AQUALYN CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHON IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XXIII, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, NATION…

The petition before this Court, premised on the hackneyed
aspersion of wanton exercise of discretion, impugns the Resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals dated May 9, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 24829, (Puno,
Lantin, and Francisco, C. (P), JJ.) which denied due course to herein
petitioner’s application for certiorari (p. 76, Rollo). Assailed as well in consequence of
respondent Court’s action are the orders emanating from the court of origin
relative to its Civil Case No. 90-53263, viz:

a).  the order dated April 30, 1991 which dissolved
the writ of injunction previously issued in favor of petitioner (p. 35, Rollo), and

b).
the Order dated May 14, 1991 which
directed Philippine Marisco Corporation of Tacloban City to pay to Cabral
Fishpond Industry Corporation and to
Editha Cabral, the private respondents herein, the sum of P57,356.75 (p. 79,
Rollo).

The instant petition has its roots in the complaint instituted by
petitioner docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53263, for reformation of a management
and development contract it entered into on February 13, 1989 with Cabral
Fishpond Industry Corporation (p. 25, Rollo), the herein respondent
corporation, on the supposition that the covenant did not reflect the true
intention of the parties. The Honorable
William M. Bayhon, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court
stationed at Manila, to whose sala the case was assigned, issued a restraining
order which was supplemented later by a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Cabral from putting an end to the contract, from interfering in the
management of the fishponds at Samar and Kalibo, Aklan, and from taking
possession thereof.

Private respondents Cabral Fishpond Industry Corporation and
Editha Cabral reacted by alleging, inter alia, that the contract
was not approved by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and that
petitioner is not entitled to occupy the subject fishponds (Paragraph 17,
Answer; pp. 66, Rollo). Thereafter,
private respondents submitted a motion for summary judgment, coupled with the
plea for the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction and the dismissal of
the complaint as well. The court of
origin was persuaded by private respondents’ argument along this line that
there is no contract to reform inasmuch as the management contract had been
nullified on December 20, 1989 by the Bureau of Fisheries, which nullification
was well within the knowledge of herein petitioner even prior to the filing of
its suit for reformation (p. 5, Decision in Civil Case No. 90-53263, p. 32,
Rollo; Paragraph 26, Complaint, p. 45, Rollo).

Consequently,
petitioner’s complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action and the writ of preliminary injunction
initially issued was ordered lifted. This judgment of dismissal was received on April 22, 1991 by petitioner,
per its candid statement in the petition before this court (paragraph 14,
Petition; p. 6, Rollo).

Eight days later, or on April
30, 1991, Judge Bayhon issued an order instructing Deputy Sheriff Zacarias
Cunanan, the other respondent herein, to implement the dissolution of the
injunction which instruction (p. 35, Rollo), together with the judgment of
dismissal and the order lifting the injunction, was challenged via a
petition for certiorari on May
6, 1991 before respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 24829; p. 2, Rollo
in CA-G.R. SP No. 24829). However, on
May 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the petition for certiorari was not the proper course of
action to pursue, and that instead petitioner should have appealed from both
the judgment of dismissal and the order calling for the implementation of the
dissolved injunction on the basis of Section 4, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court (p. 77, Rollo).

Petitioner then turned back to the court of origin and filed a “Petition for
Relief From Judgment and/or Motion for Reconsideration” in regard to the
questioned decision on July 26, 1991, insisting
that the management contract was never intended by the Bureau of
Fisheries to be nullified in accordance with the memorandum from that
office. (p. 107, Rollo).

A few days thereafter, petitioner this time
lodged a petition for injunction at the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar
on August 2, 1991 (p. 123, Rollo) which was favorably acted upon by Judge
Dacuycuy, the Presiding Judge of Branch 33 stationed thereat (p. 138, Rollo).

Perturbed by this development, Cabral Fishpond Industry filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which momentarily
restrained Judge Dacuycuy from enforcing his order (p. 144, Rollo).

Private respondents informed Us on October 14, 1991 that Judge Dacuycuy’s
directive was set aside and that the petition filed by herein petitioner in the Samar court was ordered
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on October 9, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25949
(p. 176, Rollo).

On January 22, 1992, Our attention was again invited to the fact
that the petition for relief filed by petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila was denied because “the period
to appeal had already expired on May 7,
1991 and the instant petition/motion was filed only on July 26, 1991″
beyond the 60-day period specified
under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court (p. 4, Omnibus Order in
Civil Case No. 90-53263; p. 244, Rollo).

The rejection it experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 24829 when its
petition for certiorari was denied due course paved the way for the
filing of the present petition
(p. 2, Rollo) but despite six favorable extensions of time within which to file
its memorandum, petitioner has not bothered to heed the directive of this Court to comply therewith (p.
271, Rollo).

Focusing now Our attention to the argument advanced by petitioner
that respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred in denying due course to the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 24829, We are of the firm
belief that on the contrary, respondent Court did not deliberate on the issue
that confronted it in an arbitrary fashion.

It is axiomatic under the law on procedure that a summary
judgment is a final disposition in a legal suit which can be rectified by means
of an appeal therefrom (Rongo vs. Abastillas, 74 Phil.
176; cited by Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, with Notes and
Comments, Volume 2, 1982 edition, p. 162; Bell Carpets International
Trading Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
185 SCRA 35; 40; cited by Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume 2, 1990 edition,
p. 52).

In the Bell Carpets case, this Court had occasion
to pronounce through then Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa that the
petition for certiorari in that case, which was designed to challenge
the affirmance by the Intermediate Appellate Court of the summary judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, must be denied for want of merit,
because:

“In the first place, the judgment of the Trial Court sought to be annulled has
become final and executory by reason of BCITC’s failure to appeal therefrom
within the time appointed, i.e., 15 days from notice of the judgment. The summary judgment was unquestionably a
final one. It disposed of the case on
the merits. It definitely declared
which party was in the right and the nature and extent of the obligations of
one party in relation to the
other, and left nothing more to be done by the Trial Court. The remedy against such
a judgment is an appeal,
regardless of the questions sought to be raised
on appeal, whether of fact,
or of law, whether involving jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion of the
Trial Court. No appeaI was taken from the summary
judgment. Instead a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court. But it is obvious that the party aggrieved thereby did not have the option to substitute the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of
appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of
the right of appeal are antithetical to
the availment of the
special civil action of certiorari. The summary judgment having thus become final and executory, the proceedings
at bar for its annulment are futile and inefficacious.”

Danger signals should have flashed when petitioner acknowledged
that it received a copy of the judgment dismissing its complaint on April 22,
1991 (paragraph 14, Petition; p. 6, Rollo), for indeed an appeal or a motion
for reconsideration therefrom, could have been interposed until May 7, 1991. Unfortunately, petitioner committed error after procedural error, first
by filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, thence
compounding that blunder by filing a petition for relief from judgment beyond
the period allowed by the Rules and also by filing a petition for injunction
with the Samar regional trial court.

At this juncture, it would be wise to recall the rule that certiorari
is not a substitute for an available or lost appeal as a remedial measure in
adjective law (Dulos vs. Court of Appeals,
188 SCRA 413; 419). Of course, there
are notable exceptions to this precept which are recognized by jurisprudence
and too basic to be ignored. None of
the exceptional circumstances, however, appears to be present in the instant
petition. The justification offered by
petitioner is that the Court of Appeals, in effect, allowed private respondents
to take over the possession and control of the fishponds (Paragraph 29,
Petition; p. 10, Rollo). Yet, petitioner must realize and
accept the proposition that capricious exercise of the faculty conferred upon
the magistrates concerned should be demonstrated by petitioner to such a degree
as to overcome the presumption of regularity of official duty (Section
3 (m, n), Rule 131, Revised Rules
on Evidence) which it did not so discharge in the manner expected. The mere fact that the Court of Appeals, in
essence, upheld the summary judgment does not in the least suggest gross abuse
of its discretion.

Insofar as the dissolution of the writ of injunction in Civil Case
No. 90-53263 is concerned, We also have to impress upon petitioner that wanton
exercise of discretion cannot be inferred from the mere issuance of the order
from the court of origin on April 30, 1991 (p. 35, Rollo) since it is expressly
sanctioned by the first sentence of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court that:

“The injunction may be refused, or if granted ex parte, may be dissolved, upon the insufficiency of the complaint as
shown by the complaint itself, with or without notice to the adverse
party.”

after the complaint for reformation was
ascertained to be insufficient in cause
of action (p. 34, Rollo). Hence, no
serious objection can be interposed by petitioner when the other impugned order
dated May 14, 1991 was issued as it is
the logical and posterior result of the lifting of the injunction which, as
aforesaid, was not timely and properly questioned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Counsel for petitioner
is hereby warned that a repetition of the abhorred practice of forum shopping
will subject him to disciplinary
action. With costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr.,* J., (Chairman), on
official leave.

* On official leave.