CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, RESPONDENTS.

The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision^[1]
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 20222, entitled “Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce,
Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilie Dayrit
Cuyugan,” promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.^[2] Said
decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of
the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is
an interlocutory order and cannot be the
subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being
petitioner’s remedy.

In said Civil Case No. 7938, herein private respondent, in her
capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April
9, 1987 a complaint denominated “Claim for Inheritance” against
herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo. The operative allegations in
said complaint are as follows:

x x x

“2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal
guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the
late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the
real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo,
who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983;

“3. Plaintiff has been
estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during
which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship
with each other that, as a consequence thereof, begot a child who was
christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said
Atty. Ocampo;

“4. Chad, the son of
plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on
October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent
love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned
from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein
plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced:

‘x x x Keep good keep
faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to you
and to Chad.’

‘x x x Please take good
care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and for the child sake.’

‘x x x Keep him. Take good care of him.’

‘x x x I’m proud that
you are his mother …I’m proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all what I
am and what I’ve got.’

‘x x x I have vowed to
recognize him and be my heir.’

‘x x x How is CHAD and
you…’

‘x x x Why should we not
start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the
product of our love.”

“5. The minor, Chad D.
Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the
intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of
the surviving heirs;

“6. The deceased Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga
with approximate value of several millions of pesos;

“7. The estate of the
late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the
inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise
been ascertained;

“8. The only known
surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children,
namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O.
Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose
behalf this instant complaint is filed;

“9. Plaintiff has no
means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and
relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent,
necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support from the
estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;

“10. Several demands,
verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad’s lawful
inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of
the late Atty. Ocampo;”^[3]

x x x

Plaintiff thereafter
prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child
Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with
counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the material allegations in the
complaint. She maintained by way of
affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no
cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit is barred by prescription;
that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the
suit; that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action;
and that there is improper
joinder of causes of action.^[4]

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds
asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial court issued the following order on
October 20, 1987:

x x x

“The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need
of further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties
so as to hear their respective sides.

“WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which
partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is
in the meantime held in abeyance. The
Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case is set for pre-trial x x x
.”^[5]

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order
on November 19, 1987,^[6]
petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.
13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on
August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner’s motion
praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses
within ten (10) days from notice thereof.^[7]

In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial
court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been
pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated
October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:

x x x

“The Court now resolves:

No. 1. The complaint
sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the
plaintiff. A cause of action being the
‘primary right to redress a wrong’ (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which
apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce
through this case. Defendant’s
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.

No. 2. The present action,
despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then
recognition. To go about the step by
step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after another is
definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.

No. 3. It is not the
plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that she
represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.

No. 4. Prescription has not
set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition
within four years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code, Art. 285,
No. 2). Whether the letters of the
putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a
hearing on the merits.

No. 5. Several causes of
action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The defendant’s claim that there was a
misjoinder is untenable.

No. 6. The Court being a
court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate
court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.

“The nature of the case ‘CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE’ does not
control the body of the complaint.

“From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is
sufficient in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could
not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that
the allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the
action exists.

“WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.”^[8]

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said order was denied
by the trial court on January 30, 1990.^[9] As a
consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with
respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders
dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and
set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated
its decision dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present
petition for review on certiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these
grounds:

“a. The Honorable
Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
providing clear exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may
not be elevated by way of the special civil action of certiorari;

“b. Respondent Court
refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF
SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial
approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take
place in a record of birth or in a will; of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to
Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the prescriptive period with
respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of
the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the
action for recognition of a natural child; and

“c. Respondent Court
has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings.”^[10]

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance
filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan,
is premature and the complaint states no cause of action. She submits that the recognition of the minor
child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father
must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and
participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such
recognition in the complaint denominated as “Claim for Inheritance,”
then there exists no basis for private respondent’s
aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs.
Paulino, et al.,^[11]
wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private
respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the
estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia,
that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the
settlement of the deceased’s estate had been commenced in court; and that the
defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the
deceased. She accordingly prayed that
the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of
her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if
it does, the same is barred by prescription.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at
bar is that at the time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner
in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in
the present case is still a minor. In Paulino,
we held that an illegitimate child, to
be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed
parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that
the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child
because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of
such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot
be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore,
is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner
to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of
the action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although
petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent
merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one
to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs.
Briz, et al.,^[12]
wherein we said:

“The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a
natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character
of heir, is one which in the opinion of
this court must be answered in
the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of
the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute
necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which
that same plaintiff seeks additional
relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different
from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x .

“The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior
decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right
to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against
his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x
x. In neither of these situations has
it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is
that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who
might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship
is appropriate to such proceedings.”

The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel
recognition has prescribed.

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action
is one to compel recognition, private respondent’s cause of action has
prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means
of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation
of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged putative father. In the case at
bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged
parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal
of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes
that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and,
instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given
retroactive effect. The theory is
premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural
in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply
retroactively.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:

“Art. 285. The action
for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother
died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority;”

x x x

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:

“Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.”

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action
is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission
by the parent of the child’s filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the child. However, if the
action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the
status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.^[13]

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in
which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the
putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Private respondent,
however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since
the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for
filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the
minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that “[t]his Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” It
becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child
to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold
that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of
the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.^[14] We
herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.^[15]
where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right
can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that
a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions
and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate
proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed
by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises
especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application
to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of
private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents,
both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that
private respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that
the questioned order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by
petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not
present and may not be relied upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed
decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Paras, and
Padilla, JJ., concur

Nocon, J., on leave.

^[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Asaali S. Isnani, with the con­currence of
Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Luis L. Victor; Rollo, 119-124.

^[2]
Rollo, 142.

^[3]
Rollo, 43-45.

^[4]
Ibid., 48-52.

^[5]
Ibid., 68.

^[6]
Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, 64.

^[7]
Ibid., id., 65-68.

^[8]
Rollo, 69-70.

^[9]
Ibid., 81-83.

^[10]
Ibid., 8-9.

^[11]
3 SCRA 730 (1961).

^[12]
43 Phil. 763 (1922).

^[13]
Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, 1989 ed., 249.

^[14]
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, pursuant to the clarification in
Memorandum Circular No. 85 of the Office of the President, dated November 7,
1988.

^[15]
G. R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992.