PAZ MARQUEZ BENITEZ, PETITIONER, VS. AMADOR D. SANTOS, RESPONDENT. MABAIT C. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. AMADOR D. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

Prior to the last war, Nicolas F. Concepcion was granted a
certificate of public convenience to establish, operate and maintain a
taxicab service composed of 80 units. On account of the failure of
Nicolas F. Concepcion to complete the registration of 80 units despite
many extensions given to him, the Public Service Commission, in its
order of April 13, 1949 in Case No. 1470, amended his certificate by
reducing the number of taxicabs which he could operate to 59 units.
Subsequently, Nicolas F. Concepcion sold his certificate to Francisco
Benitez, Jr. The sale included the right to operate the 59 units. The
Public Service Commission, however, approved the sale for only 27
units, because of the inability of Nicolas F. Concepcion to register 32
of the 59 units authorized in his certificate, as amended. The sale
having been approved for 27 units only, several applicants, namely: Paz
M. Benitez, Mabait C. Lopez and Amador Santos, separately sought
authority to operate the 32 taxicabs units.

It is well to state at this point that these 32 units form part of
the total number of taxicabs which the Public Service Commission has
already found and declared necessary for operation in the City of
Manila and suburbs, and the only question presented before the
Commission was to whom of the applicants should the authority to
operate the aforesaid 32 taxicabs units be awarded.

The records discloses that Paz M. Benitez filed her applications
first, followed by Mabait C. Lopez, daughter of Nicolas F. Concepcion,
about two months later, and then by Amador Santos about one year and five months afterwards. Each of the applicants has adduced evidence to establish their financial capacity to purchase and operate.

After going over the evidence, the Public Service Commission awarded
the certificate of public convenience to operate the 32 taxicab units
to Amador Santos because in its opinion he is the best qualified,
considering that Santos is presently a taxicab operator of 87 units of
the Mercedez-Benz Bantam type, that he has the experience and know-how
in the operation of the taxicab business, and that he has available
trained mechanics, drivers, personnel, tools, shop and equipment that
would insure regular, continuous and dependable service.

Both applicants, Paz M. Benitez and Mabait C. Lopez have separately
filed a petition for review of the decision of the Public Service
Commission, which we jointly resolve in this decision.

While it may be true that respondent Santos already has experience
in operating a taxicab business and owns a repair and maintenance shop,
these considerations alone do not shift the preference in his favor.
Experience and availability of garage facilities, although important,
are not decisive in the instant case. Evidently, these two factors
cannot be expected of new applicants to this business enterprise. The
latter will acquire them when they are actually given an opportunity to
do so. Moreover, the other two applicants are not entirely without
substantial experience in this particular kind of business. Petitioner
Paz M. Benitez used to be a director and part owner of a taxicab
company and petitioner Lopez gained her experience while employed in
her father’s taxicab business prior to the war.

The fact that prominently stands out is that all of the applicants
have proven their financial capacity to operate the 32 taxicab units.
And since petitioner Paz M. Benitez was the first applicant, we believe
and so hold, that she should be awarded the certificate of public
convenience to operate them. This is in line with the ruling laid down
in Batangas Transportation Co. and Eliseo Silva vs. Orlanes and Banaag Transportation Co., 55 Phil., 745, wherein we held:

“Priority in the filing of the application for a
certificate of public convenience is, other conditions being equal, an
important factor in determining the rights of the public service
companies.”

The further fact that respondent Santos already owns 87 taxicab
units which he presently operates militates against his application,
because giving the award to him would likely create a monopoly in his
particular line of business. A monopolistic trend with its concomitant
evils can only serve to prejudice public interest, stifling as it does
enthusiasm and initiative on the part of those eager to learn. Prior
experience, while itself useful, cannot create a vested right which
would endanger the national economy.

Indeed, the unjustified and irregular grant of preference to an
applicant who filed a petition one and a half years later than another,
would obviously breed in the public’s mind, a suspicion that
favoritism, with all its sinister complications, play an important role
in the award of public utility benefits. To put a premium on tardiness
would be to encourage opportunities for underhand transactions that can
only result in a miscarriage of justice.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The Public
Service Commission is hereby ordered to award the grant of public
utility operation in the instant case to first applicant, Paz M.
Benitez. So ordered without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

---

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

It is with regret that I find myself unable to agree to the learned
opinion of the majority, penned by no less than our distinguished Chief
Justice. But said opinion, involving as it does not only an important
but at the same time a new legal principle or rule governing public
utilities, which actually and in effect would reverse and abandon
fundamental doctrines hitherto laid down by this Tribunal in a long
line of decisions, and faithfully followed by the Public Service
Commission, I feel that I am in duty bound not only to voice) my
dissent, but also to state and adduce the reasons for my stand.

The statement of facts contained in the majority opinion is correct
and is supported by the evidence. However, perhaps for a better
understanding of these cases, and to set a sort of background, I am
adding the narration of facts made by the Public Service Commission,
which follows:

“By agreement of the parties, and because the
petition of each of the three applicants treats of the same
subject-matter, the above cases were heard jointly and are hereby
jointly decided.

“Each of the applicants, to wit, Pas M.
Benitez, Mabait C. Lopez and Amador Santos, asks the Commission to
grant to him the right to operate 32 taxicab units in Manila, which
units were originally authorized in the certificate of public
convenience granted to Nicolas F. Concepcion. Prior to the war Nicolas
F. Concepcion had a certificate for 801 units which certificate was
reconstituted after the war for the same number of units. By order of
April 13, 1949 in Case No. 1470, and because of the failure of Nicolas
F. Concepcion to complete the registration of the 80 units inspite of
many extensions granted to him, the Commission amended his certificate
by reducing to 59 the number of taxicab units which he could operate
under his certificate. Subsequently, Nicolas F. Concepcion Bold his
certificate to Francisco Benitez, Jr., including in the sale the Tight
to operate the 59 units, but the sale was approved for only 2.7 units,
because again Nicolas F. Concepcion had failed to register 32 of the 59
units granted to him. The sale having been approved for 27 units only,
which were the ones registered at the time of the sale, the balance of
32 units were considered as dropped from the 59 units authorized in
Concepcion’s certificate. It is the right to operate these 32 units
which the applicants herein asks the Commission to grant him.

“It
should be stated that these 32 units form part of the total number of
units which the Commission has already declared as necessary for
operation in the City of Manila and suburbs, and the authorization of
these units to another party will not result in any increase in the
total number of units which, the Commission has found as needed in
Manila and suburbs. Each of the applicants has filed an opposition to
the applications of the others, claiming to have a better right to the
32 units in question. Oppositions were likewise filed by other taxicab
operators in Manila, but aside from the fact that these oppositors,
with the exception of Antonio Heras and JD Taxi, did not appear at the
hearing nor present any evidence, their oppositions are premised on the
question of public convenience, but public convenience is not at issue
here because, as already stated, these 32 units are part of the total
number of taxicab units which the Commission has already declared as
needed in Manila and suburbs. Antonio Heras and JD Taxi reserved the
right to present a balance sheet to show that their taxicab business
has not been profitable, but this balance sheet was not submitted. On
the other hand, applicant Amador Santos, who actually operates a
taxicab service, submitted a statement of income and expenses for the
period January 1st to June 30, 1957, showing the result of the
operation of his business.

This statement shows that from
January thru June, 1957, applicant Santos has realized profits of from
P1,350.00, to over P4,000.00 per month on his taxicab business.”
(Decision appended to appellants’ brief).

It is true that Paz Marquez Benitez, later referred to as Benitez,
filed her application ahead of the other two, Mabait C. Lopez and
Amador D. Santos, later, referred to as Lopez and Santos, respectively,
in fact as early as November, 1965, while that of Santos was filed in
June, 1957. It would appear, however, that although Benitez filed her
application in November, 1955, she evidently took no steps to follow up
her application or to see to it that early action was taken on it, and
that it was duly published, as required by law, and a date set for the
hearing thereof. According to the record, it was only by order of July
3, 1957, that the Commission set it to be heard on July 15, 1957, at
the same time order applicant to publish the order. On the other hand,
Santos filed his application on June 24, 1957. He must have exercised
diligence and followed it up because the Commission by order of June
28, 1957, set it for hearing on July 15, 1957 and directed him to have
the order published. So did Lopez who filed her application about
January 24, 1956 and the Commission by order of May 27, 1957, set it
for hearing on June 28, 1957, and directed her to have the order
published.

It is a matter of public knowledge that the Public Service
Commission, with its limited personnel, is overburdened with numerous
applications for certificates of public convenience, for increase of
units, oppositions thereto, petitions, motions, complaints by public
utility operators for violations of the terms and conditions of
certificates of public convenience committed by other operators,
complaints by the public against operators for inefficient or
inadequate service, etc., and unless the applicant, movant, petitioner
or complainant is diligent and follows up his application, motion,
petition or complaint and have it set for hearing, or have notice of it
published if necessary, the Commission is liable to overlook and fail
to take action on the same. The same situation obtains in the ordinary
courts of justice. How many cases, perhaps meritorious, have been
dismissed for failure of plaintiffs to prosecute! A party must be
diligent and vigilant in the prosecution of his case before the courts
and before the Public Service Commission.

The majority opinion would appear to attach undue importance and
stress on the question of priority of application and, as a matter of
fact, is deciding this case solely on that point, apparently
overlooking and disregarding the more important factor of service to
the public and the capacity of an applicant to render said service.
Courts in the United States in numerous cases have had occasion to rule
that priority of application of several public utility applicants for
the same certificate of public convenience and necessity, although a
factor, is by far, not the most important, because it is the service to the public—safe, adequate and reliable service that is of paramount importance.

“Where two or more applicants are equally qualified, controlling effect need not be given to priority of filing. (Application of National Freight Lines (Iowa), 40 N.W. 2d 612)” (Italics supplied).

“Mere priority in time of application for certificate of convenience and necessity will not of itself govern granting of certificate to carrier and does not determine who is the pioneer in the field.” (Eagle Bus Lines vs. Illinois Commerce Commission, 119 N. E. “2d 915). (Italics supplied).

The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the following cases declared:

“Mere priority in time of application would not of itself govern granting
of certificate of necessity and convenience between competing motor bus
companies, but it is element to be considered in connection with all
other elements and facts, in determining reasonableness of action of
Public Utilities Commissioners.” (Chicago Motor Bus Co. vs. Chicago Stage Co., 122 N.E. 477). (Italics supplied).

“If,
in pursuance of policy of Public Utility Commission, it would not grant
certificates of necessity and convenience to competing lines of motor
buses, it would undoubtedly, when two corporations were asking
certificate for same purpose, have authority to determine which was capable of serving public best.” (Chicago Motor Bus Co. vs. Chicago Stage Co., supra). (Italics supplied),

“The object and purpose of granting certificates of convenience and necessity for the operation of motor bus lines is to subserve the convenience and necessities of the travelling public. While priority in the field is an element to be considered, it will not of itself govern, the granting of the certificate. Chicago Motorbus Co. vs.
Chicago Stage Co. 287 111. 320, 122. N.E. 477. The proper consideration
in a matter of this kind is, which applicant under the facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence, will best serve the public interest? (Bartonville Bus Line vs. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 157 N.E, 175). (Italics supplied).

Considering that our legislation on Public Utilities has been
patterned after that of the United States, particularly, that of New
Jersey, this Tribunal has consistently followed American decisions on
the subject. In the case of De los Santos vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 54 Phil., 357, 360, this Court stated:

“* * * Priority of application while an element to be considered, is not ordinarily of sufficient importance to control the granting of a certificate of public convenience. (Chicago Motor Bus Co. vs. Chicago Stage Co., 287 Ill. 320).” (Italics supplied).

This rule was restated in the case of Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Cagayan-Misamis Land Transportation Co., 55 Phil., 827, 829, thus:

“* * * priority of application in the granting of a certificate of public convenience, although to be considered, is not necessarily a controlling reason,
for the issuance of the corresponding certificate to the prior
applicant. It has been repeatedly held by public utility regulatory
bodies that the question to be considered in cases where there are many applications over the same territory is, which applicant or applicants can render the best service,
considering the whole territory to be developed and served by the kind
of service under consideration and the conditions and qualifications of
the respective applicants to furnish the same. Priority in the making of application does not entitle the applicant to an absolute monopoly over the route or routes, traversed by it. The priority of application is a factor to be considered, but it does not necessarily control the granting of a certificate of convenience where there are various applications. (De los Santos vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 54 Phil., 357). (Italics supplied).

In the unpublished case of Mirasol vs. Negros
Transportation Co., et al, G. R. No. 36648, August 31, 1932 (cited in
Almario, Public Service Act Annotated, p. 45), this Court stated:

“It is asserted that the Commission, as a general
rule, passes upon the applications In the order in which they are
filed, and the failure to do so is such error that this court must
reverse the action of the Public Service Commission. With this
contention we can not concur. Neither in the organic law, nor in the
rules of the Commission, is such a doctrine laid down. With the
innumerable applications, that are being filed by the large number of
owners of bus lines now operating in the Philippines, it would well
near be a practical impossibility always to follow such a rule. Legal
niceties are not the primary purpose of the Public Service Commission. The interest of the public is the basic principle that guides their actions.” (Italics supplied).

Said this Court in the case of Red Line Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Taruc, G. R. No. L-6179, November 29, 1954:

“We are satisfied,’ according to Commissioner
Paredes, ‘that the evidence of the applicant in this regard reasonably
supports the decision granting him the certificate of public
convenience therefor, the Commission having in mind that the convenience of the public is of paramount consideration.’
There is no pretense that this finding is not supported by the
evidence, for in effect petitioner only disputes its sufficiency, and
considering that this is a petition for review, or an appeal by
certiorari, said finding cannot now be disturbed.” (Italic supplied).

We should not lose sight of the fact that the field of public
utilities, particularly that of land transportation, is quite unique.
In other kinds of business, calling or industry, the important
consideration is the profit or benefit to be derived by the owner or
applicant, For instance, several persons apply for a particular parcel
of public land in the form of homestead, sale or lease. Such
applications are made for the exclusive benefit of the
applicants themselves. The public is not affected and has no direct
interest in the same. Naturally, priority in application is the
decisive factor, provided of course, that the several applicants are
equally qualified. The same thing would be true with applications for,
say, fishery or lumber concession over the same body of water or
portion of a public forest.

Not so with public utilities. The grant of a certificate of public
convenience for, say, passenger and freight service over a certain
line, or for taxicab service within the city implies that said bus or
taxicab business not only will be for the benefit and profit of the
grantee, but that the service be necessary, and above all, that its
operation will redound to the convenience, welfare, accommodation and
safety of the public that patronizes the public utility. Before
granting the certificate of public convenience, specially when there
are several applicants for the same, the Public Service Commission must
satisfy itself not only with the capacity, financial standing,
experience, training and ability of an applicant, but also that he or
it has the facilities to operate the service efficiently, adequately
and safely.

The regulations of the Commission require that a land transportation
operator may not employ any person who has had a previous criminal
record in driving. The operator may have in its employ only those who
are courteous and of good moral character, this evidently to protect
the public from acts of impudence, dishonesty, such as, theft of
luggage, extortion such as charging more than the fare authorized, or
abuse of passengers, specially females. One of the conditions imposed
in the certificate of public convenience is:

“Applicant is hereby required to employ in the
operation of his taxicab service, only chauffeurs, agents, inspectors,
auditors and other employees who are courteous and of good moral
character, and in no case or occasion shall applicant employ persons as
chauffeur who have been convicted of homicide or serious physical
injuries thru reckless negligence. Applicant is also prohibited from
employing student drivers in the operation of the taxicab service
herein authorized,”

The grantee of a certificate of public convenience must be in a
position to use landworthy vehicles equipped with modern safety
devices, specially reliable brakes, steering wheels, and good tires to
avoid blow-outs which in many cases prove fatal. The operator must be
in a position to guarantee that a vehicle leaving its station or
terminal would in all probability reach its destination safely, without
any breakdown on the way due to old broken down or faulty equipment.
This is necessary not only for the convenience of passengers, but also
for their safety, because if a bus or taxicab suffers a breakdown or
has engine trouble in an isolated place and is benighted, its
passengers may be subject to holdups, robbery, or other kinds of
outrage. Incidentally, it may be stated that the certificate of public
convenience covering the 32 taxicab units involved in this case,
authorizes the operation of said vehicles not only within the City of
Manila and suburbs, hut, also from any place therein to any point
within the island of Luzon, meaning that they make long trips to the
provinces.

The operator must be in a position to replace all vehicles with new
ones. He must offer adequate and attractive salaries so as to get the
best and most competent employees, specially among its drivers. The
Commission even regulates and determines the rate of charges. All this
shows the care and solicitude that the law takes for the safety,
convenience, and economic welfare of the public that is served. No
wonder that the courts in the United States and this Tribunal have laid
down the doctrine that it is the service to the public in public
utilities that is of controlling and paramount importance. Priority in
the application is of relatively minor importance, to be considered
only when other things are equal, which they are not, in the present
case.

But I am afraid that the majority opinion would in effect, perhaps
unwittingly, declare the business of public utilities as “free for
all”, “first come first served”, regardless of the qualifications of
the applicants, specially their ability to render service to the
public, on the basis of their experience, training and success in
actual operation, as shown by their existing facilities and past
performance. The majority would in effect open the gates of the
business of land transportation to anyone who being financially
capacitated, thinks that he can operate land transportation service;
and if he files his application first, regardless of other
considerations, he obtains approval of the same. This theory might be
permitted and perhaps will work out in the case of virgin territory
where no operator has yet ventured or dared to venture, and an
applicant is willing to take the bold venture and risk his capital. The
public in said territory will welcome the establishment of the service
line, seeing that they have not much choice in the matter, or
expectation of a better qualified operator; and the Public Service
Commission, most likely, would grant the certificate for lack of other
applications in a better position to give more adequate and better
service. But this cannot be and may not be allowed in a territory like
the City of Manila where there are about 58 persons and entities
already and actually operating taxicabs, rendering service which is
adequate, efficient and safe because of their experience, training and
facilities.

In the present case, the Commission after a study of the case and
perhaps after its agents have checked the experience and training of
the three applicants and the facilities at their disposal, has found as
a matter of fact that Santos is by far the most qualified. Says the
Commission in its decision:

“Since, on the one hand, none of the applicants has
shown any legal right to the units claimed and, on the other, there is
no question that public convenience requires that these 32 taxicab
units be placed back in operation, the determination of which of the
applicants should be granted the authority or certificate to operate
the units must necessarily depend on the question of who is the best
qualified to put up and operate the service. We do not incline to split
the units because experience has shown that a taxicab service is best
rendered by an operator with a reasonably large fleet and who, on
account of the number of units he operates maintains complete garage
facilities and equipment necessary to keep all the vehicles
continuously in good running condition, and is able, with the
facilities available to him, to immediately repair defective vehicles
and put them into service right away. Undoubtedly a small operator, to
whom it does not pay to maintain these garage facilities because of the
few units he has, in case of breakdown of vehicles, has to withdraw
them from the service until such time as, with his limited facilities,
he is able to place them back in operation and defective limits are out
of service for days and days. The three applicants have adduced
evidence to establish their financial capacity but we are convince
that, of the three, applicant Santos is the best qualified of all. This
applicant is presently a taxicab operator of 87 units of the bantam
type, Mercedez-Benz make. Our records show that he has always
registered on time all the units authorized under his certificates and
that the units he has registered are all brand new. He has a garage
fully equipped and tooled for the immediate servicing and repair of his
taxicabs. It is established that he is in a financial position to
immediately acquire and register the units applied for. As to
experience and know-how in the operation of a taxicab business, there
is no doubt that applicant Santos has a decided advantage over the
other two applicants who, according to the evidence, have never
operated a taxicab business. A person with experience in and knowledge
of the taxicab business undoubtedly can tender a better service and
thus promote further the convenience of the public than one who
ventures into it for the first time. His familiarity with the business
and the ways of operating the service efficiently, the fact that he
already has trained mechanics, drivers, personnel and needed shop
equipment, insures the rendering to the public of a regular, continuous
and dependable service. As between applicants even of identical
financial capacity, we consider’ that the one who is actually operating
and with proven experience, competence, facilities and personnel is
entitled to preference.”

The above finding of the Commission is a question of fact amply
supported by the evidence. On the basis of that finding of fact,
exercising its discretion, the Commission selected Santos as the most
deserving and the best qualified among the applicants. Are we
authorized to overrule said finding and valid exercise of discretion?
The question is answered in the negative, by a long line of cases,
American and Philippine. The Supreme Court of Ohio, speaking—

“This Court has repeatedly declared that the Motor
Transportation Act has for its object the securing of necessary and
convenient, motor transportation service to the public, and that the rights conferred upon the recipient of a certificate
of convenience and necessity are only such as are incident to the
accomplishing of such object, and are granted for the benefit of the
public, and not for the benefit of the recipient of the certificate.
Where, therefore, the Public Utilities Commission has made a selection between two or more persons,
either or all of whom are qualified to efficiently serve the public,
and has not abused its discretion in making such selection, its finding and order in that respect is neither unreasonable nor unlawful.” (Johnson vs. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, June 8, 1927, 157 N.E. 475). (Italics supplied).

On the same subject matter, said the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section:

“The court will not substitute Us views and discretion for the views and discretion of the commission on questions
of fact where there is material evidence to support the conclusions of
fact reached by the commission.” (Tennessee Cnt Ry. Co. vs. Pharr 108 S.W. 2d 289). (Italics supplied).

Then the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has the following to say:

“Whether the granting of the franchise or amendment
sought is in the public interest presents a matter for the exercise of
legislative discretion by the commission. It cannot be answered by the application of a proposition of law. It is clear therefore that a trial court must have compelling reasons for reversal where the final conclusion, of the agency is based upon a determination which is not only highly discretionary
but rests upon the agency’s finding as to what is necessary and
convenient in the public interest, two terms of indefinite and varying
content,” (Gateway Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 34 N.W. 238). (Italics supplied).

“A
pure question of fact is to be determined by the commission, rather
than by the review court; the court will not substitute its judgment or
opinion, for that of the commission on a question of fact, unless
the order of the commission is clearly against the weight of the
evidence and is unlawful or unreasonable; and it will not review the
commission’s determination of a question of fact or examine the facts
further than to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
sustain the determination.” (73 C. J. S. 1164). (Italics supplied).

In the case of Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Laguna Transportation, 104 Phil., 994; citing the case of Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commission, 41 Phil, 363; and Raymundo Transportation Co. vs. Cervo, 91 Phil., 313; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., et al. vs. Canon, 58 Phil, 75; and Padua vs.
Ocampo et al., G. R. No. L-7579, September 17, 1955, we said that this
Court will refrain from substituting its discretion on the weight of
the evidence for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on
questions of fact. In the case of Banaag vs. Intestate Estate
of Sisenando Enriquez, G. R. No. L-4266, Feb. 29, 1952, we held that so
long as there is evidence for the Public Service Commission reasonably
supporting its order and there is no clear abuse of powers, the Supreme
Court will not interfere. The same thing was said in the case of Joson vs. Santos, 79 Phil., 381; 45 Off. Gaz., 1740. Again, we said in the case of’ Santiago Ice Plant and Co. vs.
Lahoz, 87 Phil., 221; 47 Off. Gaz. (12) 403, that “this Court will not
substitute its discretion for that of the Commission on questions of
fact and will not interfere in the latter’s decision unless it clearly
appears that there is no evidence to support it.” And in the case of
Halili vs. Floro, G. R. No. L-3465, Oct. 25, 1951, we said
that, “We are not at liberty to substitute our own findings of fact for
those of the Commission reasonably supported by evidence even if we have some plausible ground to make the modification.” To the same effect was our ruling in the case of Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines vs.
Valero, 58 Phil., 7, where we said that “the Court is not authorized to
weigh the conflicting evidence and substitute its conclusion for that
of the Commission.” And in the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Tambot, 95 Phil., 661, again we said that:

“This Court even went to the extent of holding that
it ‘will refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of
‘the evidence for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on
question of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the
Public Service Commission when it really appears that the evidence is
insufficient to support their conclusions.’ (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.
& Aero Taxicab Co. us. Danon, 58 Phil., 75).”

In the case of Halili vs. De la Cruz, 88 Phil., 699, we said:

“En varias decisiones este Tribunal declaro que no
ha imponer su criterio en sustitucion del de la Comision del Servicio
Publico que ha tenido oportunidad de pesar debidamente las pruebas
presentadas por las partes; ni ha de revocar la decision apelada si hay
pruebas razonables que la apoyan.”

And in the case of Zamboanga Transportation Co. vs. Fargas, 91 Phil., 65, we also said:

“Estas conclusiones de hecho de la Comision estan
bien fundadas: No hay nada en autos que justifique su revocacion. En
asuntos de esta naturaleza ‘este Tribunal no esta llamada a examinar
las pruebas de nuevo y determinar por si mismo si la preponderancia de
las pruebas justifica o no la orden apelada.’ (San Miguel Brewery contra Lapid,
53 Jur. Fil. 574.) ‘Todo el tenor y alcance de la legislacion moderna
es investir la Comisionado de Utilidad Publica con facultades para
reglementar y controlar la exploitacion de las utilidades publicas,
bajo normas razonables y reglamentos que sirvan el interes del publico.
Eso fue al proposito de la enmienda. Aqui, como en todos partes, la
Comision esta investida de facultades administrativas amplias y
discrecionales, y, por regla general, los tribunales no se interpondran
en el ejercicio de dicha discrecion cuando la misma sea razonable. * *
*’ Inchausti Steamship Co. contra Com. de Utilidad Publica, 44 Jur. Fil. 383).”

In connection with this finding of the Commission that Santos as
compared to the other applicants, Paz Marquez Benitez and Mabait C.
Lopez, is the best qualified, it will be remembered that Lopez in
support of her claim for experience and training in the operation of
taxicab business said that being the daughter of Concepcion, who in
Case No. 1740 was authorized to operate 80 taxicab units, which
certificate was eventually sold to Santos, she had occasion and
opportunity to observe how to run a taxicab business and she believes
that she herself can do so on her account, and Paz Marquez Benitez in
her turn, being a co-owner and director of the Redi Taxicab which
engaged in the taxicab business after the war, believes that she is
also in a position to operate taxicab service on her own account. The
trouble with these claims of capacity to operate is that the Commission
is in no position to verify and check them. Being the daughter of a
taxicab operator or being a part owner and director of a taxicab
company is no guaranty that claimants can render the service, reliable,
adequate and safe, that the Commission by granting the certificate
indirectly guarantees to the public. In the case of Santos, not only
was he a pre-war operator and a successful one, but he also operated
after the war and in fact expanded his operation by buying the
certificate of Concepcion. The Commission through its agents and
experts, had the opportunity to examine and check his facilities, such
as, garages, repair shop, etc., and his mechanics, employees,
particularly, his drivers and workers. On the other hand, the
Commission had no opportunity to check similar facilities and employees
of Lopez and Benitez because they had none. True, during the hearing,
the son of Benitez, named Francisco Benitez, Jr., who is operating a
taxicab service (Redi Taxi Company), said that if a certificate is
given to his mother, he would operate the 32 taxicab units in question.
Inasmuch as the Redi Taxi Company was not an applicant in this case,
the Commission had no reason, opportunity or occasion to check its
facilities and its employees, specially its drivers and their record
for safe driving. Ail that we know of Francisco Benitez, Jr. is that
according to him, he began operating taxicab after the war by buying
certificates of public convenience of other companies engaged in the
business. He bought the certificate of public convenience of
Concepcion, including 59 units, but because Concepcion failed to
register 32 of these units, the same were dropped from, the certificate
and so only 27 units were included in the sale to him. If Francisco
Benitez, Jr. was a successful taxicab operator, and was financially
capable, it is not explained why he did not immediately register these
32 units, either in his name or in that of Concepcion, so that they
could have been included in the certificate which was sold to him. The
certificate for the 27 units that he bought was mortgaged to the R.F.C.
Francisco Benitez, Jr. either neglected or failed to pay the loan and
redeem the mortgage and so it was foreclosed and the certificate was
sold. He did not buy the certificate at the auction sale, why, it was
not explained. It was Santos who bought said certificate for 27 units.
That hardly speaks well for Francisco Benitez, Jr. as a successful and
capable taxicab operator. Furthermore, Paz Marquez Benitez did not
state in her application that if given the certificate, she would
indorse it to her son to operate in connection with the Redi Taxi
Company. She merely stated therein that:

“The applicant proposes to appropriate the authority
to operate, the 32 taxicabs which were not registered, either by
Nicolas F. Concepcion, Francisco Benitez, Jr. or the Redi Taxi, Inc.”

There is another point which may not be out of place to mention. One
of the reasons given by Santos in claiming preference to the 32 taxicab
units is that they originally formed part of the certificate of public
convenience granted to Concepcion which, through failure or neglect to
register, were dropped from the certificate. Santos contends and urges
that being part (originally) of the certificate which he bought at the
foreclosure sale, it is more logical that they be given to him or be
restored to the said certificate of public convenience instead of
separating them from the certificate, and giving them to another
applicant and issuing a new and separate certificate of public
convenience. We have to admit that there is some logic to his
contention.

It seems that the majority is in part influenced in its conclusion
that to grant the present application of Santos who already owns 87
taxicab units may lead to a monopoly in the taxicab business in the
City of Manila, as reflected by the following portion of the majority
opinion:

“The further fact that respondent Santos already
owns 87 taxicab units which he presently operates militates against his
application, because giving the award to him would likely create a
monopoly in this particular line of business. A monopolistic trend with
its concomitant evils can only serve to prejudice public interest,
stifling as it does enthusiasm and initiative on the part of those
eager to learn. Prior experience, while itself useful, cannot create a
vested right which would endanger the national, economy.”

To allay the fears of the majority about the danger of monopoly, it
may be stated that according to the record of this case, when the
application of Paz Marquez Benitez, Mabait C. Lopez and Amador D.
Santos were filed, following established procedure, they were each
required hot only to have the application published but to also
personally notify all the taxicab operators in the city of Manila and
suburbs according to the list furnished by the Commission. According to
said list, there are about 57 taxicab operators in Manila and suburbs,
some operating through companies or corporations like the Admiral
Taxicab Co., Champion Taxicab Co., Halili Taxicab Co., Redi Taxi Co.,
Aero Taxicab Co., Santos Taxicab Co., General Taxicab Co., Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co., Antipolo Taxicab Co., La Mallorca Taxicab Co., etc.
and others thru private individuals like Antonio Antico, Aurelia
Gonzales, Maximo Katigbak, Jose F. Zamora, Alfredo Zamora, F. G.
Monserrat, Carlos Dimayuga, etc. if in the opinion of the majority,
granting the application of Santos and giving him the 32 taxicab units
might create a monopoly, which surely would not happen because of the
existence of about 57 other taxicab operators, how about giving the
same 32 units to Benitez, so that they will be operated by her son,
Francisco Benitez, Jr., in connection with the Redi Taxi Co. which he
is now operating? According to the theory of the majority, would not
that also pave the way to a monopoly? There is nothing in the record
indicating how many taxicabs are being operated by the Redi Taxi Co.,
whether they are more or they are less in number than those operated by
Santos.

In conclusion, I hold that although Benitez and Lopez have filed
their applications before that of Santos, the latter has preference
despite his comparative delay in filing his application because in the
opinion of the Commission, which opinion we are not authorized under
the circumstances to set aside and substitute our own, he is by far the
party most capable, prepared to render the service demanded by the
public by reason of his experience, training, financial capacity and
success in the business even before the war and up to the present time.

We have ruled in numerous cases, only some of which I could cite for
lack of space, a ruling which finds full support in American decisions,
that priority in application in public utilities may be considered when
all things and circumstances are equal, but that ability and capacity,
to render service to the public is of paramount importance and is the
controlling factor, and that when this service to the public clearly
preponderates in the case of one of several applicants, the question of
priority of application is relegated to a minor and secondary
importance. Also, that when the Public Service Commission, after
studying the evidence and not excluding its own records concerning
public utility operators and the reports of its agents and experts,
finds as a fact that an applicant as compared to other applicants, is
by far the most qualified to render the service involved in an
application for the operation of the units, in this case, taxicab
units, and consequently, in its opinion should and will be granted the
certificate to operate, and that finding and opinion are supported not
only in part but amply and fully, in my opinion, by the evidence, we
according to our own rulings, may not set aside said finding and
opinion and substitute our own. These rulings and doctrines laid down
by us in so many cases over a period of many years, which find support
in American jurisprudence on public utilities, have stood the test. of
time and the successful operation of public utilities here and in the
United States. They are wise, sound and wholesome principles, referring
particularly to land transportation, which we should not depart from or
abandon, much less reverse, or set aside, except for powerful and valid
reasons. The Public Service Commission having implicit belief and
confidence in those rules we laid down, faithfully followed them and
decided this case in favor of Santos. Shall we now tell the Commission
that we are reversing its decision because it was wrong and acted
incorrectly in following the doctrine laid down by this Tribunal? This
whole case, in my opinion, boils down to that proposition.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

Concepcion, and Labrador, JJ., concur.