PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FERDINAND FLORENDO Y CAWILI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant
Ferdinand Florendo y Cawili was charged
with separate crimes of Rape and Robbery on 2 January 1992.

The verified complaint
for rape reads as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of October, 1991, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the undersigned MYRNA REYTIRAN y SANTIAGO without her
consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may
(be) awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.

Contrary to Law.”^[1]

The information for
robbery reads as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of October, 1991, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, by means of violence and
intimidation against person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob MYRNA REYTIRAN y SANTIAGO, in the following manner, to
wit: the said accused poked a mason’s
tool (Kutsara) at said complainant and divested her (of) cash money in the
amount of P90.00. Philippine Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the amount aforementioned and
in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil
Code.

Contrary to Law.”^[2]

The accused-appellant was
arraigned on 20 January 1992 where he pleaded not guilty to both charges.

After trial, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 97, Quezon City, rendered a decision* dated 24
March 1992, the disposi­tive part of which, reads:

“In view of the foregoing, the Court declares accused
FERDINAND FLORENDO y CAWILI, GUILTY of the crimes respectively charged in the
Complaint for rape in accordance with Art. 335, R.P.C. and charged in the
Information for robbery in accordance with Art. 294 par. 5, R.P.C., and he is
hereby sentenced to life imprisonment for rape and a prison term of four (4)
years in its minimum period to eight (8) years in its maximum period for the
robbery, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P90.00 as actual damages
and P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay costs.”^[3]

The accused-appellant
assigns the following errors to the trial court:

“x x x IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE MALEFACTOR.

“x x x IN FINDING THAT THE MALEFACTOR RAPED THE VICTIM.”^[4]

The events which led to
the filing of the complaint and information are as follows:

On 14 October 1991 at
around six o’clock in the evening, complainant Myrna Reytiran, then on her
ninth (9th) month of pregnancy, while walking on her way home, passed by a waiting
shed near the People’s Park at the intersection of North Avenue and Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City. A man poked a mason’s spoon on her stomach and forced her into a public
comfort room. Inside the comfort room,
the man stripped her of her clothes and forced her to lie down while still
poking the mason’s spoon at her. She
tried to resist but the man overpowered her and was able to forcibly have
sexual intercourse with her.

After consummating the
criminal act, the man dragged her to one side and, still poking the mason’s spoon at her, took her money amounting to ninety
pesos (P90.00) and left. After her
attacker had left, Myrna went outside to ask for help from a police patrol
which happened to pass by. She informed
the police officers that she had been raped and robbed. She was brought to the Baler Police Station where she was asked to execute a sworn statement. She was later brought to Camp Crame for
medical examination.

On 27 December 1991,
Myrna’s brother-in-law fetched her from their house and brought her to the
barangay outpost where accused-appellant Ferdinand Florendo was being ques­tioned
in connection with a complaint of an elderly woman who alleged that Florendo had
molested her. Complainant Myrna
Reytiran then pointed to Ferdinand Florendo as the person who had sexually attacked her on 14 October 1991.

They were then brought to the Baler Police Station where Myrna
Reytiran executed another sworn statement, this time identifying the
accused-appellant Ferdinand Florendo as her attacker.

There are three (3) settled principles to guide an appellate court in reviewing the
evidence in rape cases namely: 1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused though innocent, to disprove; 2) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two (2) persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.^[5]

In his appeal to this Court, accused-appellant Ferdinand Florendo
y Cawili raises the following issues which allegedly warrant his acquittal:

1. The lone testimony of the victim and the manner by which he was
pointed to as the malefactor more than two (2) months after the incident, are
susceptible to attack.

Accused-appellant
contends that the identification made by Myrna Reytiran “is irregular
because the method used was contrary to the accepted principles of scientific
crime detection” because there was identification without accused-appellant being placed in a police
line-up.^[6]
The case of People vs. Cruz,^[7] cited by accused-appellant is not applicable to the case at bench. In Cruz,
the accused was acquitted not on
the sole basis of a lack of
police line-up but also on a finding that “The manner by which [the witnesses]
were made to identify the accused at the
police station was pointedly suggestive, generated
confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subverted their reliability as witnesses.” In People vs.
Espiritu,^[8]
this Court ruled that there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential
to a proper identification. In the case
at bench, the identification made of the
accused-appellant by the
victim was spontaneous and positive.

Neither does the lapse of a period of more than two (2) months before the victim identified
the accused-appellant warrant a reversal of accused-appellant’s
conviction. The identification made by
the victim, Myrna Reytiran, was clear,
positive and independently made. It is
extremely doubtful if a rape victim would ever forget the face of her
assailant. The alleged inaccuracy in
the victim’s statement executed right after the incident describing the eyes of
her attacker to be round rather than chinky is correctly explain­ed by the
Solicitor General to have been due to the shock of the harrowing
experience. Moreover, the positive
identifica­tion made by the victim on 27 December 1991 and again at the trial
more than made up for the inaccuracy. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the victim, Myrna
Reytiran and absent any special and compelling circumstances this Court
respects the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.

2. Accused-appellant alleges that the prosecution’s failure to
present the physician who examined the victim and the fact that the medical
certificate indicated that no laceration was sustained by the victim’s genital
organ, negate the commission of the crime of rape.

In People vs. Rabanes,^[9] this Court reiterated the long settled rule
that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she had been raped and if her testimony meets the test
of credi­bility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the victim’s
testimony. Furthermore, the Court in
said Rabanes case, stated that the absence of external signs or physical
injuries does not negate the commission of the crime of rape and neither is a
medical certificate a requirement for prosecution and conviction.

In the present case, the trial court upheld the lone testimony of
the victim to support conviction of the accused-appellant. A careful
review of the records shows that the victim’s
testimony was clear, straightforward and at times
even emotional to the extent that the records indicate that the victim cried
during certain parts of her testimony.

The foregoing abundantly establish the guilt of accused-appellant
of rape. However, the trial court erred
in imposing the sentence of life imprisonment for the crime.

The correct penalty is reclusion perpetua. The two (2) penalties are not synonymous nor
interchangeable and the Court has repeatedly reminded judges to properly impose
the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua.

The civil indemnity for rape is, as a rule, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) but considering the
extraordina­ry circumstances in this case, where the victim was on her ninth
(9th) month of pregnancy when she was raped, the cruelty of the sexual assault
is quite evident. The indemnity
is increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

Regarding the charge of robbery,
the Solicitor General correctly states that
only the crime of theft was committed since
the records are bereft of any showing that force and/or intimidation was employed by the accused-appellant in taking
the victim’s money. What is
clear is that the accused-appellant picked
up the victim’s money that had scattered on the floor.

WHEREFORE, the conviction for rape imposed by the lower
court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the accused-appellant
Ferdinand Florendo is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered
to pay the victim Myrna Reytiran the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).

The conviction for robbery is modified and the accused-appellant
Ferdinand Florendo is found guilty of theft and sentenced to a penalty of Two
(2) to Six (6) Months of Arresto Mayor and further ordered to
return to the victim the amount of Ninety Pesos (P90.00) taken from her. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Nocon, and Puno, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 4

^[2]
Rollo, p. 3

* Penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste

^[3]
Rollo, p. 16

^[4]
Rollo, p. 31

^[5]
People vs. dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 92442-43, 23 March 1992, 207 SCRA 449

^[6]
Rollo, p. 36

^[7]
G.R. No. L-24424, 30 March 1970, 32 SCRA 181

^[8]
G.R. No. 80406, 20 November 1990, 191 SCRA 503

^[9]
G.R. No. 93709, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 768