G.R. Nos. 103226-28. October 14, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARCELINO C. MAGUIKAY (ALIAS LINO), ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) criminal cases were filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch CLVI)[1]
against MARCELINO C. MAGUIKAY, charging him with MURDER and ATTEMPTED MURDER,
allegedly committed as follows:
1. CRIM. CASE NO. 81459
“That on or about the 21st day of December 1989, in the
municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with two (2) other male persons whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one Carlos Bulilan on the vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds which directly
caused his death.
“Contrary to law.”
2. CRIM. CASE NO. 81460
“That on or about the 21st day of December 1989, in the
municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with two (2) other male persons whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one Roberto Bulilan on his head, thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot
wounds which directly caused his death.
“Contrary to law.”
3. CRIM. CASE NO. 81461
“That on or about the 21st day of December 1989, in the
municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with two (2) other male persons whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, armed with guns, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Danilo
V. Bulilan, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Murder directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony by reason of
causes other than their own spontaneous desistance that is, Danilo V.
Bulilan sustained serious physical injuries only.
“Contrary to law.”
Accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on April 3, 1990.[2]
Trial ensued thereafter.
The essential facts based on the evidence adduced by the
prosecution are as follows:
On December 21, 1989, at about 5:00 P.M., Carlos Bulilan and his
sons Roberto and Danilo, together with one Nazario Cunelas, were on board a
gray Galant car, with license plate NBR 248, owned by the Bulilans. They were on their way home from G-Liner[3]
where all of them work. The car was
then driven by Carlos. Seated beside
him was Roberto. Danilo and Nazario
Cunelas, on the other hand, were at the back seat.
Upon reaching Rosario, in Pasig, Nazario Cunelas said: “Dito
na lang ako.” He thanked the Bulilans for the ride and
alighted. The car then headed towards
Ortigas Avenue Extension. Somewhere
near De Castro Subdivision and St. Joseph Subdivision, also along Ortigas
Avenue Extension, in Pasig, the traffic slowed down and stopped. It was then 5:45 P.M. Shortly thereafter, the “go”
signal flashed. Carlos stepped on the
accelerator (umarangkada) when,
suddenly, three (3) men, one of them identified as accused Marcelino Maguikay,
approached the car. Holding a gun with
both hands, accused stood infront of the car near its right headlight. He was
in a shooting position, with both his knees slightly bent. Without much ado, accused fired at the
Bulilans. Danilo, who was then seated
behind the driver’s seat, immediately ducked. A volley of shots followed. Carlos
and Roberto were hit on the different parts of their body. Danilo was luckier. Though wounded on the abdomen, he remained
conscious during the ambush. He played
dead and survived the assault.
Thinking that the Bulilans were all dead, the assailants tried to
open the doors of the car. Danilo heard
them open the door beside the driver’s seat. Carlos’ body was then dragged out of the car. Accused uttered: “Kunin ninyo ang gamit niya, may dala
yan.” Moments later, accused and his cohorts fled.
Danilo immediately got out of the car and saw his father’s
bloodied body sprawled on the pavement. He shouted for help. Luckily, a
G-Liner bus passed by. With the bus
driver’s help, Danilo brought his father’s body back into the car and rushed
him to Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital in San Juan. His efforts were in vain. His father and brother died.
The postmortem examination conducted by DR. DARIO GAJARDO
revealed that Carlos Bulilan sustained six (6) gunshot wounds on different
parts of his body, while Roberto Bulilan had three (3) gunshot wounds on his
head.[4]
That evening, RENATO MACAPAGAL, Chairman of the Board of G-Liner,
received a telephone call informing him that the Bulilans were ambushed. He arrived at the hospital between 6:30 P.M.
and 6:45 P.M. He saw Danilo still in a
state of shock. He asked Danilo if he
recognized the assailants. Danilo was
able to point to Marcelino Maguikay. At
about 9:00 P.M., Macapagal and the President of G-Liner, Romeo de Guia, went to
the residence of the Bulilans in Taytay and brought the bad news to Isidra Bulilan.
The police was informed of the ambush. PAT. DONATO GEDA and a certain Pat. Esguerra, both of the Pasig
Police Station, rushed to the hospital at
about 7:20 that evening. Pat.
Geda immediately talked to the
lone survivor, Danilo, who was still in the emergency room. Danilo recounted to him the incident. He also identified one of the assailants as
Marcelino Maguikay, a former driver of G-Liner and president of the labor union
thereat. Danilo, however, failed to
recognize the two (2) other assailants.
Follow-up investigations were conducted that evening. The authorities recovered a slug from one of
the deceased (Exh. K). An empty shell,
apparently from a .45 cal. pistol, was also found at the locus criminis. Later
in the evening, Danilo was taken to the Pasig Police Station where his sworn
statement was taken by Pat. Geda.
SALVADOR VALISA, then a reporter of the tabloid “Evening
Bagong Pinoy,” was at the police headquarters in Pasig when he learned
of the ambush incident. He proceeded to
the hospital at 7:30 P.M. After taking pictures of the victims and the car,
he interviewed Danilo. In the presence
of police officers Geda and Esguerra, and the nurses and doctors, Danilo
identified the assailant as Lino Maguikay.[5]
ATTY. CARLOS GALARITA was in his house in Alabang when, at about
6:30 P.M., he received a telephone call from G-Liner about the ambush
incident. He also rushed to the
hospital and arrived thereat between 7:30 P.M. and 8:00 P.M. He learned that Carlos and Roberto had
died. At the morgue, he talked to
Danilo who informed him that Marcelino Maguikay was one of the gunmen.[6] He
then accompanied Danilo to the police station and assisted him during the
investigation.
On January 15, 1990, with the
assistance of a relative reporter from radio station DZRH, accused submitted
himself for investigation at the Rizal PC/INP Command[7] where
his sworn statement was taken by PC Maj. Luisito L. Maralit.[8]
The requisite preliminary investigation was conducted and accused was placed
under preventive imprisonment.
On February 5, 1990, Danilo Bulilan was invited to the police
station to identify the malefactors. A
police line-up, composed of eight (8) men, was formed. Without hesitation, Danilo Bulilan pointed
to Marcelino Maguikay as one of the culprits. Three (3) separate informations were then filed on February 21, 1989
against accused Maguikay. On even date, the “Order of
Arrest” was issued against accused for two (2) counts of Murder, with
“no bail recommended,”[9] and for Attempted Murder, with bail
fixed at P10,000.00.
The defense was anchored on alibi. It appears that accused Marcelino Maguikay was an apprentice
driver of Inland Trailways, Inc., (Inland) at the time of the incident. On December 19, 1989, he and co-drivers
Eduardo Maceda and Edwin Jimenez were dispatched to Catbalogan, Samar, on board
Bus No. 1919. The bus left the Pasay
City Terminal at about 5:00 P.M.[10]
Enroute to Catbalogan, Samar, the bus made several stop-overs, viz:
Masapan, Quezon; Daet, Camarines Norte; Naga City; Sorsogon, Matnog; and
Calbayog City. On December 21, 1989, at
around 12:30 A.M., the bus reached Catbalogan, Samar, its final destination.
At about 9:00 A.M., on December 21, 1989, Bus No. 1919 left the
Catbalogan Terminal for its return trip to Pasay City. At midnight, however, in San Felipe, Basud,
Camarines Norte, the bus was stranded due to a defective hi-beam. Upon Maceda’s instruction, accused boarded
another bus and proceeded to Inland’s terminal in Daet, for assistance. An hour later, accused returned on board Bus
No. 9952. The stranded passengers of
Bus No. 1919 were then transferred to Bus 9952. Again, following Maceda’s order, accused boarded Bus No. 9952 for
its return trip to Pasay City, leaving behind Maceda and Jimenez who looked
after the stranded bus.[11]
According to accused, when he arrived in Pasay City on December
22, 1989, his second wife told him of a newspaper report implicating him in the
slaying of Carlos Bulilan. He was told
that policemen were also looking for him. Mrs. Castro, his employer, however, did not believe the report. Thus, he was made to take another trip to
Maasim (in Visayas) that same day. He
obeyed.
To bolster his alibi, accused offered in evidence the testimonies
of his co-drivers, Maceda and Jimenez, and Inland’s logbooks where the arrival
and departure of Inland buses, including Bus No. 1919, were recorded.
On rebuttal, TEODORO MARTINEZ, one of G-Liner’s bus drivers,
claimed that in the morning of December 21, 1989, accused boarded the bus he
(Martinez) was then driving. From the
rear mirror, he allegedly saw accused talking to the bus conductor. After accused had alighted, the conductor told
him that accused had asked for money to buy newspaper.
On surrebuttal, LUIS FRANCISCO, a cellmate of accused at the
Pasig municipal jail, testified that Teodoro Martinez was detained at the
municipal jail for reckless
imprudence. While thus incarcerated, he
allegedly overheard Teodoro Martinez asking for forgiveness from accused because
he (Teodoro) executed an affidavit against the accused in connection with the
ambush. Teodoro likewise admitted to
accused that he was paid P10,000.00 in consideration for said affidavit, in
addition to G-Liner’s promise that he would not be dismissed from his job.
After trial, the court a quo found accused guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the
trial court Decision,[12]
dated November 27, 1991, reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
MARCELINO alias LINO C. MAGUIKAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER (on two counts), qualified by treachery defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the attending generic
circumstance of evident premeditation and hereby sentences said accused to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in EACH of Criminal Case No.
81459 and Criminal Case No. 81460, both entitled “People of the
Philippines versus Marcelino @ Lino C. Maguikay, to indemnify EACH of the heirs
of victims Carlos Bulilan and Roberto Bulilan, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) in accordance with the new policy of the High Court on the
matter xxx and the further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of
moral and exemplary damages, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
“The Court likewise finds the accused MARCELINO @ LINO C.
MAGUIKAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER
charged in Criminal Case No. 81461 and hereby sentences said accused to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of One (1) year, seven (7) months and Eleven (11)
days of prision correccional to Six (6) years, One (1) month and
Eleven (11) days of prision mayor and to pay the costs.
“In the successive service of his sentence, the
accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
“SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises these issues:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE ASSAILANTS;
II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONIES OF (GEDA), MACAPAGAL AND VALISA AS PART OF RES GESTAE;
III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED
HAD SUFFICIENT MOTIVE TO KILL THE VICTIMS;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ENTRIES IN THE (SUBJECT) LOGBOOKS HAVE NO PROBATIVE VALUE;
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE TESTIMONIES OF THE CO-DRIVERS OF MAGUIKAY;
VI
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE THE
ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED, HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI MUST NECESSARILY FALL;
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CRIME WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
The issues are interrelated, hence, they shall be resolved
jointly.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Accused-appellant was positively identified by a credible
eyewitness, Danilo Bulilan. We are
convinced of the truthfulness of Danilo’s testimony against
accused-appellant. He testified:
“COURT:
Q: Where
were you seated?
(DANILO BULILAN)
A: At
the back of the driver, Your Honor.
Q: Where did you see the accused in relation to
the car?
A: At the front side, near the headlight, right
front, Your Honor. He suddenly appeared.
Q: His
feet on the ground?
A: Slightly
bent, Your Honor.
Q: No
vehicle?
A: I
do not know where he came from, Your Honor.
Q: What
was he wearing?
A: White
T-shirt and pants, Your Honor.
Q: Was
it (the gun) a revolver or a pistol?
A: I
do not know, sir.
x x x
(ATTY. PEKAS)
Q: When
you saw Marcelino Maguikay in the (sic) front
of the car, was the car where you were riding on still moving?
A: Umaarangkada po because there was
traffic.
Q: You
saw him in the right front portion of the car?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: When
did you hear Maguikay talk?
A: After
the shooting incident and when my father was slumped on the street and he
uttered and I quote, “Kunin
mo ang gamit niyan, may dala iyan.”
Q: At
that point, were the alleged companions of Marcelino Maguikay still shooting?
A: They
were not, sir.
Q: What
was your position in the car at that time?
A I
was lying flat on the floor of the car, sir.
“Q: You
did not see the person who was talking
at that time.
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
you were suffering at that time from a gunshot wound?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Of
course, you were also shocked by the ambush?
A: Yes,
sir.
x x x
Q: You
said awhile ago that Marcelino Maguikay had two companions. Did you see their faces?
A: No,
sir.
Q: You
did not see them appear before the shooting?
A: I
just saw their shadow but I did not look directly because they were already
shooting, sir.
COURT:
Q: The
car is tinted?
A: Yes,
Your Honor.
Q: The
air-conditioning is running?
A: No,
Your Honor.
Q: What time was it?
A: 5:45 (P.M.), Your Honor.
(ATTY. PEKAS)
Q: And Marcelino Maguikay was at that time not
wearing anything over his face?
A: None, sir.
x x x
COURT:
Q: How many shots more or less did you hear?
A: The first is one or two
shots, then
I lie (sic) down.
Q: With
the same sound?
A: The
first. The other I was already lying
(down), Your Honor.”
x x x.
(TSN, May 21, 1990, pp. 12-14)
It is crystal clear from the foregoing
that Danilo Bulilan had a clear view of accused-appellant before he hid himself
for safety. He could not have committed
a mistake as he knew accused-appellant even before the incident. The records show that accused-appellant was
a former driver of G-Liner. Moreover,
Danilo’s testimony is replete with minutiae of the ambush incident,
evincing his sincerity, not to mention that, as correctly found by the trial
court, his testimony is categorical and straightforward. Notably, the eyewitness did not falter
during his cross-examination.
More importantly, about an hour after the ambush, Danilo Bulilan
tagged accused-appellant as one of the assailants. Renato Macapagal testified that as soon as he arrived at the
hospital, between 6:30 P.M. and 6:45 P.M., he talked to Danilo. Renato testified:
(PRIVATE PROSECUTOR)
“Q: Now,
you said that Danilo Bulilan revealed to you the incident of the ambush as well
as the identity of the gunman Marcelino Maguikay, what was the physical condition of Danilo Bulilan when
he reveal(ed) to you the incident?
A: When
I approached Mr. Danilo Bulilan, he was in a state of shock and he was very nervous and stunnering (sic) and for quite sometime, I could
feel that … I could also understand
that position considering that his father and his brother were
inside the emergency room.
Q: Have
you also noticed whether or not Danilo Bulilan was wounded in the ambush?
A: Danilo
was hit somewhere in the stomach which he mentioned also to me.”
(TSN, September 14, 1990, p. 8).
Danilo’s statement pertaining to the participation of
accused-appellant in the ambush incident can be taken as part of res gestae.[13] The statement was made within an hour
after a startling occurrence, respecting the circumstances thereof, when the
victim did not have time to contrive or devise a falsehood.[14]
The test for the admissibility of a declaration is the unreflecting character
of the statements made during the startling occurrence, or immediately before
or after said occurrence. A suspicion
of afterthought would suffice to prevent its reception as part of res gestae. In
this case, the ambush took place at about 5:45 P.M. Danilo himself was
wounded. Both his father and brother
were in critical condition. Albeit
wounded, Danilo had managed to bring his father and brother to the hospital,
and an hour later, while they were still in the emergency room, he disclosed to
Renato Macapagal the identity of accused?appellant as one of the
gunmen. These circumstances negate the
opportunity for Danilo to contrive or concoct a falsehood. We find it unbelievable that Danilo, would
falsely accuse anybody for the death of his father and brother. His natural instinct, at that time, was to
see the real culprits pay for their crime.
It ought to be mentioned that accused-appellant himself denied
any knowledge why Danilo Bulilan took an active role in prosecuting him. The absence of motive on the part of Danilo
to make a phony accusation against accused-appellant enhances his credibility
as a witness. In addition, at least two
(2) disinterested witnesses, Patrolman Donato Geda and reporter Salvador
Valisa, confirmed accused-appellant’s identification by the eyewitness.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant insists that his alibi should not
be dismissed as weak, vis-a-vis his positive identification by the
eyewitness, since Inland’s logbooks and the testimonies of his co-drivers
Eduardo Maceda and Edwin Jimenez, had sufficiently established his whereabouts
on the material date and time. In
rejecting his argument, the trial court ruled as follows:
“The Court cannot lend credence to the entries in the several
logbooks presented by the accused as not one of the authors thereof was
presented in Court to substantiate said entries. xxx. The Court moreover
cannot but notice the intercalations and insertions in the said
logbooks as evidenced by the different colors of ink used therein
notwithstanding that the recordings therein were of the same nature. In the eyes of the Court, they have no
probative value whatsoever.” (emphasis ours)
(Decision, dated November 27, 1991, p. 10)
On the other hand, accused-appellant posits as follows:
“It is precisely these intercalations and insertions
which are found in all the logbooks which fortify their authenticity and
genuineness. Any person fraudulently inserting an
entry therein would have taken the pains at least to look for a similar
ballpen. Besides, it is impossible to
ask that the same ballpen be used for all the entries considering that each
person making the entry may have his own pen. Moreover, the intercalations and insertions happen(ed) not only on the
entries regarding Maguikay but (also) randomly on all entries.” (emphasis
ours)
(Brief for the Accused-Appellant, May 30,
1992, p. 18)
We have examined the subject logbooks and we agree with the
observation made by the trial court. The logbooks presented by accused-appellant to prove his defense of
alibi will not exculpate him.
To begin with, the entries in the subject logbooks were written
by several individuals as evidenced by their different penmanships. Different types of pen, i.e.,
fountain pens, ballpens, and signpens, with different inks, were used. There were also insertions and
intercalations found on the different entries in all the logbooks
presented. The entries pertaining to
Bus No. 1919 were no exception.
There was no explanation for the insertions and intercalations
found on the entries material to the defense of accused-appellant so as to cast
away any suspicion on their truthfulness. Such omission is fatal to
accused-appellant’s defense of alibi for, without the testimony of the author
thereof, it would be difficult to ascertain which of the entries were genuine
and which were spurious. Worse, under
the circumstances in field, the integrity of those material entries is not
beyond suspicion. Contrary to the
argument of accused-appellant, precisely because of the various insertions and
intercalations found in the subject logbooks, it was easier for
accused-appellant to pass on as genuine the entries pertaining to his trip to
Samar. The trial court was, therefore,
correct in refusing to give them any probative value.
Accused-appellant avers that his alibi was sufficiently
corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses, namely, Edwin Jimenez and
Eduardo Maceda. In spite of their unimpeached testimonies, he
laments that the trial court did not consider them.
The argument lacks merit. The issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses. We find no cogent reason to disturb the
settled rule that findings of a trial court on credibility of witnesses deserve
respect, if not finality. Trial courts
are in a better position to resolve issues of credibility since they have
observed the demeanor of the witness in open court.
It is also asserted that the assailed decision did not consider
all his asseverations and arguments. Accused-appellant
misconstrues Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides:
“No decision shall be rendered by the trial court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.”
All that the provision requires is that
the decision should state the “essential ultimate facts” upon
which the court’s conclusion is drawn.[15]
Courts need not discuss in their decision every evidence adduced by the parties
for many of them are not relevant to the decisive issues of fact and law
involved in the case. Indeed, a trial judge enjoys a wider latitude
of determining the material facts based on the conflicting asseverations of
both parties which would be the basis of his decision.[16]
In congruence, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed,
and that all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.[17]
We agree that the assault was characterized by treachery
which qualified the killing to Murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might take. The
prosecution had met the requisites for alevosia to be
appreciated, viz: (1) at the time of the attack the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method, or form of the attack employed by him.[18]
The records reveal that the Bulilans were on their way home and completely
unaware of the impending danger. They
were totally defenseless as their car were riddled with bullets by
accused-appellant and his cohorts.
The defense alleges that crime was not attended by evident
premeditation. It appears that prior to
the ambush, accused-appellant was separated from his employment at
G-Liner. At that time, Carlos Bulilan
was the Operations Manager of G-Liner. He had a hand in the separation of the employees from the company. Between the months of January and June 1988,
Carlos received death threats from unidentified persons, saying: “Mag-iingat ka Mr. Bulilan, ng dahil
sa iyo natanggal kami sa aming trabajo, kapag nagutom ang aming pamilia, papatayin ka namin o isa sa
miembro ng pamilia mo, Tuta ka ng mga De Guia.”[19]
In view of these circumstances, the trial court concluded that
accused-appellant had resolved to kill the Bulilans from the time he lost his job,
sometime in 1988, and he clung to his determination to commit the crime until
the ambush on December 21, 1989. We
hold otherwise.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to prove that the
crime was committed with evident premeditation. The circumstance of evident premeditation can be appreciated when
these requisites have been established: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination;
and (3) the lapse of an interval of time between the determination to commit
the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.[20] We
have ruled that when there is no showing as to how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered to
exist.[21] In
this case, there was no direct evidence on when and how the plot to kill
the Bulilans was made. We cannot
attribute the death threats received by Carlos Bulilan solely to
accused-appellant since, admittedly, there were other employees dismissed from
G-Liner besides him.
On the other hand, the lower court should have appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in
favor of accused-appellant. It is evident from the records that
accused-appellant had voluntarily submitted himself to the authorities for
investigation as early as January
15, 1990, even before the “Order of Arrest” against him was issued on
February 21, 1990. We hold that all the
requisites for voluntary surrender to be appreciated were met, viz: (1)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; (3) the surrender must be voluntary.[22]
We now come to the proper penalties in this case. The trial court had correctly held
accused-appellant guilty of MURDER for the treacherous killing of Carlos
Buililan and Roberto Bulilan in Criminal Case Nos. 81459-60. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for Murder is reclusion
temporal maximum to death. Taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender,
and there being no aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty
should be imposed in its minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal maximum.[23]
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that in
imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
laws of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the
offense.
Applying the said law, accused-appellant is entitled to a minimum
penalty of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium, the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[24]
Accused-appellant is also guilty for the ATTEMPTED MURDER of
Danilo Bulilan. In this case, albeit
the intent to kill was proved, Danilo’s wound was not fatal. The rule is, where the wound inflicted on
the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the accused not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime
is only attempted murder.[25]
Under Article 51 of the same code, the penalty for an attempted
felony shall be imposed two degrees
lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Hence, the penalty for attempted murder is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
medium.[26]
Again, taking into consideration the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, with no aggravating circumstance, the minimum period of the penalty for attempted murder, i.e., prision correccional maximum, should be imposed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law entitles accused-appellant to the minimum penalty of arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, the range of penalty next lower to the penalty prescribed for
attempted murder.
With respect to the moral damages granted in favor of the legal
heirs of the victims, we find that there was no proof to justify the award
thereof. On the other hand, exemplary
damages may be awarded in criminal cases where the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstance. In
this case, there was none. Hence, the
trial court erred in awarding the same.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the impugned
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos.
81459-60, accused-appellant Marcelino Maguikay is meted the indeterminate
sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum as the minimum penalty, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximum as the
maximum penalty, together with all the accessory penalties provided by law.[28]
In Criminal Case No. 81461, accused-appellant is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum penalty, to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
In Criminal Case Nos. 81459-60, we affirm the indemnification of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
each in favor of the legal heirs of Carlos Bulilan and Roberto Bulilan, or a
total of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). The awards for moral and exemplary damages, however, are DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 81459, 81460 and 81461.
[2]
Original Records, p. 13.
[3]
Also known as De Guia Enterprises, Inc.
[4]
Exhibit “V”.
[5]
TSN, July 6, 1990, pp. 6-7.
[6]
TSN, January 7, 1991, p. 3.
[7]
Exhibit “17”; Original Records, pp. 301 and 304.
[8]
Exhibit “14”; Original Records, p. 301.
[9]
Criminal Case Nos. 81459-60; Original Records, p. 3.
[10]
Exhibits “2” and “2-A.”
[11]
Exhibit “13”; See also Pasay Terminal Logbook, p. 198.
[12]
Penned by Judge Martin S. Villarama; Rollo, pp. 29- 40.
[13]
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
“Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statement
made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. xxx.”
The elements of res gestae are: (1) there must be a startling occurrence (enough to produce
nervous excitement and to keep the will dormant so far as any deliberation in
concocting matters for speech or selecting words is concerned); (2) the
statement must relate to the circumstances of the startling occurrence; and (3)
the statement must be made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise.
[14]
People vs. Masangkay, G.R. No. 73461, January 25, 1988, 157 SCRA 320.
[15]
Air France vs. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA
155.
[16]
See also People vs. Bravo, G.R. No. 101191, October 18, 1993, 227 SCRA
285.
[17]
Section 3 (m) and (o), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[18]
People vs. Genial, G.R. No. 105692, December 7, 1993, 228 SCRA 283.
[19]
Exhibit “I”.
[20]
Article 16, par. 13 of the Revised Penal Code; People vs. Antonio
Danque, G.R. No. 107978, November
19, 1993, 228 SCRA 83; People vs. Lug-aw, G.R. No. 85735, January 18, 1994, 229 SCRA 308.
[21]
People vs. Buela, G.R. No. 92536, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 534; See
also People vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 101215, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 819.
[22]
People vs. Amaguin, G.R. No. 54344-45, January 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 166.
[23]
Article 63, par. 3, Revised Penal Code.
[24]
People vs. Ocaña, G.R. No. 63009, January 19, 1994, 229 SCRA 341.
[25]
People vs. Tui, G.R. No. 75032-33, December 1, 1992, 216 SCRA 140.
[26]
People vs. Tui, supra.
[27]
Article 2230 of the Civil Code; See also People vs. Rabanes, G.R. No.
93709, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 768.
[28]
People vs. Ocaña, G.R. No. 63009, January 19, 1994, 229 SCRA 341.