PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision
and the Order of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig,
Metro Manila dated February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal
Case No. 1345-D entitled “People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide”
for violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.

Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with
violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section
is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a
fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The information against him reads:

“That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality
of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or
prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride
(Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (p. 15, Rollo)

During the arraignment, the accused
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On
November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally
manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his
former plea of ‘not guilty’ to that of ‘guilty’ to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six
hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist,
physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or
fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the
violation or failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent Judge issued an order (annex
“B,” p. 17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure the consent
of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision
on January 30, 1991. On January 30,
1991, respondent Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to February
18, 1991 to give private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent
of the prosecutor. Also, on the said
date, the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense. On February 18, 1991,
respondent Judge issued another order (Annex “D” p. 19, Rollo)
postponing the promulgation of decision to February 25, 1991 to give private
respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed
his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex
“E,” p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November 21, 1990;
(2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally
charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the
valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to
waste. On February 21, 1991, private
respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to
a Lesser Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other
matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period
within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25, 1991,
respondent Judge rendered a decision
granting the accused’s motion, to wit:

“It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the
accused is not availing of the ‘voluntary plea of guilt’ as a mitigating
circumstance envisioned under Article 13, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal
Code. The accused simply wants
to avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the PAO, there is
nothing in the said provision which requires that the same be availed of prior
to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is conceded though, as pointed out by the
prosecution, that such is a waste of time on the part of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor and of the Court, nonetheless, this Court, having in mind
Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides that the
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding and also for humanitarian considerations, hereby
APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at bar.

“Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates
his submission to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966)

“Let it be made of record however that the Court is not
putting a premium on the change of heart of the accused in mid-stream.

“WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article
III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to a straight
prison term of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correctional,
to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

“In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited
in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

“Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, let the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject
matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and
be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of
according to law.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 24-25)

Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforestated decision but the same was denied in the order of March 13,
1991, which states:

“It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule
116 of the Rules should not be interpreted to the letter in ‘victimless
crimes’ such as this case, possession of regulated drugs, which is more of a
‘social disease’ case so to speak and in the light of (the) provision itself
that ‘with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal.’ Is the fiscal the offended party?

“Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal has not been very consistent on this ‘lesser offense plea’ thing. It would perhaps be in consonance with
justice that a guideline be laid down by the said Office, if only to apprise
the public, the Court and the accused on when said consent is to be given by
the fiscal as a matter of course and when it will be withheld. For to leave the same undefined is in the
mind of this Court, not conducive to a ‘just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 41-42)

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

“I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST
WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE CONSENT THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE
OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT OBTAINED.

“II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF THE OFFENSE ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW, IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF
PLEA.” (Rollo, pp. 74­-75)

In the resolution of
January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the aforesaid
criminal case (Rollo, p. 86).

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p.
1037). It usually involves the
defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during
the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity
to change his plea thereafter. Thus,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:

“Sec. 2. Plea of
guilty to a lesser offense. — The
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether
or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a
court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

“A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.”

However, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable
by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely
to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No.
94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc Resolution).

In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead
guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its
case. In such situation, jurisprudence
has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick
within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31,
1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such
a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v.
Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale of the law:

“x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only
basis on which the fiscal and the
court could rightfully act in allowing
the appellant to change his former plea
of not guilty to murder to guilty
to the lesser crime of homicide could
be nothing more nothing less than the
evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of
Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is
allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise,
much less bargaining.”

As evident from the foregoing, the trial
court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it
could act on the accused’s motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or
against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution’s evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the
public will be served. A reading of the
disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence. Apparently,
the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections
(i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution)
interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two
grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and
that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent of the crime
originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the
prosecution. Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge’s acceptance of the
private respondent’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in
crimes involving violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended
party to speak of and that even the latter’s consent is not an absolute
requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to change his plea.

We do not agree. The
provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense (see Manuel
v. Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions
(Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15,
1991). Consequently, it is his duty to
always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former (see People v. Parohinog, supra,
concurring opinion of then Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et
al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396).

It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended
party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they
are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human
dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v.
Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by
the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society’s survival is endangered because its basic
unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party
in this case. As guardian of the rights
of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The Fiscal
who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests,
threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person
directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691,
696). Viewed in this light, the consent
of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal
who acts in behalf of the government.

Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the
private respondent’s change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to
review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be
violated.

Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2,
Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
offended party consent to the private respondent’s change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the
private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that
found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

“SEC. 7. Former
conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —

x x x.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:

(a) x x x;

(b) x x x;

(c) the plea of
guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of
the offended party;

x x x.”

Under this rule, the private respondent
could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16
of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court’s approval of his change of
plea was irregular and improper.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March
13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide)
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial
on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Grino-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.