MELANIO S. TORIO, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL PRINTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY AND EFREN CAMACHO, RESPONDENTS.

These two consolidated petitions assail the resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) revoking the appointment of herein petitioners
on the ground that they lacked the necessary civil service eligibility at the
time of the issuance of their appointments.

The same series of events gave rise to the controversy in these
two petitions.

Executive Order No. 285 issued on July 25, 1987 abolished the
General Services Administration (GSA) including all offices and agencies under
it. The General Printing Office (GPO)
which was under the GSA was merged with the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA) and out of the merger arose the National
Printing Office (NPO) which was placed under the control and supervision of the
Office of the Press Secretary (OPS). A
new plantilla of personnel for the NPO was prepared and approved and the
affected officers and employees continued to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity pending the implementation of the
reorganization.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 99336, Melanio Torio, was the Chief of
the Production Staff of the Printing Division, PIA, while the petitioner in
G.R. No. 100178, Jaime Espanola, was a Bindery Foreman at the PIA. They continued discharging their functions
in a hold-over capacity after the PIA was merged with the GSA. On March 1, 1988, in accordance with the new
staffing pattern of the NPO, petitioner Torio was temporarily appointed as
Assistant Operations Superintendent of Printing while petitioner Espanola was
appointed as Temporary Supervising Bookbinder. Both appointments lapsed on February 28, 1989. So on March 1, 1989, petitioner Torio was extended a renewal
appointment which was likewise in a temporary capacity while petitioner
Espanola was issued another appointment as Supervising Bookbinder with a
permanent status. On the same date,
Espanola was granted a
testimonial eligibility.

On July 1, 1989, the positions of both petitioners were upgraded
– the Assistant Operations Superintendent of Printing was changed to Assistant
Superintendent of Printing and the Supervising Bookbinder to Bookbinder
IV. This time, another appointment was
issued to Torio for the upgraded position together with his change of status
from temporary to permanent. Espanola,
on the other hand, was given only a notice of the upgrading of his position
inasmuch as he was already holding it in a permanent capacity.

Prior to the appointments of the petitioners to the permanent
items, protests were lodged with the CSC. The protestants were Efren Camacho and Letty Cangayda, the private
respondents in G. R. No. 99336 and G.R. No. 100178, respectively. The CSC referred Camacho’s protest to the
NPO while Cangayda’s protest was referred to the Reorganization Appeals Board
of the OPS. The offices concerned did
not take any action on the referrals by the CSC so the latter was constrained
to resolve the protests based on the available documents or papers before it.

On January 7, 1991, the CSC issued a resolution in CSC Case No.
796 revoking the appointment of Torio and ordering those qualified, including
Camacho, to be evaluated for the position. Subsequently, on February 5, 1991, the CSC rendered another resolution
in CSC Case No. 832 cancelling Espanola’s appointment
and ordering the reappointment of Cangayda to the position. The motions for reconsideration filed
separately by the present petitioners were denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.

As was stated earlier, the two petitions herein were consolidated
in a resolution of this Court on September 3, 1991. A temporary restraining order, as prayed for by the petitioners,
was issued pursuant to the Court’s resolution dated October 10, 1991.

On the basis of the pleadings before us, we give due course to
the petitions and decide them on their respective merits.

The two petitions raise the following assignments of errors:

G.R. No.
99336

I

“THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DID NOT CAREFULLY
REVIEW THE RECORDS OF THE CASE IN RESOLVING THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

II

“THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS UTTERLY WRONG IN
RULING THAT AT THE TIME OF THE ISSUANCE OF HIS APPOINTMENT IN QUESTION,
PETITIONER TORIO WAS NOT QUALIFIED FOR ALLEGED LACK OF ELIGIBILITY AND THE
REQUIRED EXPERIENCE THEREFOR.

III

“THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS UTTERLY WRONG IN
RULING THAT ‘IN THE PRESENCE OF QUALIFIED EMPLOYEES IN THE AGENCY, THE PROPOSED
PLACEMENT OR APPOINTMENT OF ONE WHO IS NOT QUALIFIED (NOT ELIGIBLE) IS NOT IN
ORDER FOR THE REASON THAT AT THE TIME THE APPOINTMENT IN QUESTION WAS ISSUED,
OTHER CONTENDERS WITH ‘PERMANENT APPOINTMENTS LIKE PROTESTANT SANTIAGO WERE
NEVER CONSIDERED.” (Rollo, G.R. No. 99336, p. 93)

G. R. No.
100178

I

“THAT IF THE AFORECITED RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION ARE ENFORCED, PETITIONER, A PERMANENT CAREER CIVIL SERVICE
EMPLOYEE WILL BE DISMISSED OR REMOVED FROM THE SERVICE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND WITHOUT JUST AND VALID CAUSE.

II

“THAT THE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.

III

“THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED
WHICH ARE PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER.” (Rollo, G.R. No.
99336, p. 93)

Petitioner Torio alleges that at the time of his appointment, he
was already a civil service eligible having passed the career service
professional examination held on July 26, 1987 and the results of which were
released on January 13, 1988. He
further contends that Camacho’s protest has become moot and academic inasmuch
as the temporary appointment against which the protest was directed has already
expired. Consequently, the Commissioner
has no authority to withdraw its previous approval which has lapsed. Torio likewise stresses the fact that he has
security of tenure as provided under the Constitution such that his removal
must only be for cause and after due process.

Private respondent Camacho, on the other hand, avers that the
Commission has the power to review appointments for the correction of mistakes
in the approval or disapproval thereof. Moreover, at the time of Torio’s appointment, there were other qualified
eligibles who were not given the chance to be considered for the contested
position through no fault of their own. Thus, the Commission did not exceed its authority when in the exercise
of its power of review, it revoked the appointment of petitioner.

The Solicitor General filed an adverse Comment stating that the
CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the permanent appointment
of petitioner Torio who was found to possess all the qualifications required of
the position. It added that an
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of the appointing
authority, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.

Petitioner Espanola, for his part, contends that he possesses the
qualifications for the position of Supervising Bookbinder (now Bookbinder
IV). He is a Supervising Bookbinder Eligible; he has more than ten years of
service very relevant to the duties and functions of Supervising Bookbinder; he
is not facing any administrative charge; and he possesses the minimum
educational qualifications to the position for all of which his appointment has
been approved by the CSC. He further
contends that inasmuch as his appointment has already been approved by the CSC,
it cannot be withdrawn, recalled or cancelled. He takes the same stand as petitioner Torio with respect to the protest
being moot and academic as well as his security of tenure under the
Constitution.

Private respondent Cangayda, on the other hand, claims that the
appointment of petitioner Espanola is a flagrant violation of Republic Act 6656
entitled “An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Government Officers
and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization.” She was
a Supervising Bookbinder under a permanent status prior to the reorganization
and she should, thus, thereafter, be appointed to the same item in the same
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Act. She contends that her protest is primarily
directed against her demotion and non-reappointment to the position of Supervising
Bookbinder as well as the consequential appointment of petitioner in her stead
and not petitioner’s temporary appointment. Thus, petitioner Espanola’s argument that his temporary appointment as
Supervising Bookbinder cannot be the subject of an appeal since the same has
already expired is off-tangent. More
importantly, Espanola is not qualified for appointment to the contested
position since at the time of his appointment, he was not a civil service
eligible and there was a civil service eligible actually available and ready to
accept the appointment in the person of private respondent Cangayda. And since the appointee is not qualified,
the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the government, can look into
the legality of an appointment and consequently order its revocation and cancellation.

The Solicitor General, in his comment for the public respondent,
added that the subsequent acquisition of eligibility by the petitioner is of no
moment inasmuch as the reckoning point should be the time of appointment and
not any time before or after.

The CSC, in revoking the appointments of herein petitioners based
its resolutions primarily on the fact that the petitioners did not possess the
civil service eligibility called for by their respective positions. The CSC ruled further, that their subsequent
acquisition of eligibility will not validate the otherwise invalid appointments
inasmuch as the material date is the date of appointment.

We first rule on the nature of the petitioner’s appointments.

The foregoing pronouncements of the CSC hold true only insofar as
the temporary appointment of petitioner Espanola is concerned. However, it must be noted that under Section
25 Presidential Decree 807 otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, an appointee with a temporary status need not possess the civil
service eligibility required by the position provided he meets the following
qualifications: (1) it is necessary in
the public interest to fill a vacancy; (2) there are no appropriate eligibles;
(3) the temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months; and (4) he may be
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

Still, at the time of the temporary appointment of petitioner
Espanola, a civil service eligible who was willing to accept the position was
available in the person of private respondent Cangayda. Apparently, there was disregard of the
mandate of the law when Espanola’s temporary appointment was issued. Nevertheless, the petitioner has correctly
pointed out that the protest lodged by private respondent Cangayda had become
moot and academic inasmuch as petitioner Espanola’s temporary appointment had
already lapsed on February 28, 1989. It
is erroneous for the CSC to treat Cangayda’s protest as a continuing one. The same holds true for the protest lodged
by Camacho.

A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary
appointment – these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority. The fact that the appointees in the two
appointments are one and the same person is purely incidental. Any irregularities in the former appointment
are not to be automatically carried over to the latter. If the protest is directed against the
temporary appointment, it would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the subsequent permanent
appointment.

The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean, however,
that by the mere expedient of appointing the temporary appointee to a permanent
status, the appointing authority can deprive the protestant of an opportunity
to question the appointment. First, the
protestant is not precluded from filing another protest directed against the
permanent appointment. Second, if it
can be shown that the appointment was purposely done to moot the protest or is
characterized by malice, then corrective action can be taken and, moreover, the
erring officials can be proceeded against administratively.

It must be emphasized that if a protest filed against a temporary
appointment is carried over to the subsequent permanent appointment to the same
position of the same person, an anomalous situation will arise wherein the
permanent appointee’s security to his position would be jeopardized by
considerations outside of his permanent appointment.

The chances of the occurrence of the previously described situation
would be minimized if the CSC promptly acts upon the protest. After giving the department or agency to
which the protest is referred a reasonable deadline to act, its inaction may be
a basis for the CSC to give positive relief. It is worthy of note that the CSC has recognized the importance of the
speedy disposition of cases in its resolution No. 89­-779, which provided for
the Rules on Protest Cases requiring the disposition of cases within 60 days
from filing thereof.

The situation in the present petitions could have been prevented
if the CSC did not waits for two years before taking the appropriate action on
the protests filed.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussions, it is established
that the questioned resolutions of the CSC should be declared inapplicable to
the petitioners because they refer to the temporary appointments which had
already lapsed when they were issued.

At any rate, this Court deems it best to make a ruling on the
validity of the permanent appointments inasmuch as the same has already been
put in issue in the present petitions. Moreover, if the present petitions be granted without prejudice to the
private respondents’ right to file a protest
against the permanent appointments of the petitioners, then that would unduly
prolong the resolution of who should rightfully be appointed to the contested
positions to the prejudice of the public service.

THE PERMANENT APPOINTMENTS OF
PETITIONERS ESPANOLA AND TORIO

The Qualification Standard (QS) for the position of Bookbinder IV
provides the following minimum requirements:

EDUCATION       :            Completion of Secondary School
Course

EXPERIENCE :            Two years of experience in bindery
work

ELIGIBILITY :         Bookbinder

Supervising Bookbinder

As to the QS for the position of Assistant Superintendent of
Printing, the following minimum requirements are prescribed:

EDUCATION :           Bachelor’s
degree preferably in Commerce or Business Administration

EXPERIENCE :          4
years of progressive responsible experience in the different technical
activities of printing operations or other related work

ELIGIBILITY :                      Career
service

Sub-professional

The appointing authority should, thus, appoint persons to the
contested positions possessing the aforementioned minimum qualifications so as
to be within the ambits of the law. For
even if the appointing authority is given a
wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion in personnel actions,
the appointee must first possess the minimum qualifications prescribed by law
(Cortez v. The Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA 216 [1991]).

At the time petitioner Espanola was issued a permanent
appointment, he was also granted testimonial eligibility such that he is to be considered as possessing the
requisite civil service eligibility for his position. The same holds true with petitioner Torio. At the time of his permanent appointment, he was already a career service
professional, having passed the civil service examination held on July 26, 1987
and the results of which were released on January 13, 1988. In fact, even at the time of Torio’s
temporary appointment on March 1, 1988, he already possessed the civil service
eligibility called for by the position.

The QS established for the contested positions do not only
prescribe the eligibility but also the minimum education and experience
required of the position. Even if the
petitioners possess the required civil service eligibility, there would still
be abuse of discretion by the appointing authority if the other qualifications
are not satisfied.

Based on the QS listed above, the records show that both
petitioners possess qualifications required of the contested positions.

Private respondent Cangayda, however, questions petitioner
Espanola’s non-completion of a secondary course as prescribed by the QS.

It would be appropriate to state at the outset that when
necessary, education, experience or training may be used interchangeably to
offset deficiencies (in fact, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 23 series
of 1991 expressly allowing the offsetting of deficiencies except the required
elibility). The necessity exists if the
appointee’s training or experience is of such a level that the same would more
than supplement the deficiency in education considering the demands of the
position in question. The converse
holds true if the appointee’s deficiency is in the required training or
experience. The decision as to when the
conditions give rise to a necessity to interchange education with experience
and vice-versa rests upon the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. This is not to be viewed as
an unbridled license given to the appointing authority to appoint whomsoever he
desires. This is rather a recognition
of the fact that the appointing authority is in the best position to determine
the needs of his department or agency and how to satisfy those needs. Moreover, it is precisely the province of
the QS to provide the gauge by which the appointing authority shall exercise
his discretion. The QS has been defined
in Section 20, PD 807 as expressing the minimum requirements for a class of
position in terms of education, training and experience, civil service
eligibility, physical fitness and other qualities required for successful
performance. It is, thus, the QS
which provides for the considerations upon which the appointing authority
decides when the levels of education or experience may be sufficient to offset
each other.

With respect to petitioner Espanola’s case, the necessity to
offset the deficiency in education with his training is very apparent from his
work-experience. It must be stressed
that the contested position belongs to the trades and crafts group wherein the
emphasis is necessarily on the skill required by the work. There can be no doubt that fitness for the
job is developed through years of actual work. Petitioner Espanola’s service record (Annex “D”) shows that
from 1973 until his permanent appointment in 1989, he had continuously engaged
in bindery work. It must likewise be
pointed out that he was extended a testimonial eligibility which is a confirmation by the appointing
authority of his capacity to perform the type of work which his position
requires. Worthy of note is the fact
that at the time of the grant of testimonial eligibility, the QS was already
being enforced such that the appointing authority is presumed to have taken
into consideration the standards prescribed by the QS. There is, thus, no escaping the conclusion
that Jaime Espanola is qualified to handle the demands of the contested
position.

However, this Court does not rule on the validity of the grant of
testimonial eligibility. The issue is
not before us. Private respondent
Cangayda stated in her brief that an action to question the validity of such
grant shall be filed in due time. The
pronouncements of this Court, then, as to the validity of the appointment of
petitioner Espanola are without prejudice to the said action.

With respect to
petitioner Torio, on the other hand, the records show that he fully qualifies
for the position to which he was appointed. The Solicitor General, in his adverse comment, aptly summarized the
petitioner’s qualifications in the following manner:

“EDUCATION —
1981 to 1983 – “MBA” Candidate for Graduation, Ateneo de Manila;

1965 to 1969 – “A.B. Political Science”,
University of the Philippines;

1960 to 1965 –
“Valedictorian, High School”, Luna Colleges; and

1955 to 1960 –
“1st Honorable Mention, Elementary” Grade Graduate.

ELIGIBILITY — Career Service Professional (81.48%) July 26, 1987.

(B) With the
Government

(B-1) Sept. 1986 to Dec. 1986 – Acting Chief, Printing Division
& Ex. Asst. for Technical
Services, PIA;

(B-2) Jan. 1987 to Feb.
1988 – Chief, Production Staff & Chief Printing Div., PIA;

(B-3) Mar. 1, 1988 to
Present – Assistant Printing Operations Supt. (now Asst. Supt. of Printing,
NPO).

“Petitioner likewise
participated, upon recommendation of his department head as duly authorized by
the Executive Secretary, in the UNIDO Training Programme in the Field of
Printing Industry held in Karl Marx Stadt/Dresden/Leipzig, GDR from September
30 to October 13, 1990 (Annexes “E”, “E-1” to “E­-5”).

“On November 24 to December 5, 1986 petitioner attended and
actively participated in the Evaluation Workshop on Audiovisual Materials for
the Book Publishing Course conducted by the UP Institute of Mass Communication
it cooperation with UNESCO (Paris) (Annex “L-1”). Later, particularly on May 28 to June 6,
1987, petitioner completed a Seminar Workshop for Quality Printing through Better
Supervision of Printing Shop, conducted by the Printing Industry Board
Foundation (Annex “L-2”). Then again on November 12 to 14, 1987 petitioner participated in the
Seminar on Promotion of PIA’s Programs conducted by the Philippine Information
Agency (Annex “L-3”). Still
persistent with the quest for better knowledge, petitioner again attended the
Seminar/Workshop on ‘The Business of Book Publishing-Managing for Profit and
Economic Choices” conducted by Peter H. Neumann on November 24 to 27, 1987 sponsored
by the United States Information Service
and the Book Development Association of the Philippines (Annex “L-4″)” (Rollo, G.R. No. 99336, p. 93-95)

Although petitioner Torio majored in Political Science and not in
Commerce or Business Administration, the QS provided that the latter two are
mere preferences. As to private
respondent’s claim that Torio had only one year, six months and eight days of
experience in printing operations at the time of his appointment (it must be
noted, however, that the private respondent was referring to Torio’s government
service at the time of his temporary appointment since at the time of permanent
appointment, Torio had over two years of government service), the QS provided
that the experience may be on other related work. The appointing power may have found Torio’s previous work
experiences sufficient to tack to the number of years of experience in actual
printing operations coupled with the numerous seminars and trainings he had
attended. There is thus, no evident violation
of the QS.

From the foregoing, it is established that petitioners Espanola
and Torio are qualified for the positions to which they were appointed. The appointing authority’s exercise of
discretion in the choice of appointees must be respected even if there are
other persons who are likewise qualified for the position such as private
respondents Cangayda and Camacho. In
fact, the CSC does not have the power to
overrule such discretion even if its finds that there are other persons more
qualified to the contested position (underscoring supplied) [De la Cruz
v. The Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88333, December 2, 1991; Cortez v.
The Civil Service Commission, supra; Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 774
[1990]).

As has been held in Español v. The Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 85479, March 3, 1992,
“every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of
academic units in a certain course, seminars attended and so forth, may be
valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of
the service. Given the demands of a
certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the Office
concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.”

This Court does not overlook the fact that prior to the
reorganization of the GSA, the petitioners were holding contractual or casual
employment. This circumstance is of
utmost importance considering the provision of Section 4, Republic Act. 6656:

“SECTION 4. Officers and employees holding permanent
appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in
the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or in case
there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in
rank. x x x”

In Medenilla v. The Civil Service
Commission, 194 SCRA 278 [1991], this Court stated the rationale for the
preference given to permanent employees in the following manner:

“x x x The preference given to permanent employees assumes
that employees working in a Department for longer periods have gained not only
superior skills but also greater dedication to the public service. x x x”

The Court, then, continued by making the following observations:

x x x that the presumption is not always true and the law does not
preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism or necessary talents into
the government service. “If, after
considering all the current employees, the Department Secretary cannot find
among them the person he needs to revive a moribund office or to upgrade second
rate performance, there is nothing in the Civil Service Law to prevent him from
reaching out to other Departments or to the private sector provided all his
acts are bona fide and for the best interest of the public service and the
person chosen has the needed qualifications.”

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing that employees or officers
holding permanent appointments do not automatically get appointed to the new
positions. The appointing authority is
still given latitude in making his choice considering the duty resting on his
discretion to see to it that the best interest of the public is served with
each appointment he makes. More so in
cases of reorganization of offices, where in making the new appointments, the
appointing authority has also to take into consideration the purposes and
objectives of the reorganization. In
the present case, the reorganization was undertaken to promote economy,
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services. The appointing authority should be given
sufficient discretion to be able to ensure that the purposes and objectives are
met. It is in this light that the
appointments of petitioners Espanola and Torio should be viewed.

Petitioners Espanola and Torio were validly appointed to the
questioned positions. Only the
corollary issue of whether or not private respondent Cangayda’s security of
tenure was violated by the appointment of petitioner Espanola remains to be
settled.

In Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108
[1990], the ruling in favor of the dismissed personnel was made in the light of
the finding that the reorganization undertaken was not in good faith. The Court even reiterated the principles in De La Llana v. Alba, 112
SCRA 294 [1982] and Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998 [1968]
that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if
done in good faith suffers from no infirmity and a valid abolition of office is
neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.

The same principles were enunciated earlier in Dario v.
Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989] where the Court made the following
declarations:

“x x x Reorganizations
in this jurisdiction have been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in ‘good
faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal
(in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not
be a Chinese wall. x x x” (Underscoring
supplied)

It is worthy to re-state that the present petitions arose due to
the abolition of the GSA and its merger with the relevant printing units of the
PIA giving rise to the NPO. There is no
showing that the reorganization was undertaken for any reason other than its
purpose of promoting economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of
public service. In fact, the private
respondents did not put in issue the validity of the reorganization of the
offices. They questioned only their
non-appointment to the contested positions. We are constrained to assume that there was in the present case, a bona
fide reorganization. Hence, private
respondent Cangayda cannot successfully impugn her alleged removal as illegal
for under the facts of the case, she was not dismissed; rather, her former
position was abolished. More important,
this Court has ruled in Siete v. Santos, 190 SCRA 50
[1990] that Section 16, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
authorizes the dismissal of career civil service employees not for cause but as
a result of the reorganization following the ratification of said Constitution.

As to the alleged violation of Republic Act 6656, it must be
emphasized that the question has to be resolved in the light of the prevailing
bona fide rule in reorganization of the public offices. The foregoing principle has been applied in Floreza
v. Ongpin, 182 SCRA 692 [1990] where the Court ruled that:

“x x x Section 2 of Republic Act 6656 entitles a
victim of a removal in violation of the
bona fide rule to a reinstatement or reappointment to the
position from which he was removed” (underscoring supplied).

There is nothing in this decision which precludes the more
appropriate recourse of private respondent Cangayda to appeal to the better
judgment of the Department Head to consider her for other vacant positions more
commensurate to her qualifications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS
the petitions in G.R. No. 99336 and G.R. No. 100178. The assailed resolutions of the Civil Service Commission in CSC
Case No. 796 and CSC case No. 832 are set aside. The permanent appointments of petitioners Melanio S. Torio and
Jaime Espanola are declared valid. The
temporary restraining order issued pursuant to the Court’s resolution dated
October 10, 1991 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., retired.