PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JONATHAN ALABAN Y JOSHEP, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Dissatisfied with the sentence to suffer an imprison­ment term for
life and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 imposed on him by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Iloilo City for violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Jonathan
Alaban comes to us questioning his conviction. He claims that the trial court
committed reversible error in appreciating and assessing the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on the morning of
February 24, 1990, the 6th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Regional Unit stationed
at General Luna Street, Iloilo City with Sgt. Francisco Allaga as the team
leader, proceeded to Benedicto St., Jaro, Iloilo
to conduct a buy-bust operation in response to telephone calls from
concerned citizens that a tricycle driver named Jonathan Alaban was peddling
marijuana. Agent Torres Recomono who
was designated to act as the poseur-buyer was able to intercept Jonathan Alaban
as he was about to leave his house. Striking a conversation with him, Agent Recomono let Jonathan know that
he needed a “score”, meaning he needed marijuana. Jonathan initially feigned innocence but after being prodded and
handed a twenty-peso (P20.00) bill by Agent Recomono, Jonathan went up to his house and then returned to Agent Recomono with a matchbox.

On seeing the contents of the matchbox to be marijuana, Agent
Recomono ran his hand over his head, the pre-arranged signal for the
apprehending NARCOM team to move in. Jonathan was promptly arrested and frisked. Recovered from him was the marked twenty (P20.00) peso bill
bearing the initial of Sgt. Gabasa.

Jonathan was then taken
to the NARCOM Headquarters where
he signed a receipt of property or confiscation receipt. The matchbox was sent to the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory for analysis
of its contents. The results of the laboratory
examination confirmed that the contents
of the matchbox was marijuana.

The above narration was made at the trial by Sgt. Francisco
Allaga and Agent Tomas Recomono. Captain Zenaida Sinfuego
of the PC Crime Laboratory testified on the results of her laboratory
examination of the contents of the matchbox.

Jonathan denied the charge. He said that on the morning in question, he was watching television in
his house when suddenly four persons barged in led by Arthur Banzale, a
tricycle driver, and Agent Tomas Recomono and that Arthur pointed to him
(Jonathan) and he was immediately placed under arrest. Accused-appellant further claimed that the house was then searched for ten
minutes but the searchers failed to find what they were looking for and that
they then asked him to bring out the marijuana but he could not do so because
he had none in the house. Nonetheless,
he was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM and thereat, he was forced
to sign a document, the contents of which he did not know.

After assessing the evidence of the parties, the Honorable
Norberto E. Devera, Jr., in his
now assailed decision dated October 10, 1990, found the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him. We defer to his decision in view of his
superior opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to test their
credibility on the stand under direct and cross-examination. In the absence of a showing that they were
reached arbitrarily or without sufficient basis, the factual findings of the
trial judge are received with much respect by, and indeed are even binding on,
this Court.

In his brief, the accused-appellant points to certain
discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, but we find that
these are only minor inconsistencies that do not militate against the
correctness of his conviction. As we
have repeatedly declared, the witnesses testifying on the same event do not
have to be consistent in every detail as differences in recollection or
viewpoints or impression are inevitable. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not required. As long as the witnesses concur on material
points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details do not reflect
on the essential veracity of their testimony.

The alleged contradiction
pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of Agent Recomono and Sgt. Gabasa — in that the former
allegedly testified that he had a difficult time looking for the house of accused-appellant on the day of the
buy-bust operation, while the latter testified that on the said day, Agent
Recomono went directly in front
of accused-appellant’s house without any apparent difficulty — is too trivial
to warrant an acquittal. Whether or not
Agent Recomono had a difficult time looking for appellant’s house does not
change the fact that Agent Recomono eventually found accused-appellant and was
able to buy marijuana from him.

Accused-appellant next assails the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses for being incredible. He
contends that it is contrary to human experience for a drug pusher (a) to sell
to a total stranger and (b) to sell drugs in a public place.

This contention must be rejected. In People vs. Paco (170 SCRA, 681, 689), this Court
observed:

“Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to
that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the
exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public
place and in the presence of
other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade
as these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the
conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall
[People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252], in front of a store
[People v. Khan, supra] along a street at 1:45 p.m. [People v. Toledo, G.R. No.
67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259], and in front of a house [People v.
Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988.]”

The Court also held in People v. Rodriquez y Teves, (172
SCRA 742):

“What matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and
the seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery
of the marijuana leaves.”

Finally, accused-appellant submits that because he was forced to
sign the receipt of seized property or confiscation receipt at the NARCOM
Headquarters, the said receipt should not have been admitted in evidence
against him. This submission is
likewise untenable.

It is apparent that the NARCOM operatives had no known motive or
reason to falsely impute a serious and unfounded charge against
accused-appellant. Their testimony,
therefore, carry the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions (People v. Dekingco, 189 SCRA 512). Nor should the above insinuation that accused-appellant
was forced to sign the confiscation receipt merit any consideration. The unimpeached testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, independent of the assailed confiscation receipt, sufficiently prove
accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In the recent case of People
v. Como (202 SCRA 200,
211), this Court stressed:

“On appellant’s final assertion that the receipt signed by him as the owner of the marijuana seized is
inadmissible in evidence as his signature therein was procured in the absence
of counsel, such supposed flaw does not overcome the prosecution’s case. No useful purpose can be served by
appellant’s invoking such constitutional
guarantee since it has been rendered unnecessary and inconsequential by
the overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt. Where there is independent evidence,
apart from the accused’s
uncounselled confession, that the accused is truly guilty, he accordingly
faces a conviction.”

All told, we see no reason to reverse the decision of the trial
court. Compared to the baseless
disclaimers of accused-appellant, the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses is far more worthy of belief coming as it does from law
enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of convincing proof to the contrary.

WHEREFORE, the
judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr.,* J.,
(Chairman), on leave.

* On official leave.