Jalandoni, GR No. 132286, February 1, 2002.
[15]
Mangahas v. Court of Appeals,
304 SCRA 375, March 10, 1999; citing Cayabyab v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 232 SCRA 1, April 28, 1994.
[16]
Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725,
November 19, 1999.
[17]
Destura v. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 341, February 10, 2000.
[18]
Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 645, August 22, 1996.
[19]
Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[20]
Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112443, January 25, 2002.
[21]
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., GR No. 130876, January 31, 2002.
[22]
An act to amend and compile the laws relative to land of the public domain,
effective December 1, 1936.
[23]
Section 91 of the Public Land Act provides:
“SEC. 91. The
statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions
and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering,
changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the
material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty
of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it
advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they
continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the
purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to
obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in
accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment,
or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if
the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his
authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and
specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption,
an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings.”
[24]
Section 46 of the Public Land Act provides:
“SEC. 46. If, after
the filing of the application and the investigation, the Director of Lands
shall be satisfied with the truth of the allegations contained in the
application and the applicant comes within the provisions of this chapter, he
shall cause a patent to issue to the applicant or his legal successor for the
tract so occupied and cultivated, provided its area does not exceed twenty-four
hectares: Provided, That no application shall be finally acted upon
until notice thereof has been published in the municipality and barrio in which
the land is located and adverse claimants have had an opportunity to present
their claims.”
[25]
Exhibit “A”; exhibits folder, p. 1.
[26]
Exhibit “B”; id., p. 2.
[27]
Espino v. Salubre, 352
SCRA 668, February 26, 2001.
[28]
RTC Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 76.
[29]
Robles v. Court of Appeals, 328
SCRA 97, March 14, 2000.
[30]
See Exhibit “B”; exhibits folder, p. 2.
[31]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m) provides:
“(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. – When the
law imposes certain duties and obligations, it will be presumed that such
duties and obligations have been performed unless it is expressly made to
appear to the contrary. All things are presumed to have been rightly and duly
performed until there is proof to the contrary.”
[32]
Francisco, Basic Evidence, 2nd ed., (1999), pp. 214-215.
[33]
Exhibit “G”; exhibits folder, pp. 8-10.
[34]
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 607, June 17, 1997.
[35]
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v.
Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., GR No. 136914, January 25, 2002.
[36]
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines Part I (1997),
p. 518; citing 31 CJS 988.
[37]
There are five kinds of independently relevant statements that are
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue:
1. Statements of a person showing his
state of mind; that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill
will and other emotions
2. Statements that may identify the date,
place and condition as illness and the like
3. Statements of a person from which an
inference may be drawn as to the state of mind of another person; i.e., the
knowledge, belief, good or bad faith noticed of the latter
4. Statements that may identify the date,
place and person in question
5. Statements showing the lack of
credibility of a witness
[38]
Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[39]
Robles v. Court of Appeals,
328 SCRA 97, March 14, 2000.
[40]
Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, July 14, 1995.
[41]
Daez v. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 856, February 17, 2000.
[42]
Barrera v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 123935, December 14, 2001.
[43]
Petition for Review, p. 18; rollo, p.
23.
[44]
Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides:
“SEC. 32. Review
of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.- The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority,
or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of
title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than
one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase ‘innocent purchaser of
value’ or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
“Upon the expiration
of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree
of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.”
[45]
Respondent Alejagas’ Memorandum, p. 43; rollo,
p. 336.
[46]
Baguio v. Republic, 301 SCRA
450, January 21, 1999.
[47]
Ibid.
[48]
J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Macalindong, 6 SCRA 938, December 29,
1962.
[49]
This section provides:
“SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to
the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.”
[50]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 335, March 29, 1996.
[51]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 721, April 10, 1989.
[52]
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, 244 SCRA 537, May 31, 1995.
[53]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra,
p. 343.
[54]
Republic v. Heirs of Agustin L. Angeles, GR No. 141296, October 7, 2002.
[55]
Baguio v. Republic, supra; Republic
v. Court of Appeals, supra at
note 51; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 620, March 23, 1990; Republic v. Mina, 114 SCRA
945, June 29, 1982; Director of Lands v. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358, August
31, 1983.
[56]
This section provides:
“SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the
date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
“No alienation,
transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before
twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be
denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.” (As amended by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.)
[57]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 639, November 14, 1997.
[58]
Republic v. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, April 29, 1968.
[59]
The following are the pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved on May 5,
1941:
“SEC.
121. Except with the consent of the
grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and
solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a right of
way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right,
title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free
patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any
permanent improvement on such land.
“SEC.
122. No land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public
domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines
authorized therefor by their charters.
“Except in cases of
hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under
the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any
individual, nor shall such land or any permanent improvement thereon be leased
to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his own, shall
exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereof shall be null
and void.”
[60]
Exhibit “C”; exhibits folder, p. 3.
[61]
Exhibit “E”; id., p. 5.
[62]
See Promissory Note; records, p. 24.
[63]
See Credit Agreement; id., p.
25.
[64]
TSN, July 24, 1991, p. 9.
[65]
Siy v. Tan Gun GA, 119 Phil. 676, February 29, 1964.
[66]
Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390, August 31, 1987.
[67]
80 Phil. 792, April 30, 1948, per Bengzon, J. (later CJ).
[68]
281 SCRA 639, November 14, 1997.
[69]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra,
p. 648, per Panganiban, J.
[70]
Republic of the Philippines v. Garcia et al., 105 Phil. 826, May 27,
1959.