G.R. No. 12727. February 29, 1960
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES, PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR AND AP…
BARRERA, J.:
Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case
No. 31274), in which the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. intervened as
party in interest with leave of court, praying that judgment be
rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB),
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary
Fortunato de Leon:
“(a) Interpreting Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 1502 in
such a manner that the 30 Sundays unreserved for charitable
institutions and therefore belonging to the private racing clubs under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309 continue to pertain to said private
entities, and that the 6 additional sweepstakes races authorized under
Republic Act No. 1502 should be held on 6 of the 12 Saturdays not
reserved for any private entity or particular charitable institution
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, or on any other day of the
week besides Sunday, Saturday and legal holiday;“(b)
Holding that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to
appropriate or use the race tracks and equipment of petitioner without
its consent, nor can respondents compel petitioner to so allow such use
of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its license
revoked.”
Respondents duly filed their respective answers to said petition and
the case was heard. After hearing, the court, on July 5, 1957, rendered
a decision which, in part, reads:
“The court does not deem it necessary to rule on the
deprivation of property of the petitioner and the intervenor without
due process of law, as feared by them, because as they have stated, the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is using their premises and
equipment under separate contracts of lease voluntarily, and willingly
entered into by the parties upon payment of a corresponding rental.
There is therefore no deprivation of property without due process of
law.“Wherefore, the court is of the opinion and so holds
that once a month on a Sunday not reserved for the Anti-Tuberculosis
Society, the White Cross and other charitable institutions by Section 4
of Republic Act No. 309, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office is
authorized to hold one regular sweepstakes draw and races, pursuant to
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1502, thus reducing the number of Sundays
which may be allotted to private entities by the Games and Amusements
Board. * * *.”
From this judgment, petitioner and intervenor interposed the present appeal.
The issue is the proper placement of the six (6) additional racing
days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of
Republic Act No. 1502, approved on June 16, 1956.
The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed
in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 309, the basic law on horse racing in
the Philippines, as later amended by Republic Act No. 983, are as
follows:
A. Sundays:
| (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society………………………………………………………………. |
12 Sundays
|
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| (2) For the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)…………………………………………………… |
6 Sundays
|
||
| (3) For the White Cross, Inc………………………………………………………………………………………. |
4 Sundays
|
||
| (4) For the Grand Derby Race of the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society………………………………… |
1 Sunday
|
||
|
__________
|
|||
|
23 Sundays
|
||
| (5) For private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB, other Sundays not reserved under this Act, as may be determined by the GAB ……………………………………………… |
29 Sundays
|
||
| or 30 for Leap years | |||
|
52 Sundays
|
B. Saturdays:
| (1) For the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society………………………………………………………………… |
12 Saturdays
|
||
| (2) For the White Cross, Inc………………………………………………………………………………………. |
4 Saturdays
|
||
| (3) For private Individuals and entities duly licensed by GAB and as may be determined by it ………. |
24 Saturdays
|
||
| (4) For races authorized by the President for charitable, relief, or civic purposes other than the particular charitable institutions named above, all other Saturdays not reserved for the latter…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. |
12 Saturdays
|
||
|
___________
|
|||
|
52 Saturdays
|
C. Legal Holidays: All, except Thursday
and Friday of the Holy Week, July 4th and December 30th, have been
reserved for private individuals and entities duly licensed by the GAB.
As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and
races of the PCSO to twelve, but without specifying the days on which
they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, the GAB
resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private
individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that
the said increased should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to
the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or should be
assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and
legal holiday.
Appellants’ contention cannot be sustained. Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms,
specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine
Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12
Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic
purposes. These days can not be disposed of by the GAB without
authority of law. As to the remaining racing days, the law provides:
“SEC. 4. Racing days.—Private individuals
and entities duly licensed by the Commission on Races (now GAB) may
hold horse races on Sundays not reserved under this Act, on twenty-four
Saturdays as may be determined by the said Commission (GAB), and on
legal holidays, except Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, July fourth,
commonly known as Independence Day, and December thirtieth, commonly
known as Rizal Day.”
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that appellants have no
vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays
(except, perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of races on
these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and
determination by the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502 was
enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but
without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no
alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did,
from among the only available racing days unreserved by any law—the
Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been
permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination
by the GAB.
It is suggested that the GAB should have chosen any week days or
Saturday afternoons. In the first place, weeks days are out of the
question. The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with
betting on week days (See Article 198 of the Revised Penal Code).
Secondly, sweepstakes races have always been held on Sundays. Besides,
it is not possible to hold them on Saturdays afternoons as, it is
claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes
balls, the drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of
the sweepstakes races. Be that as it may, since the law has given
certain amount of discretion to the GAB in determining and allocating
racing days not specifically reserved, and since the court does not
find that a grave abuse of this discretion has been committed, there
seems to be no reason, legal or otherwise, to set aside the resolution,
of the GAB.
Furthermore, appellants contend that even granting that the six (6)
additional sweepstakes races should be run on Sundays, yet if they are
held on a club race day, the GAB should only insert them in the club
races and not give the whole day to the PCSO, to the exclusion of
appellants. In support of this contention, the following Quotation from
the debate in the House of Representatives before the voting on House
Bill No. 5732, which became Republic Act No. 1502, is cited:
“Mr. ABELEDA. If there are no more amendments, I move that we vote on the measure.
“Mr. MARCOS. Mr. Speaker, before we proceed to vote on this bill, I want to make it of record that it
is the clear intention of the House to increase by two the ten regular
and special Sweepstakes races making it all in all, twelve, and that in
cases where a sweepstake race falls in a club race days the Sweepstakes
race should be inserted in the club race.“Mr. ABELEDA.
The gentleman from Ilocos Norte is correct. * * *.” (t.s.n.,
Proceedings in House of Representatives, Congress, May 17, 1956;
italics supplied.)
Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining
the view that in the interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely
differing constructions, legislative debates and explanatory statements
by members of the legislature may be resorted to, to throw light on the
meaning of the words used in the statutes. Upon the other hand, the
appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to the
effect that statements made by the individual members of the
legislature as to the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently
enacted into law, made during the general debate on the bill on the
floor of each legislative house, following its presentation by a
standing committee, are generally held to be inadmissable as an aid in
construing the statute. Legislative debates are expressive of the views
and motives of individual members and are not safe guides and, hence,
may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what
construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body
that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members
thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who
did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.[1]
In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance
can safely be placed on any of them. It is to be noted in the specific
case before us, that while Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were,
admittedly, of the view that the additional sweepstakes races may be
inserted in the club races, still there is nothing in Republic Act No.
1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an
understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of
Congress received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for
the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication. This is,
therefore, not a case where a doubtful wording is sought to be
interpreted; rather, if we adopt appellants’ theory, we would be
supplying something that does not appear in the statute. It is
pertinent to observe here that, as pointed out by one of appellants’
own cited authorities,[2] in
the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in
the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to
obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or
authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been
expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In
short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author
meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used
sufficiently expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is
made up of two elements—an internal and an external one; it originates
in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may
defeat the former. The following, taken from 59 Corpus-Juris 1017, is
in line with this theory:
“The intention of the legislature to which effect
must be given is that expressed in the statute and the courts will not
inquire into the motives which influence the legislature, or individual
members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as to the intention of
the draftsman, or the legislature, so far as it has been expressed in
the act. So, in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will
not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all
members of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other
persons.”
Upon the other hand, at the time of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 1502 in June, 1956; the long, continuous, and uniform practice was
that all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during
the whole day. With this background, when Congress chose not to specify
in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would
be held, it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the
then prevailing situation and practice.
“On the principle of contemporaneous exposition,
common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct
indicating a particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great
value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has
been acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long
period of time; * * *. (59 C. J. 1023)
Likewise, the language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the
increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the
intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws
only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law
would not have included regular races; and since regular
sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be
confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes
races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never
been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional
sweepstakes drawers and races were intended to be held on a whole day,
separate and apart from the club races.
Appellants’ contention that to compel them to permit the PCSO to use
their premises and equipment against their will would constitute
deprivation of property without due process of law, deserves no serious
consideration. As the lower court has found, every time the PCSO uses
appellants’ premises and equipment, they are paid rentals in accordance
with the terms of separate contracts of lease existing between them and
the PCSO.
The decision appealed from, being in consonance with the above
findings and considerations of this Court, the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., on leave, took no part.
[1] Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 499-501; Ramos vs. Alvarez 97 Phil., 844; 51 Off. Gaz. [II] 56087.
[2] Vaughan Hawkins, in appendix to Thayer’s Preliminary Treatise on Evidence.