SPOUSES TIBURCIO PELAYO AND CLENOR COMIA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HONORINA S. COMIA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set
aside the decision^[1]
and resolution^[2]
of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the trial court which
nullified the foreclosure sale of the subject mortgaged properties.

Records show that petitioners spouses Tiburcio Pelayo and Clenor
Comia mortgaged to private respondent Honorina S. Comia several parcels of land
situated in Kalookan City, Malabon, and Meycauyan, Bulacan as security for a
loan in the sum of P700,000.00.

Upon petitioners’ failure to pay their loan, private respondent
filed an action against them with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 120 in Civil Case No. C-8106 which rendered a decision on March 8, 1984,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice while accommodating his
[should be her] brother-in-law and sister who are both spouses because of pity
in helping them in their problem with Allied Bank and having failed to redeem
the properties of plaintiff [herein private respondent], judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:

“1. Declaring the
5 parcels of land covered by the Real Estate Mortgage executed by defendant
spouses Tiburcio Pelayo and Clenor Comia [herein petitioners] as mortgagor[s],
in favor of plaintiff in this case is hereby ordered foreclosed in favor of
plaintiff/mortgagee;

“2. Declaring the Deed of Sale made by spouses
Tiburcio Pelayo and Clenor Comia in favor of defendant Tiu Ngo as null and
void;

“3. Declaring the claims and the subsequent sale
of TCT No. 291399 in favor of defendant, Antonio’s Agronomics, Inc., as null
and void;

“4. Ordering the
defendant spouses Tiburcio Pelayo and Clenor Comia to pay the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS by way of attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of
the suit;

“5. Dismissing all
the counterclaims of defendants against the plaintiff for lack of merit and
denying all the counterclaims of the defendants against the plaintiff for lack
of merit; and

“6. Ordering the spouses Tiburcio Pelayo and
Clenor Comia to pay the cost of suit.”^[3]

Petitioners appealed said decision with the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 06888 and on March 20, 1989, the latter modified the
decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in
the sense that the lower court shall order defendants-appellants [herein
petitioners] to pay to it the amount of P700,000.00 representing the mortgage
debt within ninety (90) days from service of such order; and should they fail
to comply, the lower court shall order that the mortgage properties in question
be sold at public auction to realize such debts and costs.

“With the exception of the MODIFICATION as aforestated, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant spouses Tiburcio Pelayo and Clenor Comia.”^[4]

When said decision became final and executory, private respondent
filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution and the presiding judge of the trial
court issued the corresponding Writ of Execution directing its Sheriff to
notify the petitioners.

On May 27, 1991, Sheriff Cesar L. Cruz served petitioners a copy
of the Writ of Execution together with the following Notice:

“In connection with the Writ of Execution issued by the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 120, Caloocan
City, Metro-Manila, dated May 21, 1991, in the above-entitled case, a copy of
which is hereto attached and herewith served upon you, the undersigned Deputy
Sheriff is giving you a period of 90 days upon receipt to pay the amount of
P700,000.00 representing mortgage debt, and should you fail to comply, the
undersigned will be constrained to sell at Public Auction the mortgage
properties in question to realize such debts and costs.”^[5]

After the expiration of the 90-day period or on October 16, 1991,
the trial court issued an Order directing the sheriff to implement the Writ of
Execution and a Notice of Attachment/Levy was subsequently served on the
respective Registrar of Deeds where the mortgaged properties were situated.

On December 12, 1991, the mortgaged properties were sold to
private respondent as the highest bidder at a public auction for the total
amount of P747,200.00 in full satisfaction of the judgment.

As soon as petitioners learned about the sale of their mortgaged
properties, they filed with the trial court a motion to set aside the foreclosure sale alleging failure on
the part of the trial court to issue an order specifically directing them to
pay their debt within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.

On January 9, 1992, the trial court issued an Order^[6],
the pertinent portion of which reads, as follows:

“x x x, the Court finds that indeed it has not issued any
specific Order directing the herein defendants-appellants to pay to it the
amount of P700,000.00 regarding the
mortgage debt within the ninety days period from notice of such order in
compliance with the resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 20,
1989 x x x.

“True enough that the Court in acting on the motion for
execution of the aforesaid resolution of the Court of Appeals issued the following
Order dated May 9, 1991, which reads:

‘Acting on the Motion for Writ of Execution, copy of which has been
duly served to the counsel for defendant spouses, and considering the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-06888 affirming the decision of the
lower court with the modification that the defendants-appellants should be
ordered to pay the amount of P700,000.00 representing the mortgage debt within
90 days from service of this Order, the motion is hereby GRANTED.’

“However, in strictly construing the said resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the order so required directing the payment of P700,000.00 to
it must FIRST be issued before the mortgage[d] property may be sold at public
auction.

“Accordingly, the
foreclosure sale of the mortgage[d] properties is hereby set aside.

“And, pursuant to the aforesaid resolution of the Court of
Appeals on March 20, 1989, the defendants-appellants are hereby ORDERED to pay
the amount of P700,000.00 in cash within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
order.

“Failure to do so, said
mortgage[d] property shall be sold at public auction to realize such debts and
costs as adjudged by the Court of Appeals.”^[7]

On February 6, 1992, private respondent appealed said Order to
respondent Court of Appeals after the trial court denied its Motion for
Reconsideration on January 20, 1992.

On March 18, 1992, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Order dated January
2, 1992 [should be January 9, 1992] is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.”^[8]

On April 13, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied on July 22, 1992.

Hence, this petition.

The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not the
trial court validly issued the January 9, 1992 Order considering that the
judgment on the foreclosure of the subject mortgaged properties had already
become final and executory.

Section 1(a), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“SECTION 1. Execution
upon final judgments or orders. — Execution shall issue only upon a
judgment or order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of
right upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.”

Inasmuch as the decision dated March 20, 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No.
06888 had long become final and executory, the execution of said judgment
cannot anymore be postponed or deferred by the trial court. It is a fundamental rule of procedure that
once a decision becomes final and executory, it is incumbent upon the judge to
issue a writ of execution.^[9] The
fact that petitioners issued bounced checks^[10] to
private respondent for the payment of their mortgage debt indicates
petitioners’ intention to delay the execution of the final decision of the
court. We have time and again ruled
that courts should never allow themselves to be a party to maneuvers intended
to delay the execution of final decisions. They must nip in the bud any dilatory maneuver calculated to defeat or
frustrate the ends of justice, fair play and prompt implementation of final and
executory judgment. Litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.^[11]

Under the Revised Rules of Court, the trial court is not required
to issue another order specifically directing petitioners to pay their mortgage
debt of P700,000.00 as the dispositive portion of the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals had already specifically ordered the petitioners to
pay the mortgage debt within ninety (90) days from receipt of said decision. As stated by the respondent Court of Appeals:

“The dispositive portion of the decision of this Court in
CA-G.R. CV No. 06888, is clear and certain and need no further clarification or
rectification or construction that is, that xxx the lower court shall order
defendants-appellants to pay x x x P700,000.00 x x x within ninety (90) days
from service of said order x x x. Our
judgment had become final and executory. No addition can be made. No
court can modify or revoke it. Nothing
can be done except to have it executed.”^[12]

Thus, the court sustains the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals since no abuse of discretion has been found to have been committed by
the latter to justify a reversal. Moreover, the court finds this petition to be part of a dilatory attempt
to stall the execution of a final and executory decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the respondent
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED and the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondent Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Puno, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp.
18-21; Ponente: Justice Artemon D. Luna
with the concurrence of Justice Jose A. R. Melo and Justice Segundino G. Chua
promulgated on March 18, 1992.

^[2]
Id., at p. 29 promulgated on
July 22, 1992.

^[3]
Id., at pp. 18-19.

^[4]
Id., at pp. 19-20.

^[5]
Court of Appeals’ Rollo, p. 12.

^[6]
Issued by Judge Arturo H. Romero.

^[7]
Court of Appeals’ Rollo, pp.
15-16.

^[8]
Rollo, p. 21.

^[9]
Ortegas vs. Hidalgo, 198 SCRA 635
[1991].

^[10]
Rollo, p. 47.

^[11]
Maceda, Jr. vs. Moreman Builders
Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 [1991].

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 20-21.